State v. Fuentas

Opinion

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1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 2 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 3 Plaintiff-Appellee, 4 v. No. A-1-CA-35508 5 RONALD JULIAN FUENTES, 6 Defendant-Appellant.

7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CHAVES COUNTY 8 Freddie J. Romero, District Judge

9 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 John Kloss, Assistant Attorney General 12 Albuquerque, NM

13 for Appellee

14 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 15 Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender 16 Santa Fe, NM

17 for Appellant 18 MEMORANDUM OPINION 19 VARGAS, Judge.

1 {1} Defendant Ronald Julian Fuentes appeals the district court’s determination 2 that he was incompetent to stand trial and dangerous, pursuant to NMSA 1978, 3 Section 31-9-1.2(B), (C) (1999). He raises two issues: (1) the district court erred by 4 failing to sua sponte order a hearing to determine whether Defendant was mentally 5 retarded as defined in NMSA 1978, Section 31-9-1.6(E) (1999); and (2) that 6 defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request such a hearing. We 7 previously remanded this matter for a determination of whether Defendant is 8 mentally retarded, and whether a civil commitment should have been ordered. On 9 remand, and after conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district entered an order 10 finding that Defendant was not mentally retarded. We dismiss Defendant’s appeal 11 as moot. 12 BACKGROUND 13 {2} In the approximate two-year period between March 2013 and May 2015, 14 Defendant’s competence was evaluated four times. In 2016 the district court 15 entered a decision and order (order) on Defendant’s competency, pursuant to 16 NMSA 1978, Section 31-9-1.5 (1999). Based on the pleadings, exhibits, 17 evaluations, testimony of witnesses and arguments of counsel, and notwithstanding 18 that the parties had twice stipulated that Defendant was incompetent and dangerous 19 pursuant to Section 31-9-1.2(B), (C), the district court “independently” found by 20 clear and convincing evidence that Defendant was incompetent and dangerous.

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1 Based on its findings, the district court committed Defendant to the New Mexico 2 Behavioral Health Institute for a period of twelve years, with hearings to be 3 conducted every two years on the issues of trial competency and criminal 4 dangerousness. This appeal followed. Defendant’s appeal initially challenged only 5 the district court’s ruling on dangerousness. 6 {3} During the summary calendar process, on March 21, 2017, this Court filed a 7 second notice of proposed summary disposition in which we remanded for “a 8 determination of whether Defendant is mentally retarded, and whether a civil 9 commitment should have been ordered in this case.” Thereafter, and upon an oral 10 motion by Defendant, the district court entered an ex parte order for a confidential 11 forensic evaluation, directing the Department of Health to evaluate Defendant, to 12 address “[i]ssues regarding competency to stand trial and for issues regarding 13 mental retardation.” Following evaluations by two separate experts and after an 14 evidentiary hearing, the parties agreed that a third evaluation would be done. The 15 third expert evaluated Defendant and issued a report stating that Defendant did not 16 meet the definition of mentally retarded set out in Section 31-9-1.6(E). The parties 17 stipulated to the findings in the report and defense counsel stipulated that the 18 defense would be unable to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 19 Defendant fit the definition. The district court entered an order setting forth the 20 above findings and concluding that “Defendant does not meet the definition set

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1 forth in [Section] 31-9-1.6(E) for a finding of mental retardation.” The district 2 court further concluded that “Defendant’s appeal is now moot and this matter shall 3 proceed in [d]istrict [c]ourt pending final resolution.” Defendant nonetheless 4 argues that we should consider the issue raised in his appeal because it is “on[e] of 5 substantial importance that may affect defendants around the [s]tate whose cases 6 are evading the [Section 31-9-1.6] procedure.” 7 {4} As a general rule, appellate courts do not decide moot cases. Republican 8 Party of N.M. v. N.M. Taxation and Revenue Dep’t, 2012-NMSC-026, ¶ 10, 283 9 P.3d 853. However, New Mexico courts recognize two exceptions to the rule that 10 moot cases should be dismissed: cases presenting an issue of substantial public 11 interest, and cases that are capable of repetition, yet evade review. See id. 12 (explaining a substantial public interest involves a constitutional question or affects 13 a fundamental right, and capable of repetition refers to an issue likely to arise in a 14 future lawsuit regardless of the identity of the parties). “The [appellate c]ourt’s 15 review of moot cases that either raise an issue of substantial public interest or are 16 capable of repetition yet evading review is discretionary.” Id. Defendant contends 17 that just as the trial court in this case failed to follow the procedures in the New 18 Mexico Mental Illness and Competency Code, other cases like his “may be 19 avoiding review because they were not appealed.” Thus, he argues, we should 20 exercise our discretion to give trial courts guidance on proper procedure in cases

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1 where a defendant is found incompetent and his incompetence may be attributable 2 to mental retardation, rather than mental illness. We note that Section 31-9-1.6 sets 3 out a procedure to obtain a ruling to determine whether a defendant is mentally 4 retarded. See § 31-9-1.6(A) (“Upon motion of the defense requesting a ruling, the 5 court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the defendant has mental 6 retardation.”). To the extent Defendant asks us to expand the statute to require 7 district courts to order a hearing sua sponte to make a determination of mental 8 retardation, we decline to do so. Defendant points to no facts or legal authority to 9 suggest the district courts are in need of guidance beyond that which has already 10 been statutorily provided, and we have found none. See ITT Educ. Servs., Inc. v. 11 Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 1998-NMCA-078, ¶ 10, 125 N.M. 244, 959 P.2d 969. 12 (concluding this Court will not consider propositions that are unsupported by 13 citation to authority.) We decline to exercise our discretion to address a moot 14 argument. 15 {5} Defendant’s appeal is dismissed.

{6} IT IS SO ORDERED.

16 _____________________________ 17 JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge

18 WE CONCUR:

19 ________________________________

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1 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge

2 ________________________________ 3 KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge