State v. Galbreath

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: September 3, 2024
• Docket: 24-48
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA 24-48

Filed 3 September 2024

Wake County, Nos. 19 CRS 217618–20

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

CHRISTOPHER GALBREATH, Defendant.

Appeal by Defendant from Judgments entered 1 September 2022 by Judge

Thomas H. Lock in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12

June 2024.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Ellen Newby, for the State.

Christopher J. Heaney for Defendant-Appellant

HAMPSON, Judge.

Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant appeals from his convictions for two counts of Statutory Rape of a

Child by an Adult, three counts of Statutory Sex Offense with a Child by an Adult,

and two counts of Indecent Liberties with a Child. The record reflects the following:

In 2007 G.M. was born to her mother and Defendant, who were not in a

relationship but worked together and were friends. Until she was in the sixth grade,

G.M. and Defendant primarily interacted on birthdays and holidays. STATE V. GALBREATH

Opinion of the Court

In November 2018, G.M. began living with Defendant. She slept on a pad on a

bedroom floor with him. One night, G.M. woke up with her hand on Defendant’s penis.

She reported this to her grandmother, who lived in the home with Defendant and

G.M., but was told to go back to sleep. After this, Defendant began regularly forcing

G.M. to perform oral sex on him at night. He would also drive her to a location in the

woods where he forced her to perform oral and vaginal sex. He continued raping her

orally, vaginally, and anally in the home, on at least one occasion to the point of

injury, and did not stop after G.M. told him she was hurt. Defendant gave G.M.

alcohol and forced her to take emergency contraception when her menstruation was

late, telling her that if she got pregnant he would go to prison for a long time. He

would also get drunk and tell G.M. that she “deserved to be raped.”

In August 2019, G.M. called the police after Defendant struck her. She was

taken to a hospital and reported the sexual abuse. Defendant was indicted for two

counts of Statutory Rape of a Child by an Adult, three counts of Statutory Sex Offense

with a Child by an Adult, and two counts of Indecent Liberties with a Child. The case

came on for jury trial in August 2022.

At trial, G.M. testified to the above. During the State’s case, one of the bailiffs

reported to the trial court that one of the jurors, Juror Number Four, appeared to

have torn pages out of her notepad and taken them with her when the court recessed

for the day. The district attorney’s legal assistant also reported that one of the State’s

witnesses had overheard Juror Four talking with other jurors about research she had

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done. That witness testified:

I heard someone who had a red jury tag on saying something about development. I thought she said maybe child or psychological development, but I heard the word “development” very clearly. And so I told Ms. Byrum that. And I said it a little more decidedly when I told Ms. Byrum about it, but I know I heard the word “development,” and I thought I heard the word “psychological child development when I heard it, so I mentioned it to Ms. Shekita’s assistant.

She identified Juror Four as having made the comments and did not hear any

additional conversation.

The trial court questioned Juror Four, who denied having any conversation as

described by the witness and claimed that she only tore blank pages out of her

notepad. She testified that she was struggling to keep up with testimony and had

taken the pages to write down notes in the jury room. The trial court reopened voir

dire, and both the State and counsel for the defense challenged Juror Four for cause.

The trial court sustained the challenge and removed Juror Four.

The defense moved for a mistrial based on Juror Number Four’s conduct. The

trial court examined each juror individually.

Jurors One, Three, Six, Seven, and Nine and Alternate Juror Two did not hear

any statements by other jurors about the evidence in the case or issues involved.

Several of the other jurors testified that Juror Four had spoken to them or they

had overheard her speaking. Juror Two heard Juror Four make some statements the

previous day, but did not know what she had said, and said that another juror stopped

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Juror Four from continuing to speak. Juror Five testified that Juror Four attempted

to talk to him, but he couldn’t recall what she had started to say and he stopped her

from finishing. Juror Eight testified that Juror Four attempted to make a statement

on the first day of the trial but that another juror told her to stop talking: “She started

to say something about little girl, and the other girl told her to stop talking, and that

was -- that was it.” Juror Ten testified that Juror Four had “said something to the

effect of I feel very bad for that girl,” and Juror Ten told her they were not allowed to

talk about the case. Juror Eleven also heard Juror Four speak about G.M.’s testimony

and how she felt after hearing it. Juror Twelve also heard Juror Four “remarking

about her personal feelings about the information she had heard in the courtroom,”

describing G.M.’s testimony as “awful.” Alternate Juror One testified that he only

heard one other juror say that it was difficult to hear the evidence and testimony

presented.

No juror stated that Juror Four had spoken about child development or

conducting outside research. Each juror, when asked, responded that they could

continue to serve as a fair and impartial juror.

After the trial court had examined the jurors, Defendant renewed his motion

for a mistrial. The trial court found that no juror had heard any comments from Juror

Four regarding child development or outside research she had conducted. It found

that some had heard her comment on the difficult nature of G.M.’s testimony, but

that each juror who had heard her remarks reported that she was quickly cut off. It

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also found that the jurors were not impacted by Juror Four’s conduct and could serve

as fair and impartial jurors and denied the motion for a mistrial.

The trial court seated the first alternate in place of Juror Number Four, and

instructed the jury not to have any conversations about the case until deliberations

began and not to consider outside resources or conduct outside research.

The trial continued and the jury found Defendant guilty of all charges. The

trial court sentenced Defendant to three consecutive sentences of 300 to 420 months’

imprisonment, and a concurrent sentence of 21 to 35 months. Defendant gave oral

notice of appeal.

Issue

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s

motion for a mistrial based on juror misconduct.

Analysis

We review the trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of

discretion. State v. Burgess, 271 N.C. App. 302, 305, 843 S.E.2d 706, 710 (2020). A

trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is “manifestly unsupported by reason

or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State

v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988).

Due process guarantees defendants a panel of impartial jurors, and the trial

court has a duty to ensure the jurors “remain impartial and uninfluenced by outside

persons.” State v. Rutherford, 70 N.C. App. 674, 677, 320 S.E.2d 916, 919 (1985).

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When allegations of juror misconduct are made, the trial court must make “such

investigations as may be appropriate” to determine if misconduct has occurred and if

the defendant has been prejudiced. State v. Drake, 31 N.C. App. 187, 191, 229 S.E.2d

51, 54 (1976). “The determination of the existence and effect of jury misconduct is

primarily for the trial court whose decision will be given great weight on appeal.”

State v. Bonney, 329 N.C. 61, 83, 405 S.E.2d 145, 158 (1991). The trial court’s ruling

is given deference because questions of juror misconduct and its effect depend on facts

and circumstances specific to the case. Drake at 190, 229 S.E.2d at 54.

When investigating possible juror misconduct, the trial court is vested with the

“discretion to determine the procedure and scope of the inquiry.” State v. Burke, 343

N.C. 129, 149, 469 S.E.2d 901, 910 (1996). Because the trial court is in the best

position to examine the facts and circumstances, we give great weight to its

determination of whether juror misconduct occurred and whether to declare a

mistrial. State v. Boyd, 207 N.C. App. 632, 640, 701 S.E.2d 255, 260 (2010). “[A]

mistrial is a drastic remedy, warranted only for such serious improprieties as would

make it impossible to attain a fair and impartial verdict.” State v. Jones, 241 N.C.

App. 132, 138, 772 S.E.2d 470, 475 (2015).

In sum, where the trial court has made a “careful, thorough” investigation and

concluded the conduct has not prejudiced the jury on any key issue, we have generally

declined to find it abused its discretion. Drake, 31 N.C. App. at 191, 229 S.E. 2d at

53.

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In this case, the trial court was informed Juror Four may have conducted

outside research and shared that information with other jurors, based on the

prosecutor’s legal assistant’s testimony that she overheard Juror Four say the word

“development” and possibly “psychological child development.” The trial court

examined Juror Four and excused her. It then questioned each remaining juror and

alternate individually. None of the jurors testified that they had heard Juror Four

speak about outside research she had done or child development. Of the jurors who

heard Juror Four speak, several could not specify what she had said, or testified that

she was stopped from speaking before communicating any information. Three jurors

heard her remark on her sympathy for G.M., and one heard her say the testimony

was “hard to hear.” During the examinations, the trial court allowed counsel for the

State and Defendant to ask the jurors additional questions. Each juror stated they

could remain fair and impartial. The trial court allowed the trial to continue,

instructing the jurors not to have any conversation about the case until deliberations

began and not to consider outside information or do their own research.

The trial court’s investigation was appropriate and sufficient. In State v.

Taylor, for example, the trial court investigated a report by a juror that their vehicle

was followed by a person from the gallery when court recessed the previous day. 362

N.C. 514, 537, 669 S.E.2d 239, 260. Our Supreme Court held that the trial court’s

investigation, consisting of examining the affected juror, examining another juror

who had witnessed the alleged incident, and rebuking the audience member, was

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sufficient. As in Taylor, the trial court here “thoroughly question[ed] all parties

involved in or affected by the incident,” it “received assurances . . . of impartiality”

from each juror, and it concluded that Defendant had not been prejudiced. Id. at 538,

669 S.E.2d at 260. We cannot identify, nor does Defendant propose, any way in which

the trial court’s investigation was deficient.

Instead, Defendant argues that the trial court’s ruling was an abuse of

discretion: (1) because its findings of fact were unsupported by the jurors’ testimony;

and (2) because it erred in concluding that Defendant did not suffer prejudice. We

disagree. A trial court does not abuse its discretion when its decision on a motion for

mistrial is based on its findings of fact and those findings are supported by evidence.

State v. Smith, 320 N.C. 404, 418-19, 358 S.E.2d 329, 337 (1987).

Defendant argues the trial court found that “only two or three of the jurors

heard [Juror Four’s] comments,” but that finding was unsupported because five of the

jurors testified to hearing Juror Four comment on the case. He also takes issue with

the finding that the comments were made only “yesterday” (Tuesday), arguing there

was testimony Juror Four had also made comments on Monday, the first day of trial.

However, the trial court actually found:

that two or three of the jurors reported to the Court, upon questioning, that [Juror Four] yesterday in the jury room did made some statement concerning the testimony of the alleged victim in this case and in particular commenting on the – how difficult it may have been for this young lady to testify.

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Of the jurors who testified that Juror Four spoke, most did not recall the substance

of her comments. Only Jurors Ten, Eleven, and Twelve testified they had heard Juror

Four talk about G.M.’s testimony, and each stated the comments had been made on

Tuesday. Alternate Juror One additionally testified to hearing another juror, possibly

Juror Four, state that the testimony was “hard to hear.” To the extent the trial court’s

finding as to the exact number of jurors who overheard Juror Four or the days on

which this occurred were unsupported, these facts do not undermine its conclusions:

that (1) no outside research into child development had been communicated to the

other jurors and (2) each juror could remain impartial after Juror Four had expressed

sympathy for G.M. following her testimony.

Defendant also argues the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that

Defendant was not prejudiced. Defendant contends that, because G.M.’s testimony

was crucial to the case, Juror Four’s expression of sympathy after hearing the

testimony irreparably tainted the jury.

“The trial judge is in a better position to investigate any allegations of

misconduct, question witnesses and observe their demeanor, and make appropriate

findings.” Drake, 31 N.C. App. at 191, 229 S.E.2d at 54. Where the trial court’s

investigation was sufficient, we rarely disturb trial court rulings on juror misconduct.

The testimony of the jurors showed that their exposure to outside information

was minimal, if any, and each testified that they could remain impartial. The extent

of the jury’s exposure to outside information was Juror Four’s expression of sympathy

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for G.M. after hearing her testimony. There is “no evidence tending to show the jurors

were incapable of impartiality or were in fact partial in rendering their verdict.”

Taylor, 362 N.C. at 538, 669 S.E.2d at 260. The trial court did not abuse its discretion

in ruling Defendant had not been prejudiced.

Thus, the trial court properly discharged its duty to investigate possible juror

misconduct. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that

Defendant had not been prejudiced by any alleged juror misconduct. Consequently,

the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for mistrial

Conclusion

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, there was no error at trial and the

Judgments are affirmed.

NO ERROR.

Judges MURPHY and WOOD concur.

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