[Cite as State v. Gadison, 2026-Ohio-472.]
COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO Case No. 2025 CA 00060 & 2025 CA 00061
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Municipal Court, Case Nos. 2025 CRB 0125, 2025 TRD 0160 PERCY GADISON Judgment: Affirmed Defendant – Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: February 12, 2026
BEFORE: Andrew J. King; William B. Hoffman; Kevin W. Popham, Appellate Judges
APPEARANCES: JASON P. REESE, KATIE M. ERCHICK GILBERT, MAGDALANA WALLACE, for Plaintiff-Appellee; GEORGE URBAN, for Defendant-Appellant.
King, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Percy Gadison appeals the May 9, 2025 judgment of
the Canton Municipal Court which denied his motion to suppress. Plaintiff-Appellee is the
State of Ohio. We affirm the trial court.
{¶ 2} In early January, 2025, Canton Police Detective Michael Brown was made
aware of 411 tip-line complaint regarding Gadison selling drugs in a local Circle K parking
lot. Detective Brown works as part of the Canton Police Department's community
response team (CRT) and familiarized himself with Gadison in response to the tip. Brown
reviewed Gadison's LEADS report, his CJIS record, and his available social media. These
sources provided several photos of Gadison, some when Gadison had short hair and some when he had dreadlocks. The information additionally provided Brown with
information indicting Gadison's operator's license was suspended until at least 2028.
{¶ 3} On January 11, 2025, Brown was patrolling the area near the Circle K and
observed Gadison standing beside a Chrysler 300. Later, at 8:24 p.m., while Brown was
sitting stationary in his cruiser at the intersection of 14th St. NE and Gibbs Street NE, he
observed Gadison operating the Chrysler through the intersection. Brown therefore
conducted a traffic stop and cited Gadison for driving under suspension as well as failure
to comply with the order or signal of a police officer.
{¶ 4} Gadison pled not guilty and filed a motion to suppress the stop. On May 9,
2025, a hearing was held on the motion. The State presented the testimony of Detective
Brown. Gadison rested without presenting evidence. The same day, via judgment entry,
the trial court overruled Gadison's motion to suppress.
{¶ 5} On May 21, 2025, Gadison filed a motion to reconsider which the trial court
denied the same day.
{¶ 6} Gadison subsequently entered pleas of no contest.
{¶ 7} Gadison timely filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for
consideration. He raises two assignments of error as follows:
I
{¶ 8} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT BASED
ITS DECISION ON A MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE RECORD." II
{¶ 9} "THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY CREDITING
DETECTIVE BROWN'S TESTIMONY WHICH WAS INHERENTLY UNRELIABLE AS A
MATTER OF LAW AND CONTRARY TO WELL-SETTLED SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES."
Initial Matters
{¶ 10} As Gadison's reply brief notes, State's brief is non-responsive to the any of
the issues raised in Gadison's initial brief. We therefore address only those matters raised
by Gadison in his initial brief.
{¶ 11} In his first assignment of error, Gadison argues the trial court's decision
denying his motion to suppress was based on a misunderstanding of the record. We
disagree.
{¶ 12} As stated by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Leak, 2016-Ohio-154, ¶
12:
"Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question
of law and fact." State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-
5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. In ruling on a motion to suppress, "the trial
court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best
position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of
witnesses." Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582
N.E.2d 972 (1992). On appeal, we "must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible
evidence." Id., citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437
N.E.2d 583 (1982). Accepting those facts as true, we must then
"independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to
the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the
applicable legal standard." Id.
{¶ 13} As the United States Supreme Court held in Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690,
(1996), "…as a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable
cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal."
Gadison's Argument
{¶ 14} Gadison's argument hinges on his interpretation of one paragraph of the
trial court's judgment entry, specifically:
On the date of the stop, Detective Brown testified that he saw the
Defendant standing next to a vehicle in a Circle K parking lot. He was
in uniform and in a marked cruiser. Detective Brown then testified he
saw the Defendant driving the vehicle. Based on Detective Brown's
knowledge of the defendant not having a valid license, he initiated
the stop.
{¶ 15} Judgment Entry, May 9, 2025 at page 2. {¶ 16} According to Gadison, these facts are not supported by the record because
"Detective Brown never testified that he saw the Appellant driving the automobile at the
gas station." Brief of appellant at 4. But nothing in the cited paragraph states Brown saw
Gadison driving at the gas station.
{¶ 17} Moreover, Brown's testimony was clear; he saw Gadison twice on the
evening in question. The first time, he merely observed Gadison standing beside his
vehicle at the gas station. The second time was a short time later when Brown actually
observed Gadison driving the same vehicle at a different location. Transcript of
suppression hearing (T.) 16, 20-21. We therefore reject Gadison's argument that the trial
court's decision rested on an inaccurate statement of the evidence.
{¶ 18} The first assignment of error is overruled.
II
{¶ 19} In his final assignment of error, while not labeled as such, Gadison makes
a manifest weight argument. He alleges the trial court's ruling was erroneous because
the testimony of Detective Brown was not credible. We disagree.
Standard of Review
{¶ 20} When an appellant raises a manifest-weight argument, this court must
review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider
witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier
of fact clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997).
Gadison's Argument {¶ 21} Gadison argues Brown's testimony was inherently unreliable because it was
after sunset when Brown spotted Gadison driving his car. First, in a footnote Gadison
takes issue with the trial court's "material" finding that the traffic stop took place at 8:24
p.m. because "nothing in the record indicates this is true." Brief of Appellant at 8. We note
however, that the traffic citation contained in the record indicates the stop took place at
20:24 military time, which is 8:24 standard time. We further note the detail is immaterial
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[Cite as State v. Gadison, 2026-Ohio-472.]
COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO Case No. 2025 CA 00060 & 2025 CA 00061
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Municipal Court, Case Nos. 2025 CRB 0125, 2025 TRD 0160 PERCY GADISON Judgment: Affirmed Defendant – Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: February 12, 2026
BEFORE: Andrew J. King; William B. Hoffman; Kevin W. Popham, Appellate Judges
APPEARANCES: JASON P. REESE, KATIE M. ERCHICK GILBERT, MAGDALANA WALLACE, for Plaintiff-Appellee; GEORGE URBAN, for Defendant-Appellant.
King, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Percy Gadison appeals the May 9, 2025 judgment of
the Canton Municipal Court which denied his motion to suppress. Plaintiff-Appellee is the
State of Ohio. We affirm the trial court.
{¶ 2} In early January, 2025, Canton Police Detective Michael Brown was made
aware of 411 tip-line complaint regarding Gadison selling drugs in a local Circle K parking
lot. Detective Brown works as part of the Canton Police Department's community
response team (CRT) and familiarized himself with Gadison in response to the tip. Brown
reviewed Gadison's LEADS report, his CJIS record, and his available social media. These
sources provided several photos of Gadison, some when Gadison had short hair and some when he had dreadlocks. The information additionally provided Brown with
information indicting Gadison's operator's license was suspended until at least 2028.
{¶ 3} On January 11, 2025, Brown was patrolling the area near the Circle K and
observed Gadison standing beside a Chrysler 300. Later, at 8:24 p.m., while Brown was
sitting stationary in his cruiser at the intersection of 14th St. NE and Gibbs Street NE, he
observed Gadison operating the Chrysler through the intersection. Brown therefore
conducted a traffic stop and cited Gadison for driving under suspension as well as failure
to comply with the order or signal of a police officer.
{¶ 4} Gadison pled not guilty and filed a motion to suppress the stop. On May 9,
2025, a hearing was held on the motion. The State presented the testimony of Detective
Brown. Gadison rested without presenting evidence. The same day, via judgment entry,
the trial court overruled Gadison's motion to suppress.
{¶ 5} On May 21, 2025, Gadison filed a motion to reconsider which the trial court
denied the same day.
{¶ 6} Gadison subsequently entered pleas of no contest.
{¶ 7} Gadison timely filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for
consideration. He raises two assignments of error as follows:
I
{¶ 8} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT BASED
ITS DECISION ON A MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE RECORD." II
{¶ 9} "THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY CREDITING
DETECTIVE BROWN'S TESTIMONY WHICH WAS INHERENTLY UNRELIABLE AS A
MATTER OF LAW AND CONTRARY TO WELL-SETTLED SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES."
Initial Matters
{¶ 10} As Gadison's reply brief notes, State's brief is non-responsive to the any of
the issues raised in Gadison's initial brief. We therefore address only those matters raised
by Gadison in his initial brief.
{¶ 11} In his first assignment of error, Gadison argues the trial court's decision
denying his motion to suppress was based on a misunderstanding of the record. We
disagree.
{¶ 12} As stated by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Leak, 2016-Ohio-154, ¶
12:
"Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question
of law and fact." State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-
5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. In ruling on a motion to suppress, "the trial
court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best
position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of
witnesses." Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582
N.E.2d 972 (1992). On appeal, we "must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible
evidence." Id., citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437
N.E.2d 583 (1982). Accepting those facts as true, we must then
"independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to
the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the
applicable legal standard." Id.
{¶ 13} As the United States Supreme Court held in Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690,
(1996), "…as a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable
cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal."
Gadison's Argument
{¶ 14} Gadison's argument hinges on his interpretation of one paragraph of the
trial court's judgment entry, specifically:
On the date of the stop, Detective Brown testified that he saw the
Defendant standing next to a vehicle in a Circle K parking lot. He was
in uniform and in a marked cruiser. Detective Brown then testified he
saw the Defendant driving the vehicle. Based on Detective Brown's
knowledge of the defendant not having a valid license, he initiated
the stop.
{¶ 15} Judgment Entry, May 9, 2025 at page 2. {¶ 16} According to Gadison, these facts are not supported by the record because
"Detective Brown never testified that he saw the Appellant driving the automobile at the
gas station." Brief of appellant at 4. But nothing in the cited paragraph states Brown saw
Gadison driving at the gas station.
{¶ 17} Moreover, Brown's testimony was clear; he saw Gadison twice on the
evening in question. The first time, he merely observed Gadison standing beside his
vehicle at the gas station. The second time was a short time later when Brown actually
observed Gadison driving the same vehicle at a different location. Transcript of
suppression hearing (T.) 16, 20-21. We therefore reject Gadison's argument that the trial
court's decision rested on an inaccurate statement of the evidence.
{¶ 18} The first assignment of error is overruled.
II
{¶ 19} In his final assignment of error, while not labeled as such, Gadison makes
a manifest weight argument. He alleges the trial court's ruling was erroneous because
the testimony of Detective Brown was not credible. We disagree.
Standard of Review
{¶ 20} When an appellant raises a manifest-weight argument, this court must
review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider
witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier
of fact clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997).
Gadison's Argument {¶ 21} Gadison argues Brown's testimony was inherently unreliable because it was
after sunset when Brown spotted Gadison driving his car. First, in a footnote Gadison
takes issue with the trial court's "material" finding that the traffic stop took place at 8:24
p.m. because "nothing in the record indicates this is true." Brief of Appellant at 8. We note
however, that the traffic citation contained in the record indicates the stop took place at
20:24 military time, which is 8:24 standard time. We further note the detail is immaterial
as the parties did not dispute the stop took place after dark.
{¶ 22} Next Gadison appears to argue that because the stop took place after dark,
it was impossible for Brown to determine who was driving the Chrysler before he initiated
the stop. The record reflects, however, that Brown researched Gadison in response to a
tip-line complaint and viewed photos of him through law enforcement data bases and
social media one week before the stop. T. 7-8.
{¶ 23} On the evening in question, Brown observed Gadison standing beside his
Chrysler in the same parking lot where the tipster indicated Gadison sold drugs. A short
time later, as Brown sat stationary in his cruiser, he observed Gadison driving past him
the same vehicle. Brown testified he was able to view the person behind the wheel despite
the hour as Gadison's vehicle did not have tinted windows. T. 16, 20. Contrary to
Gadison's argument, Detective Brown's testimony is simply not implausible.
{¶ 24} Finally, "[a] police officer may effect a traffic stop of any motorist for any
traffic infraction, even if the officer's true motive is to detect more extensive criminal
conduct." State v. Bennett, 2006-Ohio-4274, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), citing United States v. Mesa,
62 F.3d 159, 162 (6th Cir.1995). Here Detective Brown was aware Gadison did not have a valid operator's license, yet was operating a vehicle. The trial court therefore did not err
in finding the stop valid.
{¶ 25} Having reviewed the entire record, weighed the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, and considered witness credibility, we find the trial court did not lose its way
or create a manifest miscarriage of justice in denying Gadison's motion to suppress.
Accordingly, the final assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 26} For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the
Canton Municipal Court is affirmed.
{¶ 27} Costs to Appellant.
By: King, P.J.
Hoffman, J. and
Popham, J. concur.