State v. Fisher

Opinion

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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT L. FISHER (AC 48859)

Westbrook, Wilson and Eveleigh, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree as a result of a shooting, the defendant appealed. He claimed that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a new trial because the judge improperly failed to disclose, prior to presiding over the trial, that he had applied for the position of Inspector General within the Division of Criminal Justice, which created the appearance of a lack of impartiality. Held:

The judge’s pending application for the supervisory prosecutorial position of Inspector General while presiding at the defendant’s trial created an appearance of a lack of impartiality, as the Division of Criminal Justice was the same agency that prosecuted the defendant through the state’s attorney’s office, and, pursuant to rule 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires a judge to avoid the appearance of partiality, the judge should have disqualified himself or disclosed his application to the parties and obtained their waiver prior to proceeding with the trial; accordingly, as the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

This court rejected the state’s contention that the defendant waived his claim regarding the judge’s appearance of partiality, as it was undisputed that the defendant was not aware of the judge’s prospective employment until a hearing on the defendant’s postverdict motions when the judge disclosed that he had been appointed to the Inspector General position, the defendant at that hearing consented only to the judge’s adjudication of the postverdict motions and his presiding at the defendant’s sentencing, and defense counsel made clear that the defendant was preserving his right to file a motion for a new trial based on an appearance of partiality.

The state’s claim that the defendant untimely filed his motion for a new trial based on an appearance of partiality was unavailing, as the record was unclear as to when the defendant became aware that the judge had submitted an application for the Inspector General position prior to presiding at the trial, and, even if this court were to apply a harmless error type analysis, as the state requested, reversal of the defendant’s conviction was appropriate, as there existed a risk of injustice to the parties, a denial of relief would produce injustice in other cases in which judges preside while applying and negotiating for their next jobs, and the public’s confidence in the judicial process would be undermined.

Argued May 28—officially released August 25, 2026

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with the crime of manslaughter in the first degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Litchfield and tried to the jury before Prescott, J.; thereafter, the court denied the defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal; verdict of guilty; subsequently, the court denied the defendant’s motions to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, and rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed; new trial.

Jon L. Schoenhorn, for the appellant (defendant). Meryl R. Gersz, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, was David R. Shannon, state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

EVELEIGH, J. The defendant, Robert L. Fisher, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims, inter alia, that the trial judge improperly failed to disclose that he had a pending application for a prosecutorial position within the Division of Criminal Justice at the time of the defendant’s trial, which created an appearance of a lack of impartiality. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.1 The record reveals the following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history. At 1 The defendant also claims that (1) the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting a character witness for the defense from testifying that he was a former prosecutor, (2) the trial court committed plain error in its final charge to the jury regarding an eyewitness’ testimony on cross-examination, (3) the trial court improperly denied his motion to set aside the jury’s guilty verdict, and (4) the prosecutor made improper remarks during closing argument that deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. In light of our conclusion reversing the judgment, we need not reach these claims.

approximately 4:45 p.m. on June 7, 2021, the seventyfive year old defendant parked his car in the parking lot of Cramer & Anderson LLP, a law firm at 46 West Street in Litchfield. The defendant, who was an attorney, had practiced real estate and probate law as a partner of the law firm for more than four decades.

The decedent, Matthew Bromley, had been driving his car behind the defendant’s car. Bromley parked at an angle in the space next to the defendant’s car. He got out and quickly walked around the rear of his car toward the driver’s door of the defendant’s car. He pulled open the door and began punching the defendant in the face. After he punched the defendant several times, the defendant exited his car. The altercation continued and the defendant retrieved a handgun from its holster in his right front pocket.2 He shot Bromley once in the head, killing him.3 Immediately after the shooting, the defendant called 911. The defendant spoke to the police at the scene and indicated that he had shot Bromley, whom he did not know, after Bromley had assaulted him and threatened to kill him. The defendant was not arrested at that time. The defendant also subsequently gave a written statement to the police through his counsel, providing a detailed account of his altercation with Bromley and again indicating that he had shot Bromley in self-defense. Almost one year after the shooting, the defendant was arrested and charged with manslaughter in the first degree in violation of § 53a-55 (a) (1).

The case was tried to a jury over the course of several days in March 2025 with the court, Prescott, J.,4 presiding . The state presented testimony from, inter alios, two 2 The defendant possessed a valid pistol permit. 3 An autopsy revealed that Bromley’s blood alcohol content was 0.11 percent at the time of his death.

4 Judge Prescott was a senior judge at the time of the defendant’s trial. “A senior judge is a judge who elects to retire from full-time service prior to reaching the age of seventy. . . . A senior judge continues to retain all of the powers possessed prior to assuming senior status.” (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Wasko v. Farley, 108 Conn. App. 156, 160, eyewitnesses who had seen the shooting.5 Guadalupe Salazar, one of the eyewitnesses, worked at a restaurant near the defendant’s law office. Salazar had been walking through the parking lot of a Union Savings Bank, which was adjacent to the law office parking lot, as he was returning to work from his car. The parking lots were separated by a median with grass, trees, and asphalt curbing.

Salazar testified that he had heard two cars enter the law office parking lot. He stopped and watched as Bromley parked next to the defendant and got out of his vehicle .6 Salazar testified that Bromley, who he described as aggressive, went “[f]ast” around his car and rapidly opened the defendant’s door. He saw Bromley punch the defendant. He could not remember how many times Bromley punched the defendant. Salazar testified that there was no argument preceding Bromley’s attack on the defendant. When Bromley stopped punching the defendant, Bromley turned around and walked toward his car. It appeared to Salazar, at that point, that the fight was over.

Salazar testified that Bromley had stopped walking when he got to the rear of his car. Salazar saw the defendant exit his car holding a pistol. Salazar could see that the defendant and Bromley were arguing, but they were not yelling and he could not hear what they were saying. He saw the defendant take two steps toward Bromley and put the gun on Bromley’s stomach. They kept arguing, and the defendant moved the gun toward Bromley’s throat. The defendant then shot Bromley, and Bromley immediately fell to the ground. Salazar testified that, 947 A.2d 978, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 922, 958 A.2d 155 (2008); see also General Statutes §§ 51-50d and 51-50i.

5 The state also presented testimony from Henry B. Morehouse, a witness who heard the shooting from a nearby residence, observed the scene from a window after the shooting, and called 911. Morehouse did not observe the shooting itself or the events leading up to the shooting. Although he heard the gunshot and a woman’s scream afterward, he did not hear any argument prior to the shooting.

6 Throughout his testimony, Salazar referred to Bromley as the “younger” man and to the defendant as the “older” man.

when the defendant shot Bromley, they were “[r]ight next to each other” behind their cars and they stood “[f]ace to face.” He believed that the defendant shot Bromley in the neck.

Salazar testified that, once the defendant exited his car, he did not see Bromley hit the defendant. In addition, he saw the defendant walk toward Bromley but did not see Bromley walk toward the defendant. Salazar did not see Bromley try to reach for the defendant’s gun but did see that Bromley’s hands were “[d]own” at the time he was shot. Salazar explained that he was “right in front of [the defendant’s] car,” approximately eight to ten yards away from where the shooting took place, when he made the foregoing observations. He also testified, however, that it was “impossible” to hear the argument between Bromley and the defendant because he was “far away . . . .” He believed that he was “the only [witness] who saw the whole thing” because other witnesses were farther away.

Nakisha Marrero, the other eyewitness presented by the state, had been sitting in the driver’s seat of her father’s car in the parking lot of the Union Savings Bank.7 The car was parked facing toward the law office parking lot, where the defendant and Bromley were parked. Marrero testified that she had been looking at her phone and, when she looked up, saw the defendant reach into his car and pull out a gun. She could not hear what the defendant and Bromley were saying but assumed they were arguing. She saw the defendant shoot Bromley and watched Bromley fall backward immediately.

During direct examination by the state, Marrero testified that, when Bromley was shot, he was standing toward the back of his car, and the defendant was still 7 Marrero, who was eighteen years old at the time of the shooting, testified that she and her mother had driven to the parking lot to meet her father so they could have dinner with him in his car while he was on his break at work. Marrero’s father, who was not in the parking lot at the time of the shooting, worked at the same restaurant as Salazar. Marrero’s mother, who was still in her car at the time of the shooting, was not called as a witness at trial.

standing in the doorway of his car. She had seen the defendant “[move] forward a little bit, but [he] was still very close enough to the door.” She noticed that Bromley was “way . . . smaller” and “a little bit . . . skinnier” than the defendant, and that, when Bromley was shot, his hands were “[a]t the side of his body.” She also testified that she had not seen Bromley hit the defendant or reach for the defendant’s gun prior to the shooting.

During cross-examination of Marrero, defense counsel offered into evidence a written statement that Marrero had provided to the police on the night of the shooting, which was admitted for impeachment purposes only.8 After reading her statement, Marrero acknowledged that there were inconsistencies between her initial trial testimony and her written statement to the police. For instance, Marrero initially testified that she did not see any kind of fight or commotion prior to seeing the defendant retrieve his gun, as she “wasn’t really paying attention at that time.” On cross-examination, however, she acknowledged that she previously had stated that she saw Bromley approach the defendant’s driver’s door, that he appeared very angry and that he wanted to hit the defendant.9 She testified, in accordance with her writ-

8 At the time of the statement’s admission, the court instructed the jury: “Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this is now a full exhibit, which, my understanding is, it’s her prior statement given to law enforcement. As of right now, all that you can use this document for is to assess her credibility in court. It’s not substantive evidence . . . the things that are in that statement are not substantive evidence of what happened. You have her in-court testimony. That’s going to help you judge whether or not you find it to be credible and consistent.”

In addition, during its final charge to the jury, the court provided the following instruction: “[D]uring the testimony of . . . Marrero, I admitted evidence that she may have made statements outside of court that may be inconsistent with her trial testimony. You should consider this evidence only as it relates to the credibility of her testimony in court, not as substantive evidence. In other words, consider such evidence as you would any other evidence of inconsistent conduct in determining the weight to be given to the testimony of the witness in court. Any other use of that evidence would be improper.”

9 Specifically, Marrero’s written statement provides in relevant part: “I saw [two] males, one younger and one older, the older male was still in his car . . . . The younger male was approaching the driver’s side door ten statement, that the defendant was trying to defend himself against Bromley, as Bromley kept going after him while he was in the car. Marrero further testified that, when the defendant got out of the car, Bromley “tried to swing, but he wasn’t close.”

In addition, according to Marrero’s written statement, she had seen Bromley step toward the defendant, while the defendant was outside the car, before the gun was fired.10 Marrero explained that her initial testimony to the contrary was incorrect. As to the reason for her inconsistent testimony, Marrero explained: “It’s hard to remember. It was a couple of years ago.”11 She agreed with defense counsel that the written statement she had provided to the police on the night of the shooting would be more accurate than her initial testimony at trial.

The state also presented testimony from several responding police officers. The officers testified regarding of the older [male’s] vehicle. I could not hear anything because the air conditioning in the car was on high and loud. The younger male seemed really mad from his body language as if he wanted to hit the older male. The older [male’s] door was open and the younger male was in the door trying to hit the older male from what I was able to see. The older male was trying to push the younger male away and protect himself from being hit, trying to push the younger male out of the car. The younger male kept coming toward the older male who was still in the car. I was able to see the younger male punching at the older male, the older male was stopping the younger male from punching him using his hands to block.”

10 Specifically, Marrero’s written statement provides in relevant part:

“I don’t remember seeing the older male exit the car, I don’t know if I looked away or blanked out, but I remember seeing the older male out of the car with a gun pointed at the younger male. . . . The older male had the gun pointed at the younger [male’s] neck area backing the younger male toward the rear of the vehicle. The older male lowered the gun slightly towards the chest area of the younger male. It looked like they were yelling at each other but I could not be sure what they were saying. I assume that the older male was telling the younger male to back away or something along those lines. Both males took a few more steps backward towards the rear of the car. The younger male took a step or two towards the older male. I heard a ‘Pop’ and saw the gun rise up towards the younger [male’s] neck, the younger male fell towards the ground.”

11 Marrero also explained: “[T]his happened back in 2021. I don’t have memory problems, but all the details can get foggy over the years.” She agreed with defense counsel that her testimony during direct examination “was a bit foggy because of the time elapsed.”

their observations of the scene and initial interactions with the defendant. James Holm, the resident state trooper in Litchfield, arrived within minutes of being dispatched. Holm recognized the defendant,12 and saw that he was bleeding from his upper lip and that he had redness to the side of his face. According to Holm, the defendant looked “upset” and “distraught.” Holm testified that, although the defendant appeared to be stressed and breathing heavily, he refused medical treatment.

In addition to testimonial evidence, the state presented numerous exhibits that were admitted into evidence, including photographs of the scene from the night of the shooting, autopsy photographs, body camera footage from the responding officers, and a surveillance video of the Union Savings Bank parking lot, where the eyewitnesses had been parked, showing those witnesses before and after the shooting.

The defendant testified at trial and maintained that he had shot Bromley in self-defense.13 The defendant had noticed a car driving behind him before he entered the law office parking lot14 and saw that car park next to his car. Bromley got out of his car, ran to the driver’s door of the defendant’s car, and pulled the door open. The defendant did not know who Bromley was. He had never seen Bromley before.

The defendant testified that Bromley reached into his car and punched him several times on the left side of his face, near his jaw. According to the defendant, Bromley 12 At trial, Holm described the defendant as “an acquaintance from a local restaurant in Goshen.”

13 The defendant’s testimony was consistent with his prior statements to the police.

14 The defendant had been driving from the Washington Depot office of his law firm to the Litchfield office. He noticed Bromley’s car behind him somewhere between Bantam and Litchfield. The defendant explained that he had noticed the car because it “had its headlights on, and one of them was either dim or misaimed so that one was bright, and the other one was not. It just seemed a little bit odd at the time, but I didn’t really think too much about it.” The defendant testified that the driver did not show any signs of aggression, was not trying to pass him, and was not sounding the car’s horn.

repeatedly yelled at him: “You’re a cocksucker, you’re a motherfucker, I’m going to kill you, you ruined my life, you’ll burn in hell forever.” Bromley spit in the defendant’s face. The defendant described Bromley as being “so impossibly angry. I’ve never seen anything like it before. . . . His face was contorted with rage.” At that point, the defendant was “extremely worried” and thought his life was in danger, as he believed that Bromley was trying to kill him.

The defendant testified that he did not believe he could safely escape from Bromley. He explained that it would have been impossible for him to run away due to his various health issues and physical limitations. The defendant had undergone, inter alia, a knee replacement, a hip replacement, and three back surgeries. His left leg was “totally numb” due to nerve damage. He presented medical records and testimony from one of his surgeons to corroborate his testimony about his physical condition.

The defendant further testified that he did not believe he could safely escape from Bromley by driving away. According to the defendant, he could not close his car door because Bromley was in the way, and he did not know if his car could clear the asphalt curbing of the median in front of the car.15 The defendant also believed that he “had a better chance of staying alive if [he] was outside” the car. The defendant explained: “I felt that if I was trapped in the car that [Bromley] would be able to do whatever he wanted. And he had already shown that he could reach into the car and hit me in the face. So, I was definitely afraid he was going to hurt me badly or kill me.”16 15 The defendant explained: “[I]n theory, I could have started the car and moved forward, but we had the asphalt curbing and the grassy median. And my car has only a few inches of ground clearance. I honestly felt that if I tried to go that way, I would have been hung up and then I’d really be in deep trouble.”

The defendant also testified on cross-examination that if he had put his car in reverse, he “probably would have dragged [Bromley] . . . with [the] open car door.” When the prosecutor suggested that would have been “[b]etter than shooting him,” the defendant explained that, “at that point in time, I wasn’t thinking of shooting anybody . . . .”

16 The defendant similarly testified on cross-examination: “I basically felt that as long as I was in my car, I would be trapped. [Bromley] would be able to do whatever he wanted to do.”

The defendant explained that he was able to kick Bromley backward and get out of the car. Bromley charged at the defendant and hit him in the chest. The defendant was able to push Bromley backward a couple of feet. The defendant shouted at Bromley, asking, “who are you and what did I do to you to ruin your life?” Bromley charged at the defendant a second time, and the defendant again pushed him backward. According to the defendant, every time he pushed Bromley away, Bromley “would back up . . . two or three feet and then come back.” Bromley spit on the defendant again and continued to yell, among other things, that he was going to kill the defendant and that the defendant was going to “burn in hell forever.”

Once the defendant believed that Bromley “was not going to go away,” he pulled his gun out of his pocket and aimed it at Bromley’s chest. He did not want to shoot Bromley but wanted Bromley to know that he “wanted to defend [him]self” and “certainly didn’t want to die.” According to the defendant, Bromley charged at him again, so he pulled the gun down to the area of his right hip in “more of a defensive position,” making it “harder for somebody who is trying to take your gun away from getting it.” The defendant testified that Bromley reached for him, bent forward, and grabbed his right forearm. At that point, the defendant believed that Bromley was going to get the gun, which he was holding in his right hand, and kill him. As they were “basically tangled up with each other,” the defendant pulled the trigger and shot Bromley. He testified that his “intent was to stop [Bromley] from killing [him].” The entire incident took place in less than one minute.17 In addition to the defendant’s testimony, the defense presented testimony from five character witnesses, 17 Surveillance video of the Union Savings Bank parking lot appears to corroborate the defendant’s testimony regarding how quickly the altercation took place. Salazar is shown on the video walking through the bank parking lot at approximately 4:45 p.m., which, according to his testimony, was before the shooting took place. In addition, at 4:46 p.m., Salazar is shown returning to the bank parking lot, which, according to Marrero’s testimony, was after the shooting took place.

including the defendant’s daughter and four attorneys who had known the defendant for more than four decades throughout his legal career. They described the defendant as being very calm and levelheaded, and explained that he did not have a propensity for anger or aggression.

Finally, the defense presented testimony from several witnesses regarding physical evidence that corroborated the defendant’s version of events. Mark Davison, a lieutenant colonel with the Connecticut State Police, had conducted a “distance determination”18 to determine the distance between the muzzle of the defendant’s gun and the “target” area, i.e., the location of Bromley’s gunshot wound, at the time of the shooting. Davison concluded that the defendant’s weapon was fired when it was six to eighteen inches away from Bromley. In addition, a state forensic science examiner testified that a swab of the exterior lenses of the defendant’s glasses had tested positive for amylase, a component of saliva. A different state forensic science examiner testified that Bromley was included as a contributor to a DNA profile that had been generated from a swab of the exterior lenses of the defendant’s glasses.19 According to Brooke W. Kammrath, the defendant’s criminalist expert, the physical evidence supported the defendant’s version of events, rather than the accounts initially provided by Salazar and Marrero.

To obtain a conviction, the state was required to disprove the defendant’s claim of self-defense beyond a 18 The distance determination was conducted at the request of a prosecutor from the Litchfield state’s attorney’s office. Davison’s report of experimental findings associated with the distance determination was admitted into evidence as a full exhibit.

19 Specifically, the forensic science examiner testified that “the DNA [profile is] consistent with being a mixture of three contributors with at least one of them being male. . . . [The defendant] is assumed to be a contributor to that DNA profile. Assuming three contributors, where [the defendant] is one of the contributors, the DNA profile . . . is at least a hundred billion times more likely to occur if it originated from . . . Bromley and [the defendant] and one unknown individual than if it originated from [the defendant] and two unknown individuals.”

reasonable doubt.20 The state argued, inter alia, that the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that the degree of force used by the defendant was not necessary under either a subjective or an objective perspective.21 In addition, the state raised the duty to retreat as a statutory disqualification to the defendant’s claim of self-defense pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-19 (b) (1).22 The state suggested that the defendant could have, inter alia, driven away from Bromley. The state presented testimony from Mark Puglielli, an inspector within the Litchfield state’s attorney’s office, who had test-driven the defendant’s car. Puglielli testified, among other things, that the defendant would have been able to start his car and drive forward even with the door open. He explained that it took him less than two seconds to engage the ignition and put the car in drive. He also testified, 20 “The state bears the burden of disproving the defendant’s justification defense of self-defense. . . . To sustain its burden, the state must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt any of the components of [the defense] or establish beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the statutory exceptions . . . applied.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Baez, 354 Conn. 564, 570, 354 A.3d 698 (2026).

21 “The Connecticut test for the degree of force in self-defense . . . is a subjective-objective one. The jury must view the situation from the perspective of the defendant. [General Statutes §] 53a-19 (a) requires, however, that the defendant’s belief ultimately must be found to be reasonable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hargett, 343 Conn. 604, 620, 275 A.3d 601 (2022). “The components that must exist for an act of violence to be justified on the [ground] of self-defense . . . [are] (1) the defendant must actually have believed that the victim was using or was about to use physical force against him . . . (2) a reasonable person, viewing all the circumstances from the defendant’s point of view, would have shared that belief, (3) the defendant must actually have believed that the degree of force he used was necessary for defending himself . . . and (4) a reasonable person, viewing all the circumstances from the defendant’s point of view, also would have shared that belief.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Matheney, 354 Conn. 212, 218, 350 A.3d 516 (2026).

22 “Under § 53a-19 (b), a person is not justified in using deadly physical force upon another person if he or she knows that he or she can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety (1) by retreating . . . . The underlying policy of the duty to retreat is that the protection of human life has a higher place in the scheme of social values than the value that inheres in standing up to an aggression.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Baez, 354 Conn. 564, 570, 354 A.3d 698 (2026).

from looking at a photograph of the scene, that nothing prevented the defendant from driving in reverse. Puglielli , however, acknowledged that there was no barrier in front of the car while he conducted his testing, and he did not know whether the defendant’s car could clear the asphalt curb in the law office parking lot.23 At the conclusion of trial, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged. The court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict and imposed a total effective sentence of seven years of incarceration, execution suspended after two and one-half years, followed by three years of probation. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that Judge Prescott improperly failed to disclose to the parties, prior to presiding over the defendant’s criminal trial, that he had applied for the role of Inspector General, which is designated as a Deputy Chief State’s Attorney position within the Division of Criminal Justice. He argues that Judge Prescott’s application for a senior prosecutorial role within the Division of Criminal Justice—the same agency that comprised the state’s attorney’s office that prosecuted the defendant’s case—presented a situation in which Judge Prescott’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. We agree with the defendant.

The following additional undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant’s claim. On April 29, 2025, after the jury had returned its verdict and prior to sentencing, Judge Prescott was appointed by the Criminal Justice Commission to serve as Inspector General.24 As Inspector General, 23 Although the prosecutor pointed out that the front of the defendant’s car already had cleared the asphalt curbing in photographs from the scene, Puglielli acknowledged that he did not know whether the back area of the car, where the muffler was located, would clear the curb.

24 Judge Prescott presumably did not begin serving as Inspector General until July 1, 2025. See General Statutes § 51-277e (b) (“[t]he Inspector General shall serve a term of four years from July first in the year of the appointment”).

Although the legislature has amended § 51-277e several times since the events at issue; see, e.g., Public Acts 2026, No. 26-14, § 5; those

Judge Prescott was tasked with, inter alia, investigating certain incidents in which police officers used physical force and determining whether to file criminal charges and prosecute matters in which the use of force was not justified, in accordance with General Statutes § 51-277a.25 Judge Prescott disclosed his appointment as Inspector General to the parties prior to considering the defendant ’s postverdict motions,26 specifically, a motion to set aside the verdict filed on April 4, 2025, and a motion for a new trial filed on April 29, 2025. On May 16, 2025, at the hearing on the defendant’s postverdict motions, the following discussion took place on the record regarding Judge Prescott’s appointment:

“The Court: We have a couple of substantive posttrial motions to adjudicate this morning. But, before we do that, I need to put something on the record. . . . Last week . . . counsel and I met via [Microsoft Teams]27 where I disclosed to the extent that counsel did not know, but I believe they already did know, that I had recently been appointed by the Criminal Justice Commission to the role amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. We therefore refer in this opinion to the current revision of the statute, which was in effect at the time that Judge Prescott applied for the position of Inspector General.

25 Although the legislature has amended § 51-277a several times since the events at issue; see, e.g., Public Acts 2026, No. 26-14, § 3; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. Except as noted, all references in this opinion to § 51-277a are to the current revision of the statute, which was in effect at the time that Judge Prescott applied for the position of Inspector General. See also General Statutes § 51-277e. A more comprehensive discussion of the Inspector General position is set forth subsequently in this opinion.

26 We believe that Judge Prescott properly disclosed his hiring at this hearing due to the position’s connection with the state. It is our opinion, however, that the same disclosure should have been made while the application was pending at the start of trial.

27 Microsoft Teams is “collaborative meeting [computer software]

with video, audio, and screen sharing features.” Connecticut Judicial Branch, Connecticut Guide to Remote Hearings for Attorneys and Self-Represented Parties (January 17, 2024), p. 5, available at https:// jud.ct.gov/HomePDFs/ConnecticutGuideRemoteHearings.pdf (last visited August 19, 2026).

of Deputy Chief State’s Attorney, the Inspector General. I felt that it was appropriate to notify counsel of my appointment by the Criminal Justice Commission and indicate that I would be interested in knowing their position regarding whether or not they think that I should be disqualified from this case, from further involvement in this case, or whether I should recuse myself. . . . I do not use those terms interchangeably. . . .

“[A]nd I asked counsel to report back on their positions with respect to my further involvement in this case, which would involve both adjudicating these posttrial motions and, ultimately, conducting the sentencing proceeding , which is scheduled for early June. Counsel and I met in chambers this morning, and [defense counsel] reported to me that he has met with his client, discussed these issues with his client, and that his client . . . believes that I should continue to preside over this matter. Is that accurate, [defense counsel]?

“[Defense Counsel]: That is accurate, Your Honor. “The Court: And just let me put a couple other things on the record about that. As I said, I was appointed by the Criminal Justice Commission. I was not appointed by the Division of Criminal Justice. And, in fact, the Chief State’s Attorney, who is the [head] of the Division of Criminal Justice by statute, had no involvement in my selection as the Inspector General. And that’s because of the statutory independence that the Office of Inspector General has with respect to its regulatory mission. The office isn’t even allowed to be housed in the same building as other prosecutors, and it is only within the Division of Criminal Justice for administrative purposes.

“So, I certainly don’t feel like . . . there would be a basis to disqualify me. I believe that . . . my impartiality cannot reasonably be called into question under these circumstances. But, having said all of that, I certainly wanted to know what the party’s position[s] were and [give] them an opportunity to discuss the issue with [the defendant]. So, [defendant], you’ve had those discussions with your counsel?

“[The Defendant]: Yes, Your Honor. “The Court: All right. And . . . I don’t want to get into the substance of that because it’s attorney-client privileged . But is what I’ve just put on the record consistent with what you understood the facts to be?

“[The Defendant]: Yes, Your Honor. “The Court: Okay. And they informed me that you don’t have any concerns about me conducting the further proceedings in this case. Is that accurate?

“[The Defendant]: . . . [Y]es, Your Honor. “The Court: Okay. And that means I will both adjudicate these posttrial motions that your lawyers have filed, and I’ll conduct the sentencing later in June. Is that your understanding?

“[The Defendant]: Yes, Your Honor. “The Court: Okay. And, to the extent that your consent is necessary for me to do this, and I’m not saying it is, but to the extent that it is, you consent to me doing this?

“[The Defendant]: Yes, Your Honor. “The Court: And you don’t have concerns about my impartiality at this point?

“[The Defendant]: No, Your Honor. “The Court: Okay. And you’re not under the influence of anything today that would interfere with you exercising good judgment? “[The Defendant]: I am under no influence . . . . “The Court: Okay. “[The Defendant]: . . . of anything, Your Honor. “The Court: Okay. And you’re making this decision voluntarily?

“[The Defendant]: Yes, Your Honor.

“The Court: Okay. Thank you, sir. All right. Anything else you want me to put on the record about that, [defense counsel]?

“[Defense Counsel]: I do. . . . [A]s we did discuss in chambers, there was the issue of appellate counsel and I having a conversation with regard to a potential issue and a potential basis for a new trial based upon this information that has come [to] light in the last couple of weeks. . . . The issue with regard to this is the appearance of an issue. Not any substantive issue. He wanted to make sure that when he relayed that information to me that I was very specific that it is the question of an appearance of an issue, more than anything else. But, with that being said, I wanted to preserve that on the record now, prior to any other motions that might be filed by appellate counsel. Or, if for some reason he wants to address that, I can bring that to Your Honor as quickly as possible because obviously the time frame is exceedingly short now.” (Footnote added.)

Once Judge Prescott confirmed that defense counsel was not pursuing such a motion at that point in time, he proceeded to consider the defendant’s postverdict motions, which he denied at the conclusion of the hearing.

On June 2, 2025, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on an alleged appearance of partiality that had been created by Judge Prescott’s application for the position of Inspector General. The defendant attached to his motion the job posting for the Inspector General position, which indicated that applications were being accepted by the Division of Criminal Justice from January 10 through February 26, 2025. In the present case, jury selection began on February 19, 2025, and the evidentiary phase of the trial commenced on March 3, 2025, after the jury had been sworn.

In his motion for a new trial, the defendant acknowledged that Judge Prescott had met with counsel to discuss the potential conflict of interest after his April 29, 2025 appointment to the position but argued that “[a]t no time prior to this meeting did Judge Prescott indicate to the parties that he was a candidate for the position of Inspector General.” The defendant set forth that the motion was based on, inter alia, rule 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and explained that “[t]he undersigned possesses no information or belief that Judge Prescott has, or may have harbored, actual personal bias or prejudice against the defendant, nor does the undersigned suggest that Judge Prescott was predisposed to reach a particular result or to rule in a particular way during the course of the trial. Instead, the defendant seeks a new trial based on the fact that a Superior Court judge’s application for employment for the position of Inspector General within the Division of Criminal Justice creates a situation where the judge’s objectivity might reasonably be questioned; i.e., whether a reasonable person might question the judge’s impartiality on the basis of all the circumstances presented.”

On June 6, 2025, prior to the defendant’s sentencing, Judge Prescott denied the motion for a new trial. He explained that, in his view, the motion was untimely because there had been a “significant delay” in its filing since he had disclosed his appointment as Inspector General. Judge Prescott also explained that, “even if it were timely filed, I would deny it for many of the reasons I stated in open court last time. And, in particular, in light of the canvass of [the defendant] that I engaged in in court last time, where he indicated that he believes the court can be fair in this matter. And it strains credulity, to me, to understand why a new trial would be required under those circumstances, particularly now that I have received this appointment. And the mere fact that I had applied for it, I don’t understand how that changes anything. So, the motion is denied.”

The following legal principles guide our analysis of the defendant’s claim. “[T]he law presumes that duly elected or appointed judges, consistent with their oaths of office, will perform their duties impartially . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Milner, 325 Conn. 1, 12, 155 A.3d 730 (2017). Nevertheless, “[w]e must continuously bear in mind that to perform its high function in the best way ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’ ” Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864, 108 S. Ct. 2194, 100 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1988).

Accordingly, pursuant to rule 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge must avoid the appearance of partiality. A judge must disqualify himself, or, alternatively , disclose such grounds for disqualification and ask the parties to consider, outside his presence, whether to waive disqualification28 “in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned”; Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.11 (a); even if there is no basis for a claim of actual bias. See, e.g., State v. Milner, supra, 325 Conn. 12; see also State v. Herman K., 212 Conn. App. 592, 603, 275 A.3d 1233 (noting that rule 2.11 of Code of Judicial Conduct “covers both claims of actual bias and the appearance of partiality”), cert. denied, 344 Conn. 902, 277 A.3d 136 (2022); Tracey v. Tracey, 97 Conn. App. 278, 281, 903 A.2d 679 (2006) (explaining that Code of Judicial Conduct “encompasses two distinct grounds for disqualification: actual bias and the appearance of partiality”).

Rule 2.11 (c) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that “[a] judge subject to disqualification under this Rule, other than for bias or prejudice under subsection (a) (1),29 28 As set forth subsequently in this opinion, rule 2.11 (c) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that “[a] judge subject to disqualification under this Rule, other than for bias or prejudice under subsection (a) (1), may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, outside the presence of the judge and court personnel, whether to waive disqualification , provided that the judge shall disclose on the record the basis of such disqualification. If, following the disclosure, the parties and lawyers agree, either in writing or on the record before another judge, that the judge should not be disqualified, the judge may participate in the proceeding.”

29 Subsection (a) (1) of rule 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge must disqualify himself if “[t]he judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.”

may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, outside the presence of the judge and court personnel, whether to waive disqualification, provided that the judge shall disclose on the record the basis of such disqualification. If, following the disclosure, the parties and lawyers agree, either in writing or on the record before another judge, that the judge should not be disqualified, the judge may participate in the proceeding.” (Footnote added.)

In applying rule 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, “[t]he reasonableness standard is an objective one. Thus, the question is not only whether the particular judge is, in fact, impartial but whether a reasonable person would question the judge’s impartiality on the basis of all the circumstances.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Milner, supra, 325 Conn. 12; see also State v. Martin, 77 Conn. App. 778, 785, 825 A.2d 835 (“The standard to be employed is an objective one, not the judge’s subjective view as to whether he or she can be fair and impartial in hearing the case. . . . Any conduct that would lead a reasonable [person] knowing all the circumstances to the conclusion that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned is a basis for the judge’s disqualification.” (Emphasis added; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 266 Conn. 906, 832 A.2d 73 (2003).

Moreover, as we already have indicated, “it is well established that [e]ven in the absence of actual bias, a judge must disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, because the appearance and the existence of impartiality are both essential elements of a fair exercise of judicial authority.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Milner, supra, 325 Conn. 12; see also, e.g., State v. Echols, 170 Conn. 11, 13, 364 A.2d 225 (1975) (in criminal trials, trial judge has “responsibility to have the trial conducted in a manner [that] approaches an atmosphere of perfect impartiality” (internal quotation marks omitted)).30 30 To underscore the high standard to which a judge is held to maintain an appearance of impartiality, we briefly mention an advisory opinion

A judge’s decision declining to disqualify himself is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Milner, supra, 325 Conn. 12 (“[o]ur review of the trial court’s denial of a motion for disqualification is governed by an abuse of discretion standard”).31 Similarly, “a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial is reviewable for abuse of discretion.” State v. Johnson, 345 Conn. 174, 204, 283 A.3d 477 (2022); see also State v. Harvey, 239 Conn. App. 257, 314, A.3d (2026) (“[o]ur standard of review of the trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial is limited to a determination of whether, by such denial, the court abused its discretion” (internal quotation marks omitted)), petition for cert. filed (Conn. June 22, 2026) (No. 250479).

Neither this court nor our Supreme Court has addressed the issue of whether, and under what circumstances, a judge’s actions in seeking future employment may give rise to an appearance of partiality. The defendant cites several decisions from other jurisdictions to support the general proposition that a judge places his or her impartiality in question by presiding over a trial while from the Committee on Judicial Ethics concerning whether a judge could accept an award from an advocacy organization. The committee opined that a judge may not accept an award from Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) because that organization is a victim support and advocacy group that takes strong positions on cases involving an individual operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs (DUI) and, inter alia, lobbies actively on behalf of its interests. See Connecticut Judicial Branch Committee on Judicial Ethics, Informal Opinion No. 2012-25 (August 31, 2012), available at https://www.jud.ct.gov/committees/ethics/sum/2012-25.htm (last visited August 19, 2026). The committee concluded that acceptance of the award would violate the rules of the Code of Judicial Conduct related to, inter alia, promoting public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. The committee reached this conclusion regardless of whether MADD currently was involved in a case before the judge, explaining: “[T]he acceptance of an award under these circumstances would cast doubt on the accepting judge’s impartiality in future DUI cases.” Id.

31 To the extent the defendant suggests that Milner “articulated a more expansive standard of review,” we are not persuaded. The language in Milner relied on by the defendant relates, instead, to the reviewability of an unpreserved claim of judicial bias. See State v. Milner, supra, 325 Conn. 7.

actively seeking employment for a position with one of the parties. See Scott v. United States, 559 A.2d 745, 750 (D.C. 1989); see also In re Continental Airlines Corp., 901 F.2d 1259, 1262–63 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. O’Neill Group v. Continental Airlines Corp., 506 U.S. 828, 113 S. Ct. 87, 121 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1992); Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillen, 764 F.2d 458, 460–61 (7th Cir. 1985); Voeltz v. John Morrell & Co., 564 N.W.2d 315, 319 (S.D. 1997); see also State v. Pratt, 813 N.W.2d 868, 877 (Minn. 2012) (“[s]ome courts have found that merely negotiating for future employment might cause a reasonable observer to question a judge’s impartiality ”); DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 517, 958 A.2d 446 (2008) (“any sort of employment negotiations with a party—preliminary, tentative, indirect, unintentional, [or] ultimately unsuccessful—right before or during a pending matter, reasonably call into question a judge’s impartiality” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Before considering these legal principles in the context of the present case, we provide an overview of the role of Inspector General, for which Judge Prescott had submitted an application prior to presiding over the defendant’s trial. The position of Inspector General and the Office of the Inspector General were established by the legislature during its special session in July 2020.32 See Public Acts, Spec. Sess., July 2020, No. 20-1, §§ 33 and 34; see also General Statutes §§ 51-277a and 51-277e. The Inspector General, as head of the Office of the Inspector General, is appointed as a Deputy Chief State’s Attorney within 32 As we will set forth more fully, the Office of the Inspector General is tasked with, inter alia, conducting an investigation “[w]henever a peace officer, in the performance of such officer’s duties, uses physical force upon another person and such person dies as a result thereof or uses deadly physical force, as defined in section 53a-3, upon another person . . . .” General Statutes § 51-277a (a) (1).

Before the Office of the Inspector General was established, the Chief State’s Attorney would initiate such an investigation by “designat[ing] a prosecutorial official from a judicial district other than the judicial district in which the incident occurred to conduct the investigation,” or “appoint[ing] a special assistant state’s attorney or special deputy assistant state’s attorney to conduct the investigation.” General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 51-277a (b).

the Division of Criminal Justice, which is the agency “in charge of the investigation and prosecution of all criminal matters in the Superior Court.” General Statutes § 51-276; see also General Statutes § 51-277e (a). As a Deputy Chief State’s Attorney, the Inspector General “shall receive his or her prosecutorial powers as a designee of the Chief State’s Attorney”; General Statutes § 51-278 (b) (1) (A) (ii);33 who serves as the head of the Division of Criminal Justice. See General Statutes § 51-278 (a) (1).

The duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General and the Office of the Inspector General are set forth in §§ 51-277a and 51-277e. Section 51-277a (a) (1) provides in relevant part that, “[w]henever a peace officer, in the performance of such officer’s duties, uses physical force upon another person and such person dies as a result thereof or uses deadly force . . . upon another person, the Division of Criminal Justice shall cause an investigation to be made and the Inspector General shall have the responsibility of determining whether the use of physical force by the peace officer was justifiable . . . .”

In addition, “whenever a person dies in the custody of a peace officer or law enforcement agency, the Inspector General shall investigate and determine whether physical force was used by a peace officer upon the deceased person, and if so, whether the use of physical force by the peace officer was justifiable . . . . If the Inspector General determines the deceased person may have died as a result of criminal action not involving the use of force by a peace officer, the Inspector General shall refer such case to the Chief State’s Attorney or a state’s attorney for potential prosecution.” General Statutes § 51-277a (a) (2) (A). The Inspector General similarly must conduct an investigation whenever a person dies in the custody of the Department of Correction. See General Statutes § 51-277a (a) (2) (B).

33 There are three Deputy Chief State’s Attorneys within the Division of Criminal Justice. In addition to the Inspector General, two Deputy Chief State’s Attorneys are appointed to serve “as assistant administrative heads of the Division of Criminal Justice, one of whom shall be deputy chief state’s attorney for operations and one of whom shall be deputy chief state’s attorney for personnel, finance and administration, who shall assist the Chief State’s Attorney in his duties . . . .” General Statutes § 51-278 (b) (1) (A) (i).

Finally, “[w]henever a person who (A) is a next of kin of a deceased person, (B) is not notified of such deceased person’s death as required pursuant to section 7-294mm and no other person who is a next of kin of the deceased person was so notified, and (C) requests of the Office of the Inspector General an investigation of the lack of notification or timely notification of such death, the Inspector General shall investigate and determine whether there was any malfeasance on the part of a peace officer or a supervisor of the peace officer in the failure to provide such notification or timely notification, and if so, may make recommendations to the Police Officer Standards and Training Council . . . .” General Statutes § 51-277a (a) (3).

Upon the conclusion of the investigation of an incident described in § 51-277a (a) (1) or (2),34 the Inspector General must file a report with the Chief State’s Attorney “which shall contain the following: (1) The circumstances of the incident, (2) a determination of whether the use of physical force by the peace officer was justifiable under section 53a-22, and (3) any recommended future action to be taken by the Office of the Inspector General as a result of the incident.”35 General Statutes § 51-277a (b).36 34 As set forth previously, § 51-277a (a) (1) involves incidents during which “a peace officer, in the performance of such officer’s duties, uses physical force upon another person and such person dies as a result thereof or uses deadly force, as defined in section 53a-3, upon another person,” and § 51-277a (a) (2) involves incidents when a person dies while in the custody of a peace officer or law enforcement agency, or while in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction. See General Statutes § 51-277a (a) (1) and (2).

35 The Inspector General must also complete a preliminary status report whenever a peace officer, in the performance of such officer’s duties, uses physical force or deadly force upon another person and such person dies as a result thereof. See General Statutes § 51-277a (a) (5). “The Inspector General shall complete the report and submit a copy of such report not later than five business days after the cause of the death is available to the Chief State’s Attorney and, in accordance with the provisions of section 11-4a, to the joint standing committees of the General Assembly having cognizance of matters relating to the judiciary and public safety.” General Statutes § 51-277a (a) (5).

36 General Statutes § 51-277a (b) also provides that “[t]he Chief State’s Attorney shall provide a copy of the report to the chief executive officer of the municipality in which the incident occurred and to the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection or the chief of police

In addition, the Office of the Inspector General “shall prosecute any case in which the Inspector General determines that (1) the use of force by a peace officer was not justifiable under section 53a-22, or (2) there was a failure to intervene in such incident or to report any such incident , as required under subsection (a) of section 7-282e or section 18-81nn.” General Statutes § 51-277a (c).

Section 51-277e similarly provides that the Office of the Inspector General “shall: (1) Conduct investigations of peace officers in accordance with section 51-277a; (2) prosecute any case in which the Inspector General determines a peace officer used force found to not be justifiable pursuant to section 53a-22 or where a police officer or correctional officer fails to intervene in any such incident or to report any such incident, as required under subsection (a) of section 7-282e or section 18-81nn, as applicable; (3) investigate any failure to report the death of a person in accordance with the provisions of section 7-294mm; (4) investigate any failure to report in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (1) of subsection (h) of section 7-294d; and (5) make recommendations to the Police Officer Standards and Training Council established under section 7-294b concerning censure and suspension, renewal, cancelation or revocation of a peace officer’s certification, provided in the case of a failure to report a death of a person, any such recommendation may be made to said council only in a case where such failure is found to be intentional or made with reckless indifference, or if there is no finding that such failure was intentional or made with reckless indifference , a recommendation may be made to the officer’s employing agency for any further disciplinary action as so determined by such employing agency.”

In conducting investigations, the Inspector General has authority to issue subpoenas to, inter alia, municipalities and law enforcement units “requiring the production of reports, records or other documents concerning an of such municipality, as the case may be, and shall make such report available to the public on the Division of Criminal Justice’s Internet web site not later than forty-eight hours after the copies are provided to the chief executive officer and the commissioner or chief of police.”

investigation . . . and . . . compelling the attendance and testimony of any person having knowledge pertinent to such investigation.”37 General Statutes § 51-277e (d). In addition, the Inspector General “shall request the appropriate law enforcement agency to provide such assistance as is necessary to investigate and make a determination under subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of [§ 51-277a (a)].” General Statutes § 51-277a (a) (4).38 As the Office of the Inspector General is “a separate office within the Division of Criminal Justice,” which is “at a location that is separate from the locations of the Office of the Chief State’s Attorney or any of the state’s attorneys for the judicial districts”; see General Statutes § 51-277e (a) and (f), respectively; the Inspector General may employ necessary staff to fulfill his duties. See General Statutes § 51-277e (g). Such staff shall be selected by the Inspector General and shall include, but not be limited to, an assistant state’s attorney or a deputy 37 The legislature recently repealed § 51-277e (d) of the 2026 supplement to the General Statutes and replaced it with language clarifying that the Inspector General may compel the attendance and testimony of any person having knowledge pertinent to such an investigation “at an investigative deposition conducted by the Inspector General, or the Inspector General’s designee.” See Public Acts 2026, No. 26-14, § 5 (P.A. 26-14).

In addition, P.A. 26-14, § 3, repealed § 51-277a (a) (4) of the 2026 supplement to the General Statutes and replaced it with language providing that “[t]he Division of Criminal Justice and the Inspector General shall have the unrestricted right to access the scene and collect evidence whenever a peace officer, in the performance of such officer’s duties, uses physical force upon another person and such person dies as a result thereof or uses deadly physical force, or a person dies in the custody of a peace officer or law enforcement agency, regardless of whether such incident involved only peace officers employed by the federal government and did not involve any peace officer employed by the state or a municipality.” P.A. 26-14, § 3; see also General Statutes § 51-277a (a) (5) (C) (authorizing action for injunctive relief against any person who has restricted Division of Criminal Justice or Inspector General’s right to access scene and collect evidence in violation of § 51-277a (a) (5) (B)).

38 We note that, in addition to the powers afforded the Inspector General pursuant to §§ 51-277a and 51-277e, the Inspector General, as a Deputy Chief State’s Attorney, “may sign warrants, informations, applications for grand jury investigations and applications for extradition .” General Statutes § 51-277 (d) (1).

assistant state’s attorney, an inspector and administrative staff. See General Statutes § 51-277e (g). The Inspector General may also share resources with, and receive assistance from, other offices within the Division of Criminal Justice. “As needed by and upon request of the Inspector General, the Office of the Chief State’s Attorney shall ensure assistance from additional assistant state’s attorneys or deputy assistant state’s attorneys, inspectors and administrative staff.” General Statutes § 51-277e (g). In addition, the Inspector General and the attorneys operating under his direction “shall be qualified to act in any judicial district in the state and in connection with any matter regardless of the judicial district where the offense took place, and may be assigned to act in any judicial district at any time on designation by the Chief State’s Attorney or the Inspector General, as applicable.” General Statutes § 51-281.

The selection process for the position of the Inspector General is administered by the Criminal Justice Commission . See General Statutes § 51-277e. The Criminal Justice Commission is tasked with, inter alia, appointing all prosecutors within the Division of Criminal Justice. See General Statutes § 51-278.39 Although the Chief State’s Attorney is a member of the Criminal Justice Commission, he does not participate in selecting the Deputy Chief State’s Attorneys40 and, thus, is not involved in the appointment process of the Inspector General. See General Statutes §§ 51-275a and 51-278 (b) (1) (A). The other members of the Criminal Justice Commission appoint the Inspector General by a majority vote. See General Statutes § 51-278 (b) (1) (A) (8). In the present case, the job posting for the Inspector General position was listed on the website for job openings 39 The Criminal Justice Commission is comprised of the Chief State’s Attorney and six members, two of whom must be judges of the Superior Court, who are nominated by the Governor and appointed by the General Assembly. See General Statutes § 51-275a.

40 The Chief State’s Attorney is involved in the appointment process for the state’s attorneys for each judicial district, along with the assistant state’s attorneys and the deputy assistant state’s attorneys. See General Statutes § 51-278 (b) (1) (B) and (6).

within the executive branch of the state of Connecticut.41 The position was listed as open to the public from January 10 until February 26, 2025. The posting included an overview of the Division of Criminal Justice;42 explained that the Office of the Inspector General was a separate office within the Division of Criminal Justice that was located in Shelton; and provided examples of the duties of the Inspector General, including the responsibility to conduct investigations of peace officers and prosecute any case in which the Inspector General determines that a peace officer has used force found to not be justifiable. Although it is unclear from the record before us precisely when Judge Prescott applied for the Inspector General position,43 it is undisputed that he must have submitted his application prior to the evidentiary portion of the defendant’s trial, which began on March 3, 2025, given that applications were due by February 26, 2025.

We conclude that Judge Prescott’s pending application for the position of Inspector General created an appearance of a lack of impartiality. A reasonable person might question Judge Prescott’s impartiality based on his application because, as established by §§ 51-277a and 51-277e, the role of Inspector General is a supervisory prosecutorial position within the Division of Criminal Justice, the same agency prosecuting the defendant through the Litchfield state’s attorney’s office. Accordingly , pursuant to rule 2.11 of our Code of Judicial Conduct , Judge Prescott should have disqualified himself or, 41 As previously mentioned, the job posting was attached to the defendant ’s June 2, 2025 motion for a new trial.

42 The job posting stated: “The State of Connecticut, Division of Criminal Justice (DCJ) is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all criminal matters in the State of Connecticut. It is an independent agency of the executive branch of state government, established under the Constitution of the State of Connecticut. The Division is composed of the Office of the Chief State’s Attorney, located in Rocky Hill, Connecticut , and the Offices of the State’s Attorneys for each of the thirteen Judicial Districts in the State of Connecticut.”

43 To the extent the defendant, on appeal, suggests that Judge Prescott was a “finalist” for the position of Inspector General at the time of the defendant’s trial, we note that there is nothing in the record to support this assertion.

alternatively, disclosed such information to the parties and obtained their waiver prior to proceeding with trial. See Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.11 (a) and (c). As a result, we further conclude that Judge Prescott’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial was an abuse of his discretion.

In reaching our conclusion, we are guided by the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Scott v. United States, supra, 559 A.2d 745. In Scott, the court concluded that the trial judge in that case had violated canon 3 (C) (1) of the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct by negotiating for employment with the Executive Office for United States Attorneys, within the United States Department of Justice (Department of Justice), while presiding over a criminal case being prosecuted by the Department of Justice through the United States Attorney’s Office. See id., 748–56. Canon 3 (C) (1) of the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which is nearly identical to rule 2.11 of our Code of Judicial Conduct, provides that “[a] judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . .”44 (Emphasis omitted.) Id., 748.

At the outset, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia highlighted the importance of impartiality in the judiciary, particularly in a criminal trial. The court stated: “Our criminal justice system is founded on the public’s faith in the impartial execution of duties by the important actors in that system. . . . It is beyond dispute that the trial judges perform a unique and pervasive role in that system: confidence in the judiciary is essential to the successful functioning of our democratic form 44 The model rule governing the appearance of impartiality is now set forth in rule 2.11, within canon 2, of the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct. See American Bar Association, Model Code of Judicial Conduct: Canon 2, “Rule 2.11: Disqualification,” available at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/ publications/model_code_of_judicial_conduct/model_code_of_judicial_ conduct_canon_2/rule2_11disqualification/ (July 15, 2020) (last visited August 19, 2026).

of government. . . . Criminal justice is concerned with the pathology of the body politic. In administering the criminal law, judges wield the most awesome surgical instruments of society. A criminal trial, it has well been said, should have the atmosphere of the operating room. The presiding judge determines the atmosphere. He is not an umpire who enforces the rules of the game, or merely a moderator between contestants. If he is adequate to his function, the moral authority which he radiates will inspire the indispensable standards of dignity and austerity upon those who participate in a criminal trial. . . . To obtain the public trust in the judiciary judges are required to adhere to high standards of conduct. . . . [T]he [American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct] was designed to protect public confidence in the integrity of judges since [a]n independent and honorable judiciary is an indispensible condition of justice in our society.” (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

The court acknowledged that “[v]iolations of the [c]anons based on appearances is unquestionably a difficult area in which reasonable people can harbor differing views.” Id., 749–50. Nevertheless, based on the facts presented, the court concluded “that there is a violation of [c]anon 3 (C) (1) when the trial judge who is presiding at the prosecution by the United States Department of Justice through the United States Attorney’s Office is actively negotiating for employment with the [Department of Justice’s] Executive Office for United States Attorneys. This circumstance presents the specter of partiality that the [c]anon and the [United States] Supreme Court entreat all judges scrupulously to avoid. The employment sought by the trial judge involved ‘oversight responsibility and policy guidance to the Debt Collection Units in the United States Attorney’s offices,’ and consequently from the perspective of ‘the average person,’ a fully informed person might reasonably question whether the judge ‘could decide the case with the requisite aloofness and disinterest when he [was seeking ] employment [in the prosecutor’s executive office in the department prosecuting] the case.’ Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillen, [supra, 764 F.2d 461]. The situation does not change because of the trial judge’s general reputation among his colleagues and the legal community.”45 Scott v. United States, supra, 559 A.2d 750.

The court reached its conclusion notwithstanding the fact that the trial judge had applied to an executive office within the Department of Justice and not the particular office that had prosecuted the defendant. The trial judge in Scott had been engaged in discussions with the Department of Justice about employment as the Assistant Director for the Debt Collection Staff in the Executive Office for United States Attorneys. Id., 747. “[T]he Debt Collection Staff provided policy and oversight guidance to the debt collection units of the United States Attorneys Offices across the country and operated as a part of [the Office of Management Information, Services and Support], which had essentially a record-keeping and computer systems management function. The position of Assistant Director was managerial in nature and did not have direct litigation control.” Id. In reaching its conclusion that the trial judge had violated canon 3 (C) (1) of the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the court explained that “[the situation ] does [not] change simply because the prospective employer is a component of the Department of Justice; the negotiations at issue for employment with a unit directly linked to the prosecutor’s office are ethically analogous to negotiations for employment with a large private law firm.”46 Id.

The court emphasized that “[t]he dignity and independence of the judiciary are diminished when the judge 45 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia explained that the trial judge had “served as a Superior Court Judge in active service for over eighteen years before he assumed senior status, and his good reputation is not at issue here.” Scott v. United States, supra, 559 A.2d 749. 46 The state attempts to distinguish Scott from the present case on the ground that “the Inspector General’s office does not provide oversight or policy guidance to the state’s attorney’s office that prosecuted the defendant.” In Scott, however, the judge’s prospective position involved comes before the lawyers in the case in the role of a suppliant for employment. The public cannot be confident that a case tried under such conditions will be decided in accordance with the highest tradition[s] of the judiciary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 750, quoting Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillen, supra, 764 F.2d 461. The court concluded that the appearance of partiality in that case “require[d] a new trial in order to assure the continued public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.” Scott v. United States, supra, 559 A.2d 756.

In the present case, Judge Prescott, like the trial judge in Scott, was actively seeking employment with a unit directly linked to the office prosecuting the defendant, as the Office of the Inspector General and the Litchfield state’s attorney’s office are both components of the same agency, the Division of Criminal Justice. As a result, “from the perspective of the average person, a fully informed person might reasonably question whether the judge could decide the case with the requisite aloofness and disinterest . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted .) Id., 750; see also Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillen, supra, 764 F.2d 461.

The state contends that the defendant cannot prevail on this claim because, (1) at the hearing on May 16, 2025, he consented to Judge Prescott’s continuing to preside over further proceedings in the case and, “oversight responsibility and policy guidance to the Debt Collection Units in the United States Attorney’s Office”; (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted) Scott v. United States, supra, 559 A.2d 750; not to the office that had prosecuted the defendant. See id., 747 and n.2 (defendant was prosecuted on charge of “assault with intent to kill while armed” by Office of United States Attorney for District of Columbia, which is component of United States Department of Justice). The court in Scott recognized that the judge’s prospective employer was a separate component of the Department of Justice; see id., 747; just as the Office of the Inspector General is a separate component of the Division of Criminal Justice. Moreover, although the Office of the Inspector General is not physically located within the executive office of the Division of Criminal Justice, i.e., the Office of the Chief State’s Attorney, the Inspector General nonetheless has a supervisory role within the Division of Criminal Justice, designated as a Deputy Chief State’s Attorney.

therefore, waived any claim regarding the appearance of partiality at his trial; (2) the motion for a new trial based on Judge Prescott’s alleged appearance of partiality was untimely; (3) a reasonable person would not question Judge Prescott’s impartiality on the basis of his application for the Inspector General position due to the independent nature and scope of that role and its lack of connection or relation to the entity prosecuting the defendant; and (4) even if Judge Prescott’s application for the position of Inspector General created an appearance of partiality, reversal is not warranted. We are not persuaded.

First, our review of the record reflects that the defendant did not waive this claim. “[W]aiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. . . . It involves the idea of assent, and assent is an act of understanding.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wade, 351 Conn. 745, 757, 333 A.3d 90 (2025). It is undisputed that the defendant was not aware of Judge Prescott’s prospective employment as Inspector General at the time of his trial in March 2025, as Judge Prescott made a disclosure only once he had been appointed to the position, after the trial, in May 2025. Compare Ajadi v. Commissioner of Correction, 280 Conn. 514, 526–31, 911 A.2d 712 (2006) (petitioner’s failure to seek disqualification of judge could not be viewed as consent when petitioner was not aware of alleged appearance of partiality until after habeas proceedings had concluded), with Bonilla v. Commissioner of Correction, 231 Conn. App. 836, 843, 334 A.3d 1090 (concluding that petitioner “implicitly consented” to judge’s adjudication of habeas petition despite alleged appearance of partiality because petitioner had cause to know of alleged appearance of partiality at time of habeas trial and failed to move to disqualify judge at that time), cert. denied, 352 Conn. 907, 336 A.3d 81 (2025).

At the hearing on May 16, 2025, the defendant consented only to Judge Prescott’s continuing to conduct “the further proceedings in [the] case,” i.e., adjudicating the postverdict motions and conducting sentencing.47 Defense counsel made clear at that time that the defendant was preserving his right to file a motion for a new trial based on “an appearance of an issue . . . .” Accordingly , we cannot conclude that the defendant waived his ability to raise a claim regarding Judge Prescott’s appearance of partiality at the time he presided over the defendant’s trial.

Next, we cannot conclude that the defendant’s motion for a new trial was untimely. Practice Book § 42-54 provides: “Unless otherwise permitted by the judicial authority in the interests of justice, a motion for a new trial shall be made within five days after a verdict or finding of guilty or within any further time the judicial authority allows during the five-day period.” The state acknowledges that the defendant could not have filed his motion within five days of the jury’s verdict on March 7, 2025, because the Criminal Justice Commission did not appoint Judge Prescott as Inspector General until April 29, 2025, and Judge Prescott did not discuss his appointment with the parties until after that date. The state, instead, focuses on the defendant’s “approximately one month” delay in filing his June 2, 2025 motion for a new trial based on the timing of Judge Prescott’s disclosure of his appointment as Inspector General—which took place off the record during the week of May 5, 2025, and was discussed on the record on May 16, 2025. It is unclear from the record before us, however, the timing of when the defendant became aware that Judge Prescott had submitted an application for the Inspector General position prior to presiding over the trial, which was the basis of the defendant’s motion. 47 We note that, even if the defendant’s consent to Judge Prescott’s conducting the postverdict proceedings in the case is viewed as an implicit waiver of a claim of actual bias—a claim which the defendant explicitly waived in his June 2, 2025 motion for a new trial—that does not preclude the defendant from raising a claim regarding an appearance of partiality. See, e.g., State v. Herman K., supra, 212 Conn. App. 604 (although defendant conceded that trial court had no actual bias, this court considered defendant’s claim that judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned under rule 2.11 of Code of Judicial Conduct).

We also are not persuaded by the state’s argument that a reasonable person would not question Judge Prescott’s impartiality based on his application for the Inspector General position due to the independent nature and scope of that role and its lack of connection or relation to the Litchfield state’s attorney’s office, which had handled the defendant’s prosecution. The state emphasizes that the Office of the Inspector General is a separate office within the Division of Criminal Justice;48 that the Inspector General has the “unique duty” of investigating and prosecuting unjustified use of force by police officers; and that the Chief State’s Attorney has no involvement in hiring or appointing the Inspector General.

The state contends that the circumstances of the present case are comparable to those in Troxel v. State, 875 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2016). In Troxel, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether a judge should have been disqualified from presiding over the defendant’s criminal jury trial, based on an appearance of partiality , because he was actively negotiating for a position as a prosecutor in a different county. See id., 312–16.

In Troxel, prior to the defendant’s trial, which would take place in Pennington County District Court, the judge had issued an order for recusal disclosing that he was engaged in employment negotiations with certain law firms and the Marshall County Attorney’s Office (MCAO), and that he would therefore be disqualified from hearing cases involving those entities. Id., 312–13. The defendant filed a motion to remove the judge from presiding over his trial on the basis of rule 2.11 (A) of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct, which, like rule 2.11 of our Code of Judicial Conduct, provides that “a judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 48 In addition to referencing the text of § 51-277e, the state argues that the legislative history of that provision “demonstrates the separation of the Office of the Inspector General from other state’s attorneys in the [Division of Criminal Justice] and further supports that a reasonable person would not question Judge Prescott’s impartiality.”

Id., 314. In support of his motion, the defendant filed an affidavit setting forth, inter alia, that the trial judge was in the “ ‘final stages’ ” to be appointed to the MCAO as a prosecutor; that Marshall County and Pennington County—where the defendant’s trial would take place— were adjacent and only twenty-nine miles apart; that Marshall County and Pennington County law enforcement agencies often share resources and cooperate; and those law enforcement agencies and the county attorney offices use the services of both the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension and the Minnesota Attorney General ’s Office. Id. The Chief Judge of the Ninth Judicial District of Minnesota denied the defendant’s motion to remove the judge from presiding over the case, concluding that the defendant had not established that, based on an objective examination of the circumstances, the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Id.

On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, a majority of the court agreed that “a reasonable and objective examiner, with full knowledge of the above facts and circumstances, would not question [the trial judge’s] impartiality,” and, therefore, he was not disqualified under rule 2.11 (A) of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct. Id., 316.

The court focused primarily on the distinction between the MCAO, with which the trial judge had engaged in employment negotiations, and the Pennington County Attorney’s Office (PCAO), which had prosecuted the defendant’s case.49 See id., 315–16. Despite the defendant ’s assertions that the law enforcement entities in 49 The court also emphasized that the judge was in “mere negotiation[s]

for future employment” and had not yet been “actually retained” by that office. (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Troxel v. State, supra, 875 N.W.2d 315. The defendant in Troxel had cited secondary sources to support the general propositions that prosecutors must adopt the role as an advocate for the government, that prosecutors would be aligned ideologically with other prosecutors, and that an advocacy function is not consistent with the neutral role of a judge. Id. In response, a majority of the Minnesota Supreme Court stated: “Although these propositions are not incorrect, they do not establish that negotiating to become a prosecutor in the future results in the neighboring Marshall County and Pennington County sometimes cooperated, or shared resources and services, the court determined that there was no evidence in the record that the MCAO had any interest or involvement in the defendant’s case or that the outcome would have an effect on the trial judge’s future employment plans. See id., 316. The court explained that the trial judge “was not retained by the [PCAO]; he was not expected to act in a way that was aligned with the interests of the PCAO; and he did not stand to benefit financially from the PCAO.” Id., 315. The court further explained: “No precedent directly supports the argument that a judge is disqualified for an appearance of partiality based solely on employment negotiations with a county attorney’s office when that office is outside the county in which the trial proceeds, that office is not appearing before the judge, and there are no indications that the office has had any involvement or interest in the case. Here, [the trial judge] took all necessary steps to avoid an appearance of partiality by ordering his own recusal from any cases involving the MCAO.” (Footnote omitted.) Id., 315–16.

In the present case, the state suggests that there exists a similarity to Troxel insofar as the Office of the Inspector General is separate and independent from the office that prosecuted the defendant, the Litchfield state’s attorney’s office. The state contends that Judge Prescott was seeking employment “with an independent office, housed in a different building, and that serves a purpose distinct from the Litchfield state’s attorney’s office.”

We recognize, however, that there are some factual distinctions between Troxel and the present case. Here, although the Office of the Inspector General is a separate office in a different location, it is still a component of the Division of Criminal Justice and, therefore, a part of the same overarching agency as the Litchfield state’s attorney’s office. In addition, there is more potential overlap between those offices. appearance of a judge becoming an advocate, re-aligning his or her ideology, or departing from a neutral role.” (Emphasis in original.) Id.

As set forth previously in this opinion, § 51-277e (g) provides that, “[a]s needed by and upon request of the Inspector General, the Office of the Chief State’s Attorney shall ensure assistance from additional assistant state’s attorneys or deputy assistant state’s attorneys, inspectors and administrative staff.” In addition, pursuant to § 51-281, “[t]he Chief State’s Attorney and each deputy chief state’s attorney, state’s attorney, assistant state’s attorney and deputy assistant state’s attorney, including the deputy chief state’s attorney acting as the Inspector General and any state’s attorney, assistant state’s attorney or deputy assistant state’s attorney operating under the direction of the Office of the Inspector General established under section 51-277e, shall be qualified to act in any judicial district in the state and in connection with any matter regardless of the judicial district where the offense took place, and may be assigned to act in any judicial district at any time on designation by the Chief State’s Attorney or the Inspector General, as applicable.”

Moreover, Troxel was a four to three decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court, and we find more persuasive the dissenting opinion in that case. See Troxel v. State, supra, 875 N.W.2d 317 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that the trial judge should not have presided over the defendant’s murder case at the time when he was actively negotiating to become a county attorney whose duties included prosecuting on behalf of the state. Id. In the dissent’s view, the judge’s actions in seeking such employment during that time created an appearance that the judge lacked impartiality and, to maintain public confidence in the state’s judiciary, it would reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial. Id. The dissent reasoned: “By continuing to preside over criminal cases in which the [s]tate was a party, while actively negotiating to become a county attorney—the advocate for the [s]tate in criminal cases— a reasonable examiner would question the judge’s ability to be impartial.50 Put another way, a reasonable examiner would see that the judge was seeking to leave his position as umpire in order to join one of the teams: the [s]tate.” (Footnote added; footnote omitted.) Id., 318.

The dissent was not convinced by the majority’s distinction between the prosecutors’ offices as being separate offices in different counties. The dissent explained that the majority “view[s] the issue through too narrow a lens. The [s]tate, not a county attorney or the attorney general, was the real party in interest in the case before the district court judge. Whether the judge’s hoped-for compensation would flow from county or state coffers, the judge was working actively to secure employment that included representing the very party in the case then before him: the [s]tate.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id., 319.

The dissent added: “[W]e would be myopic if we failed to see the structure of the relationships between and among the county attorneys and the attorney general. The [s]tate is their client in common. They share a mission : to prosecute violations of the state criminal code. They work closely with the [s]tate’s Bureau of Criminal Apprehension. All county attorneys and the attorney general are members of the statutorily-created council known as the Minnesota County Attorneys Association. . . . Especially in greater Minnesota, the county attorneys and the attorney general work closely together in major criminal matters, handling each other’s cases when faced with specific conflicts or heavy caseloads. Indeed, in this case, both the trial and this appeal were handled primarily by the attorney general. A reasonable examiner would not view the county attorneys, or the attorney general, as separate. Rather, a reasonable examiner would view them to be part of the same team.” (Citation omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

The dissent concluded that the facts presented in that case were reminiscent of those in Scott v. United States, supra, 559 A.2d 745. As we set forth previously in this 50 Of course, just as in Troxel, the state is the party in interest in the present case, and the entities discussed are arms of the state.

opinion, the judge in Scott presided over a trial in which the United States was a party, and the government was represented by the United States attorney. See id., 747. The dissent in Troxel explained: “The position [sought by the judge in Scott]—Assistant Director for the Debt Collection Staff—had little, if any, connection to the day-to-day trial work of the United States Attorney. . . . The job was managerial with no direct litigation control . . . . Yet, said the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the fact that the two components of a large cabinet department were separate as a practical matter did not solve the appearance problem: the judge was presiding over a criminal case prosecuted by one component of the department while the judge was negotiating with another component. . . . In the same vein, and considering all of the circumstances here, a reasonable examiner would reasonably question why this district court judge would preside over a criminal case prosecuted by the [s]tate during the very time the judge was negotiating for a job that would include prosecuting for the State in other criminal cases. He should not have presided over this trial.” (Citations omitted.) Troxel v. State, supra, 875 N.W.2d 319–20 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).

Similar to the dissent’s reasoning in Troxel, we believe that, by focusing on the separate location and distinct purpose of the Office of the Inspector General, the state is viewing the issue through too narrow a lens. The Inspector General is still a part of the Division of Criminal Justice, charged with handling criminal investigations and prosecutions. Thus, even though the position sought by Judge Prescott “had little, if any, connection to the day-to-day trial work” of the Litchfield state’s attorney’s office; id., 319 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting); those offices are nonetheless components of the same agency. Accordingly , “a reasonable examiner would view them to be part of the same team.” Id. (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).

Finally, even if we apply the “harmless error type analysis” requested by the state, we conclude that reversal of the judgment is appropriate in the present case. In

Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., supra, 486 U.S. 864, the United States Supreme Court considered three factors when determining whether to vacate a judgment due to a judge’s violation of 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a), the federal counterpart to rule 2.11 of our Judicial Code of Conduct,51 based on an appearance of partiality.52 Those three factors were (1) the risk of injustice to the parties in this particular case, (2) the risk that denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and (3) the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process. Id.

As to the first factor, the state argues that the risk of injustice to the parties in this particular case is low considering that the defendant has raised no claim of actual bias and, after Judge Prescott disclosed his appointment as Inspector General, he consented to Judge Prescott’s continuing to preside over the postverdict proceedings. In Scott, however, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia explained: “That [the defendant] does not claim that his trial was unfair or that [the trial judge] was actually biased against him is not dispositive. The factors deemed by the [United States] Supreme Court as significant in determining that Liljeberg was an appropriate case in which to apply a retroactive remedy are 51 Section 455 (a) of title 28 of the United States Code provides that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a) (2024).

52 The state has cited no cases, and we are aware of none, in which this court or our Supreme Court has applied the three factor test set forth in Liljeberg to a violation of rule 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. In cases such as Ajadi v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 280 Conn. 525, and Belcher v. State, 99 Conn. App. 353, 358, 913 A.2d 1117 (2007), it was plain error for the judges not to disqualify themselves and, therefore, automatic reversal was required and there was no need for a discretionary determination by the court regarding the imposition of a remedy. See State v. Bellamy, 323 Conn. 400, 438, 147 A.3d 655 (2016) (“plain error is reserved for the very few cases in which the alleged error is so extraordinary that automatic reversal is required”). The defendant in the present case, however, does not contend that the appearance of partiality here was structural error or that it rose to the level of plain error.

present in [the defendant’s] case.” Scott v. United States, supra, 559 A.2d 755.

Even if the risk of injustice to the parties is slight, there is a risk, under the second factor set forth in Liljeberg , that denying relief will produce injustice in other cases in which judges preside while applying to and negotiating their next jobs. See Troxel v. State, supra, 875 N.W.2d 320 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting). Granting the defendant relief in the present case will serve to encourage careful examination by judges of the circumstances giving rise to concerns under rule 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. See Scott v. United States, supra, 559 A.2d 754 (discussing prophylactic value of vacating defendant’s conviction and remanding for new trial); see also Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., supra, 486 U.S. 868 (“the Court of Appeals’ willingness to enforce [28 U.S.C. § 455] may prevent a substantive injustice in some future case by encouraging a judge or litigant to more carefully examine possible grounds for disqualification and to promptly disclose them when discovered”).

The third factor set forth in Liljeberg tips the balance in favor of reversal of the judgment. As the dissent in Troxel explained: “[T]he public’s confidence in the judicial process is undermined when we do nothing in a criminal case over which a judge presided while seeking to represent one of the parties—the State—as a prosecutor .” Troxel v. State, supra, 875 N.W.2d 320 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting); see also Scott v. United States, supra, 559 A.2d 756 (concluding that new trial was required “in order to assure the continued public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary”). Accordingly, we conclude that reversal of the judgment is warranted in the present case.

In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that our decision is not based on any actual bias on the part of Judge Prescott. The defendant does not raise a claim of actual bias and readily admits that there is no evidence in the record to support such a claim. Accordingly, our decision does not reflect on Judge Prescott’s ability to remain impartial nor does it impugn his exceptional reputation. Rather, our conclusion serves to emphasize the high standard of impartiality set forth in rule 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, requiring judges to be impartial and appear to be impartial.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.