State v. Feeley

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: July 9, 1976
• Docket: 13199
• Status: Published

Opinion

No. 13199

I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O M N A A F OTN

THE STATE O MONTANA, F

P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,

-vs - ROBERT DAVID FEELEY,

Defendant and A p p e l l a n t ,

Appeal from: District Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable C h a r l e s Luedke, Judge p r e s i d i n g . P

Counsel o f Record:

For A p p e l l a n t :

Keefer and Roybal, B i l l i n g s , Montana J. Dwaine Roybal argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana

For Respondent:

Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, A t t o r n e y General, Helena, Montana Charles Erdmann argued, A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General, Helena, Montana Harold F. H a n s e r , a r g u e d , County A t t o r n e y B i l l i n g s , Montana

For Amicus C u r i a e :

Charles M, Brown appeared, Helena, Montana

Submitted: A p r i l 2 2 , 1976

Decided : m[ S :ga Filed : ;:li ?-I 3 '3.c fyT.7 Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .

T h i s i s a n a p p e a l by d e f e n d a n t R o b e r t David F e e l e y from

a judgment e n t e r e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Yellowstone County,

Hon. C h a r l e s Luedke p r e s i d i n g , f o l l o w i n g a j u r y v e r d i c t f i n d i n g

F e e l e y g u i l t y of t h e f t .

F e e l e y was charged w i t h t h r e e c o u n t s o f h o r s e t h e f t

p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 94-6-302(1), R.C.M. 1947. H e was found

g u i l t y o f one c o u n t , t h e f t o f a h o r s e owned by Glen L a r s e n , and

s e n t e n c e d t o t e n y e a r s i n t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n .

The j u r y h e a r d t h i s t e s t i m o n y c o n c e r n i n g t h e t h e f t :

Glen L a r s e n t e s t i f i e d he owned a b l a c k mare w i t h t h e l e t t e r s

"CLR" t a t o o e d i n s i d e i t s lower l i p , a t a t o o which he s a i d would

n o t be n o t i c e d i n a c a s u a l i n s p e c t i o n , and t h e h o r s e w a s p a s t u r e d

a t t h e Rob S t e p h e n s r a n c h on Blue Creek. A neighbor of Stephens,

G o l d i e P a t t e r s o n , t e s t i f i e d t h i s same h o r s e wandered o n t o h e r

p a s t u r e and i n a n a t t e m p t t o i d e n t i f y t h e owner, s h e a s k e d defend-

a n t F e e l e y t o examine t h e h o r s e . Defendant t o l d h e r he had n o t

seen t h e horse before. On J a n u a r y 8 o r 9, 1975, s h o r t l y a f t e r

defendant's v i s i t t o Goldie P a t t e r s o n ' s ranch, t h e horse disappeared.

On F e b r u a r y 3 , 1975, Maxine Gibson, a p a r t t i m e i n s p e c t o r

f o r t h e s t a t e of Montana, t e s t i f i e d s h e i n s p e c t e d a mare s i m i l a r

i n c o l o r t o t h e h o r s e i n q u e s t i o n f o r d e f e n d a n t a t Rockvale,

Montana. Not f i n d i n g a b r a n d , s h e assumed t h e h o r s e belonged t o

d e f e n d a n t and d i d n o t r e q u i r e a b i l l of s a l e b u t m e r e l y i s s u e d

a n a n n u a l p e r m i t l i s t i n g d e f e n d a n t a s owner o f t h e h o r s e . On

February 5 , 1 9 7 5 , defendant brought t h e horse i n q u e s t i o n t o t h e

Lewistown P u b l i c Auction where J i m A r t h u r , a brand i n s p e c t o r

f o r t h e s t a t e of Montana, i n s p e c t e d t h e h o r s e b u t found no brand.

A t t h i s t i m e , A r t h u r t e s t i f i e d d e f e n d a n t t o l d him he had owned

t h e h o r s e f o r some t i m e . Defendant t h e n s o l d t h e h o r s e i n

Lewistown u s i n g t h e l o c a l i n s p e c t i o n p e r m i t o b t a i n e d i n Rockvale

a s e v i d e n c e of t i t l e . Subsequent i n v e s t i g a t i o n by t h e Department

- 2 - o f L i v e s t o c k d i s c l o s e d t h e h o r s e i n s p e c t e d a t Rockvale and

s o l d a t Lewistown was i n f a c t , Glen L a r s e n ' s h o r s e .

D e f e n d a n t ' s v e r s i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e manner he o b t a i n e d

t h e L a r s e n h o r s e was: That w h i l e a t t h e S t a n d a r d Bar i n B i l l i n g s ,

a n u n i d e n t i f i e d p e r s o n o f f e r e d t o s e l l him a h o r s e , They t r a v e l e d

t h a t n i g h t t o P r y o r , Montana, where d e f e n d a n t bought t h e h o r s e i n

question. H e t e s t i f i e d he r e c e i v e d a b i l l of s a l e a t t h a t t i m e ,

b u t it w a s s u b s e q u e n t l y d e s t r o y e d by f i r e on March 2 , 1975.

Defendant p r e s e n t s two i s s u e s t o t h i s C o u r t f o r r e v i e w :

(1) Was t h e r e s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o s u s t a i n a c o n v i c t i o n ?

( 2 ) Does s e c t i o n 94-6-302 ( 4 ) , R.C.M. 1947, which makes

t h e f t o f a "commonly d o m e s t i c a t e d hoofed a n i m a l " a f e l o n y , deny

d e f e n d a n t e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n o f law?

Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e e v i d e n c e was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s u s -

t a i n a c o n v i c t i o n f o r h o r s e t h e f t i n Yellowstone County on two

grounds :

F i r s t , i n g e n e r a l t e r m s , t h e e v i d e n c e a t b e s t gave mere

grounds f o r s u s p i c i o n and a s such was n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y

c o n v i c t i o n of a c r i m e .

Second, and more s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e s t a t e f a i l e d t o p r o v e

a s a n e l e m e n t of t h e c r i m e , t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e a l l e g e d a c t i n

t h a t no e v i d e n c e was e v e r o f f e r e d t o p r o v e d e f e n d a n t s t o l e a

h o r s e i n Yellowstone County.

W cannot agree with defendant's general contention of e

t h e l a c k of s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o c o n v i c t . Defendant was

charged and c o n v i c t e d of t h e o f f e n s e o f t h e f t a s d e f i n e d i n

s e c t i o n 94-6-302(1), R.C.M. 1947:

" ( 1 ) A p e r s o n commits t h e o f f e n s e of t h e f t when he p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly o b t a i n s o r e x e r t s un- a u t h o r i z e d c o n t r o l o v e r p r o p e r t y o f t h e owner, and :

" ( a ) h a s t h e p u r p o s e o f d e p r i v i n g t h e owner o f t h e property; o r

" ( b ) p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly u s e s , c o n c e a l s , o r abandons t h e p r o p e r t y i n s u c h manner a s t o d e p r i v e t h e owner of t h e p r o p e r t y ; o r

" ( c ) u s e s , c o n c e a l s , o r abandons t h e p r o p e r t y knowing s u c h u s e , concealment o r abandonment p r o b a b l y w i l l d e p r i v e t h e owner! of t h e p r o p e r t y . "

The t e s t i m o n y a t t r i a l c l e a r l y . d e m o n s t r a t e d d e f e n d a n t

was i n p o s s e s s i o n o f a b l a c k mare and had, i n f a c t , s o l d t h a t

horse. Glen L a r s e n t e s t i f i e d t h e h o r s e i n q u e s t i o n c a r r i e d h i s L *

t a t o o and was owned by him. Nowhere i n t h e t r a n s c r i p t i s t h e r e

any i n d i c a t i o n d e f e n d a n t was a c t i n g f o r - t h e b e n e f i t of L a r s e n

d u r i n g t h e t i m e when he p o s s e s s e d and s u b s e q u e n t l y s o l d t h e h o r s e .

Therefore, s u b s t a n t i a l d i r e c t evidence e x i s t s t o i n d i c a t e defend-

a n t exerted unauthorized c o n t r o l over of t h e owner s o deprive a s t o / t h e owner, t h e c r i m i n a l a c t c o n t e m p l a t e d i n s e c t i o n 94-6-302(1).

A s t o evidence of criminal i n t e n t , " * * * knowingly * * * . *

purposely * * *" , , a s c o n t e m p l a t e d by s k c t i o n 94-6-302 (1) a n

e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e t e s t i m o n y l e a d s t o - t h e s e c o n c l u s i o n s : Defend-

a n t i n a l l h i s t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s concerning

t h i s h o r s e , r e p r e s e n t e d h i m s e l f t o be t h e owner. He t e s t i f i e d he

had t h e b i l l o f s a l e f o r t h e h o r s e i n . q u e s t i o n u n t i l March 2,

1975, y e t he d i d n o t produce t h a t bil'l.of s a l e a t t h e Rockvale

i n s p e c t i o n o f F e b r u a r y 3 , 1975, o r t h e Lewistown s a l e o f F e b r u a r y

5, 1975. Defendant t o l d brand i n s p e c t o r J i m A r t h u r he had owned

t h e h o r s e f o r some t i m e , w h i l e a month e a r l i e r he t o l d G o l d i e

P a t t e r s o n he had n e v e r s e e n t h e h o r s e b e f o r e . To be s u r e s u c h

e v i d e n c e of i n t e n t i s , by n a t u r e , c i r c u m s t a n t i a l , b u t t h i s C o u r t

h a s r e p e a t e d l y h e l d t h e e l e m e n t of c r i m i n a l i n t e n t may be proven

by c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e . S t a t e v . Cooper, 158 Mont. 1 0 2 , 489

P.2d 99; S t a t e v. G a l l a g h e r , 1 5 1 Mont. 501, 445 P.2d 45; S t a t e b

v. Madden, 128 Mont. 408, 276 P.2d 974. The r e a l q u e s t i o n h e r e

i s whether s u b s t a n t i a l c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e e x i s t e d t o p r o v e

intent. I n S t a t e v . F i t z p a t r i c k , 163 Mont. 220, 226, 516 P.2d

605, t h e C o u r t s a i d :

"To f i n d a p e r s o n g u i l t y beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , each f a c t i n a chain of circumstances t h a t w i l l establish guilt need not be proven beyond a . r o - - i s -- - - - reasonable doubt. What must be ~ - - - v e- k- - that- - - . A

there is not a reasonable doubt arising from consideration of all the evidence in the case." (Emphasis supplied.) Here, examination of the circumstantial evidence in its totality clearly demonstrates defendant knew he possessed a horse belong- ing to someone else and did so with criminal intent to deprive the owner of the horse. There was sufficient substantial evi- dence to support the jury's verdict of guilty. Where substan- tial evidence exists to support the jury's verdict, it must stand. State v. Miner, Mont. , 546 P.2d 252, 33 St.Rep. 201; State v. Stoddard, 147 Mont. 402, 412 P.2d 827; State v. White, 146 Mont. 226, 405 P.2d 761. Defendant contends no evidence was offered to prove Yellowstone County was the location of the crime as charged in Count I of the Information; thus a necessary element of the crime of theft remained unproved. First,we note that location is not an element of the crime of theft as defined in section 94-6-302, R.C.M. 1947. Defendant apparently has confused elements of a crime with the doctrine of venue. Second, examination of the record reveals defendant failed to make any objection as to venue prior to trial. By neglecting to do so, defendant waived any objection he might have had as to the place of trial. Section 95-401, R.C.M. 1947. Defendant next contends section 94-6-302(4), R.C.M. 1947, is unconstitutional as being a denial of equal protection of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, United States Consti- tution and Article 11, Section 4, 1972 Montana Constitution. We find no merit in this contention. For purposes of discussion, we set forth section 94-6-302(4): "(4) A person convicted of the offense of theft of property not exceeding one hundred fifty dollars ($150) in value shall be fined not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500) or be imprisoned in the county jail for any term not to exceed six (6) mopths, or both. A person convicted of the offense of theft of property exceeding one hundred fifty dollars ($150) in value or theft of any commonly domesticated hoofed animal shall be imprisoned in the state prison for any term not to exceed ten (10) years." (Emphasis added.) Defendant bases his contention on the fact section 94-6-302(4) contains two classifications of felony theft. One pertains to "commonly domesticated hoofed animals" for which no minimum monetary value is required for felony conviction. The second pertains to other animals and inanimate objects for which a minimum monetary value in excess of $150 is required for felony conviction. With regard to legislative classifications such as this, this Court recently said in State v. Jack, Mont . , 539 P.2d 726, 729, 32 St.Rep. 858. " * * * Where the challenge extends only to the more general legislative classifications, the judicial inquiry must be limited to determining whether the distinction is justified by a rational basis. Stated another way, we can determine only whether the law has a sufficiently reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose so as not to be deemed arbitrary. * * * In connection with this standard, a classification having some reasonable basis does not deny equal protection merely because it is not made with precise math- ematical nicety or results in some inequality. One who attacks the legislation has the burden of proving the classification to be arbitrary." See also: Montana Land Title Ass'n v. First American Title, Mont . , 539 P.2d 711, 32 St.Rep. 874. Defendant failed to meet his burden of proving unreasonable and arbitrary the felony

classification for theft of a "commonly domesticated hoofed animal". As the Amicus Curiae brief of the Department of Live- stock points out, this classification is both reasonable and necessary. Raising livestock is an important industry in Montana. Theft of livestock is a problem of some magnitude because of the state's large geographical area and small population. In recog- nition of these facts the legislature, as a deterrent, enacted severe penalties for such theft. That the legislature felt such classification was still necessary is evidenced by the fact it was carried over to the Montana Criminal Code of 1973, with only minor changes. In addition, we note other western states recently presented with this very issue have ruled such a felony classification for theft of livestock not to be a denial of equal protection. The rationale for so holding was substantially the same as that advanced here. See: State v. Pacheco, 81 N.M. 97, 463 P.2d 521; State v. Webb, 96 Ida. 325, 528 P.2d 669; People v. Thomas, 43 Cal.App.3d 862, 118 Cal.Rptr. 226. The judgment of the district c o .y t is affirmed. ,

---- Ad% ----- -------------- --- Justice We concur:

u n . R. D. McPhillips, district judge, sitting in place of Mr. Chief Justice James T. Harrison.