State v. Gaffney

77 P.2d 398, 106 Mont. 310, 1938 Mont. LEXIS 22
CourtMontana Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 10, 1938
DocketNo. 7,761.
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 77 P.2d 398 (State v. Gaffney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Gaffney, 77 P.2d 398, 106 Mont. 310, 1938 Mont. LEXIS 22 (Mo. 1938).

Opinion

MR. JUSTICE STEWART

delivered the opinion of the court.

Leslie L. Gaffney was convicted of an attempt to commit arson in Prairie county and sentenced to the state prison. The appeal is from the judgment and is predicated upon four assignments of error, which raise the following questions: (1) Did the court err in requiring defendant to go to trial upon the amended information? (2) Does the evidence in the record contain independent facts and circumstances sufficient to corroborate the testimony of Harold A. Sayer, confessed accomplice in the attempted arson ?

The information as amended charged as follows: “The said Leslie L. Gaffney on the 18th day of October, 1936, * * * did, in the night-time of said day, unlawfully, feloniously, wilfully and maliciously attempt to burn a certain inhabited frame building, * '* * in which said building there were at said times human beings, * * ® with intent by the said defendant then and there to set fire to, burn and destroy said building, by placing several receptacles containing kerosene, gasoline, and other inflammatory materials and scattering the same on *312 the bed and about the rooms of the second floor of said building. ® * * ”

The italicized portions indicate the amendment which was made by interlineation at the time of trial. Notice of the proposed amendment was served on defendant and his counsel ten days prior to day of trial. The court took the position that the amendment was one of substance requiring rearraignment. On rearraignment defendant again pleaded not guilty, and the trial proceeded over the objection that he was not prepared for trial on the amended information.

Defendant insists that after the information was amended as to a matter of substance, he was entitled to at least two days in which to prepare for trial by virtue of section 11935, Revised Codes, which provides: “After his plea, the defendant is entitled to at least two days to prepare for trial.” The force of defendant’s contention based on this statute loses much of its effect in the face of the reeord showing that he had been given ten days’ notice of the state’s intention to move that the amendment be made. However, there is yet a further reason why the contention is without merit, and that is that we believe the original information was sufficient without the amendment. The amendment added nothing more than could have been obtained by the defendant in a bill of particulars, which any defendant may obtain. (State v. Stevens, 104 Mont. 189, 65 Pac. (2d) 612, and cases therein cited.)

Technically speaking, defendant, having been required to plead again, ordinarily should have been allowed the statutory minimum of two days in which to prepare for trial (section 11935, supra), but here the amendment was not necessary, nor was the rearraignment, which facts made the defendant’s position different from that of a defendant entering his plea for the first time. In any event, the defendant’s rights were in no way prejudiced by the amendment after the ten days’ notice which he had been given. If he could not prepare a defense in ten days, it was unlikely that he could have done so in the two additional days. What was said in State v. Stevens, supra, on the question of sufficiency of the information is applicable *313 here. See, also, State v. Shannon, 95 Mont. 280, 26 Pac. (2d) 360, for related matter and the modern trend in criminal procedure.

We are not impressed with the contention that defendant was prejudiced by the endorsement of the additional names on the information the morning of the trial. Ten days’ notice of three of these names had been given. Of the remaining seven, only four testified. Section 11805, Revised Codes, provides: “The county attorney must endorse upon the information at the time of filing the same, the names of the witnesses for the state, if known.” The record shows affirmatively that the county attorney conformed to the command of the statute, both in letter and spirit. There is no showing that he knew at the time of filing the information that any of the additional seven would be material witnesses. (See State v. McDonald, 51 Mont. 1, 6, 149 Pac. 279; State v. Akers, ante, p. 43, 74 Pac. (2d) 1138, 1143.)

The determinative question is as to the existence of eorroborative evidence sufficient to sustain the judgment. We enter upon a consideration of the evidence guided by the controlling statute, section 11988, Revised Codes, and with the settled constructions of its meaning in mind, as set forth in State v. Bolton, 65 Mont. 74, 212 Pac. 504, and State v. Jones, 95 Mont. 317, 26 Pac. (2d) 341, and recently reviewed and approved in State v. Alters, supra. The statute provides as follows: “A conviction cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other evidence, which in itself, and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient, if it merely shows the commission of the offense, or the circumstances thereof.”

In order that the discussion of the evidence may be more easily understood, a few facts should be mentioned in addition to those set out in the information. The building described was, at the time of the attempted arson, an asset of the estate of defendant’s deceased mother. Defendant was administrator of *314 the estate and sole heir thereto. The building was insured for the sum of $3,000.

The testimony of Harold A. Sayer, confessed accomplice, a witness called by the state, was substantially as follows: He testified that he had known defendant for sis or seven years but not intimately; that he had never had any business dealings with him; that he himself was living in Red Lodge at the time of the attempted arson and had been residing there for two years; that prior to that time he lived in Billings, where he was acquainted with defendant; that he was not personally familiar with the Gaffney building in Terry, the object of the attempted arson, prior to his visit to it the night he made the attempt to burn it, but that he had been in Terry before and “knew his way around.”

He said that defendant had conversed with him about the building at Red Lodge in July, 1936, and at that time told him, “He had this old rattle-trap building about ready to fall down and which he would like to get rid of because it wasn’t paying him anything.” Sayer said he was interested and agreed to burn it down for 10 per cent, of the entire proceeds of the insurance. He said these negotiations occurred at the first meeting between the parties in Red Lodge in July, 1936; that in September of that year defendant called at his home and took him for a short ride and told him “any time I wanted to come down to Terry it would be al] right, and that the place was all ready to bum.” He said that defendant then drew a map for his guidance.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
77 P.2d 398, 106 Mont. 310, 1938 Mont. LEXIS 22, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-gaffney-mont-1938.