State v. Flowers

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: February 26, 2024
• Docket: 2203013243
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) Case No. 2203013243 ) ) ) KERON FLOWERS, ) ) Defendant. )

Submitted: February 6, 2024 Decided: February 26, 2024

On Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss/Speedy Trial;

Denied.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

William H. Leonard, Esq. and Thomas J. Williams, Esq. of the Department of Justice, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Michael C. Heyden, Esq., Attorney for Defendant.

WINSTON, J. I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant, Keron Flowers, moves to dismiss all charges against him for

violation of his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution. The State

argues that the delay is equally attributable to both the State and Mr. Flowers. For

the following reasons, Mr. Flowers’ Motion to Dismiss/Speedy Trial is DENIED.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Mr. Flowers was arrested on March 24, 2022, then indicted on August 15,

2022, on charges of Burglary First Degree, Attempted Robbery First Degree,

Conspiracy Second Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a

Felony, Wearing a Disguise During the Commission of a Felony, Kidnapping First

Degree, Strangulation, and Assault Third Degree.1

The Scheduling Order in this case was issued on October 25, 2022, which

established the following deadlines: First Case Review: November 21, 2022; Final

Case Review: March 6, 2023, and Trial: March 20, 2023.2 On March 9, 2023, the

State filed a joint continuance request due to Mr. Flowers’ counsel’s conflict with

the March 20, 2023 trial date.3 The parties requested trial be continued to May 22,

1 See Superior Court Criminal Docket, case 2203013243 Docket Item (“D.I.__”) 13. 2 D.I. 18. 3 D.I. 34. 2 2023.4 The Court approved the request, and trial was rescheduled for May 22, 2023.5

On May 10, 2023, the State proposed Detective Skrobot, the officer who

conducted the search warrant, testify out of turn for medical reasons.6 Subsequently,

on May 22, 2023, the State filed a continuance request due to the unavailability of

the State’s witness, Detective Skrobot. Prior to requesting the continuance, the State

suggested to Mr. Flowers’ counsel that Detective Skrobot’s testimony be admitted

through the Chief Investigation Officer.7 Mr. Flowers did not agree to the State’s

proposal but did not oppose the State’s continuance request. Trial was then

rescheduled for September 11, 2023, despite the State informing the Court that

Detective Skrobot would not be available on the proposed trial date.8 Although

Detective Skrobot was unavailable to testify in-person, the State proposed that

Detective Skrobot testify remotely.9 Mr. Flowers did not agree.10 The State, then

filed another trial continuance request and requested a specially assigned judge for

scheduling purposes.11 Mr. Flowers did not oppose the State’s requests.12

4 Id. 5 D.I. 37. 6 State’s Response at Ex. A. Detective Skrobot’s wife was expecting a baby the week of trial. Id. 7 Id. 8 D.I. 44 and State’s Response at Ex. C. 9 See State’s Response at 3. 10 Id. 11 D.I. 45. 12 See State’s Response at 3. 3 On August 31, 2023, this judge was assigned and on October 19, 2023, an in-

person scheduling conference was held.13 Based on the availability of all parties,

trial was set for March 4, 2024.14 During the scheduling conference, counsel for co-

defendant, Isaiah Boykin, stated that Mr. Boykin would be filing a motion for speedy

trial.15 At the end of the scheduling conference Mr. Flowers’ counsel stated he might

join Mr. Boykin’s motion.16

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: “[i]n

all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public

trial….”17 The Constitution of the State of Delaware provides a nearly identical

right.18 A defendant’s speedy trial rights attach upon the date of his arrest or

indictment, whichever occurs first.19 To determine whether a defendant has been

deprived of his right to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (i) the length

of delay; (ii) the reason for delay; (iii) the defendant’s assertion of their right; and

13 D.I. 47 and 48. 14 Id. 15 D.I. 48. 16 Id. 17 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 18 DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath a right ... to have ... a speedy and public trial....”). 19 Brodie v. State, 2009 WL 188855, at *3 (Del. Jan. 26, 2009) (quoting Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002)). 4 (iv) the prejudice to the defendant (the “Barker factors”).20 No individual factor is

conclusive.21 Instead, the four factors are related “and must be considered together

with such other circumstances as may be relevant.”22 Thus, in weighing the factors,

courts must engage in a “difficult and sensitive balancing process,”23 weighing “the

conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant.”24 The Court will examine each

factor in turn.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Length of Delay Mr. Flowers contends that the almost two-year delay between his arrest and

scheduled trial violates his constitutional right to a speedy trial.25 Until the length

of delay is determined to be “presumptively prejudicial,” it is unnecessary to

consider the additional Barker factors.26 The Delaware Supreme Court has

previously held that “if the delay between arrest or indictment and trial approaches

[or surpasses] one year, then the Court will generally consider the additional

20 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 21 Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 533). 22 Id. 23 Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. 24 Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530). 25 D.I. 50. 26 Rivera v. State, 292 A.3d 111 WL 1978878 (Del. 2023) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530). 5 factors.27 Mr. Flowers was arrested on March 24, 2022, and due to the scheduling

conflicts with his counsel and the State’s witness, trial has been continued to March

4, 2024. The State concedes that the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial.

Due to the almost two-year delay in this matter, this factor weighs in favor of Mr.

Flowers and the Court will consider the remaining Barker factors.

B. Reason for the Delay The Delaware Supreme Court has stated that “different weights are assigned

to different reasons for the delay.”28 “A deliberate attempt to delay [] trial in order

to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government.”29 More

neutral reasons, however, should be weighted less heavily, but still considered since

the ultimate responsibly for such circumstances must rest with the government.30 A

valid reason, such as the disappearance or illness of an important witness, or an event

over which the prosecution has no control supports an appropriate rescheduling of

the proceedings.31

Here, the first delay was the result of a joint continuance request due to a

scheduling conflict with Mr. Flowers’ counsel. Accordingly, both sides were

27 Cooper v. State, 2011 WL 6039613, at *7 (Del. 2011). 28 Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 274 (Del. 2022); See also, Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972). 29 Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 (citations omitted). 30 Id. 31 Key v. State, 463 A.2d 633, 636 (Del. 1983). 6 responsible for the first delay. Two months lapsed between the first scheduled trial

date and the second scheduled trial date. Three months lapsed between the second

scheduled trial date and the third scheduled trial date. The second and third delays

were the result of an unavailable State witness. Mr. Flowers did not oppose either

delay. Before the second trial continuance request, however, the State attempted to

cure its witness unavailability issue by proposing the Chief Investigating Officer

testify in place of the unavailable witness. Mr. Flowers objected. And, before the

third trial continuance request, the State again attempted to cure its witness

unavailability issue by having the witness testify remotely. Mr. Flowers opposed.

The true impetus for the third delay is more attributable to Mr. Flowers rather than

the State. The State was prepared to go forward with trial on September 11, 2023,

but Mr. Flowers opposed, which required the trial to be moved. Mr. Flowers cannot

prolong the matter then claim infringement on his right to a speedy trial.

After the instant case was specially assigned, the parties agreed on the current

trial date. The five-month delay between the third trial date and the current trial date

is attributable to the Court and parties’ availability for trial. As there was no attempt

by the State to hamper Mr. Flowers’ defense, this factor will not be heavily weighted.

Nonetheless, this factor weighs in favor of Mr. Flowers.

C. Assertion of the Right to a Speedy Trial The Delaware Supreme Court has explained that “the defendant’s assertion of

7 his speedy trial right … is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining

whether the defendant is being deprived of the right.”32 “If and when a defendant

asserts his rights are factors of considerable significance in determining whether

there has been a speedy trial violation.”33

Mr. Flowers did not assert his right to a speedy trial, either directly or

inferentially, until the scheduling conference with the Court on October 19, 2023.34

At the scheduling conference, Mr. Flowers’ counsel advised the Court that Mr.

Flowers might assert his speedy trial rights by joining his co-defendant’s motion to

dismiss.

Mr. Flowers’ initial assertion came more than nineteen months from the date

of his arrest. During those nineteen months, Mr. Flowers could have asserted his

right at any time during the pendency of the case. This does not mean that Mr.

Flowers has forfeited his right to a speedy trial. Instead, his failure to assert that

right at an earlier time and acquiesce to the continuance requests weigh against him.

Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of the State.

D. Prejudice Resulting to the Defendant from the Delay

The fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant. “This factor should be

32 Id. 33 Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d at 275 (citing Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1075 (Del. 1987). 34 D.I. 48. 8 assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was

designed to protect.”35 Those interests as: (i) preventing oppressive pretrial

incarceration; (ii) minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) limiting

the possibility that the defense will be impaired.36 The most serious of these interests

being the last, “because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case

skews the fairness of the entire system.”37

Mr. Flowers contends that due to his pretrial incarceration, he has lost his

business, experienced strained personal and familial relationships, and is living

under a cloud of anxiety and distress, all of which seriously affect his mental health

and well-being. Mr. Flowers has been incarcerated for almost two years. Except for

the last few months, this time can be attributed to continuance requests sought by

the State, one of which Mr. Flowers joined and the other two he did not oppose. Mr.

Flowers’ own silence suggests that he did not suffer oppressive pretrial

incarceration, or any undue anxiety related to the delay. Additionally, the Delaware

Supreme Court has recognized that all defendants face some degree of anxiety while

awaiting trial, whether incarcerated or not.38 This does not constitute prejudice

unless, the defendant shows excessive concern or anxiety.39 Mr. Flowers has

35 Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. 36 Id. 37 Id. 38 Fensterer v. State, 493 A.2d at 966-67; Stovall, 1998 WL 138931, at *4. 39 Id.; Rodriguez, 2021 WL 1221461, at *6; see also Cooper, 2011 WL 6039613 9 presented no evidence that he has suffered an unusual amount of anxiety because of

the delay. Therefore, this last factor weighs in favor of the State.

V. CONCLUSION After carefully analyzing and balancing the Barker factors, the Court finds

Mr. Flowers’ right to a speedy trial has not been violated. The third and fourth

factors outweigh the first two factors. Importantly, the State has not attempted to

hamper Mr. Flowers’ defense, and Mr. Flowers did not oppose the three continuance

requests. Mr. Flowers’ Motion to Dismiss/Speedy Trial is therefore DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Patricia A. Winston Judge Patricia A. Winston

(“The second interest does not weigh in Cooper’s favor, as Cooper has not alleged excessive concern or anxiety”). 10