State v. Flowers

2025 Ohio 2071
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 12, 2025
Docket114287
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2025 Ohio 2071 (State v. Flowers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Flowers, 2025 Ohio 2071 (Ohio Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Flowers, 2025-Ohio-2071.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 114287 v. :

ARTEZ M. FLOWERS, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: DISMISSED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 12, 2025

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-24-690045-A

Appearances:

Michael P. Maloney, for appellant.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:

Appellant Artez M. Flowers filed a notice of appeal of his convictions

and sentence following his guilty plea. After reviewing the record, Flowers’s

appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), seeking leave to withdraw as appellate counsel. After a full review of the

record, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal. I. Background

The State charged Flowers in an eight-count indictment as follows:

Count 1 charged attempted murder in violation of R.C. 2923.02/2923.02(A), a

felony of the first degree; Counts 2 and 3 charged felonious assault, a second-degree

felony, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (2), respectively; Count 4 charged

strangulation in violation of R.C. 2903.18(B)(1), a second-degree felony; Counts 5

and 6 charged strangulation in violation of R.C. 2903.18(B)(2) and (3), respectively,

third-degree felonies; Count 7 charged domestic violence in violation of R.C.

2919.25(A), a first-degree misdemeanor; and Count 8 charged assault in violation of

R.C. 2903.13(A), with a furthermore specification that the victim in this count was a

peace officer while in performance of the officer’s official duties. Counts 1 through

4 each carried a notice-of-prior-conviction (“NPC”) and repeat-violent-offender

(“RVO”) specification.

The charges arose out of an incident that occurred on March 7, 2024,

when Flowers brutally attacked his female friend, strangled her repeatedly with a

cord, gouged out her right eye with a screwdriver, and then attempted to remove her

left eye, leaving the victim completely blind. The victim suffered deep lacerations to

her face, hands, and scalp, requiring stitches and surgery. Following Flowers’s

arrest, officers transported him to a hospital, where Flowers punched a police officer

in the face.

Flowers accepted the State’s plea offer and pleaded guilty to Count 1,

attempted murder, including the NPC and RVO specifications as charged in the indictment and Count 8, assault of a peace officer as charged in the indictment. As

part of the plea agreement, Flowers agreed that (1) the offenses were not allied, and

(2) the State reserved the right to indict Flowers for homicide offenses if the victim

succumbed to the inflicted injuries. The State requested a presentence-investigation

report, and Flowers requested a mitigation report, both of which the court ordered,

obtained, and reviewed prior to sentencing.

Following the presentation of exhibits showing the harm inflicted, an

impact statement from the victim, mitigation arguments, and allocution by Flowers,

the trial court ordered Flowers to serve a prison term of 17 to 22 years.

II. Anders Review

Based on his belief that no error occurred in the trial court and that

any grounds for appeal would be frivolous, Flowers’s counsel filed a motion to

withdraw pursuant to Anders. This court entered a judgment entry granting

Flowers 49 days to file a supplemental pro se brief raising any additional

assignments of error. That time has expired, and Flowers has not filed a

supplemental brief.

In Anders, the United States Supreme Court outlined a procedure for

counsel to follow to withdraw due to counsel’s belief that an appeal would be

frivolous. Specifically, if after a conscientious examination of the record counsel

finds the appeal to be wholly frivolous, counsel should so advise the court and

request permission to withdraw. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Counsel’s request to

withdraw “must be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.” Id. Counsel must also furnish a copy of the

brief to his client, and the court must allow time for the appellant to file his own pro

se brief. Id.

When these requirements have been satisfied, the appellate court

must complete a full examination of the trial court proceedings to determine

whether the appeal is “wholly frivolous.” Id. If the court, after its full review, “finds

any of the legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous), it must

. . . afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.” Id. If, however,

the court determines that the appeal is wholly frivolous, the appellate court may

grant the motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal. Id.

Some judges of this court have criticized the Anders approach and

suggested eliminating the Anders procedure. See, e.g., State v. Ruffin, 2020-Ohio-

5085 (8th Dist.) (S. Gallagher, J., dissenting); State v. Sims, 2019-Ohio-4975 (8th

Dist.) (Boyle, J., dissenting). Other districts have declined to accept Anders briefs,

noting that the procedure is a constitutional safeguard but not a constitutional

requirement. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 2017-Ohio-5772 (4th Dist.); State v.

Wenner, 2018-Ohio-2590 (6th Dist.); State v. Cruz-Ramos, 2018-Ohio-1583 (7th

Dist.). And, Justice Fisher in his dissenting opinion in State v. Upkins, 2018-Ohio-

1812, outlined the existence of “a number of problems regarding Anders briefs” in

Ohio and asserted that the Court’s decision dismissing the Upkins appeal as

improvidently allowed deprived the Court of the opportunity to resolve “several of

those problems.” Upkins at ¶ 2 (Fisher, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the Eighth District “continues to follow the procedures

announced in Anders.” State v. Phillips, 2022-Ohio-375, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), citing State

v. Taylor, 2015-Ohio-420 (8th Dist.); State v. Williams, 2019-Ohio-3766 (8th

Dist.); In re J.L., 2020-Ohio-5254 (8th Dist.). We are mindful, however, that

“wholly frivolous” is not synonymous with “non-meritorious.” Therefore, we must

consider whether the appeal is wholly frivolous before granting counsel’s request to

withdraw. Although Flowers’s counsel asserts that an appeal in this case satisfies

this requirement, counsel suggests that the only arguable error would be whether

Flowers entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea.

A defendant must make a guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily, and “[f]ailure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea

unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio

Constitution.” State v. Engle, 1996-Ohio-179, ¶ 7. To ensure that a plea is entered

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, Crim.R. 11(C) requires the trial judge to

determine whether the criminal defendant is fully informed of his constitutional and

nonconstitutional rights. The court must also confirm that the defendant

understands the consequences of his plea before accepting a guilty plea. Id. Counsel

asserts that an appeal on this basis would be frivolous, however, because the trial

court complied with the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C) and Flowers entered a

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2025 Ohio 2071, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-flowers-ohioctapp-2025.