[Cite as State v. Fleckinger, 2024-Ohio-5659.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240253 TRIAL NO. B-2304839 Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
JENNIFER FLECKINGER, : OPINION
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: December 4, 2024
Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sean M. Donovan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Schuh & Goldberg, LLP, and Brian T. Goldberg, for Defendant-Appellant. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
WINKLER, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Jennifer Fleckinger appeals her conviction for
possession of cocaine under R.C. 2925.11(A). In her sole assignment of error, she
contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence found
in her car following a traffic stop. We find no merit in this assignment of error, and
we affirm her conviction.
{¶2} The record shows that on September 28, 2023, Agent Andrew Cadell of
the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office was assigned to the Regional Enforcement
Narcotics Unit. On that afternoon, he was in a marked cruiser conducting “highway
interdiction” along I-75 southbound when he saw a vehicle with extremely tinted front
windows and windshield. The tint was heavy enough that he could not tell whether
the driver of the vehicle was male or female.
{¶3} When Agent Cadell first noticed the vehicle, he was behind it, and he
believed that the driver changed his or her behavior upon seeing his cruiser. He
positioned his cruiser in front of the vehicle, but not in the same lane, and slowed down
to let the vehicle pass him so that he could initiate a traffic stop. The vehicle would
not pass him. Eventually, when he slowed down to less than 40 m.p.h. in a 65-m.p.h.
zone, the vehicle passed him and he conducted the stop. He noticed that the vehicle’s
front windows were up while it was in motion, but after the stop, they were rolled
down.
{¶4} Agent Cadell identified Fleckinger as the driver. He informed her that
she was pulled over because “the window tint is extremely dark” and that she was
driving at a slow speed. She told him that the vehicle belonged to a friend and that she
had picked it up for him. When Agent Cadell asked her for her driver’s license, she
produced it and informed him that it was under suspension.
2 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶5} Agent Cadell asked his partner to test the tint level. His partner
reported back that it was 96 percent, which was consistent with Agent Cadell’s
observations, although he did not know which window his partner had tested. He then
filled out a uniform traffic citation charging Fleckinger with excessive window tint
under R.C. 4513.241. During the course of the stop, the officers found that Fleckinger
possessed a small amount of cocaine.
{¶6} After the trial court denied her motion to suppress, Fleckinger entered
a plea of no contest to one count of possession of cocaine. She was sentenced to one
year of community control. This appeal followed.
{¶7} In her sole assignment of error, Fleckinger contends that the trial court
erred in denying her motion to suppress. She argues that the police officers lacked
probable cause to stop her vehicle. This assignment of error is not well taken.
{¶8} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of
law and fact. We must accept the trial court’s findings of fact as true if competent,
credible evidence supports them. But we must independently determine whether the
facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8;
State v. Houston, 2020-Ohio-5421, ¶ 56 (1st Dist.).
{¶9} An investigative stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment that must be supported by objective justification. State v. Andrews, 57
Ohio St.3d 86, 87 (1991); Houston at ¶ 57. The standard is not probable cause but
reasonable suspicion. Houston at ¶ 57; State v. Erkins, 2012-Ohio-5372, ¶ 32 (1st
Dist.). The police officers must point to specific and articulable facts that, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.
Andrews at 87, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). The standard is objective:
would the facts available to the officers at the moment of the seizure have warranted
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
an individual of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?
Andrews at 87; Houston at ¶ 57.
{¶10} Specifically, in relation to automobiles, if there is a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that an automobile or its occupants are subject to seizure for a
violation of the law, stopping that automobile and detaining its occupants are
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663
(1979); Houston at ¶ 58. A court determines the validity of an investigative stop by
looking at the totality of the circumstances. State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291
(1980), paragraph one of the syllabus; Houston at ¶ 58.
{¶11} Reasonable suspicion is an elusive concept, and “[p]recisely defining
reasonable suspicion is not possible.” It is not readily reduced to a “neat set of legal
rules.” State v. Hawkins, 2019-Ohio-4210, ¶ 20, quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 695-696 (1996); State v. Fisher 2024-Ohio-3164, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.). It is a less
demanding standard than probable cause. Hawkins at ¶ 20; Fisher at ¶ 17. But it is
something more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’”
Hawkins at ¶ 20; Fisher at ¶ 17.
{¶12} Fleckinger acknowledges that window-tint violations may provide
reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. See State v. McDonald, 2023-Ohio-464, ¶ 26
(8th Dist.); State v. Davenport, 2017-Ohio-688, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.). She argues that the
state failed to show that a window-tint violation occurred.
{¶13} When read together, R.C. 4513.241 and Adm.Code 4501-43-03 provide
that tinted windows preventing a person from seeing into the vehicle are prohibited,
subject to the standards in the Ohio Administrative Code. The administrative code
then sets out the specific light transmittance standards for each window. State v.
Scott, 2022-Ohio-3020, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.).
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶14} The administrative code requires that “light transmittance be at least 70
percent (plus or minus three percent) for windshields and at least 50 percent (plus or
minus three percent) for front side windows” Id. at ¶ 16. It defines “transmittance” as
“the ratio of the amount of total light, expressed in percentages, which is allowed to
pass through the product or material, including glazing, to the amount of total light
falling on the product or the material and the glazing.” Id. at ¶ 15, quoting Adm.Code
4501-41-02(C).
{¶15} Agent Cadell testified that when he first observed the vehicle, it had dark
window tint on the windows, including the windshield. He described it as “extremely
dark” to the point that he could not tell who the driver was or if the driver was male or
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[Cite as State v. Fleckinger, 2024-Ohio-5659.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240253 TRIAL NO. B-2304839 Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
JENNIFER FLECKINGER, : OPINION
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: December 4, 2024
Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sean M. Donovan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Schuh & Goldberg, LLP, and Brian T. Goldberg, for Defendant-Appellant. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
WINKLER, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Jennifer Fleckinger appeals her conviction for
possession of cocaine under R.C. 2925.11(A). In her sole assignment of error, she
contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence found
in her car following a traffic stop. We find no merit in this assignment of error, and
we affirm her conviction.
{¶2} The record shows that on September 28, 2023, Agent Andrew Cadell of
the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office was assigned to the Regional Enforcement
Narcotics Unit. On that afternoon, he was in a marked cruiser conducting “highway
interdiction” along I-75 southbound when he saw a vehicle with extremely tinted front
windows and windshield. The tint was heavy enough that he could not tell whether
the driver of the vehicle was male or female.
{¶3} When Agent Cadell first noticed the vehicle, he was behind it, and he
believed that the driver changed his or her behavior upon seeing his cruiser. He
positioned his cruiser in front of the vehicle, but not in the same lane, and slowed down
to let the vehicle pass him so that he could initiate a traffic stop. The vehicle would
not pass him. Eventually, when he slowed down to less than 40 m.p.h. in a 65-m.p.h.
zone, the vehicle passed him and he conducted the stop. He noticed that the vehicle’s
front windows were up while it was in motion, but after the stop, they were rolled
down.
{¶4} Agent Cadell identified Fleckinger as the driver. He informed her that
she was pulled over because “the window tint is extremely dark” and that she was
driving at a slow speed. She told him that the vehicle belonged to a friend and that she
had picked it up for him. When Agent Cadell asked her for her driver’s license, she
produced it and informed him that it was under suspension.
2 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶5} Agent Cadell asked his partner to test the tint level. His partner
reported back that it was 96 percent, which was consistent with Agent Cadell’s
observations, although he did not know which window his partner had tested. He then
filled out a uniform traffic citation charging Fleckinger with excessive window tint
under R.C. 4513.241. During the course of the stop, the officers found that Fleckinger
possessed a small amount of cocaine.
{¶6} After the trial court denied her motion to suppress, Fleckinger entered
a plea of no contest to one count of possession of cocaine. She was sentenced to one
year of community control. This appeal followed.
{¶7} In her sole assignment of error, Fleckinger contends that the trial court
erred in denying her motion to suppress. She argues that the police officers lacked
probable cause to stop her vehicle. This assignment of error is not well taken.
{¶8} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of
law and fact. We must accept the trial court’s findings of fact as true if competent,
credible evidence supports them. But we must independently determine whether the
facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8;
State v. Houston, 2020-Ohio-5421, ¶ 56 (1st Dist.).
{¶9} An investigative stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment that must be supported by objective justification. State v. Andrews, 57
Ohio St.3d 86, 87 (1991); Houston at ¶ 57. The standard is not probable cause but
reasonable suspicion. Houston at ¶ 57; State v. Erkins, 2012-Ohio-5372, ¶ 32 (1st
Dist.). The police officers must point to specific and articulable facts that, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.
Andrews at 87, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). The standard is objective:
would the facts available to the officers at the moment of the seizure have warranted
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
an individual of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?
Andrews at 87; Houston at ¶ 57.
{¶10} Specifically, in relation to automobiles, if there is a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that an automobile or its occupants are subject to seizure for a
violation of the law, stopping that automobile and detaining its occupants are
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663
(1979); Houston at ¶ 58. A court determines the validity of an investigative stop by
looking at the totality of the circumstances. State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291
(1980), paragraph one of the syllabus; Houston at ¶ 58.
{¶11} Reasonable suspicion is an elusive concept, and “[p]recisely defining
reasonable suspicion is not possible.” It is not readily reduced to a “neat set of legal
rules.” State v. Hawkins, 2019-Ohio-4210, ¶ 20, quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 695-696 (1996); State v. Fisher 2024-Ohio-3164, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.). It is a less
demanding standard than probable cause. Hawkins at ¶ 20; Fisher at ¶ 17. But it is
something more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’”
Hawkins at ¶ 20; Fisher at ¶ 17.
{¶12} Fleckinger acknowledges that window-tint violations may provide
reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. See State v. McDonald, 2023-Ohio-464, ¶ 26
(8th Dist.); State v. Davenport, 2017-Ohio-688, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.). She argues that the
state failed to show that a window-tint violation occurred.
{¶13} When read together, R.C. 4513.241 and Adm.Code 4501-43-03 provide
that tinted windows preventing a person from seeing into the vehicle are prohibited,
subject to the standards in the Ohio Administrative Code. The administrative code
then sets out the specific light transmittance standards for each window. State v.
Scott, 2022-Ohio-3020, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.).
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶14} The administrative code requires that “light transmittance be at least 70
percent (plus or minus three percent) for windshields and at least 50 percent (plus or
minus three percent) for front side windows” Id. at ¶ 16. It defines “transmittance” as
“the ratio of the amount of total light, expressed in percentages, which is allowed to
pass through the product or material, including glazing, to the amount of total light
falling on the product or the material and the glazing.” Id. at ¶ 15, quoting Adm.Code
4501-41-02(C).
{¶15} Agent Cadell testified that when he first observed the vehicle, it had dark
window tint on the windows, including the windshield. He described it as “extremely
dark” to the point that he could not tell who the driver was or if the driver was male or
female. That violation of R.C. 4513.241 gave him reasonable suspicion to stop the
vehicle.
{¶16} Video footage recorded by Agent Cadell’s dashboard camera and his and
his partner’s body cameras was admitted into evidence. Fleckinger argues that even
though Cadell testified that the windshield and the driver’s window were extremely
dark, the video footage showed that he could see through the windshield from the back
of the vehicle. While Agent Cadell acknowledged that he could see through the
windshield from the back, he said it was “still too dark.” He added that “it is a lot easier
to see out of a tinted windshield than into a tinted window.”
{¶17} Fleckinger further argues that Agent Cadell wrote on the citation that
the tint was 96 percent because that was reported to him by his partner. But he did
not check the windows himself, and he was not sure which window his partner had
tested. The testing did not occur until after the stop had taken place. In reviewing the
propriety of a stop, a court only looks at the facts the officer knew at the time of the
stop. Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 10 (1996); McDonald, 2023-Ohio-464, at
5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
¶ 30 (8th Dist.).
{¶18} Fleckinger’s arguments relate more to whether she was guilty of the
charged offense. But the police are not required to “correctly predict that a conviction
will result.” State v. Sims, 2017-Ohio-8379, ¶ 24 (1st Dist.). Whether a driver could
ultimately be found guilty of a window-tint violation is not determinative of whether
police had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. State v. Daniels, 2024-Ohio-
3392, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.); Sims at ¶ 24.
{¶19} The trial court’s findings that the window tint was “excessively dark,”
and that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle were supported by
competent, credible evidence. Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying
Fleckinger’s motion to suppress. We overrule Fleckinger’s assignment of error, and
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
BERGERON, P.J., and CROUSE, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.