State v. Evans
This text of State v. Evans (State v. Evans) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE, ) ) ) ID 1206024952 v. ) ) DWAYNE EVANS, ) ) Defendant. )
ORDER LIFTING THE STAY AND DENYING RULE 35(A) MOTION
Having considered Dwayne Evans’ (“Evans”) Motion for Correction of Illegal
Sentence (the “Motion”), for the reasons that follow, the Motion is DENIED.
Introduction
1. After the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Erlinger v. United
States1 in June 2024, many Delaware defendants serving a prison sentence filed a
motion under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a) arguing that his sentence was
illegal. Due to the significant number of motions seeking relief under Erlinger, the
court coordinated with counsel to establish a consolidated briefing schedule for a
subset of the cases (i.e., the Bellwether Cases).2 Many of the remaining motions,
including this one, were stayed pending a ruling in the Bellwether Cases.
1 602 U.S. 821 (2024). 2 See D.I. 43. 2. Upon further review of Evans’ Motion, the Court has determined that
there is no need to wait for a ruling in the Bellwether Cases to address the Motion.
Accordingly, the stay is hereby LIFTED.
Procedural and Factual Background
3. In 2012, Evans was indicted on seven charges, including Murder First.
The charges stem from an altercation between Evans and his uncle, during which
Evans stabbed his uncle, who later died.
4. On June 24, 2013, Evans pled guilty to Murder Second.3 Evans signed
the Plea Agreement. He also signed the Truth-In-Sentencing (“TIS”) form,
affirming that he was waiving certain constitutional rights, including his right to a
trial by jury. The TIS reflected that Evans faced a prison term of 15 years (minimum
mandatory) to Life.
5. The Court held a colloquy with Evans, during which Evans pled guilty
to Murder Second and admitted that he was pleading guilty because he was in fact
guilty of this crime.4 Evans also confirmed that he: (i) answered the questions in the
TIS truthfully;5 (ii) understood he would not have a trial;6 (iii) was not forced or
threatened into entering into the Plea Agreement;7 and (iv) was satisfied with
3 Plea Transcript, D.I. 25. 4 Id. at 5. 5 Id. at 6. 6 Id. at 8. 7 Id. at 6. 2 counsel’s representation.8 Evans also confirmed he understood that Murder Second
carried a sentence of 15 years minimum mandatory and up to Life at Level V.9
6. The Court found that Evans was entering into the agreement knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently, and accepted the guilty plea.10 On October 10, 2013,
effective June 30, 2012, the court sentenced Evans to 25 years at Level V, followed
by 1 year at Level IV DOC Discretion, followed by 2 years at Level III.11
The Motion
7. In the Motion, Evans argues that under Erlinger v. United States,12
Wooden v. United States,13 Apprendi v. New Jersey,14 Blakely v. Washington,15 and
other cases, his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated because “there was
no jury present to determine Defendant’s punishment (sentence) besides the statutes
of crimes.” While acknowledging that statutes set a sentencing range, Evans argues
that he had a right to have a jury determine his guilt and punishment.16 Without a
jury at the sentencing phase, Evans claims he was subjected to increased punishment
by the judge making factual findings. Evans challenges his sentence as illegal and
8 Id. at 10. 9 Id. at 9. 10 Id. at 15. 11 D.I. 16. 12 602 U.S. 821 (2024). 13 595 U.S. 360 (2002). 14 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 15 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 16 D.I. 42. 3 contends that if he were to be retried now, he would be subjected to Double Jeopardy.
Therefore, he requests that his sentence be vacated and that he be immediately
released from custody.
Standard of Review
8. Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a), the Court “may correct an
illegal sentence at any time.”17 Rule 35(a) relief is limited to instances
when the sentence imposed exceeds statutorily-authorized limits, [] violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, . . . is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is a sentence that the judgment of conviction did not authorize.18
Analysis
9. Murder Second is a Class A Violent Felony, which carries a statutory
penalty of 15 years to Life at Level V.19 Under the Delaware Sentencing
Accountability Commission (“SENTAC”) guidelines, the presumptive sentence is
15 years at Level V.
10. After a Presentencing Investigative Report, the sentencing judge
exercised his discretion, imposing a sentence of 25 years on the Murder Second
17 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a). 18 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998) (citations omitted). See Ellerbe v. State, 155 A.3d 1283 (TABLE), 2017 WL 462144, at *1 (Del. Feb. 2, 2017). 19 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(1). 4 charge. While above the minimum mandatory and SENTAC guidelines, it is not
illegal.20 A sentence of 22 years at Level V is within the statutory limits.
11. After the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Erlinger21 in June
2024, Evans, like many other defendants serving Level V sentences, filed the Motion
under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a), arguing that his sentence was illegal
because a jury did not make factual findings before imposing enhanced sentencing.
12. Erlinger ruled that “‘any fact’ that ‘increase[s] the prescribed range of
penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed’ must be resolved by a unanimous
jury beyond a reasonable doubt (or freely admitted in a guilty plea).”22 Case law
makes clear “that the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury
verdict or admitted by the defendant.”23
20 Wallace v. State, 326 A.3d 708 (TABLE), 2024 WL 3874151, at *5 (Del. Aug. 20, 2024) (“[A] sentence is not illegal simply because it exceeds the SENTAC guidelines.” (quoting Smith v. State, 287 A.3d 1159 (TABLE), 2022 WL 17087056, at *2 (Del. Nov. 18, 2022)) (citing Richmond v. State, 279 A.3d 815(TABLE), 2022 WL 2276282, at *2 (Del. June 22, 2022)). See also Siple v. State, 701 A.2d 79, 82 (Del. 1997) (“The [SENTAC] standards are considered voluntary and nonbinding; thus, no party to a criminal case has any legal or constitutional right to appeal to any court a statutorily authorized sentence which does not conform to the sentencing standards.”). 21 602 U.S. 821 (2024). 22 Id. at 835 (cleaned up); Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 111-13, (2013) (“‘[a] fact that increases’ a defendant’s exposure to punishment, whether by triggering a higher maximum or minimum sentence, must ‘be submitted to a jury’ and found unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.’”; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 23 Blakely v.
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