State v. Gaines

2025 Ohio 5132

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 13, 2025
• Docket: 114223 & 115225
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Gaines, 2025-Ohio-5132.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : Nos. 114223 and 115225 v. :

HAROON GAINES, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 13, 2025

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case Nos. CR-21-658791-A and CR-22-667768-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Omar Siddiq, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Wegman Hessler Valore and Matthew O. Williams, for appellant.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:

In this consolidated appeal, Haroon Gaines appeals the trial court’s

judgments in CR-21-658791-A (“Case 1”) and CR-22-667768-A (“Case 2”), asserting that both pleas violated Crim.R. 11 and that Case 2’s sentence, which was made

pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law, was unconstitutional. We affirm.

Case 1 was indicted on May 3, 2021, and charged Gaines with

domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), specifying furthermore that the

offender knew the victim was pregnant at the time of the violation; trafficking drugs

in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) that included forfeiture of two cell phones, a scale,

and $551 in currency; drug possession in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) with the same

forfeiture specifications; and possessing criminal tools in violation of

R.C. 2923.24(A) with the same forfeiture specifications.

In Case 1, Gaines accepted a plea deal and pleaded guilty to drug

possession including all three forfeiture specifications and possessing criminal tools

with all forfeiture specifications. The remaining charges were nolled, and Gaines

was sentenced to 24 months in prison. The journal entry indicated that Gaines

would be held in jail until Case 2 was resolved.

Case 2 was indicted on February 18, 2022, and charged Gaines with

two counts of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) and one count of assault in

violation of R.C. 2903.13(A).

In Case 2, Gaines accepted a plea deal and pleaded guilty to one

amended count of felonious assault. The remaining charges were nolled, and Gaines

was sentenced pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law to four to six years, served

concurrently to the sentence imposed in a Summit County case that Gaines was

presently serving. We summarily overrule Gaines’s second assignment of error, which

contests the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law. As Gaines acknowledges,

this court is bound by the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Hacker, 2023-

Ohio-2535, holding that the Regan Tokes Law is constitutional. Gaines has not

raised any novel issues concerning the Reagan Tokes Law’s constitutionality that

have not been addressed in Hacker.

In the first assignment of error, Gaines argues that both pleas were

made unknowingly, unintelligently, and involuntarily.

In both Case 1 and Case 2, Gaines challenges the trial court’s

statement relating to postrelease control. In Case 1, the trial court stated: “[I]f you

violate the conditions of post-release control, the [p]arole [b]oard must impose an

additional prison term for up to one-half of any time I impose.” (Tr. 10.) In Case 2,

the trial court stated: “If you violate the conditions of post-release control, the parole

board must impose an additional prison term for up to one-half of any term I might

impose.” (Tr. 13.) After both advisements, Gaines indicated that he understood.

Gaines argues that the trial court (1) misstated the law by stating that

the board must impose prison for violating postrelease control, (2) incorrectly

implied in its advisements that the court is going to sentence Gains for postrelease-

control violations, and (3) incorrectly stated that the board is also going to impose a

sentence that is one-half of the trial court’s sentence.

Since plea deals usually involve waiving constitutional rights, the

decision to enter the plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 10. Crim.R. 11 “outlines the procedures that trial courts

are to follow when accepting pleas.” Id. at ¶ 11. In enforcing Crim.R. 11 challenges,

“our focus in reviewing pleas has not been on whether the trial judge has ‘[incanted]

the precise verbiage of the rule,’ but whether the dialogue between the court and the

defendant demonstrates that the defendant understood the consequences of his

plea.” Id. at ¶ 12, quoting State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 92 (1977). Thus, when

analyzing a plea, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the relevant facts are “(1) has

the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has

not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a

defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing

of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden?” Id. at ¶ 17. Where, as

here, the challenges to the court’s colloquy are nonconstitutional aspects of the plea,

a defendant must show prejudice to invalidate a plea. State v. Veney, 2008-Ohio-

5200, ¶ 17.

We find that Gaines has not satisfied his burden pursuant to the third

factor in Dangler. Since nonconstitutional issues were raised by Gaines, he was

required to show that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s misstatements. The

prejudice he argues is that the trial court “offered a brief, difficult to understand, and

possibly incorrect advisal on post-release control[.]” In reviewing both transcripts

in their entirety, we cannot agree that Gaines’s alleged prejudice is such that would

justify invalidating his plea, nor do the transcripts indicate that Gaines did not understand the consequences of his plea. Accordingly, we overrule Gaines’s second

assignment of error.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s

convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Cases

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR