State v. Fletcher

13 R.I. 522, 1882 R.I. LEXIS 31

• Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
• Decided: January 19, 1882
• Status: Published

Opinion

Per Curiam.

The appeal allowed under Pub. Laws R. I. cap. 889, § 41, of April 29, 1881, is not dependent on the recognizance prescribed by § 42, but remains good, whether the recognizance is given or not. The complaint was therefore properly before the Court of Common Pleas on appeal, and the appellant was triable there, however defective or invalid the recognizance may have been.

We think the word “ Sunday,” used in the complaint, is either to be regarded as without effect, being simply surplusage, or at most as having the effect of superfluous description to limit proof to the Sunday named. It does not essentially alter the charge, and afforded no ground for dismissal.

Chapter 889 does not expressly confer jurisdiction over the offences created by it on any particular tribunal. • Some of the offences, however, are clearly within the jurisdiction of Justice Courts as conferred by Gen. Stat. R. I. cap. 186, § 1. Yiolations of §§ 28, 29, and 30 are so. The complaint here is for a violation of § 22, and is not in our opinion within the jurisdiction there conferred, the jurisdiction there conferred extending only to of-fences punishable by fine or imprisonment, not to offences punishable by fine and imprisonment. We think, however, that, while the jurisdiction is not conferred by Gen. Stat. R. I. cap. 186, nor by Pub. Laws R. I. cap. 889, in express terms, 'it is conferred by cap. 889 by implication. Section 24 provides forms of procedure for prosecutions under §§ 21 and 22, the procedure being by complaint and warrant in a Justice Court. The implication from this is very strong that the General Assembly intended that Justice Courts should have the jurisdiction; for though the forms might be used in a preliminary proceeding to bind over, it is highly improbable that they would be provided for it, form being considered of minor importance in such a proceeding. If, however, there could still be doubt on this point, the doubt is completely removed by § 40, which reads as follows, to wit: “ All fines recovered under §§ 21, 22, and 23 of this chapter shall enure, one half to the use of the State, and the other half to the complainant; and in all such complaints, judgment rendered upon a subsequent complaint for the same offence shall be no bar, or prevent judgment upon the merits being rendered on any prior complaint, and the pendency of the former complaint may be pleaded in bar of the second complaint.” It is perfectly evident that the complaint here designated is not a complaint used in a proceeding to bind over, but one in which a fine may be recovered and final judgment rendered; and inasmuch as there is no provision for the prosecution of criminals by complaint otherwhere than in Justice Courts, except on appeal, the conclusion is inevitable that Justice Courts were intended to have complete original jurisdiction to try and determine all of-fences under §§ 21 and 22. Our decision is that they do have it.

Samuel P. Colt, Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff. Hugh J. Carroll, for defendant.

The exceptions are therefore overruled, and the cause remanded for sentence. Exceptions overruled.