[Cite as State v. Funk, 2013-Ohio-444.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
PORTAGE COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : OPINION
Plaintiff-Appellant, : CASE NO. 2012-P-0071 - vs - :
NICOLE R. FUNK, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
Criminal Appeal from the Portage County Municipal Court, Ravenna Division, Case No. R2012 TRC 00890.
Judgment: Reversed and remanded.
Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, and Pamela J. Holder, Assistant Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellant).
Dennis Day Lager, Portage County Public Defender, and John P. Laczko, Assistant Public Defender, 209 South Chestnut Street, #400, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Defendant-Appellee).
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals the judgment of the Portage
County Municipal Court, Ravenna Division, holding the breath test results of the
Intoxilyzer 8000 would not be admissible at trial in a prosecution for driving with a
prohibited breath alcohol concentration (OVI). The issue before this court is whether a
trial court, exercising its evidentiary role as gatekeeper, may pass judgment on the
general reliability of a breath testing instrument where the Ohio director of health has approved such instrument for determining the concentration of alcohol in a person’s
breath. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the court below.
{¶2} On January 22, 2012, the Ohio State Highway Patrol issued defendant-
appellee, Nicole R. Funk, a traffic ticket, charging her with OVI, a misdemeanor of the
first degree in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) (driving under the influence of alcohol)
and (d) (driving with a prohibited breath alcohol concentration), a Speed violation, a
minor misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 4511.21(C), and a Safety Belt violation, a minor
misdemeanor in vioation of R.C. 4513.263.
{¶3} On January 27, 2012, Funk entered a plea of not guilty.
{¶4} On May 15, 2012, Funk filed a Motion to Suppress, seeking “to suppress
any and all evidence in this case, including tests.” Inter alia, it was argued that “the
Blood Alcohol Content test result from the Intoxilyzer 8000 is inadmissible and
scientifically unreliable pursuant to State vs. Johnson (2012) in Portage County
Municipal Court case 2011 TRC 04090.”
{¶5} On June 28, 2012, a suppression hearing was held, at which “the
Assistant Prosecutor and Defense Attorney made oral arguments to the Court regarding
the issue of the scientific reliability and admissibility of the Defendant’s breath test result
from the Intoxilyzer 8000.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the municipal court granted
Funk’s Motion to Suppress with respect to the breath test results, and dimissed the
charge of violating R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d) (driving with a prohibited breath alcohol
concentration). The court stayed proceedings on the remaining charges, pending the
State’s appeal.
{¶6} On July 2, 2012, the State filed its Notice of Appeal.
2 {¶7} On appeal, the State raises the following assignment of error:
{¶8} “[1.] [The] Portage County Municipal Court erred in permitting a general
attack on the scientific reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000 contrary to Ohio statutes and
well-established case law.”
{¶9} The appropriate standard of review where the lower court’s judgment is
challenged on a purported misconstruction of the law is de novo. State v. Morris, 132
Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 16. “In determining a pure
question of law, an appellate court may properly substitute its judgment for that of the
trial court.” (Citation omitted.) Id.
{¶10} As a preliminary matter, Funk argues that the appealed judgment is not a
final order, as it was “limited to an initial evidentiary ruling regarding the admissibility of
the results of the Intoxilyzer 8000,” and did not address the other “suppression issues”
raised. Funk’s argument has been previously rejected by this court.
{¶11} The Ohio Supreme Court has held: “Any motion, however labeled, which,
if granted, restricts the state in the presentation of certain evidence and, thereby,
renders the state’s proof with respect to the pending charge so weak in its entirety that
any reasonable possibility of effective prosecution has been destroyed, is, in effect, a
motion to suppress. The granting of such a motion is a final order and may be appealed
pursuant to R.C. 2945.67 and Crim. R. 12(J) [now (K)].” State v. Davidson, 17 Ohio
St.3d 132, 477 N.E.2d 1141 (1985), syllabus. Accordingly, “[a] pretrial challenge to a
breathalyzer test, if granted, destroys the state’s case under [former] R.C. 4511.19(A)(3)
[prohibited breach alcohol concentration], and the state is permitted to appeal pursuant
3 to R.C. 2945.67 and Crim. R. 12[(K)(2)].” Defiance v. Kretz, 60 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 573
N.E.2d 32 (1991).
{¶12} In the present case, the municipal court’s decision to exlude the breath
test results of the Intoxilyzer 8000 resulted in the dismissal of the charge of driving with
a prohibited breath alcohol concentration, R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d). Accordingly, it is a
final order. See State v. Miller, 11th Dist. No. 2012-P-0032, 2012-Ohio-5585, ¶ 13-20.
{¶13} The State argues that, purusant to Sections 3701.143 and
4511.19(D)(1)(b) of the Ohio Revised Code, and Ohio Administrative Code 3701-53-
02(A)(3), a trial court is required to accept the Intoxilyzer 8000 as an appropriate device
for chemically analyzing a person’s breath to ascertain the amount of alcohol in the
breath. As we have held in prior decisions, we agree. State v. Rouse, 11th Dist. No.
2012-P-0030, 2012-Ohio-5584; Miller.
{¶14} “In any criminal prosecution * * * for a violation of division (A) or (B) of
[R.C. 4511.19] * * *, the court may admit evidence on the concentration of alcohol * * *
in the defendant’s * * * breath * * * at the time of the alleged violation as shown by
chemical analysis of the substance withdrawn within three hours of the time of the
alleged violation.” R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b). “The bodily substance withdrawn under
division (D)(1)(b) of this section shall be analyzed in accordance with methods approved
by the director of health by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by the director
pursuant to section 3701.143 of the Revised Code.” Id.
{¶15} “For purposes of section[] * * * 4511.19 * * * of the Revised Code, the
director of health shall determine, or cause to be determined, techniques or methods for
4 chemically analyzing a person’s * * * breath * * * in order to ascertain the amount of
alcohol * * * in the person’s * * * breath * * *.” R.C. 3701.143.
{¶16} The Ohio director of health has approved the “Intoxilyzer model 8000 (OH-
5)” as an “evidential breath testing instrument[] for use in determining whether a
person’s breath contains a concentration of alcohol prohibited or defined by section[]
4511.19 * * * of the Revised Code.” Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-02(A)(3).
{¶17} Funk contends that the use of permissive language in the OVI statute, i.e.,
the word “may” in the phrase “the court may admit evidence on the concentration of
alcohol,” recognizes the trial court’s discretion to admit and to exclude evidence.
According to Funk, the court below could, but was not required to, admit the breath test
results of the Intoxilyzer 8000.
{¶18} Consideration of Ohio Supreme Court decisions construing the relevant
statutes compels a different conclusion. In light of these decisions, the trial court’s
discretion to admit or exclude evidence is restricted to determining whether the breath
test was conducted “in accordance with methods approved by the director of health”
and “by an individual possessing a valid permit.” The court’s discretion under R.C.
4511.19(D)(1)(b) does not permit it to exclude test results based on the “scientific
accuracy and reliability” of the breath testing device, as was done in the present case.
{¶19} The lead Ohio Supreme Court case on this issue is State v. Vega, 12 Ohio
St.3d 185, 465 N.E.2d 1303 (1984), in which the court addressed the issue of whether
the general reliability of intoxilyzers could be challenged “in view of the fact that the
General Assembly has legislatively provided for the admission of such tests in R.C.
5 4511.19 if analyzed in accordance with methods approved by the Director of Health.”
Id. at 186.1
{¶20} In Vega, the Ohio Supreme Court made clear that “an accused may not
make a general attack upon the reliability and validity of the breath testing instrument.”
Id. at 190. The court explained that, by enacting R.C. 4511.19, the General Assembly
“ha[s] legislatively resolved the questions of the reliability and relevancy of intoxilyzer
tests.” Id. at 188. “[The judiciary must recognize] the necessary legislative
determination that breath tests, properly conducted, are reliable irrespective that not all
experts wholly agree and that the common law foundational evidence has, for
admissibility, been replaced by statute and rule; and that the legislative delegation was
to the Director of Health, not the court, the discretionary authority for adoption of
appropriate tests and procedures, including breath test devices.” Id. at 188-189, citing
State v. Brockway, 2 Ohio App.3d 227, 232, 441 N.E.2d 602 (4th Dist.1981).
{¶21} In subsequent decisions, the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in
Vega. The court has emphasized that, when regulations are promulgated pursuant to
R.C. 4511.19 and 3107.143, “it must be presumed that the Director of Health acted
upon adequate investigation,” and that the courts “must defer to the department’s
authority and * * * not substitute our judgment for that of the Director of Health.” State v.
Yoder, 66 Ohio St.3d 515, 518, 613 N.E.2d 626 (1993).
{¶22} Funk maintains that trial courts must retain the discretion to refuse to
admit such test results to “counter balance * * * the Department of Health’s unfettered
1. In Vega, the defendant sought to challenge the intoxilyzer’s reliability through expert testimony presented at trial, whereas, in the present case the defendant seeks to exclude the intoxilyzer’s test result by placing the burden on the State to prove reliability. The differing procedural posture of Vega is not material to the relevance of its holding for the present case.
6 discretion in choosing instruments and promulgating rules for chemical tests.” Under
Vega, however, defendants are expressly allowed to demonstrate that “there was
something wrong with the test and the results were erroneous.” Id. at 189.
{¶23} When duly challenged, the State must demonstrate that the bodily
substance was “analyzed in accordance with methods approved by the director of
health” and “by an individual possessing a valid permit.” R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b). Vega
recognized that “[t]here is no question that the accused may * * * attack the reliability of
the specific testing procedure and the qualifications of the operator,” as well as present
“expert testimony as to testing procedures at trial going to weight rather than
admissibility.” Id. at 189. Thus, “[t]he defendant may still challenge the accuracy of his
specific test results, although he may not challenge the general accuracy of the
legislatively determined test procedure as a valid scientific means of determining blood
alcohol levels.” State v. Tanner, 15 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 472 N.E.2d 689 (1984); Columbus
v. Aleshire, 187 Ohio App.3d 660, 2010-Ohio-2773, 933 N.E.2d 317, ¶ 27 (10th Dist.)
(“while [supreme court precedent] permits evidentiary objections to the test results
challenging issues such as competency, admissibility, relevancy, authenticity, and
credibility, it does not indicate that a challenge to the ‘general reliability’ is among the
permissible challenges”).
{¶24} Accordingly, the application of Vega does not sacrifice a defendant’s due
process rights, as Funk claims. Rather, a trial court retains its authority and
responsibility to regulate the admission of test results. Where the State fails to
demonstrate that it followed the procedures set forth by the director of health and/or that
the operator was properly qualified, test results may be suppressed. A defendant may
7 also challenge the accuracy of his specific test results at trial and with evidence going to
the weight accorded the test results.
{¶25} Moreover, to interpret R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b) and Vega as urged by Funk
would frustrate the purpose of delegating the authority for approving methods of
analyzing alcohol concentration in a person’s bodily substance. If the general reliability
of a particular instrument or method could be challenged despite its approval by the
director of health, then all methods currently employed by law enforcement are
vulnerable. Stated otherwise, if the results produced by the Intoxilyzer 8000 may be
challenged, with the State bearing the burden of proving reliability through expert
testimony, then so could the results obtained from the Intoxilyzer 5000 and the various
BAC DataMasters currently approved for use. In like manner, defendants could
challenge previously approved techniques and methods such as gas chromatography
and enzyme assays. Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-03(A). Equally vulnerable to challenge
would be the methods used for determining concentrations of controlled substances.
Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-03(B). Finally, law enforcement would be put in the untenable
position of speculating what techniques or instruments might be acceptable to the
courts, with the only recourse being trial and error and appeal throughout Ohio’s more
than 88 county and municipal jurisdictions.
{¶26} When Funk’s arguments have been raised in these other contexts, they
have similarly been rejected. See State v. Klintworth, 4th Dist. No. 10CA40, 2011-Ohio-
3553, ¶ 12 (“this court will not allow the defendant to us[e] expert testimony to attack the
general reliability or general accuracy of a legislatively determined test procedure - urine
testing - as a valid scientific means of determining blood alcohol levels”) (citation
8 omitted); State v. Massie, 2nd Dist. No. 2007 CA 24, 2008-Ohio-1312, ¶ 36 (“Massie’s
Daubert challenge [to the BAC DataMaster test results] * * * is forestalled by the
‘legislative mandate recognized in Vega,’ and the trial court properly limited Massie to
the issue of his own test”).
{¶27} Alternatively, it is argued that the delegation of authority to the director of
health to approve testing methods and devices violates the separation of powers
doctrine and infringes upon the trial court’s regulation of the admission of expert
testimony under Evidence Rule 702.
{¶28} “The supreme court shall prescribe rules governing practice and
procedure in all courts of the state * * *. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no
further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.” Ohio Constitution, Article IV,
Section 5(B). Thus, “the Ohio Rules of Evidence, which were promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, must
control over subsequently enacted inconsistent statutes purporting to govern evidentiary
matters.” State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 451,
491, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999). “In order to demonstrate the legislature infringed upon
the judiciary’s power to enact evidentiary rules appellant must demonstrate the
legislation contradicts or is an attempt to supersede an existing evidentiary rule.” State
v. Boczar, 11th Dist. No. 2004-A-0063, 2005-Ohio-6910, ¶ 38. “When a statute does
not conflict with a Rule of Evidence, a statute can control the admissibility of evidence.”
State v. Cross, 11th Dist. No. 2004-L-208, 2006-Ohio-1679, ¶ 21.
{¶29} The delegation of authority to the director of health to establish the
appropriate methods for determining the amount of alcohol in a defendant’s bodily
9 substances does not conflict with any Rule of Evidence. Funk refers to Evidence Rules
104(A) and 702; but nothing in these Rules establishes the trial court as the sole
“gatekeeper” with respect to the general reliability of instruments measuring the
concentration of alcohol in a person’s bodily substances. On the contrary, Evidence
Rule 102 states that “[t]hese rules shall not supersede substantive statutory provisions.”
The Staff Notes elaborate further by stating, “[t]he Rules of Evidence * * * are not an
exhaustive compilation of the rules governing evidence questions, nor are the rules
preemptive as to subjects that they do not address.”
{¶30} The Ohio Supreme Court, in State v. Mayl, 106 Ohio St.3d 207, 2005-
Ohio-4629, 833 N.E.2d 1216, expressly characterized R.C. 4511.19(D)(1) as a “three-
paragraph gate-keeping statute.” Id. at ¶ 20. Where R.C. 4511.19(D)(1) is satisfied, it
does “no[t] matter under which portion of R.C. 4511.19(A) a person is charged, the state
has the opportunity to offer the results of a ‘bodily substance’ test to show either
impairment * * * or to show that the statutory concentrations of alcohol or drugs have
been exceeded.” Id. at ¶ 19.
{¶31} It has also been observed that “the legislature has created standards for
the admissibility of evidence in many instances.” State v. Phipps, 3rd Dist. No. 2-03-39,
2004-Ohio-4400, ¶ 12.2
{¶32} In a similar situation, the Ohio Supreme Court considered whether the
General Assembly’s authority statutorily provided for the admissibility of the results of
2. As examples, the Third District Court of Appeals noted: R.C. 2907.02(D) (limiting the admissibility of evidence regarding a victim’s sexual activity in prosecutions for Rape); R.C. 4513.263(F) (limiting the permissible uses of evidence regarding the use of occupant restraining devices); R.C. 2925.51(A) (providing that laboratory reports constitute “prima-facie evidence of the content, identity, and weight” of controlled substances); and R.C. 2317.47 (providing for blood-grouping tests to determine identity or paternity).
10 field sobriety tests based on substantial compliance, rather than the strict compliance
standard, based on common law, adopted by Ohio courts. The Supreme Court found
no encroachment “on the exclusive rule-making authority of the judiciary.” State v.
Boczar, 113 Ohio St.3d 148, 2007-Ohio-1251, 863 N.E.2d 155, ¶ 22. While
acknowledging that “[t]he trial judge is the guardian of the admissibility of evidence,” the
General Assembly, “through its deliberative process,” could conclude “that failure to
strictly comply with test procedures affects the evidentiary value of field sobriety tests
but that substantial compliance will not result in the tests’ exclusion,” i.e., “that the tests
are sufficiently reliable to be admissible by meeting a clear-and-convincing standard.”
Id. at ¶ 23.
{¶33} Concerns about the reliability of the results in the absence of strict
compliance could be addressed by the defense on cross-examination. Id.
{¶34} Likewise in the present case, R.C. 3701.143 and R.C. 4511.19(D)(1) do
not preempt the trial court’s authority to rule on the admissibility of evidence, but rather
delegate the preliminary determination regarding the scientific reliability of testing
devices to the director of health. That determination is not conclusive as to the ultimate
admissibility of the test results. As noted above, the State must demonstrate that the
bodily substance was “analyzed in accordance with methods approved by the director of
health.” R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b). The defendant may always challenge the accuracy of
his or her specific test results and the qualifications of the person administering the test
and otherwise strive to discredit the weight to be given the specific test results. Vega,
12 Ohio St.3d at 189, 465 N.E.2d 1303; Tanner, 15 Ohio St.3d at 6, 472 N.E.2d 689.
11 {¶35} Finally, we reject Funk’s argument that the municipal court cannot take
judicial notice of the Intoxilyzer 8000’s reliability. Ohio Civil Rule 44.1(A)(1) states that,
“[j]udicial notice shall be taken of the rules of the supreme court of this state and of the
decisional, constitutional, and public statutory law of this state.” Administrative rules
“enacted pursuant to a specific grant of legislative authority” have the “force and effect
of law.” Doyle v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 51 Ohio St.3d 46, 554 N.E.2d 97 (1990),
paragraph one of the syllabus. Accordingly, the Ohio director of health’s determination
that the Intoxilyzer 8000 is an appropriate breath testing device is properly recognized
as part of the statutory law of this State.
{¶36} The State’s sole assignment of error is with merit.
{¶37} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Portage County Municipal
Court, Ravenna Division, granting Funk’s Motion to Suppress Evidence, is reversed,
and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs
to be taxed against appellee.
MARY JANE TRAPP, J., concurs,
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.
______________________
{¶38} R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b) does not mandate admissibility of breath test
results derived from the Intoxilyzer 8000. Rather, that statute which, by its plain
12 language controls the issue in this case, vests the trial court with discretion regarding
admissibility despite approval from the director. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
{¶39} R.C. 3701.143 empowers the director to approve breath testing devices,
and R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b) grants trial courts the discretion to admit the results from
approved devices without further proof of reliability when circumstances warrant.
Although some claim the contrary, nobody is correct all the time. In recognizing human
fallibility, the legislature had the wisdom to vest within the trial court the discretion per
R.C.4511.19(D)(1)(b) to conduct further inquiry when there is an issue as to the
reliability of an approved breath testing device before admitting the results.
{¶40} R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b) states that “[i]n any criminal prosecution or juvenile
court proceeding for a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section or for an equivalent
offense that is vehicle-related, the court may admit evidence on the concentration of
alcohol, drugs of abuse, controlled substances, metabolites of a controlled substance,
or a combination of them in the defendant’s whole blood, blood serum or plasma,
breath, urine, or other bodily substance at the time of the alleged violation as shown by
chemical analysis of the substance withdrawn within three hours of the time of the
alleged violation[,]” and “[t]he bodily substance withdrawn under division (D)(1)(b) of this
section shall be analyzed in accordance with methods approved by the director of
health by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by the director pursuant to
section 3701.143 of the Revised Code.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶41} The statute does not use the word “shall,” which would mandate
admission regardless of the circumstances. Rather, the statute uses the word “may.”
For purposes of statutory construction, “use of the word ‘may’ is generally construed to
13 make the provision in which it is contained optional, permissive, or discretionary * * *.”
Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist., 27 Ohio St.2d 102, 107 (1971); State v. Suchevits,
138 Ohio App.3d 99, 102 (11th Dist. 1999).
{¶42} In this case, the trial court exercised its discretion not to admit the breath
test absent proof from the state that the Intoxilyzer 8000 is generally reliable, a decision
consistent with the discretion it possesses under R.C.4511.19(D)(1)(b). As reliability
presents a threshold admissibility issue, reliability, as opposed to the weight to be
afforded any admitted evidence, is one for the trial court. Knott v Revolution Software
Inc. 181 Ohio App.3d 519, 2009-Ohio-1191, ¶45 (5th Dist.); State v. Riley, 6th Dist. No.
WD-03-076, 2007-Ohio-879, ¶27 (expert testimony must be deemed reliable before it is
deemed admissible.); Saad v. Shimano American Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10974,
*7 (N.D. Ill. 2000)(The Supreme Court has made it clear that the courts must allow into
evidence only expert testimony that meets certain threshold standards of reliability and
usefulness).
{¶43} Moreover, the determination of evidential reliability necessarily implicates
the defendant’s substantive due process rights.
{¶44} “Substantive due process, [although an] ephemeral concept, protects
specific fundamental rights of individual freedom and liberty from deprivation at the
hands of arbitrary and capricious government action. The fundamental rights protected
by substantive due process arise from the Constitution itself and have been defined as
those rights which are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ (* * *) While this is
admittedly a somewhat vague definition, it is generally held that an interest in liberty or
property must be impaired before the protections of substantive due process become
14 available.” State v. Small, 162 Ohio App.3d. 375, 2005-Ohio-3813, ¶11 (10th Dist.),
quoting Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F. 2d. 1317, 1328 (6th Cir. 1989).
{¶45} However vague the conceptual parameters of one’s substantive due
process guarantees may be, the following principle is clear; “[substantive] * * * due
process is violated by the introduction of seemingly conclusive, but actually unreliable
evidence.” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 931, fn. 10 (1983).
{¶46} The trial court was aware that other courts had deemed the Intoxilyzer
8000 unreliable even though it was approved. Against the backdrop, the court ordered
the state to establish the general reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000 before admitting the
results. Given the constitutional gravity of admitting unreliable results, however, and its
statutory authority to act as gatekeeper regarding breath test results, the lower court’s
decision to require the state to produce evidence of the machines reliability was an
eminently reasonable and sound legal decision. “[A]n abuse of discretion is the trial
court’s ‘failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.’” State v.
Beechler, 2d Dist. No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶62, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary
(8 Ed.Rev.2004) 11.
{¶47} Rather than present evidence of the general reliability of the Intoxilyzer
8000, the state took the position that the trial court could not require it to do so pursuant
to Vega and its progeny. Vega, 12 Ohio St.3d 185 (1984). I do not read Vega as
holding that under no circumstances can a trial court exercise its discretion to require
evidence of general reliability of an approved breath testing device as a condition to
admissibility.
15 {¶48} In Vega, the court held “* * * an accused is not denied his constitutional
right to present a defense nor is the state relieved of its burden of proving guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt where a trial judge does not permit expert testimony to attack the
reliability of intoxilyzers in general.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 186.
{¶49} Threshold admissibility was not at issue in Vega. That is, the defendant
made no challenge to the trial court’s admission of his breath test result. Instead, after
the state presented its case and rested, the defendant attempted to present a
“reliability” defense by attacking intoxilyzers in general. See also State v. Vega, 5th
Dist. No. CA-1766, 1993 Ohio App LEXIS 14350, *16 (Nov.22, 1983)(Hoffman, J.,
dissenting). Unlike Vega, 12 Ohio St. 3d 185, threshold admissibility is the issue in the
case before us. Moreover, unlike Vega, our case is not about the reliability of
intoxilyzers in general. Our case is limited to whether the Intoxilyzer 8000 is reliable. In
short, the circumstances at issue in Vega were fundamentally distinguishable from
those in our case.
{¶50} Additionally, the rule in Vega does not contemplate a situation where, as
here, an approved device’s general reliability has been assessed by other courts for
both use in and out of this state and the device’s reliability has been found suspect.
See State v. Johnson, Portage County Municipal Court, January 6, 2012. Vega
expressly states that its holding does not involve a situation where there was an
assertion that there was an abuse of discretion by the director in approving the breath
testing device at issue. Vega at 187, fn. 2. Obviously, in our case if the Intoxilyzer
8000 is unreliable, approval would amount to an abuse of discretion and admission of
the test results a violation of substantive due process.
16 {¶51} Breath tests are “‘* * * generally recognized as being reasonably reliable
on the issue of intoxication when conducted with proper equipment and by competent
operators.’” (Emphasis added.) Vega at 186, quoting Westerville v. Cunningham, 15
Ohio St.2d 121, 128(1968). Thus, the central issue as presented in the case before us,
does the Intoxilyzer 8000 qualify as “proper equipment”? The answer is “yes” if it is
generally reliable and “no” if it is not. This is a query, however, that, under Ohio law, a
trial court is entitled to resolve pursuant to R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b).
{¶52} In this case, the trial court exercised its discretion to safeguard the
defendant’s right to substantive due process by merely requiring the state to show the
Intoxilyzer 8000 is generally reliable. Under the circumstances, this decision was sound
and reasonable. This is particularly true in light of the fact that a trial court is vested
with broad discretion in the admission or exclusion of evidence and in recognition that it
has inherent power to exclude or strike evidence on its own motion. Caroll v Caroll, 7th
Dist. No. 89-C-1, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 1339, *8 (April 5, 1990); Neil v. Hamilton
County, 87 Ohio App.3d 670; Oakbrook Realty Corp. v. Blout, 48 Ohio App.3d 69, 70
(10th Dist. 1988).
{¶53} Given the foregoing point, there is no reason to remand this case to the
trial court based upon perceived inadequacies in the motion to suppress. The trial court
made it abundantly clear that it would not admit the test results absent proof of reliability
of the Intoxilyzer 8000. Requiring the proponent to establish the reliability of scientific
evidence is something that a trial court may require as previously discussed. The state
was well aware of what the trial court required when it ordered it to produce evidence of
the Intoxilyzer 8000’s reliability, independent and irrespective of the contents of the
17 motion to suppress. Accordingly, there is no procedural due process violation of the
state’s right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. The trial court’s order was
unambiguous and an exercise of the sound discretion as the gatekeeper of breath test
result admissibility.
{¶54} When an appellate court [**14] is reviewing a pure issue of law, “the mere
fact that the reviewing court would decide the issue differently is enough to find error (of
course, not all errors are reversible. Some are harmless; others are not preserved for
appellate review). By contrast, where the issue on review has been confined to the
discretion of the trial court, the mere fact that the reviewing court would have reached a
different result is not enough, without more, to find error.” Sertz v. Sertz, 11th Dist. No.
2011-L-063, quoting Beechler, 2010-Ohio-1900 at ¶67.
{¶55} This appeal is centered around a discretionary decision made by the trial
court. As I find the court’s decision not only reasonable, but constitutionally astute, I
would affirm the trial court’s exclusion of the breath test in light of the state’s refusal to
present evidence on the issue.