IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 31A24
Filed 12 December 2025
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. SCOTT EVERETT FORD
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) (2023) from the unpublished decision
of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 292 N.C. App. 111, 2024 WL 16286,
affirming judgments entered on 1 July 2022 by Judge Alan Z. Thornburg in Superior
Court, Buncombe County. On 16 October 2024, the Supreme Court allowed
defendant’s petition for discretionary review of an additional issue. Heard in the
Supreme Court on 11 February 2025.
Devereux & Banzhoff, PLLC, by Andrew B. Banzhoff, for defendant-appellant.
Jeff Jackson, Attorney General, by Brenda Menard, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellee.
RIGGS, Justice.
In this matter, we examine whether the Court of Appeals properly affirmed
the trial court’s denial of defendant Scott Everett Ford’s motions to dismiss two
charges brought against him: felony obstruction of justice and felony cruelty to
animals. The dissent below argued that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the
felony obstruction of justice charge. State v. Ford, 2024 WL 16286, at *10 (Carpenter,
J., dissenting in part). In addition, Mr. Ford argues that the Court of Appeals erred STATE V. FORD
Opinion of the Court
by applying a “should have known” standard rather than an actual knowledge
standard in analyzing the trial court’s denial of his motions to dismiss the felony
cruelty to animals charge.
For the reasons stated below, we modify the Court of Appeals’ decision to
clarify that N.C.G.S. § 14-360, the statute that establishes the felony cruelty to
animals offense, requires actual knowledge of the presence of an animal and not
merely that the defendant “should have known” of the animal’s presence. Thus, to
survive a motion to dismiss, the State must present evidence that supports a
reasonable inference of the defendant’s actual knowledge of the animal. We
otherwise affirm the Court of Appeals’ holdings that the trial court did not err in
denying Mr. Ford’s motions to dismiss the above charges.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Defendant Scott Everett Ford owns Classic Event Rental, which “set[s] up
tents, tables, [and] chairs” ahead of events like weddings and festivals. The company
has operated in the Asheville region for roughly twenty-one years. Mr. Ford employs
about seventy people and has a fleet of sixteen to twenty trucks.
On Monday, 17 May 2021, Mr. Ford was driving one of Classic Event Rental’s
white Ford F-150s back from a job in Waynesville. Kelby Manos, one of his
employees, was riding in the front passenger seat. Between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m., Mr.
Ford stopped at the intersection near Exit 44 off I-40.
Claude “Alex” McPherson, an unhoused individual, regularly panhandled at
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that spot. Mr. McPherson had a cat named Thomas. Thomas was always either on
Mr. McPherson’s shoulder or inside a stroller that had been given to Mr. McPherson
in January 2021. The evidence at the trial court tended to show that Thomas was “a
very popular character” around Asheville, with Mr. McPherson being widely known
as the “Cat Man” because of Thomas.
Mr. Ford testified at trial that Mr. McPherson “mess[ed] with [him] every time
[he went] through” the intersection near Exit 44. Because of this history, when he
stopped at that intersection on 17 May 2021, Mr. Ford “decided to harass” Mr.
McPherson and “flicked a golf ball” at him. Mr. McPherson then picked up the golf
ball, and Mr. Ford—allegedly afraid that Mr. McPherson was going to break his
windshield with the golf ball—drove onto the grassy lot where Mr. McPherson was
and hit the stroller with Thomas inside. Mr. Manos—Mr. Ford’s frontseat
passenger—testified that, during the incident, he was not initially paying attention
but that “the next thing I know I seen I was in a field,” that he then saw “the kitty
kitty,” and that Mr. Ford “hit a cat stroller.” Mr. Ford then drove the rest of the way
back to Classic Event Rental.
Madison Stewart and Joseph Schlenk—both of whom were familiar with Mr.
McPherson and Thomas—witnessed these events. Ms. Stewart filmed part of the
incident. At trial, Mr. Schlenk recalled that Mr. Ford “looked really upset, mad,
grimacing” as he “went straight for” Thomas’s stroller.
Right after the collision, Mr. Schlenk called 911. Before Mr. Schlenk even
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mentioned Thomas, the dispatcher asked, “[H]ow’s the cat?” Thomas was physically
unharmed but was “screaming bloody murder” and shaking. Afterward, Thomas
would not willingly get in the stroller and was less friendly to strangers.
Sometime after 5:00 p.m. that same day, Officer Rebecca Williams of the
Asheville Police Department called Mr. Ford and described to him both the incident
and the perpetrator. Mr. Ford replied, “That doesn’t sound right.” When Officer
Williams asked Mr. Ford “if he was going to be able to find out who was driving” the
truck, he said that he “was trying his best.”
The next day, Asheville police officers went to Classic Event Rental and asked
for documentation to identify which employee was driving the truck involved in the
collision. Mr. Ford denied that Classic Event Rental recorded that information. He
also said that he “had no clue” who was driving the particular F-150, explaining that
his company has so many employees that they “throw keys and tell them to go.”
On 21 May 2021, Detective Adam Roach and other Asheville police officers
returned to Classic Event Rental with a search warrant. Detective Roach gave Mr.
Ford “one last chance” to provide “some kind of documentation” on the driver of the
vehicle. Mr. Ford then led Asheville police to the “podium” at the back of Classic
Event Rental’s warehouse. There, the company posted spreadsheets of each day’s
work assignments, which included columns assigning employees and trucks.
Mr. Ford testified that the spreadsheets eventually “go in the [warehouse]
recycling bin,” although they sometimes “end up in the trash can.” At some
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unspecified time, a third-party company shreds all documents. Asheville police
watched Mr. Ford go through the contents of the warehouse recycling bin, where he
found “every day except for the day in question.” That is, the warehouse recycling
bin contained spreadsheets for the 15th, 16th, and from “the 18th on,” but the
spreadsheet for May 17, which Detective Roach originally requested on May 18, was
missing.
As part of the search, Asheville police also seized Mr. Ford’s cellphone and
examined its contents. They found a digital copy of the May 17 schedule, which had
the name “Mo” and “F-150” in the relevant columns.1 The spreadsheet also had Mr.
Ford’s handwriting on it, which he identified at trial. The spreadsheet did not,
however, contain a VIN or tag number for the assigned “F-150.”
Caleb Anglin—Classic Event Rental’s head of human resources—testified that
he often “worked the podium” (i.e., made assignments) but that Mr. Ford
“occasionally” performed that task. Mr. Anglin also testified that whoever worked
the podium usually “t[ook] a picture of the spreadsheet” and uploaded it to a
messaging app called Voxer.
Mr. Ford was charged with felony obstruction of justice and felony cruelty to
animals, as well as related offenses not relevant to this appeal. On 7 January 2022,
1 From the trial transcript, it appears that “Mo” was the nickname for an employee
named Maurice Honeycutt. Law enforcement ultimately determined that Mo was not the driver. Rather, Mr. Ford was found to be the driver of the F-150 involved in the collision on the day in question.
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Mr. Ford filed a motion asking, in relevant part, for the State “to prepare and file a
Bill of Particulars” to “identify the specific acts which [the State] alleges constitute
‘disposal’ of these documents and/or information [by Mr. Ford to obstruct justice].”
The trial court granted the motion, and the State prepared and filed a bill of
particulars on 7 April 2022 clarifying “[t]hat the ‘documentation and information’
recited in the Indictment . . . is the document attached as Exhibit A, seized from a
search of Defendant’s phone pursuant to a search warrant” and that the document
“was ‘disposed’ of by way of making it not available to officers who were executing a
search warrant seeking said documentation and information.”
At trial, Mr. Ford denied intentionally disposing of the physical copy of the
May 17 schedule. He also testified that he forgot that he had taken a picture of it.
Lastly, Mr. Ford stated that he did not know that Mr. McPherson was the “Cat Man”
or that Thomas was in the stroller when he hit it.
Mr. Ford moved twice for the trial court to dismiss the charges against him.
The trial court denied the motions both times. On 1 July 2022, a jury found Mr. Ford
guilty of both felony obstruction of justice and felony cruelty to animals, as well as
other offenses not at issue here. He received consecutive split sentences of four
months of imprisonment and twenty-four months of supervised probation. Mr. Ford
orally appealed in open court.
On 2 January 2024, the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in a divided
decision, finding no error as to the trial court’s rulings on Mr. Ford’s motions to
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dismiss. Ford, 2024 WL 16286, at *9–10. Regarding the obstruction of justice charge,
the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the evidence was sufficient for
the charge to be submitted to the jury because the evidence “could support a
reasonable inference by the jury that the defendant deliberately destroyed a
document to subvert an adverse party’s investigation.” Id. at *9 (cleaned up). As to
the felony cruelty to animals charge, the majority concluded that the evidence “was
sufficient such that ‘a reasonable mind might accept [it] as adequate to support [the]
conclusion’ that defendant knew or should have known that McPherson had the cat
with him in the carriage.” Id. at *6 (quoting State v. Miller, 363 N.C. 96, 99 (2009)).2
The dissent argued that the trial court erred in not dismissing the charge of
felony obstruction of justice. Id. at *10 (Carpenter, J., dissenting in part).
Specifically, the dissent would have held that dismissal of the charge would be proper
based on the lack of any legal obligation for Mr. Ford to retain the spreadsheet in
question. The dissent emphasized the disposal of the spreadsheet “was consistent
with his regular business practice” and “law enforcement [actually] obtained a copy
of the spreadsheet while executing the first and only search warrant appearing in the
record.” Id.
Mr. Ford appealed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) based on the dissent’s
2 The Court of Appeals also addressed an additional issue regarding special jury instructions.
Mr. Ford argued that the trial court erred by denying his request for a jury instruction incorporating the common law definition of torture into the pattern jury instructions for the offense of animal cruelty. Ford, 2024 WL 16286, at *7. The Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Ford’s argument and held that the specific definition of torture provided by the animal cruelty statute controls. Id. That issue is not before us on appeal here.
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arguments that the obstruction of justice charge should have been dismissed.3 This
Court further allowed discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 on the
felony cruelty to animals charge on the issue of whether the requirement in N.C.G.S.
§ 14-360(b) that a defendant act “intentionally” and “knowingly” required the State
to prove actual information or knowledge of the presence of an animal.
More specifically, Mr. Ford argues to this Court that the Court of Appeals erred
by concluding that Mr. Ford obstructed justice by “disposing” of a document when
that document was electronically retained pursuant to the company’s standard
procedures and was retrieved electronically by law enforcement. He further argues
that the Court of Appeals erred by failing to apply the proper standard in evaluating
the sufficiency of the evidence for the felony cruelty to animals charge because that
court’s use of the “should have known” standard is inconsistent with the requirement
that the State prove the defendant acted “intentionally” and “knowingly.”
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision in that
the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the State presented substantial
evidence of both charges. Nonetheless, while we agree with the Court of Appeals’
result, we disagree with the Court of Appeals’ analysis regarding the felony cruelty
to animals charge and modify it as addressed below. While the Court of Appeals erred
3 N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) (2023) provided a right of appeal when there is a dissent at the Court of
Appeals and was repealed by the Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2023, S.L. 2023-134, § 16.21(d), 2023 N.C. Sess. Laws 760, 1171. The right of appeal based on a dissent was still in effect at the time Mr. Ford’s notice of appeal was filed.
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in its invocation of the “should have known” language in its analysis, the State’s
evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Mr. Ford had actual
knowledge that Thomas the cat was in the stroller at the time of the incident.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
Both issues in this matter stem from the trial court’s denial of Mr. Ford’s
motions to dismiss the obstruction of justice and cruelty to animals charges.
“Whether the State presented substantial evidence of each essential element of the
offense[s] is a question of law; therefore, we review the denial of a motion to dismiss
de novo.” State v. Chekanow, 370 N.C. 488, 492 (2018)) (quoting State v. Crockett,
368 N.C. 717, 720 (2016)).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court’s task is to decide “whether
there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense
charged . . . and (2) of [the] defendant[ ] being the perpetrator of such offense.” State
v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98 (1980). The evidence is “substantial” if it is “relevant and
adequate to convince a reasonable mind to accept a conclusion.” State v. Parker, 354
N.C. 268, 278 (2001). But if the evidence merely raises “a suspicion or conjecture,”
the trial court must grant the motion to dismiss. State v. Malloy, 309 N.C. 176, 179
(1983). What matters is the sufficiency, not the weight, of the evidence presented.
State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 379 (2000).
In deciding whether the evidence presented is substantial, the trial court must
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view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit
of all reasonable inferences in the State’s favor.” Id. at 378–79 (citing State v. Benson,
331 N.C. 537, 544 (1992)). Any contradictions or conflicts in the evidence must be
resolved in the State’s favor. Miller, 363 N.C. at 98.
As long as the evidence presented ultimately supports a reasonable inference
of the defendant’s guilt, the trial court should deny the motion to dismiss, regardless
of whether the evidence also permits a reasonable inference of the defendant’s
innocence. State v. Butler, 356 N.C. 141, 145 (2002). This standard applies even
when the evidence presented is mostly or totally circumstantial. Fritsch, 351 N.C. at
379.
B. The Motions to Dismiss the Obstruction of Justice Charge
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in finding that the
State had presented sufficient evidence of the destruction of the May 17 schedule to
send the charge of felony obstruction of justice to the jury. Ford, 2024 WL 16286, at
*7, 9. Mr. Ford, in agreement with the dissent, contends on appeal that the Court of
Appeals erred by concluding that the State had presented sufficient evidence for the
trial court to submit this charge to the jury. Mr. Ford contends that the Court of
Appeals erred on that grounds that (1) schedules were routinely discarded in the
normal course of business and (2) the schedule was successfully retrieved by law
enforcement—arguing essentially that the May 17 schedule was not “disposed of”
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within the meaning of the statute. We disagree with Mr. Ford and affirm the Court
of Appeals’ decision.
Common-law obstruction of justice “take[s] a variety of forms.” In re Kivett, 309
N.C. 635, 670 (1983) (quoting 67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice §§ 1–2 (1978)). Most often,
however, this Court has defined the offense as “any act which prevents, obstructs,
impedes or hinders public or legal justice.” State v. Bradsher, 382 N.C. 656, 659 (2022)
(quoting Kivett, 309 N.C. at 670). When “done with deceit and intent to defraud,”
obstruction of justice is a felony. Id. (quoting N.C.G.S. § 14-3(b) (2021) (governing
“Punishment of misdemeanors, infamous offenses, offenses committed in secrecy and
malice, or with deceit and intent to defraud, or with ethnic animosity”)); see also State
v. Ditenhafer, 373 N.C. 116, 128 (2019).
An obstruction charge addresses “direct or indirect opposition or resistance to
[an officer’s] lawful discharge of his official duty.” State v. Estes, 185 N.C. 752, 755
(1923); see also Obstruction, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining
“obstruction” as “the act of impeding or hindering something”). Disposal—that is,
destruction—of a document sought by law enforcement can certainly constitute
obstruction of justice. See Henry v. Deen, 310 N.C. 75, 87 (1984) (acknowledging that
the plaintiff’s allegations that the defendants acted to destroy or conceal certain
records “if found to have occurred, would be acts which . . . would amount to the
common law offense of obstructing public justice”). However, “success” is not an
element of the offense. See, e.g., Kivett, 309 N.C. at 670 (“[T]he attempt to prevent
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the convening of the grand jury would support a charge of common law obstruction of
justice.” (emphasis added)); Henry, 310 N.C. at 88 (finding obstruction “[w]here . . . a
party deliberately destroys, alters or creates a false document to subvert an adverse
party’s investigation” without a requirement that the party succeed in doing so).
i. Existence of a business practice does not foreclose the possibility of obstruction of justice.
Mr. Ford argues that he was charged with “disposing” of a document that was
routinely discarded in the normal course of business. In doing so, Mr. Ford asserts
that the obstruction of justice charge requires evidence of intentional obstruction. He
argues that here, the State presented evidence that only supports an inference of Mr.
Ford’s adherence to a regular business practice that was not limited by any law or
regulation requiring retention.
This argument lacks merit because the existence of a regular business practice
of disposing of the spreadsheets does not foreclose the possibility that Mr. Ford
intentionally obstructed justice by destroying the document or hindering its
discovery. See Butler 356 N.C. at 145 (noting that when the evidence supports an
inference of guilt, the motion to dismiss should be denied even if the evidence also
permits a reasonable inference of innocence). The evidence offered by the State tends
to show that, even if the physical copy of the May 17 schedule was discarded via a
regular business practice, the copy would still be accessible as long as it remained in
the warehouse recycling bin. Asheville police managed to recover schedules for “every
single day [of the target week] consecutively except for May 17th.” Thus, the fact that
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Classic Event Rental had a regular business practice of disposing of the physical
schedules does not, in and of itself, explain why only the physical copy of the May 17
schedule was missing when law enforcement initially requested the documentation
and then physically searched for it. That the recycling bin contained spreadsheets
for “the 18th on” supports an inference that someone disposed of the physical copy of
the May 17 schedule irregularly—that is, that someone took additional, atypical steps
to prevent Asheville police officers from obtaining a document they otherwise would
have found in searching the warehouse recycling bin.
Furthermore, the State offered compelling circumstantial evidence that could
support an inference that Mr. Ford disposed of the May 17 schedule in an effort to
obstruct police efforts. Notably, Mr. Ford worked the podium on that date and thus
had access to the physical copy of that schedule. Asheville police asked Mr. Ford
about documentation of employee use of company trucks and he misled them by
denying that such records existed, insisting that he “had no clue” who was driving
the truck and had so many employees that he just “thr[e]w keys and t[old] them to
go.” When presented with a search warrant, Mr. Ford led law enforcement to the
warehouse recycling bin, and police found that the bin contained spreadsheets for
“every single day consecutively except for May 17th.” Finally, Mr. Ford knew, and
eyewitness testimony supports, that Mr. Ford was the driver who hit the stroller.
Therefore, when taken together and viewed in the light most favorable to the
State, these facts support several reasonable inferences. From the evidence, a jury
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could reasonably infer that someone intentionally removed the physical copy of the
May 17 schedule from the recycling bin, given that the bin contained spreadsheets
for every other day of that week. A jury could further reasonably infer from the
State’s evidence that Mr. Ford, the driver of the vehicle in the collision, was the party
that actually removed the May 17 schedule shortly before or during law enforcement’s
investigation. Thus, the State presented substantial evidence to support a conclusion
that Mr. Ford disposed of the physical copy of the May 17 schedule irregularly to
obstruct law enforcement’s investigation of the collision in which he hit the stroller.
ii. The success of a defendant’s obstruction of justice efforts is not an element of the offense.
Mr. Ford also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the obstruction of justice charge because the
May 17 schedule was found by law enforcement. He contends that the Court of
Appeals’ decision conflicts with the rule that common-law obstruction of justice
requires that the act be done to “impair the verity or availability” of evidence at
judicial proceedings for which he relies primarily on State v. Eastman, 113 N.C. App.
347, 353 (1994) for this argument.4 Mr. Ford argues he cannot be guilty of obstruction
because there was no impairment of the verity or availability of the May 17 schedule,
4 Mr. Ford only appears to cite to Eastman because of the quotation included above
and the fact that the documents in Eastman were completely destroyed. See Eastman, 113 N.C. App. at 353. The common-law obstruction of justice issue in Eastman, however, was different from the one presented here. In Eastman, the court acknowledged the destruction of the documents in question but was only concerned with the issue of whether the defendant had the specific intent to impede a criminal investigation. Id. at 353.
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given that a digital copy of the May 17 schedule was in fact found by law enforcement
and admitted into evidence at trial. We disagree with Mr. Ford’s interpretation that
total effective obstruction of the availability of a document is necessary to support an
obstruction of justice charge.
Mr. Ford’s narrow reading of Eastman’s language is not consistent with this
Court’s recitation of the elements of obstruction of justice in other cases. This Court
has defined the offense as “any act which prevents, obstructs, impedes or hinders
public or legal justice.” Bradsher, 382 N.C. at 659 (quoting Kivett, 309 N.C. at 670).
A plain reading of that definition is that obstruction of justice merely requires a
showing that a defendant acts to stymie law enforcement’s progress or otherwise stall
an investigation of a matter. The success of a defendant’s obstruction efforts is not
an element of the offense. See, e.g., Kivett, 309 N.C. at 670. For example, in Kivett,
the Judicial Standards Commission investigated a superior court judge, Charles
Kivett, for his unethical relationship with a local bail bondsman. Id. at 639–40.
Worried that the district attorney “was going to present a bill of indictment” against
him, Kivett implored a colleague, Judge Albright, “to enter a restraining order to
prevent the grand jury from convening.” Id. at 642. Judge Albright refused and
promptly informed the Administrative Office of the Courts of the conversation. Id.
On appeal, this Court concluded that the evidence of Kivett’s solicitation of
interference “clearly and convincingly prove[d] an attempt . . . to obstruct justice” and
therefore “would support a charge of common-law obstruction of justice.” Id. at 670.
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In sum, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence here
supports a reasonable inference that Mr. Ford disposed of the physical copy of the
May 17 schedule irregularly to obstruct law enforcement’s investigation. While
officers eventually recovered a digital copy of the May 17 schedule, the act of making
the physical copy unavailable is sufficient to support the charge. The defendant in
Kivett did not succeed in his obstruction, but the evidence of his efforts was enough
to support the obstruction of justice charge. The same result must follow here.
C. The Motions to Dismiss the Cruelty to Animals Charge
The Court of Appeals held that the State presented sufficient evidence for the
trial court to submit the felony cruelty to animals charge to the jury. Ford, 2024 WL
16286, at *3, *6. In doing so, the Court of Appeals misstated that the evidence “was
sufficient such that ‘a reasonable mind might accept [it] as adequate to support [the]
conclusion’ that defendant knew or should have known that McPherson had the cat
with him in the carriage.” Id. at *6 (emphasis added) (quoting Miller, 363 N.C. at
99). Mr. Ford contends on appeal that the Court of Appeals erred by applying the
wrong standard to the “intent” element of the cruelty to animals charge.
For reasons set forth below, we agree with Mr. Ford that the Court of Appeals
erred in using “should have known” language because the statute requires actual
knowledge. See N.C.G.S. § 14-360(b)–(c) (2023) (requiring that a defendant acted
“maliciously,” thus “intentionally” and “knowingly”). Notwithstanding that
misstatement, the Court of Appeals’ ultimate conclusion is still correct because the
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State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably infer that Mr. Ford
actually knew Thomas was in the stroller at the time of the incident. Thus, while we
affirm the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the State presented sufficient evidence
of this charge, we modify the Court of Appeals’ decision to clarify that actual
knowledge is required to meet the “intent” element of N.C.G.S. § 14-360(b).
Under N.C.G.S. § 14-360(b), a person is guilty of felony cruelty to animals if he
“shall maliciously torture, mutilate, maim, cruelly beat, disfigure, poison, or
kill . . . any animal.” “[M]aliciously” means “an act committed intentionally and with
malice or bad motive.” N.C.G.S. § 14-360(c). In turn, “intentionally” means
“committed knowingly and without justifiable excuse.” Id. Because malice and intent
are seldom proved with direct evidence, both are “ordinarily proven by circumstantial
evidence from which [they] may be inferred.” State v. Sexton, 357 N.C. 235, 238
(2003). As commonly defined, “knowingly” entails actual knowledge. See State v.
Hightower, 187 N.C. 300, 308–09 (1924) (“[W]hen it is said a person has knowledge
of a given condition, it is meant that his relation to it, his association with it, his
control over it, and his direction of it are such as to give him actual information
concerning it.” (emphasis added)). As such, the Court of Appeals erred in using the
phrase “should have known” because, under N.C.G.S. § 14-360(b), the State needed
to present substantial evidence that Mr. Ford had actual knowledge that Thomas was
in the stroller at the time of the incident.
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But while the Court of Appeals erred in its language, the Court of Appeals did
not err in holding that the trial court properly denied Mr. Ford’s motions to dismiss.
The State presented substantial evidence in the form of circumstantial evidence that
Mr. Ford knew that Thomas was in the stroller when he hit it with Classic Event
Rental’s truck. Thus, for purposes of the motion to dismiss stage, the State presented
sufficient evidence of the “intent” element of the charge of felony cruelty to animals.
The State’s circumstantial evidence, from Mr. Ford’s own testimony to the
testimony of other witnesses, supports an inference that Mr. Ford had actual
knowledge of Thomas’s whereabouts at the time of the incident. The State’s evidence
indicates that Mr. Ford owned and operated Classic Event Rental in Asheville for
over twenty years. The State’s evidence further suggests that Mr. McPherson had a
community-wide reputation as the “Cat Man,” with Thomas usually either on his
shoulder or in the stroller. Finally, the State established that Mr. Ford and Mr.
McPherson had repeated interactions, with Mr. Ford testifying that “[y]ou mess with
me every time I go through [the intersection] asking for money, whatever it might
be.” Turning to the day of the incident, Mr. Ford testified at trial that he could not
say exactly when he learned about the cat and that he did not know that there was a
cat in the stroller. But, Mr. Manos, Mr. Ford’s front-seat passenger, testified that he
was not initially paying attention but when he looked up he saw “the kitty kitty.”
Moreover, Mr. Schlenk, an eyewitness to the incident, testified that Mr. Ford “looked
really upset, mad, grimacing” and “went straight for the baby carriage.”
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Considered together, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the State, the evidence supports a reasonable inference that Mr. Ford knew and bore
animus toward Mr. McPherson and, based on this relationship, knew of Thomas,
given that Thomas was frequently with Mr. McPherson. The evidence also supports
the inference that Thomas was plainly visible to Mr. Ford during the incident given
Thomas’s plain visibility to Mr. Manos as a passenger in the same vehicle. The
State’s evidence supports the reasonable inferences that Mr. Ford had a lengthy and
adversarial relationship with Mr. McPherson, and that, on the day in question, Mr.
Ford intended to hit Mr. McPherson’s stroller, and he did so knowing that Thomas
was in it. Therefore, the State presented sufficient evidence of the elements of the
felony cruelty to animals offense, and we affirm the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that
the trial court did not err in denying Mr. Ford’s motions to dismiss this charge.
Mr. Ford argues that the State is misusing “information known to other
witnesses” to “imply that Mr. Ford should have seen [Thomas].” That assertion is
misguided because, while Mr. McPherson’s and Thomas’s widespread community
recognition made it more likely that Mr. Ford knew that Thomas was in the stroller,
as discussed above, the State’s evidence was more encompassing than just the
common knowledge of Thomas in the community. In particular, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the State, the evidence that the cat was always with Mr.
McPherson, that Mr. Manos saw the cat on the day in question, and that Mr. Ford
testified that he had repeated irritating and direct interactions with Mr. McPherson
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at that particular intersection can reasonably support an inference that Mr. Ford
knew the cat was in the stroller when he struck it.
In sum, we clarify that the State was required to present evidence of Mr. Ford’s
actual knowledge of Thomas’s presence in accord with N.C.G.S. § 14-360(b), and,
despite the Court of Appeals’ use of language indicating a different standard, the
State did provide sufficient evidence that Mr. Ford actually knew of Thomas’s
presence at the time of the incident. Thus, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding
as modified herein.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the Court of Appeals’ ultimate conclusions that the State presented
sufficient evidence of both charges to withstand motions to dismiss; however, while
we agree with those conclusions, we clarify and modify the Court of Appeals’
sufficiency of the evidence analysis relating to the felony cruelty to animals charge.
MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.
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Berger, J., concurring
Justice BERGER concurring.
I concur with the majority but write separately to clarify the burden required
of the State to survive a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. This has
apparently been the source of some confusion recently given exchanges on the subject
in recent oral arguments and as highlighted by this opinion.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must determine whether
the State presented sufficient evidence for jury consideration. “If there is more than
a scintilla of competent evidence to support the allegations in the warrant or
indictment, it is the court’s duty to submit the case to the jury.” State v. Horner, 248
N.C. 342, 344–45 (1958). At this stage, the evidence is viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, and it is entitled to every reasonable inference which can be
drawn from that evidence. State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75 (1993). “Contradictions
or conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the State, and evidence
unfavorable to the State is not considered.” State v. Miller, 363 N.C. 96, 98 (2009)
(citations omitted). In other words, the “more than a scintilla of evidence” standard
is not a high bar.
But word choice can control outcomes, and shifting the vocabulary may alter
interpretation. Our case law has also stated that the burden on the State to survive
a motion to dismiss is the production of “substantial evidence.” See State v. Scott, 356
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N.C. 591, 597–98 (2002). A casual reader of the law might reasonably think that this
is a higher bar.
But “[s]ubstantial evidence means ‘more than a scintilla of evidence.’ ” State v.
Beck, 385 N.C. 435, 438 (2023) (quoting State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99 (1980)); see
also State v. Gillard, 386 N.C. 797, 832 (2024) (“The terms ‘more than a scintilla of
evidence’ and ‘substantial evidence’ are in reality the same . . . .” (quoting State v.
Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 66 (1982))); State v. Dover, 381 N.C. 535, 547 (2022)
(“Substantial evidence only requires ‘more than a scintilla of evidence . . . .’ ” (quoting
Earnhardt, 307 N.C. at 66)).
Even though these two phrases are synonymous, the “more than a scintilla of
evidence” standard is probably the more accurate framing given the low bar.
Practitioners and judges alike should be mindful that, regardless of which phrase is
used, the burden on the State remains the same.
Although this is a recurring issue which I will certainly address again, I will
not belabor the point every time it comes up. Yes, we should insist on a consistent
articulation of the standard, but there is no need to use more toner and ink on
something that should already be clear.
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