IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE ) ) v. ) I.D. No. 1308007988 ) CURTIS FINNEY, ) ) Defendant. )
Submitted: September 21, 2023 Decided: September 25, 2023
Upon Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
ORDER
Curtis Finney, pro se, Smyrna, DE.
Abigail Rodgers, Esquire, Chief Prosecutor for New Castle County, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 820 N. French St., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.
WHARTON, J. This 25th day of September, 2023 upon consideration of the Defendant’s
Motion for Postconviction Relief,1 supporting Memorandum of Law,2 and the record
in this matter, it appears to the Court that:
1. Defendant Curtis Finney (“Finney”) was convicted after a bench trial
of Aggravated Possession of Heroin, four counts of Possession of a Firearm During
the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”) (one for possessing a .45 caliber handgun
and one for possessing a .22 caliber handgun, both during the commission of
Aggravated Possession of Heroin, and one for possessing a .45 caliber handgun and
one for possessing a .22 caliber handgun, both during Drug Dealing in Heroin), Drug
Dealing in Heroin, two counts of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited
(“PFBPP”) (one for possessing a .45 caliber handgun and one for possessing a .22
caliber handgun, both after previously having been convicted of Drug Dealing), two
counts of Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited (“PABPP”) (one for
possessing .45 caliber ammunition and one for possessing .22 caliber ammunition,
both after previously having been convicted of Drug Dealing), four counts of
Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited (“PDWBPP) (one for
possessing a .45 caliber handgun and one for possessing a .22 caliber handgun, both
while possessing a controlled substance – heroin) and one for possessing a .45
1 D.I. 97. 2 D.I. 98. 2 caliber handgun and one for possessing a .22 caliber handgun, both while possessing
a controlled substance – cocaine), and Driving While Suspended or Revoked.
2. Finney’s direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court resulted in a
remand to this Court for resentencing.3 On remand, this Court ultimately granted
Finney’s Motion for Correction of Sentence addressed to issues of multiplicity and
adopted Finney’s proposed sentence order.4 On May 1, 2017, Finney was sentenced
to 25 years at Level V, suspended after two years at Level 5 for decreasing levels of
supervision on the Drug Dealing charge; five years at Level V for each of the two
PFDCF charges (five years for the .45 caliber handgun and five years for the .22
caliber handgun); five years at Level V for each of the PFBPP charges (five years
for the .45 caliber handgun and five years for the .22 caliber handgun) (the sentences
for the PFBPP charges are concurrent); and concurrent suspended sentences on the
two PABPP charges, the Possession of Cocaine charge, and the Driving While
Suspended or Revoked charge.5 He was not sentenced on the remaining charges for
which he was convicted because they were duplicative of charges for which he was
sentenced.
3. After unsuccessfully seeking a sentence modification, Finney filed his
first Motion for Postconviction Relief (“Motion”) on February 11, 2019.6 In it he
3 Finney v. State, 2016 WL 3568176 (Del. 2016). 4 See, D.I. 85-88. 5 D.I. 88. 6 D.I. 91. 3 raised four claims for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel
“withdrew my suppression motion without any real reasoning;” (2) violation of due
process as a result of being sentenced on a violation of probation before he was
convicted of any new charges; (3) “double jeopardy for sentencing [him] for four
PFBB & four PFDCF when [he] only got arrested with two firearms;” and (4) “Fruit
of poisonous tree dropping my probable cause for my traffic stop, but still finding me
guilty on any charges that followed.”7 This Court summarily dismissed that motion
on February 13, 2019, holding that the motion was procedurally barred as untimely
and subject to procedural default.8
4. Finney now files his second Motion for Postconviction Relief.9 In his
supporting Memorandum of Law, he relies upon Wooden v. United States10 to ask the
Court to “reexamine[ ] his sentence, and grant[ ] any other relief that is just and
proper.”11 He makes no request for any form of specific relief.
5. Before addressing the merits of a defendant’s motion for postconviction
relief, the Court must first apply the procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule
61(i).12 If a procedural bar exists, then the Court will not consider the merits of the
postconviction claim.13
7 Id. 8 State v. Finney, 2019 WL 1125800, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 2013). 9 D.I. 97. 10 595 U.S. 360 (2022). 11 D.I. 98, at 9. 12 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 13 Id. 4 5. Under Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion
for postconviction relief can be barred for time limitations, successive motions,
procedural default, or former adjudication.14 A motion exceeds time limitations if it
is filed more than one year after the conviction becomes final, or, if it asserts a
retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of
conviction is final, more than one year after the right was first recognized by the
Supreme Court of Delaware or the United States Supreme Court.15 A second or
subsequent motion is considered successive and therefore barred and subject to
summary dismissal unless the movant was convicted after a trial and “pleads with
particularity that new evidence exists that the movant is actually innocent” or “pleads
with particularity a claim that a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to
cases on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware
Supreme Court, applies to the movant’s case and renders the conviction …
invalid.”16 Grounds for relief “not asserted in the proceedings leading to the
judgment of conviction” are barred as procedurally defaulted unless the movant can
show “cause for relief” and “prejudice from [the] violation.”17 Grounds for relief
formerly adjudicated in the case, including “proceedings leading to the judgment of
14 Super. Ct. Crim. R, 61(i). 15 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 16 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2). 17 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 5 conviction, in an appeal, in a post-conviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas
corpus hearing” are barred.18
6. The bars to relief do not apply either to a claim that the court lacked
jurisdiction or to a claim that pleads with particularity that new evidence exists that
creates a strong inference of actual innocence,19 or that a new retroactively applied
rule of constitutional law renders the conviction invalid.20 The bars remain
applicable here because Finney has not claimed that the Court lacked jurisdiction,
nor has he met the pleading requirements of Rule 61(d)(2)(i) or (d)(2)(ii).
7. In order to overcome Rule 61’s bars to relief, Finney expends energy
trying to convince the Court that Wooden represents a new retroactively applied rule
of constitutional law rendering his sentence invalid. In fact, he spends so much
energy arguing that Wooden makes those bars inapplicable that he fails to explain
just how Wooden applies to his case.
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE ) ) v. ) I.D. No. 1308007988 ) CURTIS FINNEY, ) ) Defendant. )
Submitted: September 21, 2023 Decided: September 25, 2023
Upon Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
ORDER
Curtis Finney, pro se, Smyrna, DE.
Abigail Rodgers, Esquire, Chief Prosecutor for New Castle County, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 820 N. French St., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.
WHARTON, J. This 25th day of September, 2023 upon consideration of the Defendant’s
Motion for Postconviction Relief,1 supporting Memorandum of Law,2 and the record
in this matter, it appears to the Court that:
1. Defendant Curtis Finney (“Finney”) was convicted after a bench trial
of Aggravated Possession of Heroin, four counts of Possession of a Firearm During
the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”) (one for possessing a .45 caliber handgun
and one for possessing a .22 caliber handgun, both during the commission of
Aggravated Possession of Heroin, and one for possessing a .45 caliber handgun and
one for possessing a .22 caliber handgun, both during Drug Dealing in Heroin), Drug
Dealing in Heroin, two counts of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited
(“PFBPP”) (one for possessing a .45 caliber handgun and one for possessing a .22
caliber handgun, both after previously having been convicted of Drug Dealing), two
counts of Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited (“PABPP”) (one for
possessing .45 caliber ammunition and one for possessing .22 caliber ammunition,
both after previously having been convicted of Drug Dealing), four counts of
Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited (“PDWBPP) (one for
possessing a .45 caliber handgun and one for possessing a .22 caliber handgun, both
while possessing a controlled substance – heroin) and one for possessing a .45
1 D.I. 97. 2 D.I. 98. 2 caliber handgun and one for possessing a .22 caliber handgun, both while possessing
a controlled substance – cocaine), and Driving While Suspended or Revoked.
2. Finney’s direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court resulted in a
remand to this Court for resentencing.3 On remand, this Court ultimately granted
Finney’s Motion for Correction of Sentence addressed to issues of multiplicity and
adopted Finney’s proposed sentence order.4 On May 1, 2017, Finney was sentenced
to 25 years at Level V, suspended after two years at Level 5 for decreasing levels of
supervision on the Drug Dealing charge; five years at Level V for each of the two
PFDCF charges (five years for the .45 caliber handgun and five years for the .22
caliber handgun); five years at Level V for each of the PFBPP charges (five years
for the .45 caliber handgun and five years for the .22 caliber handgun) (the sentences
for the PFBPP charges are concurrent); and concurrent suspended sentences on the
two PABPP charges, the Possession of Cocaine charge, and the Driving While
Suspended or Revoked charge.5 He was not sentenced on the remaining charges for
which he was convicted because they were duplicative of charges for which he was
sentenced.
3. After unsuccessfully seeking a sentence modification, Finney filed his
first Motion for Postconviction Relief (“Motion”) on February 11, 2019.6 In it he
3 Finney v. State, 2016 WL 3568176 (Del. 2016). 4 See, D.I. 85-88. 5 D.I. 88. 6 D.I. 91. 3 raised four claims for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel
“withdrew my suppression motion without any real reasoning;” (2) violation of due
process as a result of being sentenced on a violation of probation before he was
convicted of any new charges; (3) “double jeopardy for sentencing [him] for four
PFBB & four PFDCF when [he] only got arrested with two firearms;” and (4) “Fruit
of poisonous tree dropping my probable cause for my traffic stop, but still finding me
guilty on any charges that followed.”7 This Court summarily dismissed that motion
on February 13, 2019, holding that the motion was procedurally barred as untimely
and subject to procedural default.8
4. Finney now files his second Motion for Postconviction Relief.9 In his
supporting Memorandum of Law, he relies upon Wooden v. United States10 to ask the
Court to “reexamine[ ] his sentence, and grant[ ] any other relief that is just and
proper.”11 He makes no request for any form of specific relief.
5. Before addressing the merits of a defendant’s motion for postconviction
relief, the Court must first apply the procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule
61(i).12 If a procedural bar exists, then the Court will not consider the merits of the
postconviction claim.13
7 Id. 8 State v. Finney, 2019 WL 1125800, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 2013). 9 D.I. 97. 10 595 U.S. 360 (2022). 11 D.I. 98, at 9. 12 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 13 Id. 4 5. Under Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion
for postconviction relief can be barred for time limitations, successive motions,
procedural default, or former adjudication.14 A motion exceeds time limitations if it
is filed more than one year after the conviction becomes final, or, if it asserts a
retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of
conviction is final, more than one year after the right was first recognized by the
Supreme Court of Delaware or the United States Supreme Court.15 A second or
subsequent motion is considered successive and therefore barred and subject to
summary dismissal unless the movant was convicted after a trial and “pleads with
particularity that new evidence exists that the movant is actually innocent” or “pleads
with particularity a claim that a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to
cases on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware
Supreme Court, applies to the movant’s case and renders the conviction …
invalid.”16 Grounds for relief “not asserted in the proceedings leading to the
judgment of conviction” are barred as procedurally defaulted unless the movant can
show “cause for relief” and “prejudice from [the] violation.”17 Grounds for relief
formerly adjudicated in the case, including “proceedings leading to the judgment of
14 Super. Ct. Crim. R, 61(i). 15 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 16 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2). 17 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 5 conviction, in an appeal, in a post-conviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas
corpus hearing” are barred.18
6. The bars to relief do not apply either to a claim that the court lacked
jurisdiction or to a claim that pleads with particularity that new evidence exists that
creates a strong inference of actual innocence,19 or that a new retroactively applied
rule of constitutional law renders the conviction invalid.20 The bars remain
applicable here because Finney has not claimed that the Court lacked jurisdiction,
nor has he met the pleading requirements of Rule 61(d)(2)(i) or (d)(2)(ii).
7. In order to overcome Rule 61’s bars to relief, Finney expends energy
trying to convince the Court that Wooden represents a new retroactively applied rule
of constitutional law rendering his sentence invalid. In fact, he spends so much
energy arguing that Wooden makes those bars inapplicable that he fails to explain
just how Wooden applies to his case. In Wooden, the defendant was sentenced to an
enhanced minimum mandatory term of imprisonment under the federal Armed
Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) as a result of the District Court determining that
Wooden’s ten prior convictions for breaking into separate units at a storage facility
occurred on different occasions.21 Those convictions were a result of Wooden and
his co-conspirators entering a one-building storage facility and proceeding from unit
18 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 19 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). 20 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii). 21 Wooden, 595 U.S. at 364. 6 to unit, stealing items from ten separate units.22 In reversing the Sixth Circuit, which
had affirmed the District Court, the Supreme Court held that Wooden’s burglary
convictions had occurred on a single occasion and only counted as a single
conviction under the ACCA.23
8. The Court finds that Wooden has no relevance to Finney’s case. Finney’s
convictions for PFBPP were the result of him possessing two separate firearms.24
Finney was prohibited from possessing both firearms as a result of his prior
conviction for Drug Dealing.25 His sentence was enhanced as a result of a single
prior conviction, not multiple prior convictions occurring on a single occasion as in
Wooden. Moreover, nothing in Wooden precludes Finney from being convicted and
sentenced for two separate counts of PFDCF and PFBPP involving two different
firearms, even if those convictions all occurred on a single occasion.
9. Thus, Finney’s second postconviction relief motion is barred for multiple
reasons: (1) it is untimely, having been filed more than a year after Finney’s
judgment of conviction became final; (2) because there is no retroactively applicable
rule of constitutional law that renders his sentence invalid, it is a successive motion;
and (3) even if Wooden did announce such a rule, Finney’s motion still would be
22 Id. 23 Id. at 376. 24 Indictment, Counts IX and X, D.I. 36. 25 Id. 7 untimely because Wooden was decided on March 7, 2022 and this motion was filed
on September 21, 2023, more than a year later.26
10. Summary dismissal is appropriate if it plainly appears from the motion
for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the
movant is not entitled to relief.27 It is plain from the Motion and the record in this
case that Finney is not entitled to relief because it fails to meet the pleading
requirements of Rules 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii) in order to overcome the bars of Rule
61(i)(1) and (2).
THEREFORE, since it plainly appears from the Motion for Postconviction
Relief and the record in this case that Finney is not entitled to relief, the Motion for
Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ferris W. Wharton Ferris W. Wharton, J.
oc: Prothonotary cc: Investigative Services
26 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 27 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(5). 8