[Cite as State v. Fisher, 2017-Ohio-7260.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ROSS COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 16CA3553
vs. :
SAMANTHA M. FISHER, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendant-Appellant. :
_________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Mark J. Miller, Columbus, Ohio, for appellant.
Matthew S. Schmidt, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pamela C. Wells, Ross County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellee.
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT DATE JOURNALIZED: 8-14-17 ABELE, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a Ross County Common Pleas Court judgment filed by
Samantha Fisher, defendant below and appellant herein. Appellant assigns the following errors for
review:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT OVERRULING APPELLANT’S TIER III SEX OFFENDER CLASSIFICATION BECAUSE THE MANDATORY SEX OFFENDER CLASSIFICATION IMPOSED UNDER SENATE BILL 10 CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AND VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH ROSS, 16CA3553 2
AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 9 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.”
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TIER III SEX-OFFENDER REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED ON APPELLANT ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE SENATE BILL 10 VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE.”
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE APPELLANT WHEN IT FAILED TO OVERRULE APPELLANT’S TIER III SEX OFFENDER CLASSIFICATION BECAUSE A SUFFICIENT NEXUS HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE AUTOMATIC TIER III CLASSIFICATION OF THOSE IN VIOLATION OF R.C. 2907.03(A)(7), WHEN APPLIED TO INDIVIDUALS LIKE APPELLANT, AND THE GOVERNMENT’S INTEREST IN PREVENTING TEACHERS FROM TAKING UNCONSCIONABLE ADVANTAGE OF STUDENTS.”
{¶ 2} On November 6, 2015, the Ross County Grand Jury returned an indictment that charged
appellant with two counts of sexual battery in violation of R.C. 2907.03(7), both felonies of the third
degree, after she was charged with engaging in sexual conduct with a 16-year-old student aide while
she was a teacher. Appellant pled not guilty to both counts.
{¶ 3} On April 5, 2016, appellant withdrew her guilty plea and pled guilty to both counts.
On May 3, 2016, current counsel entered his appearance as counsel of record for appellant, and on
May 6, 2016, appellant filed a motion to withdraw her plea. Appellant argued that her prior attorney
informed her that sexual battery carried a 10-year registration period, not lifetime registration, and
did not inform her of community notification. Appellant also objected to the Tier III Sex Offender
Classification because, appellant argued, the classification violates due process, separation of
powers, and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. ROSS, 16CA3553 3
{¶ 4} On May 23, 2016, the trial court held a hearing for three purposes: (1) to consider the
motion to withdraw her plea, (2) to conduct appellant’s sexual-offender classification hearing, and
(3) to determine appellant’s criminal disposition. The court first denied the motion for leave to
withdraw her plea, noting that the trial court had properly notified appellant of the lifetime
requirements at the change of plea hearing. The trial court then moved on to the classification
hearing. The court noted that appellant violated R.C. 2907.03, a Tier III sex offense. The court
instructed appellant on registration requirements and, after appellant’s counsel argued that the Tier
III classification as applied to appellant is unconstitutional, the court indicated that the classification
is set by statute and the court has no discretion in the matter.
{¶ 5} Turning to the disposition, the victim urged that appellant not be subject to the
lifetime registration and notification requirements. Once again, the court indicated that it had no
discretion regarding the mandatory classification. The judge went on to state “I can’t help but look
at your life though and think it’s been exemplary up to this point. You did a lot of things that would
make me proud if I were your parent of what you’ve done in your life and I think that is remarkable
for you.” However, the court went on to say, “Unfortunately on the other side of the coin is the fact
that you took advantage of a child that was in a horrible situation. His life circumstances made him,
perhaps, more vulnerable than most children would be in his position. There’s also the fact that we
have to send a message to other teachers and other people in positions of authority that you can’t
abuse and take advantage of your position of authority and do such things.”
{¶ 6} With that, the court sentenced appellant to serve 60 days in jail, but did allow work
release, followed by 90 days of house arrest with work privileges, and required her to perform 200
hours of community service to be completed within 12 months. Further, the judge ordered appellant ROSS, 16CA3553 4
to complete a sex offender class, to be evaluated for substance abuse, to obtain and keep
employment, to have no contact with the victim, and have no unsupervised conduct with children
under 18 throughout the pendency of the case until completion of community control. This appeal
followed.
{¶ 7} On May 25, 2016, appellant filed a motion to stay the registration sex offender
classification, registration, and notification requirements pending an appeal. The trial court denied
the request. On June 27, 2016, appellant filed a motion to stay registration requirements pending
the disposition of her appeal with this court. On July 19, 2016, this court denied the motion.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶ 8} “A statute may be challenged as unconstitutional on the basis that it is invalid on its
face or as applied to a particular set of facts.” State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 2007-Ohio-606,
861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 17. Here, appellant challenges the Tier III classification as unconstitutional as
applied to her, i.e., a twenty-two-year-old adult teacher indicted for offenses committed against a
sixteen-year-old student aide. Thus, we use a de novo standard of review to assess errors based
upon violations of constitutional law. State v. Sidam, 4th Dist. Adams No. 15CA1014,
2016-Ohio-7906, ¶ 19, citing State v. Burgette, 4th Dist. Athens No. 13CA50, 2014-Ohio-3483, ¶
10; see also State v. Coburn, 4th Dist. Ross No. 08CA3062, 2009-Ohio-632, ¶ 6.
{¶ 9} The statutes enacted by the General Assembly are entitled to a “strong presumption of
constitutionality.” State v. Romage, 138 Ohio St.3d 390, 2014-Ohio-783, 7 N.E.3d 1156, ¶ 7.
Thus, “if at all possible, statutes must be construed in conformity with the Ohio and the United
States Constitutions.” State v. Collier, 62 Ohio St.3d 267, 269, 581 N.E.2d 552 (1991). The ROSS, 16CA3553 5
Supreme Court of Ohio has held that a court is only permitted to declare a statute unconstitutional if
it “ ‘appear[s] beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly
incompatible.’ ” State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 409, 700 N.E.2d 570 (1998), quoting State ex
rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St. 142, 128 N.E.2d 59 (1955).
{¶ 10} In the case sub judice, appellant pled guilty to two counts of sexual battery in
violation of R.C. 2907.03, which provides that: “(A) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with
another, not the spouse of the offender, when any of the following apply: (7) The offender is a
teacher, administrator, coach, or other person in authority employed by or serving in a school for
which the state board of education prescribes minimum standards pursuant to division (D) of section
3301.07 of the Revised Code, the other person is enrolled in or attends that school, and the offender
is not enrolled in and does not attend that school.”
{¶ 11} Senate Bill 10 created a three-tier sex-offender-classification system. R.C.
2950.01(G)(1) lists the offenses that automatically mandate that an offender be classified as a Tier III
sex offender. R.C. 2950.01(G)(1)(a) provides that a sex offender who pleads guilty to a violation of
R.C. 2907.03 must be classified as a Tier III sex offender. Thus, the trial court classified appellant
as a Tier III sex offender as a result of her conviction for two counts of sexual battery in violation of
R.C. 2907.03(A)(7). Tier III sex offenders must verify their current residence address or current
school, institution of higher education, or place of employment address every 90 days after the
offender’s initial registration date. R.C. 2950.06(B)(3).
II. FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 12} In her first assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by not
overruling her Tier III sex offender classification because the Senate Bill 10 mandatory sex offender ROSS, 16CA3553 6
classification constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and violates the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 13} While most states addressing Eighth Amendment challenges to mandatory
sex-offender classifications for adults have dismissed those challenges based on their findings that
the registration schemes are remedial rather than punitive, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that
the enhanced sex-offender reporting and notification requirements contained in R.C. Chapter 2950
are punitive. See State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, ¶ 16.
“Ohio’s current sex-offender-registration statutes create a three-tier classification system. Unlike
the earlier ‘labeling’ classification system under Megan’s Law, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2560, in
which a judge could consider the characteristics of an offender before sentencing, ‘tier’ classification
is based solely upon the offense for which a person is convicted and the judge has no discretion to
modify the classification.” State v. Blankenship, 145 Ohio St.3d 221, 2015-Ohio-4624, 48 N.E.3d
516, ¶ 11, citing Williams at ¶ 20.
A. Federal Law
{¶ 14} The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, “Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
Appellant argues that her automatic classification amounts to cruel and unusual punishment because,
she contends, the punishment is disproportionate to the crime. The central focus is that the
“punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.” Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910).
{¶ 15} When considering Eighth Amendment challenges, and whether to adopt a categorical
rule, the United States Supreme Court has taken the following approach: “The Court first considers ROSS, 16CA3553 7
‘objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice’ to
determine whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue. * * * Next,
guided by ‘the standards elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court’s own understanding
and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose, * * * the Court
must determine in the exercise of its own independent judgment whether the punishment in question
violates the Constitution.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825
(2010).
National Consensus
{¶ 16} With regard to the national consensus prong of the analysis, appellant contends that
few people would find it reasonable to require an individual to register as a sex offender when the
offender does not share any of the characteristics of a sex offender and when an extremely low risk
exists for reoffending, citing State v. Blankenship, 145 Ohio St.3d 221, 2015-Ohio-4624, 48 N.E.3d
516, ¶ 77 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). Appellant argues that she engaged in consensual sex with the
student aide, and that the trial judge seemed reluctant to classify her as a Tier III sex offender.
However, as the state notes, the pre-sentence investigation (PSI) indicated that while appellant’s
ORAS score was a 7, which is a low risk of reoffending, the PSI also indicated that appellant “has
some criminal attitudes, sometimes feels a lack of control over the events in her life, and she agrees
with ‘do unto others before they do unto you.’”
{¶ 17} Generally, a national consensus favors similar sex offender registration requirements.
See, e.g., Blankenship at ¶ 36 (Indeed, such sanctions are now the norm, citing People v. Temelkoski,
307 Mich.App. 241, 262, 859 N.@.2d 743 (2014) (“all 50 states and the federal government have
enacted some form of sex offender registration and notification provisions.”)); Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d ROSS, 16CA3553 8
at 406 (all 50 states have a sex offender registration law and Ohio has had one in place since 1963).
Further, although appellant does not have a prior criminal history, she was a teacher, a position that
the General Assembly, in enacting the subsection regarding teachers, coaches and administrators, has
deemed to have special responsibilities due to the authority that teachers exert over their students.
Thus, we do not find a national consensus would object to appellant’s classification as a Tier III sex
offender with its attendant registration and notification requirements.
{¶ 18} We now turn to the second step of our analysis.
Does the Punishment Violate the Constitution?
{¶ 19} In determining whether the punishment violates the Constitution, the United States
Supreme Court has set forth a three-step analysis: (1) the culpability of the offender in light of the
crime and characteristics, (2) the severity of the punishment, and (3) the penological justification.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 67-68.
Culpability of the Offender
{¶ 20} The first consideration in the independent review is assessing the offender's
culpability. Blankenship, 145 Ohio St.3d 221 at ¶ 23. As a matter of law, appellant’s conviction
for sexual battery makes her a sex offender. R.C. 2950.01(B)(1). Appellant argues that requiring
her to register as a sex offender based solely on the offense committed, and without considering her
character or the nature of the offense, results in excessive punishment. Appellant cites In re CP.,
131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, ¶ 42, to support her argument that the nature
of her offense is mild. However, In re C.P. held that “[t]o the extent that it imposes automatic,
lifelong registration and notification requirements on juvenile sex offenders tried within the juvenile
system, R.C. 2152.86 violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment ROSS, 16CA3553 9
contained in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution,
Article I, Section 9, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 16.” Id. at syllabus. We point out that In
re C.P. involved juvenile offenders, whereas in the case at bar appellant is an adult offender.
Further, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied an Eighth Amendment challenge in Blankenship even
though psychologists determined that Blankenship had a low risk of reoffending. See Blankenship,
145 Ohio St.3d 221, 2015-Ohio-4624, 48 N.E.3d 516, at ¶ 3. Moreover, even though appellant
argues that she is not a “sex offender,” she has been classified as one as a matter of law, and the trial
court ordered her to attend sex offender treatment.
{¶ 21} Appellant also argues that the victim in this case consented to the sexual conduct with
appellant, that no evidence indicates that the victim suffered any irreparable harm, and that appellant
is unlikely to commit another criminal offense. In Blankenship, the court noted that the defendant
was six years older than the victim and, therefore, deemed more culpable and more deserving of
punishment. Blankenship at ¶ 24. Here, appellant is also six years older than the victim. While
appellant contends that the conduct was consensual, the fact remains that appellant, a teacher, took
advantage of an underage student. Appellant also indicated in the PSI report that she knew that the
victim’s father had recently died, and she took his number to alert him if anyone was looking for him
when he was in areas of the school for which he had no authorization. Appellant was the first to
text him, and he came to her home twice where the sexual conduct occurred. Appellant is indeed
culpable for the criminal acts that she committed.
Severity of the Punishment
{¶ 22} The second consideration is the severity of the punishment. Appellant, an adult ROSS, 16CA3553 10
teacher, engaged in a sexual relationship with a 16-year-old student aide at her school, fully aware of
his age. She could have received a sentence of one to five years in prison for her third-degree
felony. Instead, the trial court placed appellant on community control for three years, sentenced her
to serve 60 days in jail and 90 days of house arrest, ordered her to attend sex offender treatment,
ordered an evaluation for substance abuse, and required her to perform 200 hours of community
service and have no unsupervised contact with children under the age of 18.
{¶ 23} In Blankenship, the Tier II offender was 21 years of age and the victim was 15 at the
time the relationship began. The court concluded “[o]ur research reveals no case in which similar
registration and verification requirements have been held to be cruel and unusual punishment.”
Blankenship at ¶ 27. Appellant also argues that she is a low risk offender. The Blankenship court
rejected a similar argument when the defendant presented evidence from a psychologist that he
presented a “low risk” of re-offending. The Blankenship court held that while the requirements to
register every 180 days for 25 years are burdensome, it did not rise to a constitutional level. Id.
While appellant’s registration requirements are more onerous than a Tier III offender, we find no
authority to support the view that the requirements rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.
Penological Justifications
{¶ 24} The final consideration in an Eighth Amendment analysis is to assess the penological
justifications for the sentencing practice. Graham, 560 U.S. at 67. As the Blankenship court noted,
“[t]he stated purpose of S.B. 10 and its registration and community-notification requirements is ‘to
protect the safety and general welfare of the people of this state.’ R.C. 2950.02(B).” Blankenship at
¶ 28. The court went on to acknowledge that sex-offender registration schemes have been criticized
on the ground that they do not actually serve the intended purpose of community protection. Id. at ROSS, 16CA3553 11
¶ 29. However, the court concluded that the penological grounds for imposing such requirements
are “still accepted in many quarters and are justified in part based upon the perceived high rate of
recidivism and resistance to treatment among sex offenders.” Id. at ¶ 30. Accordingly, we cannot
conclude that the registration and notification requirements for Tier III offenders are so unjustified as
to constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
B. Ohio Law
{¶ 25} The Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 9, contains its own prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. While it contains the same language as the United States Constitution, it
provides unique protection for Ohioans. See Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 616 N.E.2d
163 (1993), paragraph one of the syllabus. Cases involving cruel and unusual punishment are rare,
“limited to those involving sanctions which under the circumstances would be considered shocking
to any reasonable person.” McDougle v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St.2d 68, 70, 203 N.E.2d 334 (1964). “A
punishment does not violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, if
it be not so greatly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the sense of justice of the community.”
State v. Chaffin, 30 Ohio St.2d 13, 282 N.E.2d 46, paragraph three of the syllabus (1972).
{¶ 26} Ohio courts have held that the reporting requirements for Tier I and Tier II sex
offenders do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., State v. Conley, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 27869, 2016-Ohio-5310; State v. Bradley, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-100833,
2011-Ohio-6266. This court sees no reason not to apply this rationale to Tier III offenders. With
R.C. 2907.03(A)(7), the General Assembly codified an intention to protect school children from
adults in positions of authority. In this case, appellant, a teacher, used her position of authority to ROSS, 16CA3553 12
develop a sexual relationship with a 16-year-old child, a student aide in her classroom. We
conclude that based on existing authority and the reasoning behind Senate Bill 10's protections, to
require appellant to register every 90 days for life does not shock the sense of justice in the
community, and thus does not violate the Ohio Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
III. Second Assignment of Error
{¶ 27} In her second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the Tier III sex-offender
requirements are unconstitutional because Senate Bill 10 violates the separation of powers doctrine.
Appellant argues that under Senate Bill 10, the judiciary’s function is simply ministerial when
issuing a judgment to validate what the legislative branch has already finalized.
{¶ 28} Although not explicitly stated in Ohio’s Constitution, “[t]he separation-of-powers
doctrine implicitly arises from our tripartite democratic form of government and recognizes that the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of our government have their own unique powers and
duties that are separate and apart from the others.” State v. Thompson, 92 Ohio St.3d 584, 586, 752
N.E.2d 276 (2001), citing City of Zanesville v. Zanesville Tel. & Tel. Co., 63 Ohio St. 442, 59 N.E.
109 (1900), paragraph one of the syllabus. “It has long been recognized in this state that the General
Assembly has the plenary power to prescribe crimes and affix penalties.” State v. Morris, 55 Ohio
St.2d 101, 112, 378 N.E.2d 708 (1978).
{¶ 29} The Third District considered the question of whether S.B. 10 is unconstitutional, as
applied to those convicted of sexual battery in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(2), for violating the
separation of powers doctrine in State v. Ritchey, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-15-80, 2016-Ohio-2878. The
court pointed to Thompson, State v. Bodkye, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, ROSS, 16CA3553 13
and State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108. The Third District
noted that before the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams, Ohio’s sex offender registration
requirements were considered remedial in nature. Therefore, Megan’s Law did not violate the
separation of powers doctrine because it did not remove the fact-finding authority from the judiciary.
Thompson at 588.
{¶ 30} Now, however, the classification discretion has been removed from the judiciary and
vested in the General Assembly. The Supreme Court also later declared the Act punitive in
Williams. The Ritchey court concluded that requiring offenders convicted of sexual battery in
violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(2) to be classified as Tier III sex offenders “is no different than a
mandatory prison sentence, mandatory fine, or any other mandatory punishments that the General
Assembly deems necessary. Mandatory sex offender registration and classification does not remove
the fact-finding power of the court regarding whether sexual battery was committed. That power
remains with the trial court. Rather, the Act provides for an additional punishment for those
convicted of sex offenses in Ohio, which remains within the General Assembly’s plenary power.
Accordingly, the Act, as applied to those convicted of sexual battery in violation of R.C.
2907.03(A)(2), does not violate the separation of powers doctrine as it does not usurp the judiciary’s
role in administering justice.” Ritchey at ¶ 28-29. We agree. Although appellant’s convictions
involve a different subsection of the sexual battery statute, this case involves the same crime and
same Tier III classification.
{¶ 31} Moreover, this court has held that a Tier III sex offender classification “is nothing
more than a collateral consequence arising from *** criminal conduct, and because [the defendant]
has no reasonable expectation that [the defendant’s] ‘criminal conduct would not be subject to future ROSS, 16CA3553 14
versions of R.C. Chapter 2950,’ it cannot be said that SB 10 abrogates final judicial determinations.”
State v. Coburn, 4th Dist. Ross No. 08CA3062, 2009-Ohio-632, ¶ 18. Appellant’s second
assignment of error is overruled.
IV. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 32} In her third assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it
failed to overrule appellant’s Tier III sex offender classification because a sufficient nexus had not
been established between the automatic Tier III classification of those in violation of R.C.
2907.03(A))(7), when applied to individuals like appellant, and the government’s interest in
preventing teachers from taking unconscionable advantage of students.
{¶ 33} The state first points out that this issue was not raised or addressed at the trial court
level. “The failure to raise at the trial court level the issue of constitutionality of a statute or its
application, which is apparent at the time of trial, constitutes a waiver of such issue and a deviation
from this state’s orderly procedure, and therefore need not be heard for the first time on appeal.”
State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 489 N.E.2d 277 (1986), syllabus. However, reviewing courts do
have discretion to consider a forfeited constitutional challenge to a statute. State v. Quarterman,
140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 16. “Even when waiver is clear, the court
reserves the right to consider constitutional challenges to the application of statutes in specific cases
of plain error or where the rights and interests involved may warrant it.” In re M.D., 38 Ohio St.3d
149, 527 N.E.2d 286 (1988), syllabus.
{¶ 34} Turning to the potential merits of appellant’s argument, the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution provides that “no State shall * * * deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Appellant does not claim that the classification ROSS, 16CA3553 15
involves a fundamental right or a suspect class; thus, the standard of review is the “rational basis”
test, which requires that the statute be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental
purpose. See State v. Peoples, 102 Ohio St.3d 460, 2004-Ohio-3923, 812 N.E.2d 963. “The
appropriate standard of review is whether the difference in treatment between [the affected class and
those outside the class] rationally furthers a legitimate state interest. In general, the Equal
Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason for the classification.”
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992).
{¶ 35} Appellant raises an as-applied constitutional challenge to the application of R.C.
2907.03(A)(7). A successful as-applied challenge would exempt appellant from a statute’s
application, but the statute would remain otherwise enforceable. See Yajnik v. Akron Dept. of
Health, Hous. Div., 101 Ohio St.3d 106, 109, 2004-Ohio-357, 802 N.E.2d 632. Appellant argues
that the sweep of the statute should not encompass consensual sexual activity and those offenders
who are determined to pose little to no threat of re-offending. Appellant argues that “[t]here is no
evidence in this case that Ms. Fisher engaged in any violence or coercion against her student aid
(sic.). R.C. 2907.03(A)(7) is, she argues, therefore unconstitutional under the facts of this case
because it is not rationally related to its intended purpose of preventing teachers from taking
unconscionable advantage of students by using their undue influence over their students in order to
pursue sexual relationships.” We disagree.
{¶ 36} The rational-basis test involves a two-step analysis. “We must identify a valid state
interest. Second, we must determine whether the method or means by which the state has chosen to
advance that interest is rational.” McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 107 Ohio St.3d 272,
2005-Ohio-6505, 839 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 9, citing Buchman v. Wayne Trace Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., ROSS, 16CA3553 16
73 Ohio St.3d 260, 267, 652 N.E.2d 952 (1995); Pickaway Cty. Skilled Gaming v. Cordray, 127
Ohio St.3d 104, 2010-Ohio-4908, 936 N.E.2d 944, ¶ 19.
State Interest
{¶ 37} With regard to the intent prong of the analysis, we highlight the Supreme Court’s
recent analysis of a different subsection of R.C. 2907.03, (A)(13), involving peace officers. State v.
Mole, 149 Ohio St.3d 215, 2016-Ohio-5124, _ N.E.3d _. R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) provides: “No
person shall engage in sexual conduct with another, not the spouse of the offender, when any of the
following apply: (13) The other person is a minor, the offender is a peace officer, and the offender is
more than two years older than the other person.”
{¶ 38} The Supreme Court noted that the General Assembly created the offense of sexual
battery, R.C. 2907.03, to prohibit “sexual conduct with a person other than the offender’s spouse in a
variety of situations where the offender takes unconscionable advantage of the victim.’ Legislative
Service Commission 1973 Comment to R.C. 2907.03 as enacted by Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511.” Mole
at ¶ 34. Similarly, the court stated that “the purpose of R.C. 2907.03 is to protect particularly
vulnerable people, including minors and others who are legally unable to consent to sexual activity,
from the harms that flow from sexual conduct. But in doing so, the General Assembly focused its
criminalization of sexual conduct on those who use their professional status to take unconscionable
advantage of minors, * * *.” Id. at ¶ 43.
{¶ 39} The court went on to find that the state does have a compelling interest to protect
minors from sexual coercion and an interest to prohibit peace officers from abusing their authority in
order to sexually exploit minors. However, the court struck down that subsection of the statute,
holding that it is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose, and thus declared it to ROSS, 16CA3553 17
be unconstitutional on its face because the government intended to punish a class of professionals
without making a connection between the classification and the prohibited act. Id. at ¶ 70. The
court focused on the fact that peace officers are liable under the statute even if they did not use their
status as peace officers to identify potential victims and abuse them.
{¶ 40} Certain aspects of State v. Mole are relevant to this case. For example, the court
stated that “R.C. 2907.03 is generally a valid scheme insofar as it imposes strict liability for sexual
conduct on various classes of offenders who exploit their victims through established authoritarian
relationships.” Id. at ¶ 2. The court found that subdivision (A)(13) irrationally imposes the same
strict liability on peace officers even when there is no occupation-based relationship between the
officer and the victim.
{¶ 41} However, rather than calling for the same result in this case, we believe that Mole in
fact supports our view. First, Mole involved an equal protection challenge both under the United
States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, and the Court focused heavily on the fact that the
court has autonomy under the Ohio Constitution “to interpret our Constitution to afford greater rights
to our citizens when we believe that such an interpretation is both prudent and not inconsistent with
the intent of the framers.” Id. at ¶ 21. In the case sub judice, appellant challenges the statute under
the United States Constitution. Further, Mole reaffirmed that “statutes are presumed to be
constitutional and * * * courts have a duty to liberally construe statutes in order to save them from
constitutional infirmities.” Id. at ¶ 27. Moreover, “[t]he party challenging the constitutionality of a
statute ‘bears the burden to negate every conceivable basis that might support the legislation.’” Id.
{¶ 42} Most important, Mole reviewed the historical background of R.C. 2907.04 and
strict-liability sex crimes based on relationships. “When enacting the new R.C. Chapter 2907, the ROSS, 16CA3553 18
General Assembly intended that private sexual conduct between consenting adults ought not be
criminalized but that the law ought to proscribe sexual conduct that is assaultive, that involves the
young and immature, or that carries a significant risk of harm. The seriousness of harm or risk of
harm is based on one or more of four factors: ‘the type of sexual activity involved; the means used to
commit the offense; the age of the victim; and whether the offender stands in some special
relationship to the victim.’ ” Id. at ¶ 32, citing Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Summary of
Am.Sub.H.B. 511 13 (Dec. 1972) (Emphasis sic.) “Using the above four factors, the General
Assembly created a new offense of sexual battery, R.C. 2907.03, to prohibit ‘sexual conduct with a
person other than the offender’s spouse in a variety of situations where the offender takes
unconscionable advantage of the victim.’ ” Id. at ¶ 34, citing Legislative Service Commission 1973
comment to R.C. 2907.03 as enacted by Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511.
{¶ 43} The court noted that the statute was amended in response to incidents involving
inappropriate sexual conduct committed by adults who had special authoritative relationships with
minors or other vulnerable populations, but who were not covered by subdivisions (1) through (6) of
the statute. Id. at ¶ 35. The court concluded that the foregoing history “demonstrates that the
purpose of R.C. 2907.03 is to protect particularly vulnerable people, including minors and others
who are legally unable to consent to sexual activity, from the harms that flow from sexual conduct.”
Id. at ¶ 43. Although appellant argues that the sexual conduct in this case was consensual, we
believe that the statute exists to protect the vulnerable, a legitimate state interest.
Rationally Related to Legitimate State Interest
{¶ 44} The second prong of the Equal Protection analysis is whether the legislative
distinction bears a rational relationship to the legitimate state interest. The court held that the sexual ROSS, 16CA3553 19
conduct at issue in Mole is unrelated to Mole’s professional status, a fact that is distinguishable from
our analysis in the case sub judice, in which appellant’s status as a teacher is very much related to the
sexual conduct at issue. The court concluded, “it is the access provided by the occupational
relationship, and not the occupation by itself, that creates the risk of harm” Id. at ¶ 57.
{¶ 45} While the court found that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) violated Equal Protection on its face,
Mole only applies to the peace officer portion of the statute, and we see clear support in the opinion
to continue to uphold subsection (7) due to the occupational authoritative relationship of a teacher
and student.
{¶ 46} Although the appellant describes the sexual conduct in the case at bar as consensual,
it does not erase the fact that appellant was employed as a teacher, an authority figure who the
General Assembly has deemed is, and should be, held to a higher standard due to the control teachers
exert in student’s lives. This is the sort of behavior the legislature intended to punish, if not thwart,
by specifying the teacher, coach, administrator portion of R.C. 2907.03 sexual battery.
{¶ 47} Consequently, in this case we hold that R.C. 2907.03(A)(7) is rationally related to its
intended purpose to prevent teachers from taking unconscionable advantage of students by using
undue influence over the students to pursue sexual relationships. Because appellant did not
demonstrate how the statute as applied violates the Equal Protection Clause, we find no error,
overrule appellant’s third assignment of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. ROSS, 16CA3553 20
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the judgment is affirmed and that appellee recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail has been previously granted, it is continued for a period of sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of said stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of the proceedings in that court. The stay as herein continued will terminate at the expiration of the sixty-day period.
The stay will also terminate if appellant fails to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to the expiration of said sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
McFarland, J. & Hoover, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
For the Court
BY: Peter B. Abele, Judge ROSS, 16CA3553 21
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.