[Cite as State v. Etheridge, 2026-Ohio-1197.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115415 v. :
CHRISTOPHER ETHERIDGE, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 2, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-07-492933-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Anthony T. Miranda, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Clarissa A. Smith, for appellant.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:
Defendant-appellant Christopher Etheridge (“Etheridge”) appeals the
denial of his petition for postconviction relief. He claims the following errors:
1. The court erred in denying appellant’s petition for postconviction relief under the guise of R.C. 2953.21 et seq. and Crim.R. 35. 2. The court erred in denying appellant’s petition for postconviction relief under the guise of R.C. 2943.21 et seq. and Crim.R. 35 without making findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by R.C. 2953.21(H).
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Facts and Procedural History
In 2007, when Etheridge was 16 years old, he was charged with multiple
violent offenses including aggravated murder and felonious assault. He was
originally charged in the Juvenile Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of
Common Pleas but he was subsequently bound over to the General Division where
he pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated murder with a three-year firearm
specification and one count of felonious assault. After accepting Etheridge’s guilty
pleas, the trial court sentenced him to life in prison with eligibility for parole after
28 years. Because the court found Ethridge guilty and sentenced him the same day,
no presentence investigation was prepared. His convictions and sentence were
affirmed on appeal. State v. Hawkins, 2009-Ohio-4368 (8th Dist.).1
On July 11, 2025, Etheridge filed a petition for postconviction relief,
arguing that the trial court erred in failing to consider his youth when it sentenced
him. The State opposed the motion as untimely. The trial court denied the petition
without opinion. This appeal followed.
1 Ethridge explained at the plea hearing that his name was Etheridge on his birth
certificate and that his father changed his name to Hawkins. However, because he used the name Etheridge in filing this appeal, we refer to him as Etheridge. II. Law and Analysis
A. Petition for Postconviction Relief
In the first assignment of error, Etheridge argues the trial court erred
in denying his petition for postconviction relief. The State argues, among other
things, that Etheridge’s petition was properly denied as untimely.
Ordinarily, we review a trial court’s ruling on a postconviction-relief
petition for an abuse of discretion. State v. Gondor, 2006-Ohio-6679, ¶ 49. An
abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in an unwarranted
way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority. Johnson v.
Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. However, whether the trial court had subject-
matter jurisdiction to entertain an untimely petition for postconviction relief is a
question of law subject to de novo review. State v. Apanovitch, 2018-Ohio-4744,
¶ 24.
R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a) governs petitions for postconviction relief and
states that a petition for postconviction relief “shall be filed no later than three
hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court
of appeals in a direct appeal of the judgment of conviction.” The transcripts in
Etheridge’s direct appeal were filed on September 30, 2008, and the deadline for
filing a timely petition for postconviction relief was September 30, 2009. Therefore,
because Etheridge did not file his petition until July 2025, his petition was untimely.
A trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to consider an untimely
petition for postconviction relief if the petitioner demonstrates that (1) he was “unavoidably prevented” from discovering the facts he relies on, or (2) subsequent
to the statutory, 365-day deadline for filing postconviction-relief petitions, “the
United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies
retroactively to persons in [his] situation, and the petition asserts a claim based on
that right.” R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a). R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b) further provides that the
petitioner must also show, by clear and convincing evidence, that
but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense of which the petitioner was convicted or, if the claim challenges a sentence of death that, but for constitutional error at the sentencing hearing, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner eligible for the death sentence.
Etheridge argues the trial court violated the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution because it failed to consider his youthfulness at the time
of sentencing. He contends the right to have the court consider an offender’s age
before sentencing a juvenile to a life sentence is a new constitutional right that was
not recognized until after his conviction and sentence. He contends this new
constitutional right was recognized in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and
State v. Patrick, 2020-Ohio-6803.
The Court in Miller held that an offender’s youthfulness must be
considered when a court sentences a juvenile offender to life without the possibility
of parole. But Etheridge was sentenced to a life sentence with parole eligibility after
28 years. Therefore, the new right recognized in Miller is inapplicable here. See
State v. Jones, 2024-Ohio-6032, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). Etheridge argues that in Patrick, the Ohio Supreme Court expanded
the right to include juvenile offenders who were sentenced to life with the possibility
of parole and that this right applies retroactively. In Patrick, the Court held that “a
trial court must separately consider the youth of a juvenile offender as a mitigating
factor before imposing a life sentence under R.C. 2929.03, even if that sentence
includes parole eligibility.” Patrick at ¶ 2. Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized
a new right for juvenile offenders after Etheridge was sentenced.
However, the Ohio Supreme Court has also held that although the
General Assembly allows a common pleas court to entertain an untimely or
successive petition for postconviction relief based on a new state or federal right
recognized by the United States Supreme Court, it did not provide any exception
that would allow an untimely or successive petition to be granted based on a new
Ohio Supreme Court decision. State v. Parker, 2019-Ohio-3848, ¶ 2; see also Jones
at ¶ 13 (holding that postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.23 only applies to rights
recognized by the United States Supreme Court and not to rights only recognized by
the Ohio Supreme Court). Therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider
Etheridge’s petition for postconviction relief, and the first assignment of error is
overruled.
B. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
In the second assignment of error, Etheridge argues the trial court
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[Cite as State v. Etheridge, 2026-Ohio-1197.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115415 v. :
CHRISTOPHER ETHERIDGE, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 2, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-07-492933-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Anthony T. Miranda, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Clarissa A. Smith, for appellant.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:
Defendant-appellant Christopher Etheridge (“Etheridge”) appeals the
denial of his petition for postconviction relief. He claims the following errors:
1. The court erred in denying appellant’s petition for postconviction relief under the guise of R.C. 2953.21 et seq. and Crim.R. 35. 2. The court erred in denying appellant’s petition for postconviction relief under the guise of R.C. 2943.21 et seq. and Crim.R. 35 without making findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by R.C. 2953.21(H).
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Facts and Procedural History
In 2007, when Etheridge was 16 years old, he was charged with multiple
violent offenses including aggravated murder and felonious assault. He was
originally charged in the Juvenile Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of
Common Pleas but he was subsequently bound over to the General Division where
he pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated murder with a three-year firearm
specification and one count of felonious assault. After accepting Etheridge’s guilty
pleas, the trial court sentenced him to life in prison with eligibility for parole after
28 years. Because the court found Ethridge guilty and sentenced him the same day,
no presentence investigation was prepared. His convictions and sentence were
affirmed on appeal. State v. Hawkins, 2009-Ohio-4368 (8th Dist.).1
On July 11, 2025, Etheridge filed a petition for postconviction relief,
arguing that the trial court erred in failing to consider his youth when it sentenced
him. The State opposed the motion as untimely. The trial court denied the petition
without opinion. This appeal followed.
1 Ethridge explained at the plea hearing that his name was Etheridge on his birth
certificate and that his father changed his name to Hawkins. However, because he used the name Etheridge in filing this appeal, we refer to him as Etheridge. II. Law and Analysis
A. Petition for Postconviction Relief
In the first assignment of error, Etheridge argues the trial court erred
in denying his petition for postconviction relief. The State argues, among other
things, that Etheridge’s petition was properly denied as untimely.
Ordinarily, we review a trial court’s ruling on a postconviction-relief
petition for an abuse of discretion. State v. Gondor, 2006-Ohio-6679, ¶ 49. An
abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in an unwarranted
way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority. Johnson v.
Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. However, whether the trial court had subject-
matter jurisdiction to entertain an untimely petition for postconviction relief is a
question of law subject to de novo review. State v. Apanovitch, 2018-Ohio-4744,
¶ 24.
R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a) governs petitions for postconviction relief and
states that a petition for postconviction relief “shall be filed no later than three
hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court
of appeals in a direct appeal of the judgment of conviction.” The transcripts in
Etheridge’s direct appeal were filed on September 30, 2008, and the deadline for
filing a timely petition for postconviction relief was September 30, 2009. Therefore,
because Etheridge did not file his petition until July 2025, his petition was untimely.
A trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to consider an untimely
petition for postconviction relief if the petitioner demonstrates that (1) he was “unavoidably prevented” from discovering the facts he relies on, or (2) subsequent
to the statutory, 365-day deadline for filing postconviction-relief petitions, “the
United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies
retroactively to persons in [his] situation, and the petition asserts a claim based on
that right.” R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a). R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b) further provides that the
petitioner must also show, by clear and convincing evidence, that
but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense of which the petitioner was convicted or, if the claim challenges a sentence of death that, but for constitutional error at the sentencing hearing, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner eligible for the death sentence.
Etheridge argues the trial court violated the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution because it failed to consider his youthfulness at the time
of sentencing. He contends the right to have the court consider an offender’s age
before sentencing a juvenile to a life sentence is a new constitutional right that was
not recognized until after his conviction and sentence. He contends this new
constitutional right was recognized in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and
State v. Patrick, 2020-Ohio-6803.
The Court in Miller held that an offender’s youthfulness must be
considered when a court sentences a juvenile offender to life without the possibility
of parole. But Etheridge was sentenced to a life sentence with parole eligibility after
28 years. Therefore, the new right recognized in Miller is inapplicable here. See
State v. Jones, 2024-Ohio-6032, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). Etheridge argues that in Patrick, the Ohio Supreme Court expanded
the right to include juvenile offenders who were sentenced to life with the possibility
of parole and that this right applies retroactively. In Patrick, the Court held that “a
trial court must separately consider the youth of a juvenile offender as a mitigating
factor before imposing a life sentence under R.C. 2929.03, even if that sentence
includes parole eligibility.” Patrick at ¶ 2. Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized
a new right for juvenile offenders after Etheridge was sentenced.
However, the Ohio Supreme Court has also held that although the
General Assembly allows a common pleas court to entertain an untimely or
successive petition for postconviction relief based on a new state or federal right
recognized by the United States Supreme Court, it did not provide any exception
that would allow an untimely or successive petition to be granted based on a new
Ohio Supreme Court decision. State v. Parker, 2019-Ohio-3848, ¶ 2; see also Jones
at ¶ 13 (holding that postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.23 only applies to rights
recognized by the United States Supreme Court and not to rights only recognized by
the Ohio Supreme Court). Therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider
Etheridge’s petition for postconviction relief, and the first assignment of error is
overruled.
B. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
In the second assignment of error, Etheridge argues the trial court
erred by denying his petition for postconviction relief without issuing findings of fact
and conclusions of law. However, it is well-established that a trial court “has no duty to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law on successive or untimely petitions
for postconviction relief.” State ex rel. George v. Burnside, 2008-Ohio-2702, ¶ 6,
citing State ex rel. Bunting v. Haas, 2004-Ohio-2055, ¶ 11; State ex rel. Ashipa v.
Kubicki, 2007-Ohio-4563, ¶ 4. And, as previously stated, the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to consider Etheridge’s untimely petition. Therefore, the trial court
properly denied Etheridge’s untimely petition for postconviction relief without
issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law. The second assignment of error is
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR