State v. Fagg

District Court of Appeal of Florida

State v. Fagg

41 So. 3d 394, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 11099, 2010 WL 3000037

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedJuly 30, 2010

Docket1D09-5011

StatusPublished

This text of 41 So. 3d 394 (State v. Fagg) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Fagg, 41 So. 3d 394, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 11099, 2010 WL 3000037 (Fla. Ct. App. 2010).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The State appeals an Order Granting Motion for Judgment of Acquittal After a Jury Verdict. The State argues that Ap-pellee’s alleged act of deleting computer files from her former employer’s computer system constituted the destruction of data pursuant to section 815.04(2), Florida Statutes, which provides that “[wjhoever willfully, knowingly, and without authorization destroys data ... residing or existing internal or external to a computer ... commits an offense against intellectual property.” The trial court rejected this argument, concluding instead that because the employer was able to retrieve the files from its hard drives, there was no evidence that Appellee destroyed data as required for a conviction of section 815.04(2). We agree with this conclusion. We also agree with the trial court that although there was testimony that the employer *395 was able to retrieve everything except “the last four days,” the employer’s witness also testified that he did not know whether anything had been lost from those four days.

Accordingly, because the State did not present competent evidence to establish that Appellee destroyed data, we AFFIRM.

DAVIS, PADOVANO, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.

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PER CURIAM.

The State appeals an Order Granting Motion for Judgment of Acquittal After a Jury Verdict. The State argues that Ap-pellee’s alleged act of deleting computer files from her former employer’s computer system constituted the destruction of data pursuant to section 815.04(2), Florida Statutes, which provides that “[wjhoever willfully, knowingly, and without authorization destroys data ... residing or existing internal or external to a computer ... commits an offense against intellectual property.” The trial court rejected this argument, concluding instead that because the employer was able to retrieve the files from its hard drives, there was no evidence that Appellee destroyed data as required for a conviction of section 815.04(2). We agree with this conclusion. We also agree with the trial court that although there was testimony that the employer *395 was able to retrieve everything except “the last four days,” the employer’s witness also testified that he did not know whether anything had been lost from those four days.

Accordingly, because the State did not present competent evidence to establish that Appellee destroyed data, we AFFIRM.

DAVIS, PADOVANO, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

41 So. 3d 394, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 11099, 2010 WL 3000037, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-fagg-fladistctapp-2010.