State v. Evans

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: April 1, 2026
• Docket: 25-736
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Judge Jefferson Griffin

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-736

Filed 1 April 2026

Bertie County, Nos. 19CR000336-070, 19CR000337-070, 19CR000340-070, 19CR050088-070, 19CR050089-070

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

DENZEL LAMONT EVANS & KEH-LYL LITTLEJOHN, Defendants.

Appeal by Defendants from judgments entered 1 August 2024 by Judge Cy A.

Grant, Sr., in Bertie County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24

February 2026.

Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Madison L. Beveridge and Special Deputy Attorney General Sage A. Boyd, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Emily Holmes Davis, for Defendant Denzel Lamont Evans.

Shawn R. Evans for Defendant Keh-lyl Littlejohn.

GRIFFIN, Judge.

Defendants Denzel Lamont Evans and Keh-lyl Littlejohn each appeal from the

trial court’s judgments entered upon jury verdicts finding them guilty of crimes

charged for their participation in a drive-by shooting. Defendant Evans contends the STATE V. EVANS

Opinion of the Court

trial court erred by convicting him of felon in possession of a firearm because the

underlying statute is unconstitutional. Because this Court has affirmed the

constitutionality of the statute and Defendant Evans failed to preserve this argument

for our review, we dismiss his appeal. Defendant Littlejohn contends the trial court

erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charge of conspiracy because the State’s

evidence was insufficient. We hold the trial court did not err in entering judgment

against Defendant Littlejohn.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On 27 February 2019, Lloyd Cooper was in the bathroom of his home in

Windsor, North Carolina, when he heard gunshots followed by the sound of bullets

hitting his home and the three vehicles in his driveway. When the gunshots ceased,

Cooper looked out a window and saw a grey Mitsubishi Galant speed away from his

home. Cooper called 911.

Around five minutes after receiving a dispatch report of the shooting, an officer

stopped a grey Mitsubishi Galant about five miles away from Cooper’s home.

Defendant Evans, Defendant Littlejohn, and a man named Richard Armstead were

inside the vehicle at the time. Defendant Evans was wearing a GPS ankle monitor.

Records obtained from Defendant Evans’s ankle monitor revealed that, shortly before

the officer stopped his vehicle, Defendant Evans was located outside of Cooper’s home

for approximately one minute, then traveled a constant, traceable path from Cooper’s

home to the location of the stop. The officer searched the Mitsubishi Galant and

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discovered leftover 223-caliber bullet casings throughout the vehicle, as well as an

AK-47 type rifle, an M-16 type rifle, a Fabrique Nationale handgun, and a 9 mm

Baretta handgun. The officer also found over 7.5 grams of cocaine and three bags of

suspected marijuana in the vehicle.

Bullet holes damaged the inside and outside of Cooper’s home and vehicles.

Investigations around Cooper’s home revealed leftover 223-caliber bullet casings,

7.62-caliber bullet casings, and 5.7-caliber bullet casings. Each of the bullet casings

matched a weapon found in Defendant Evans’s Mitsubishi Galant. Defendant

Littlejohn’s hands had five particles of gunshot residue on them.

The trial court tried Defendants Evans and Littlejohn in a joint trial in July

2024 on multiple charges relating to the 27 February 2019 drive-by shooting. The

court did not join Richard Armstead in the trial. Nonetheless, Defendant Littlejohn’s

indictment charged him with conspiring with Armstead to discharge a weapon into

Cooper’s occupied property, but did not charge him with conspiring with Defendant

Evans. Defendant Littlejohn moved to dismiss the charge at trial, arguing the State

failed to offer evidence of a conspiracy with Armstead and recognizing the absence of

Defendant Evans as a charged coconspirator. The trial court denied the motion to

dismiss and instead ruled that only Armstead could be considered a coconspirator.

The jury questioned the absence of Defendant Evans as a coconspirator in Defendant

Littlejohn’s charges during their deliberations; the trial court informed them that this

omission was an “inadvertent mistake” in the charging documents.

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Following a number of voluntary dismissals by the State and dismissal rulings

by the trial court, the jury ultimately convicted Defendant Evans of possession of a

firearm by a felon and conspiracy to commit discharging firearm into occupied

property. Likewise, the jury convicted Defendant Littlejohn of conspiracy to commit

discharging firearm into occupied property, two counts of injury to personal property,

and injury to real property.

II. Analysis

Defendants Evans and Littlejohn each appeal from their convictions stemming

from the drive-by shooting. We address each Defendant’s arguments in turn.

A. Defendant Evans’s Appeal

Defendant Evans appeals only from his conviction for possession of a firearm

by a felon. Defendant Evans contends section 14-415.1 of the North Carolina General

Statutes, the statute criminalizing possession of a firearm by a felon, is “facially

unconstitutional under the United States and North Carolina Constitutions” and his

conviction “must be vacated” under the analysis established in New York State Rifle

& Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). However, Defendant Evans

also concedes “[t]his Court recently held [section] 14-415.1 is not facially

unconstitutional under the Bruen analysis,” acknowledging this Court’s holding in

State v. Nanes, 297 N.C. App. 863, 866–70, 912 S.E.2d 202, 206–09 (2025) (holding

facial challenge to section 14-415.1 without merit because the statute’s “regulation is

within the Nation’s tradition and history of disarming individuals who pose a threat

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to the safety of others” and can be applied constitutionally with a “‘plainly legitimate

sweep’”). We are bound by the prior holding of this Court. See In re Civil Penalty,

324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 36 (1989) (“[O]ne panel of the Court of Appeals may

not overrule the decision of another panel on the same question in the same case.”).

Defendant Evans raises this issue in an effort to preserve it in the event our

Supreme Court rules on the constitutionality of the statute. Defendant further

acknowledges he failed to take actions required to preserve this issue for appellate

review as is required by Rule 10 of the N.C. Rules of Appellate Procedure, and instead

requests this Court invoke Rule 2 to prevent manifest injustice by reviewing his

unpreserved issue on appeal. See N.C. R. App. P. 10 (“In order to preserve an issue

for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request,

objection, or motion. . . .”); N.C. R. App. P. 2 (“To prevent manifest injustice to a party

. . . either court of the appellate division may . . . suspend or vary the requirements

or provisions of any of these rules. . . .”). With our precedent in Nanes in mind, we

decline to invoke Rule 2 and dismiss Defendant Evans’s argument.

B. Defendant Littlejohn’s Appeal

Defendant Littlejohn appeals only from his conviction for conspiracy to commit

discharging a weapon into occupied property. Defendant Littlejohn contends the trial

court erred “by failing to dismiss the conspiracy charge against [him] because there

was insufficient evidence to establish the required elements of conspiracy between

[Defendant] Littlejohn and Armstead.”

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We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal charge for

insufficiency of the evidence de novo, to determine whether the State presented

“substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged” and “(2) of

[the] defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense.” State v. Tucker, 380 N.C.

234, 236–37, 867 S.E.2d 924, 927 (2022) (citation omitted). “As a general rule, a

motion to dismiss should be denied if there is any evidence that tends to prove each

element or reasonably conduces to each element’s conclusion as a fairly logical and

legitimate deduction beyond mere suspicion or conjecture.” State v. Bracey, 388 N.C.

689, 692, 923 S.E.2d 540, 544 (2025) (citation modified). “Evidence must be viewed

‘in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable

inferences.’” Id. at 693, 923 S.E.2d at 544 (citation omitted).

“The crime of conspiracy is committed when two or more persons agree to

perform an unlawful act.” State v. Beck, 385 N.C. 435, 438, 894 S.E.2d 729, 732 (2023)

(citation omitted). “In order to prove conspiracy, the State need not prove an express

agreement; evidence tending to show a mutual, implied understanding will suffice.”

State v. Morgan, 329 N.C. 654, 658, 406 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1991) (citations omitted). It

is rare that record evidence shows such direct proof of a conspiracy, and conspiracy is

more often proven by the collective weight of numerous indefinite acts. State v.

Winkler, 368 N.C. 572, 576, 780 S.E.2d 824, 827 (2015) (citation omitted). “On the

other hand, while conspiracy can be proved by inferences and circumstantial

evidence, it cannot be established by a mere suspicion, nor does a mere relationship

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between the parties or association show a conspiracy.” State v. Brewton, 173 N.C.

App. 323, 327–28, 618 S.E.2d 850, 854–55 (2005) (citation modified).

Defendant Littlejohn contends the State’s evidence was insufficient to show

conspiracy because it “established no prior relationship or connection between

[Defendant] Littlejohn and [] Armstead.” Defendant posits that “[i]n situations where

this Court has affirmed conspiracy convictions based on circumstantial evidence,

illustrative cases have elements of prior communication and association among

alleged co-conspirators.” See Brewton, 173 N.C. App. at 328–29, 618 S.E.2d at 855

(holding sufficient evidence of conspiracy where the State’s evidence included spoken

communications assenting to completion of the crime and a prior relationship

between the coconspirators); Winkler, 368 N.C. at 576, 780 S.E.2d at 827 (holding

sufficient evidence of conspiracy where the State’s evidence showed the

coconspirators had a familial connection and one coconspirator mailed the other a

package at an address unknown to the recipient coconspirator’s probation officer,

suggesting prior communication between them).

While evidence of a prior relationship and communications between

coconspirators may be sufficient circumstantial evidence of an agreement for a

conspiracy charge, such evidence is not an essential, elementary requirement of a

conspiracy charge. Our courts have found sufficient evidence of conspiracy where the

circumstances do not include prior communications or a relationship between the

coconspirators but otherwise show coordination and agreement between them. “The

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execution of an attack in a coordinated manner and joint flight after the attack have

been held sufficient evidence to survive a motion to dismiss a conspiracy charge.”

State v. Glenn, 274 N.C. App. 325, 332, 852 S.E.2d 436, 442 (2020) (citation omitted).

For instance, in State v. Lamb, the defendant argued the State’s evidence

“showed there was no discussion of the crime by any of the men” beyond mere

speculation, and the jury could “just as easily infer that the three men went to [the

victim’s] home without a shared plan.” State v. Lamb, 342 N.C. 151, 155, 463 S.E.2d

189, 191 (1995). This Court disagreed, holding there was sufficient evidence of

conspiracy based solely on evidence that the coconspirators traveled together to the

victim’s home and carried out the alleged underlying crime when they arrived. Id. at

155–56, 463 S.E.2d at 191; see also State v. Abernathy, 295 N.C. 147, 165, 244 S.E.2d

373, 385 (1978) (holding sufficient circumstantial evidence of conspiracy where

evidence showed the coconspirators traveled together directly to the victim’s

residence where they committed the alleged underlying crime).

Here, the State presented evidence tending to show the grey Mitsubishi Galant

traveled a consistent path as it approached Cooper’s address, stopped there for one

minute, then drove to the location where an officer stopped the vehicle. In the light

most favorable to the State, the evidence showed Defendant Littlejohn and Armstead

were both passengers inside the Galant throughout the incident and fled the scene of

the crime together afterward. There was a gun available for use by each person in

the vehicle, and residue on Defendant Littlejohn’s hands showed he had recently fired

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a gun. It can be inferred beyond mere suspicion a mutual, implied understanding

existed between them that the purpose of traveling to Cooper’s home that day was to

commit a drive-by shooting into his dwelling. The trial court did not err by denying

Defendant Littlejohn’s motion to dismiss.

III. Conclusion

We decline to invoke Rule 2 and dismiss Defendant Evans’s appeal for failure

to preserve his argument for appellate review. We hold the trial court did not err by

denying Defendant Littlejohn’s motion to dismiss the criminal conspiracy charge.

DISMISSED IN PART, NO ERROR IN PART.

Judges TYSON and FLOOD concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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