State v. . Floyd

39 S.E.2d 598, 226 N.C. 571, 1946 N.C. LEXIS 274
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedOctober 9, 1946
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 39 S.E.2d 598 (State v. . Floyd) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. . Floyd, 39 S.E.2d 598, 226 N.C. 571, 1946 N.C. LEXIS 274 (N.C. 1946).

Opinion

Stacy, C. J.

The question for decision is whether error was committed in the following instruction to the jury: “When the killing is shown to be intentional and without legal provocation, and without just cause or excuse, or where the killing is shown to be done with a deadly weapon or in a cruel and brutal manner, then the law implies that it was done with malice.”

It is the position of the defendant that in a prosecution for murder in the first degree, the State must prove every element of the offense, S. v. Locklear, 118 N. C., 1154, 24 S. E., 410, and cannot avail itself .of the presumption of malice arising from an intentional killing with a deadly weapon, as this mounts the crime only to the level of murder in the second degree. G. S., 14-17; S. v. Prince, 223 N. C., 392, 26 S. E. (2d), 875.

Proof of malice is one of the intermediate steps necessary to be taken in a prosecution for murder in the first degree. In taking this step, the State may rely upon the presumption which arises from an intentional killing with a deadly weapon. It is true, the additional elements of premeditation and deliberation, essential to constitute murder in the first degree, are not presumed from an intentional killing with a deadly weapon. These must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, and *573 found by the jury, before a verdict of murder in the first degree can be rendered against the accused. S. v. Hawkins, 214 N. C., 326, 199 S. E., 284; S. v. Miller, 197 N. C., 445, 149 S. E., 590. Still this would not deprive the State of the effect of an intervening presumption to the extent that it goes, or of evidence possessing under the law a degree of probative force beyond its natural tendency to produce belief. McNeill v. McNeill, 223 N. C., 178, 25 S. E. (2d), 615; Speas v. Bank, 188 N. C., 524, 125 S. E., 398. “In those cases where the evidence establishes that the killing was with a deadly weapon, the presumption goes no further than that the homicide was murder in the second degree, and if the State seeks a conviction of murder in the first degree, it has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was committed with deliberation and premeditation.” S. v. Perry, 209 N. C., 604, 184 S. E., 545.

A careful perusal of the record leaves us with the impression that no error has been shown, and that the judgment follows the command of the law.

No error.

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Related

State v. Aragon
690 P.2d 293 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1984)
State v. McCluney
180 S.E.2d 419 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1971)
State v. Creech
229 N.C. 662 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1949)
State v. . Childress
45 S.E.2d 42 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1947)
State v. . Snead
44 S.E.2d 359 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1947)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
39 S.E.2d 598, 226 N.C. 571, 1946 N.C. LEXIS 274, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-floyd-nc-1946.