[Cite as State v. Fench, 2026-Ohio-2794.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. {48}L-25-00140
Appellee Trial Court No. CR202500293
v.
Billy Fench DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: July 21, 2026
*****
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Randy L. Meyer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Tyler Naud Jechura, for appellant.
ZMUDA, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Billy Fench, appeals from a judgment entered by the Lucas
County Court of Common Pleas convicting him, following a plea of guilty, on one count
of attempted domestic violence. For the reasons that follow, the trial court’s judgment is
affirmed. Statement of the Case and the Facts {¶ 2} This case arose from events that were alleged to have occurred on October
12, 2024, and resulted in Fench’s indictment on February 27, 2025, in case No. CR-25-
00293, on charges of strangulation and domestic violence. Fench was arraigned in the
case on March 3, 2025, and pleaded not guilty. The trial court set bond at $25,000 with
no 10 percent allowed and ordered Fench to have no contact, direct or indirect, with the
victim. The record does not suggest that Fench made bond.
{¶ 3} Prior to his indictment in the current case, Fench had become incarcerated in
the Lucas County jail in connection with an earlier filed case, case No. CR-24-02731,
which involved a separate incident of domestic violence that was alleged to have
occurred on November 20, 2024. A nolle prosequi was entered in the earlier filed case on
March 18, 2025, but Fench remained incarcerated in the Lucas County jail through May
22, 2025.
{¶ 4} Several times following his arraignment in the current case, Fench orally
moved the trial court to dismiss the case on speedy-trial grounds. Each time, those
motions were denied.
{¶ 5} On May 20, 2025, Fench withdrew his not-guilty plea and pleaded guilty to
attempted domestic violence, a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of R.C. 2923.02,
R.C. 2929.25(A), and R.C. 2919.25(D)(3). On May 22, 2025, the trial court sentenced
Fench to serve 12 months in prison on the offense.
2. Assignment of Error
{¶ 6} On appeal, Fench asserts the following assignment of error:
I. The trial court errored [sic] when it denied the Appellant’s motion to dismiss as his right to a speedy trial was violated in this matter.
Law and Analysis
{¶ 7} In his sole assignment of error, Fench contends only that the State infringed
upon his right to a speedy trial. He makes no claim that the alleged infringement
precluded him from entering a knowing, voluntary plea.
{¶ 8} “A criminal defendant has a right to a speedy trial under the Ohio Revised
Code, the Ohio Constitution, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.” State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 80. R.C. 2945.71(C)(2). “‘In Ohio, the
right to a speedy trial has been implemented by statutes that impose a duty on the State to
bring to trial a defendant who has not waived his right to a speedy trial within the time
specified by the particular statute.’” State v. Mize, 2022-Ohio-3163, ¶29 (2d Dist.), citing
City of Cleveland v. Sheldon, 2003-Ohio-6331, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). “The speedy trial statutes
in Ohio are R.C. 2947.71 and R.C. 2941.401.” Id.
{¶ 9} R.C. 2945.71(C)(2) provides that a person charged with a felony must be
brought to trial within two hundred and seventy days of arrest. However, “‘[w]hen a
defendant is incarcerated in this state on other charges, R.C. 2941.401, a specific statute
prevails over the general speedy trial statutes of R.C. 2945.71 et seq., and governs the
time within which the state must bring him or her to trial.’” (Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶
30, quoting State v. Stewart, 2006-Ohio-4164, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.).
3. {¶ 10} R.C. 2941.401 states:
When a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a correctional institution of this state, and when during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in this state any untried indictment, information, or complaint against the prisoner, the prisoner shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after the prisoner causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney and the appropriate court in which the matter is pending, written notice of the place of the prisoner's imprisonment and a request for a final disposition to be made of the matter, except that for good cause shown in open court, with the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel present, the court may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance….
The written notice and request for final disposition shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden or superintendent having custody of the prisoner, who shall promptly forward it with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested….
The warden or superintendent having custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform the prisoner in writing of the source and contents of any untried indictment, information, or complaint against the prisoner, concerning which the warden or superintendent has knowledge, and of the prisoner's right to make a request for final disposition thereof….
And finally, R.C. 2941.401 states that:
[i]f the action is not brought to trial within the time provided, subject to continuance allowed pursuant to this section, no court any longer has jurisdiction thereof, the indictment, information, or complaint is void, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the action with prejudice.
{¶ 11} Relevant to this case is the fact that a guilty plea can affect a defendant’s
ability to assert his speedy trial rights. A guilty plea constitutes a complete admission of
guilt. Crim.R. 11(B)(1). “[A] defendant who…voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
enters a guilty plea with the assistance of counsel may not thereafter raise independent
claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry 4. of the guilty plea.” (Quotation omitted.) State v. Ketterer, 2006-Ohio-5283, ¶ 117. A plea
of guilty “effectively waives all appealable errors” at trial unrelated to the entry of the
plea. Id., citing State v. Kelley, 57 Ohio St.3d 127 (1990), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 12} This court has held that “a defendant, by entering a guilty plea, generally
waives both the statutory and the constitutional right to a speedy trial. State v. Glanton,
2020-Ohio-834, ¶ 26 (6th Dist.). Even where a defendant has made a demand for a
speedy trial, when he enters his plea of guilty, it amounts to a withdrawal of such demand
and waives his right to insist on the constitutional provisions relating to a speedy trial.
See State v. Ingram, 2017-Ohio-5685, ¶ 24, quoting State v. Chiles, 2016-Ohio-1225, ¶ 6
(8th Dist.), quoting Partsch v. Haskins, 175 Ohio St. 139, 141 (1963).
{¶ 13} Here, Fench argues that he was denied his speedy trial rights under R.C.
2941.401. The State argues in its opposition, first, that Fench, waived those rights when
he pleaded guilty and, further, that because Fench was neither “imprisoned” nor held in a
“correctional institution of this state” prior to the entry of his plea, R.C. 2947.71, and not
R.C. 2941.401, would be the applicable statute.
{¶ 14} Even assuming, without deciding, that R.C. 2941.401 rather than R.C.
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[Cite as State v. Fench, 2026-Ohio-2794.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. {48}L-25-00140
Appellee Trial Court No. CR202500293
v.
Billy Fench DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: July 21, 2026
*****
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Randy L. Meyer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Tyler Naud Jechura, for appellant.
ZMUDA, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Billy Fench, appeals from a judgment entered by the Lucas
County Court of Common Pleas convicting him, following a plea of guilty, on one count
of attempted domestic violence. For the reasons that follow, the trial court’s judgment is
affirmed. Statement of the Case and the Facts {¶ 2} This case arose from events that were alleged to have occurred on October
12, 2024, and resulted in Fench’s indictment on February 27, 2025, in case No. CR-25-
00293, on charges of strangulation and domestic violence. Fench was arraigned in the
case on March 3, 2025, and pleaded not guilty. The trial court set bond at $25,000 with
no 10 percent allowed and ordered Fench to have no contact, direct or indirect, with the
victim. The record does not suggest that Fench made bond.
{¶ 3} Prior to his indictment in the current case, Fench had become incarcerated in
the Lucas County jail in connection with an earlier filed case, case No. CR-24-02731,
which involved a separate incident of domestic violence that was alleged to have
occurred on November 20, 2024. A nolle prosequi was entered in the earlier filed case on
March 18, 2025, but Fench remained incarcerated in the Lucas County jail through May
22, 2025.
{¶ 4} Several times following his arraignment in the current case, Fench orally
moved the trial court to dismiss the case on speedy-trial grounds. Each time, those
motions were denied.
{¶ 5} On May 20, 2025, Fench withdrew his not-guilty plea and pleaded guilty to
attempted domestic violence, a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of R.C. 2923.02,
R.C. 2929.25(A), and R.C. 2919.25(D)(3). On May 22, 2025, the trial court sentenced
Fench to serve 12 months in prison on the offense.
2. Assignment of Error
{¶ 6} On appeal, Fench asserts the following assignment of error:
I. The trial court errored [sic] when it denied the Appellant’s motion to dismiss as his right to a speedy trial was violated in this matter.
Law and Analysis
{¶ 7} In his sole assignment of error, Fench contends only that the State infringed
upon his right to a speedy trial. He makes no claim that the alleged infringement
precluded him from entering a knowing, voluntary plea.
{¶ 8} “A criminal defendant has a right to a speedy trial under the Ohio Revised
Code, the Ohio Constitution, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.” State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 80. R.C. 2945.71(C)(2). “‘In Ohio, the
right to a speedy trial has been implemented by statutes that impose a duty on the State to
bring to trial a defendant who has not waived his right to a speedy trial within the time
specified by the particular statute.’” State v. Mize, 2022-Ohio-3163, ¶29 (2d Dist.), citing
City of Cleveland v. Sheldon, 2003-Ohio-6331, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). “The speedy trial statutes
in Ohio are R.C. 2947.71 and R.C. 2941.401.” Id.
{¶ 9} R.C. 2945.71(C)(2) provides that a person charged with a felony must be
brought to trial within two hundred and seventy days of arrest. However, “‘[w]hen a
defendant is incarcerated in this state on other charges, R.C. 2941.401, a specific statute
prevails over the general speedy trial statutes of R.C. 2945.71 et seq., and governs the
time within which the state must bring him or her to trial.’” (Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶
30, quoting State v. Stewart, 2006-Ohio-4164, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.).
3. {¶ 10} R.C. 2941.401 states:
When a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a correctional institution of this state, and when during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in this state any untried indictment, information, or complaint against the prisoner, the prisoner shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after the prisoner causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney and the appropriate court in which the matter is pending, written notice of the place of the prisoner's imprisonment and a request for a final disposition to be made of the matter, except that for good cause shown in open court, with the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel present, the court may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance….
The written notice and request for final disposition shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden or superintendent having custody of the prisoner, who shall promptly forward it with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested….
The warden or superintendent having custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform the prisoner in writing of the source and contents of any untried indictment, information, or complaint against the prisoner, concerning which the warden or superintendent has knowledge, and of the prisoner's right to make a request for final disposition thereof….
And finally, R.C. 2941.401 states that:
[i]f the action is not brought to trial within the time provided, subject to continuance allowed pursuant to this section, no court any longer has jurisdiction thereof, the indictment, information, or complaint is void, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the action with prejudice.
{¶ 11} Relevant to this case is the fact that a guilty plea can affect a defendant’s
ability to assert his speedy trial rights. A guilty plea constitutes a complete admission of
guilt. Crim.R. 11(B)(1). “[A] defendant who…voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
enters a guilty plea with the assistance of counsel may not thereafter raise independent
claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry 4. of the guilty plea.” (Quotation omitted.) State v. Ketterer, 2006-Ohio-5283, ¶ 117. A plea
of guilty “effectively waives all appealable errors” at trial unrelated to the entry of the
plea. Id., citing State v. Kelley, 57 Ohio St.3d 127 (1990), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 12} This court has held that “a defendant, by entering a guilty plea, generally
waives both the statutory and the constitutional right to a speedy trial. State v. Glanton,
2020-Ohio-834, ¶ 26 (6th Dist.). Even where a defendant has made a demand for a
speedy trial, when he enters his plea of guilty, it amounts to a withdrawal of such demand
and waives his right to insist on the constitutional provisions relating to a speedy trial.
See State v. Ingram, 2017-Ohio-5685, ¶ 24, quoting State v. Chiles, 2016-Ohio-1225, ¶ 6
(8th Dist.), quoting Partsch v. Haskins, 175 Ohio St. 139, 141 (1963).
{¶ 13} Here, Fench argues that he was denied his speedy trial rights under R.C.
2941.401. The State argues in its opposition, first, that Fench, waived those rights when
he pleaded guilty and, further, that because Fench was neither “imprisoned” nor held in a
“correctional institution of this state” prior to the entry of his plea, R.C. 2947.71, and not
R.C. 2941.401, would be the applicable statute.
{¶ 14} Even assuming, without deciding, that R.C. 2941.401 rather than R.C.
2947.71 would apply in this case, Fench’s argument necessarily fails. This court has held
in the specific context of statutory speedy trial rights under R.C. 2941.401 that “upon
entry of a guilty plea, a defendant waives any appealable errors ‘unless he or she
demonstrates that the alleged errors precluded him or her from entering a knowing,
voluntary plea.’” Ingram at ¶ 24-25, quoting State v. Ellis, 2016-Ohio-8086, ¶ 35 (6th
Dist.); see also Glanton at ¶ 21 (a plea of guilty also waives a defendant’s right to
5. challenge his conviction on statutory speedy trial grounds pursuant to R.C.
2945.71(B)(2)). Fench, by pleading guilty in this case -- and in the absence of any
evidence or allegation that he was precluded by alleged speedy trial violations from
entering a knowing, voluntary plea -- clearly waived his statutory right to a speedy trial.
Accordingly, his only assignment of error is found not well-taken.
Conclusion
{¶ 15} The judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________ JUDGE Gene A. Zmuda, J. ____________________________ Charles E. Sulek, J. JUDGE CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
6.