[Cite as State v. Ferrell, 2014-Ohio-4377.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 100659
STATE OF OHIO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
JOHN FERRELL DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-13-574239-A
BEFORE: Boyle, A.J., Rocco, J., and E.A. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 2, 2014 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Allison S. Breneman 1220 West 6th Street Suite 303 Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty Cuyahoga County Prosecutor BY: Margaret A. Troia Assistant County Prosecutor Justice Center, 9th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 MARY J. BOYLE, A.J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, John Ferrell, appeals his conviction and sentence in
connection with five counts of rape, one count of gross sexual imposition, and two counts
of kidnapping, involving two separate children — his daughter, K.O., and his niece, R.O.
Finding some merit to the appeal, we affirm the convictions, reverse the sentence, and
remand for resentencing.
Procedural History and Facts
{¶2} In May 2013, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Ferrell on 16
counts — eight counts of rape, four counts of kidnapping, and four counts of gross sexual
imposition. Eleven of the counts involved Ferrell’s daughter, K.O. (“daughter”) (d.o.b.
June 17, 1997), and the remaining five counts involved Ferrell’s niece, R.O. (d.o.b.
December 19, 1994). The rape and kidnapping counts carried sexual motivation and
sexually violent predator specifications.
{¶3} Ferrell pleaded not guilty to the charges, and the matter proceeded to a jury
trial. The state presented several witnesses at trial, including daughter and R.O., who
testified as to the sexual offenses that Ferrell committed against them.
{¶4} According to daughter’s testimony, Ferrell first inappropriately “touched”
her and inserted his finger in her vagina when she was around five years old, sleeping
over at her father’s house in Cleveland. Approximately nine years later, Ferrell, a
commercial truck driver, committed several other sexual offenses against daughter at a
rest stop in “New York or Pennsylvania” during one of his delivery trips where daughter accompanied him. The trip occurred in August 2011, prior to daughter’s start of her
eighth-grade year.
{¶5} Although daughter “never went on any truck trips” with Ferrell again, she
did not initially report the incidents because she was “scared.” Daughter testified,
however, that months following the New York trip, she told two of her cousins and then
later told R.O., her other cousin, who is more like a “sister.” Daughter ultimately
reported the incidents to her high school guidance counselor upon seeking advice on
another matter. Daughter also revealed the earlier incident of her childhood when
speaking with her high school guidance counselor. The police and the Cuyahoga County
Department of Children and Family Services (“CDCFS”) became involved immediately
following daughter’s reporting to the high school guidance counselor.
{¶6} Daughter was 16 years old at the time of the trial.
{¶7} According to R.O.’s testimony, daughter told her about the incidents with
Ferrell sometime in 2011 or 2012. In response to daughter’s revelations, R.O. stated,
“Wow, that’s really messed up, and it happened to me too.” R.O. testified that Ferrell
“molested me when I was younger.” Specifically, R.O. explained that Ferrell removed
her from a bunk bed during the night and took her to the basement where he “licked” and
“rubbed her vagina.” R.O. was only six or seven years old at the time and visiting her
cousins at a house located in Cleveland, Ohio. R.O. further testified that, when she was
seven and one-half years old, Ferrell took her into a bedroom and “rubbed his penis on
her vagina.” R.O. recalled that the incident occurred when Ferrell and his girlfriend, Rachel, were babysitting her at her home on Irma Avenue, also in Cleveland, and that
Rachel came into the room afterwards and taught her a prayer. R.O. testified that she
finally decided to come forward and report the incidents after daughter “ended up coming
out with it.” The police interviewed R.O. shortly after interviewing daughter regarding
the allegations.
{¶8} R.O. was 18 years old at the time of the trial.
{¶9} Rachel Smith, Ferrell’s ex-girlfriend, testified that she remembered an
occasion where she and Ferrell babysat R.O., and R.O. was in her bedroom with the
covers pulled up to her chin. Prior to seeing R.O. upset, Smith observed Ferrell exit
R.O.’s bedroom, where the door had previously been closed. Smith testified that R.O.
had tears in her eyes and “looked sad.” After R.O. refused to tell Smith what was
bothering her, Smith prayed with R.O.
{¶10} The state also presented several other witnesses, including daughter’s
mother and siblings, who corroborated aspects of daughter’s testimony. The state further
offered testimony to explain the police’s investigation and the treatment provided to
daughter and R.O. with respect to the CDCFS’s investigation of the allegations.
{¶11} At the close of the state’s case, the state moved to nolle two of the rape
counts and one count of gross sexual imposition relating to offenses involving the
daughter, for which the state failed to present evidence to support. The trial court
granted the motion and dismissed the counts.
{¶12} Ferrell offered no witnesses at trial. {¶13} The jury ultimately convicted Ferrell of five counts of rape, one count of
kidnapping, and one count of gross sexual imposition for acts that he committed against
K.O. The jury further found Ferrell not guilty of rape against R.O. but guilty of the
lesser included offense of gross sexual imposition and guilty of kidnapping and another
count of gross sexual imposition. Prior to sentencing, the state moved to dismiss the
sexually violent specifications attached to the counts.
{¶14} At sentencing, the trial court merged as allied offenses the following
offenses: Count 1 (rape) and Count 2 (kidnapping) — the state elected to proceed on the
rape count; Count 7 (rape) and Count 11 (kidnapping) — the state elected to proceed on
the rape count; Count 12 (lesser included offense of gross sexual imposition), Count 13
(gross sexual imposition), and Count 14 (kidnapping) — the state elected to proceed on
the kidnapping count; and Count 15 (gross sexual imposition) and Count 16 (kidnapping)
— the state elected to proceed on the kidnapping count. The trial court imposed a prison
term on each count, ordering that the counts run consecutive for a total of 75.5 years in
prison.
{¶15} Ferrell appeals, raising the following five assignments of error:
I. The jury found, against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the appellant committed the acts alleged in the indictment.
II. Because there was insufficient evidence to show venue was proper, the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to dismiss counts three, four, five, six, seven, and eleven as set forth in the indictment.
III. Offenses set forth in counts three, four, five, and six are allied offenses of similar import and should have been merged for sentencing purposes. IV. Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of Amendments VI and XIV, United States Constitution; and Article I, Section 10, Ohio Constitution.
V. The trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences.
Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶16} In his first assignment of error, Ferrell argues that his convictions are
against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶17} When an appellate court analyzes a conviction under the manifest weight
standard, it must review the entire record, weigh all of the evidence and all of the
reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in
resolving conflicts in the evidence, the factfinder clearly lost its way and created such a
manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial
ordered. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Under a
manifest weight standard, an appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and may disagree
with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony. Id. Although the appellate
court may act as a thirteenth juror, it should give due deference to the findings made by
the factfinder. Id. at 388. Only in exceptional cases, where the evidence “weighs
heavily against the conviction,” should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s
judgment. Id.
{¶18} Ferrell argues that the state’s entire case hinged primarily on daughter’s and
R.O.’s testimony and that the lack of any physical evidence corroborating their testimony
renders the verdict against the manifest weight of the evidence. He contends that daughter and R.O., who are extremely close — “more like sisters” — were not credible
and further implies that they conspired to fabricate the allegations against him.
{¶19} With respect to daughter’s credibility, Ferrell points to daughter’s testimony
that she accompanied him to New York to deliver the load on his semi-truck as being
directly contradicted by other testimony that Ferrell never made a delivery to New York at
that time. He further argues that his delivery route did not allow time for him to pick up
daughter. Ferrell also contends that daughter’s credibility was also undermined by the
contradictory testimony between herself and her high school guidance counselor as the
reason why she first sought out her guidance counselor. Daughter testified that she went
to see her guidance counselor because of a rumor that daughter was sleeping with her
brother. Conversely, daughter’s guidance counselor testified that she had no recollection
of daughter telling her that and would have remembered such an allegation.
{¶20} The weight to be given the conflicting evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses is for the trier of fact who had an opportunity to view the witnesses and observe
their demeanor. Here, the jury was aware of these inconsistencies but obviously did not
find them to render daughter’s testimony completely unreliable. “Although we consider
the credibility of the witnesses in a manifest-weight challenge, we are mindful that the
determination regarding witness credibility rests primarily with the trier of fact.” State v.
Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100338, 2014-Ohio-2186, ¶ 18, citing State v. Clark, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94406, 2010-Ohio-5600, ¶ 39. Based on the other evidence presented at trial, we cannot say that the jury lost its way in making such a credibility
determination.
{¶21} For example, although daughter believed that her father’s work trip involved
a delivery in New York, the record reveals that he delivered a load to East York,
Pennsylvania at the time of the alleged offenses. Daughter acknowledged, however, that
the rest stop where the sexual offenses took place could have been in Pennsylvania.
Given daughter’s age and grade level, the jury could have reasonably found that daughter
was confused between East York, Pennsylvania, and New York at the time that she made
the trip. As for the trip actually occurring, daughter’s testimony was corroborated by her
mother, who specifically testified that she remembered her daughter taking a “truck run”
in August 2011 with her father before the start of school for “one-two nights.”
{¶22} Likewise, even if daughter’s stated reason at trial for seeking her guidance
counselor’s help contradicted with her guidance counselor’s recollection, that alone does
not require the jury to disregard daughter’s entire testimony, including the description of
the offenses.
{¶23} As for R.O.’s credibility, Ferrell fails to point to any inconsistencies or
conflicting evidence in the record. Instead, he attacks her credibility based on her close
relationship with her cousin, the daughter. We find this argument unpersuasive.
Notably, the record contains no evidence of any motivation by the daughter or R.O.,
either individually or collectively, to fabricate a story against Ferrell. {¶24} Having considered the entire record, we cannot conclude that the trial court
clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice in finding Ferrell
guilty. The first assignment of error is without merit.
Venue
{¶25} In his second assignment of error, Ferrell argues that the rape and gross
sexual imposition counts involving his daughter, which allegedly occurred outside of
Ohio, should have been dismissed because the state failed to present sufficient evidence
of venue.
{¶26} Ohio’s venue statute, R.C. 2901.12, provides that “the trial of a criminal
case in this state shall be held in a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter, and in
the territory of which the offense or any element of the offense was committed.” R.C.
2901.12(A). However, in recognizing the modern mobility of criminal offenders and the
interest of judicial economy, the statute further provides:
When an offender, as part of a course of criminal conduct, commits offenses in different jurisdictions, the offender may be tried for all of those offenses in any jurisdiction in which one of those offenses or any element of one of those offenses occurred.
R.C. 2901.12(H).
{¶27} Here, the state argued that all counts could be tried in Ohio because Ferrell committed the acts as part of a course of criminal conduct. R.C. 2901.12(H) defines, among others, the following as prima facie evidence of a course of criminal conduct:
(1) The offenses involved the same victim, or victims of the same type or from the same group.
(2) The offenses were committed by the offender in the offender’s same employment, or capacity, or relationship to another. {¶28} Ferrell argues on appeal that he has no nexus to Cuyahoga County in Ohio
to support his convictions for the offenses that allegedly occurred outside of the county.
He contends that he has overcome the state’s prima facie evidence of a course of criminal
conduct by demonstrating a significant time lapse in between the offenses. He further
argues that daughter had accompanied him on other truck driving trips where no
wrongdoing took place, which occurred after the alleged incident in Cleveland but prior
to the New York–Pennsylvania trip. According to Ferrell, these other trips constitute an
intervening act that negate any claim of a course of criminal conduct.
{¶29} We find Ferrell’s arguments unpersuasive. The counts that occurred
outside of Ohio involved his daughter. He also committed the same act against his
daughter earlier in Cuyahoga County, as well as committing sexual offenses against R.O.
in Cuyahoga County. Further, Ferrell facilitated the offenses against his daughter, both
in Cuyahoga County and outside the county, while visiting and spending time with her.
See State v. Birt, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-02-031, 2013-Ohio-1379, ¶ 30
(recognizing sufficient evidence of venue — rapes “were committed as a ‘course of
criminal conduct’ as the offenses each involved the same victim * * * and were
committed in the same relationship, father-daughter”). Moreover, Ferrell picked his
daughter up in Cuyahoga County to take her on the road trip where the crimes were
committed and then returned her to Cuyahoga County. State v. Whitt, 5th Dist.
Coshocton No. 10-CA-10, 2011-Ohio-3022 (venue satisfied in Coshocton County for
rapes occurring in defendant’s semi-trucks out of state when evidence revealed that the trips would originate in Coshocton County and defendant would return minor victim to
defendant’s home in Coshocton County).
{¶30} Based on this record, we find that the state presented sufficient evidence of
Ferrell’s nexus to Cuyahoga County to satisfy venue. The second assignment of error is
overruled.
Allied Offenses
{¶31} In his third assignment of error, Ferrell argues that the trial court should
have merged the three counts of rape (Counts 3, 4, and 5) and single count of gross sexual
imposition (Count 6) for the offenses that occurred the first night in his semi-truck during
the out-of-state trip. We disagree.
{¶32} When a defendant’s conduct results in the commission of two or more
“allied” offenses of similar import, that conduct can be charged separately, but the
defendant can be convicted and sentenced for only one offense. R.C. 2941.25(A). In
determining whether offenses merge, we consider the defendant’s conduct. State v.
Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 44. “If the multiple
offenses can be committed by the same conduct, then the court must determine whether
the offenses were committed by the same conduct, i.e., ‘a single act, committed with a
single state of mind.’” Id. at ¶ 49, quoting State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447,
2008-Ohio-4569, 895 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 50 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting). If we answer both
questions affirmatively, then the offenses are allied offenses of similar import and will be
merged. Johnson at ¶ 50; see also State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427, 2013-Ohio-4982, 999 N.E.2d 661, ¶ 13 (offenses of similar import do not merge if the
offenses at issue “were committed separately or with a separate animus”).
{¶33} Focusing on the fact that these offenses occurred during the out-of-state trip,
Ferrell contends that the offenses were committed as part of the same transaction with a
single state of mind, namely, “to assault [daughter] throughout the out-of-state trip.” We
find Ferrell’s argument misplaced. The three separate counts of rape pertained to
Ferrell’s placing (1) his tongue inside daughter’s vagina, (2) his finger inside daughter’s
vagina, and (3) his penis inside daughter’s vagina. The count of gross sexual imposition
related to Ferrell’s touching daughter’s breasts. While these offenses all occurred close
in time to one another, each offense involved different conduct. Accordingly, we find
that these offenses do not merge as allied offenses. See, e.g., State v. Accorinti, 12th
Dist. Butler Nos. CA2012-10-205 and CA2012-11-221, 2013-Ohio-4429, ¶ 16
(recognizing digital penetration and vaginal intercourse “are two distinct types of sexual
activity, each constituting a separate crime”); State v. Trotter, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
97064, 2012-Ohio-2760, ¶ 45 (“Oral and vaginal rape are not allied offenses.”); State v.
Hudson, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 11 MA 77, 2013-Ohio-5529 (applying Johnson and
recognizing that gross sexual imposition and rape do not merge when defendant engages
in separate conduct for each offense).
{¶34} The third assignment of error is overruled. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Joinder
{¶35} In his fourth assignment of error, Ferrell argues that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to move to sever the counts involving daughter from the counts
involving R.O. We find no merit to this argument.
{¶36} To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1)
deficient performance by counsel, i.e., performance falling below an objective standard of
reasonable representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that but for
counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s result would have been different. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v.
Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), paragraphs two and three of the
syllabus.
{¶37} Ferrell contends that the joinder of the offenses involving daughter and R.O.
was prejudicial and improperly influenced the jury. He argues that the jury convicted
him simply because two different victims accused him of the same offenses and,
therefore, his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move for the severance of the
offenses.
{¶38} Under Crim.R. 8(A), two or more offenses may be charged together if the
offenses “are of the same or similar character, * * * or are based on two or more acts or
transactions connected together * * * or are part of a course of criminal conduct.” State
v. Woodson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93476, 2010-Ohio- 5230, ¶ 9, citing State v. Diar,
120 Ohio St.3d 460, 2008-Ohio-6266, 900 N.E.2d 565, ¶ 94. The law favors joining multiple offenses in a single trial if the requisites of Crim.R. 8(A) are fulfilled. Id. If it
appears, however, that the defendant would be prejudiced by the joinder, a trial court may
grant a severance under Crim.R. 14. Diar at ¶ 95.
{¶39} “A defendant is not prejudiced by joinder where the joined offenses are
‘simple and direct, so that a jury is capable of segregating the proof required for each
offense.’” State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20910, 2005-Ohio-6666, ¶ 38,
quoting State v. Fletcher, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2003-CA-62, 2004-Ohio-4517, ¶ 41.
Likewise, severance is not required if the evidence would have come in as other acts
evidence under Evid.R. 404(B). Id.
{¶40} In deciding a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we must “indulge a
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674. “[T]hat is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” (Citation
omitted.) Id. “Trial strategy, including debatable trial tactics, does not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. Benitez, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98930,
2013-Ohio-2334, ¶ 31, citing State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815, 848
N.E.2d 810, ¶ 111. Indeed, the decision to file a motion for separate trials or to proceed
with the joinder of the offenses may be a matter of counsel’s trial strategy. Benitez at ¶
31, citing State v. Bishop, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 53278, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 246, *9
(Jan. 21, 1988). {¶41} Here, we find that it is reasonable to presume that trial counsel’s decision
not to file a motion to sever the offenses was sound trial strategy. Defense counsel could
have reasonably believed that one trial would be the best strategy to try and persuade the
jury to return a verdict of not guilty on all counts of the indictment at the same time.
Indeed, in his closing argument, defense counsel emphasized the close relationship
between the two cousins, implying that they fabricated their stories against Ferrell and
neither one was credible. Specifically, defense counsel emphasized that R.O. was
daughter’s best friend, asking the jury to question “why [daughter’s] best friend, her
backup, comes to her aid and said yeah, happened to me too.” Moreover, even if defense
counsel had moved for severance, the trial court would have been well within its
discretion in maintaining the joinder. See, e.g., State v. Scott, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
91890, 2010-Ohio-3057 (no ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to
move to sever counts of sexual offenses involving a second victim; no prejudice where
trial court is well within its authority to deny such a motion).
{¶42} Having found that defense counsel’s approach constitutes reasonable trial
strategy, we find no merit to Ferrell’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See
Strickland at 689. The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
Consecutive Sentences
{¶43} In his final assignment of error, Ferrell argues that the trial court failed to
make the necessary findings to support the imposition of consecutive sentences. We
agree. {¶44} Judicial fact-finding is required to overcome the statutory presumption in
favor of concurrent sentences. State v. Bonnell, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 23.
Indeed, “[i]n order to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment, a trial court is required
to make the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and
incorporate its findings into its sentencing entry * * * .” Id. at ¶ 37.
{¶45} Specifically, “R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires the trial court to make statutory
findings prior to imposing consecutive sentences, and Crim.R. 32(A)(4) * * * directs the
court to state those findings at the time of imposing the sentence.” Id. at ¶ 26. First, the
trial court must find that “consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from
future crime or to punish the offender.” R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Next, the trial court must
find that “consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the
offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public.” Id. Finally, the
trial court must find that at least one of the following applies: (1) the offender committed
one or more of the multiple offenses while awaiting trial or sentencing, while under a
sanction, or while under postrelease control for a prior offense; (2) at least two of the
multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the
harm caused by two or more of the offenses was so great or unusual that no single prison
term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct
adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct; or (3) the offender’s history
of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the
public from future crime by the offender. Id. {¶46} Here, the trial court made the first two findings but failed to make the third
finding to support the imposition of consecutive sentences. In attempting to make the
finding, the trial judge erroneously focused on the defendant’s history of criminal conduct
related to the underlying charges — not his criminal conduct in general. However, given
that this case involves two victims, the possibility exists for the trial court to make
another finding to support the imposition of consecutive sentences, and therefore we must
remand for the trial court to consider the remaining factors of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). But
the trial court is free to impose concurrent sentences if it does not find that consecutive
sentences are appropriate.
{¶47} We further note that the sentencing hearing on remand is limited to the trial
court’s consideration of the imposition of consecutive sentences. See State v. Holdcroft,
137 Ohio St.3d 526, 531, 2013-Ohio-5014, 1 N.E.3d 382, ¶ 9 (“the defendant and the
state may challenge any aspect of the sentence and sentencing hearing, and the appellate
court is authorized to modify the sentence or remand for resentencing to fix whatever has
been successfully challenged”). At the sentencing hearing, the trial court may determine
whether the facts and circumstances of the case warrant the imposition of consecutive
sentences. State v. Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 541, 2008-Ohio-69, 880 N.E.2d 896, ¶ 20.
{¶48} The final assignment of error is sustained.
{¶49} Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellee and appellant share the costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY J. BOYLE, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., and EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR