State v. Eric Andrew Ferguson

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: July 1, 2025
• Docket: A25A0733
• Status: Published

Opinion

SECOND DIVISION RICKMAN, P. J., GOBEIL and DAVIS, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

July 1, 2025

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A25A0733. THE STATE v. FERGUSON.

GOBEIL, Judge.

Eric Andrew Ferguson was indicted in Gwinnett County for various drug

trafficking offenses. The State appeals from the trial court’s order granting

Ferguson’s motion to suppress evidence recovered as the result of a traffic stop and

search of Ferguson’s vehicle. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the trial

court’s order, and remand the case for additional findings of fact.

When the facts material to a motion to suppress are disputed, it generally is for the trial judge to resolve those disputes and determine the material facts. This principle is a settled one, and this Court has identified three corollaries of the principle, which limit the scope of review in appeals from a grant or denial of a motion to suppress in which the trial court has made express findings of disputed facts. First, an appellate court generally must accept those findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Second, an appellate court must construe the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the factual findings and judgment of the trial court. And third, an appellate court generally must limit its consideration of the disputed facts to those expressly found by the trial court.

Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 746 (1) (770 SE2d 636) (2015) (citations, punctuation

and footnotes omitted). Nevertheless, the trial court’s “application of law to

undisputed facts is subject to de novo review.” Barrett v. State, 289 Ga. 197, 200 (1)

(709 SE2d 816) (2011).

In this case, the record shows that Ferguson was arrested and charged with

trafficking methamphetamine, trafficking in illegal drugs, possession of marijuana with

intent to distribute, and possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance with intent

to distribute as a result of evidence seized during a traffic stop of a vehicle in which

Ferguson was discovered. Ferguson filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing

that the officers who searched his vehicle did not have a sufficient basis for their

warrantless search. Ferguson also filed a motion to suppress certain statements he

made to law enforcement both before and after he was given warnings pursuant to

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).

2 The trial court held a hearing on the motions. The State agreed that certain pre-

Miranda statements made by Ferguson to the officer that stopped him (responses to

questions designed to elicit incriminating responses) would not be admissible at trial

because the suspect was in custody and was questioned without being given proper

warnings. And the parties agreed that the statements Ferguson made to law

enforcement after being given his Miranda warnings were admissible. So the hearing

went proceeded only on the motion to suppress evidence.

Corporal Thomas Dangle of the Gwinnett County Police Department testified

that he was on patrol surveilling a gas station in the early morning hours of December

14, 2022. Dangle considered this gas station to be a high-crime area based on personal

experience. He observed a woman loitering in the parking lot. A Dodge Charger, being

driven by Ferguson, pulled into a parking space. The woman approached the car and

walked by the driver’s side. The woman waited around the gas station for a while

before eventually leaving and walking down the street out of view.

Dangle ran the license plate on the Charger and discovered that the person

driving the vehicle did not match the description of the person to whom the car was

registered. Dangle continued to watch the Charger for roughly 40 minutes, observing

3 Ferguson exit the vehicle, place a backpack into the trunk, and then enter the gas

station. Another individual arrived at the gas station, met up with Ferguson, and got

into the driver’s seat of the Charger. Ferguson exited the gas station and got into the

passenger’s seat. Dangle testified that this behavior could indicate that a person was

attempting to avoid interacting with law enforcement.

By that time, Dangle had coordinated with other officers to follow the Charger,

and another officer initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle shortly after it left the gas

station, based on an alleged turn signal violation. Dangle also had observed what he

believed to be an illegal window tint on the vehicle and wanted to investigate that

further. The traffic stop was initiated at 2:26 a.m., and the driver pulled over at a

second gas station.

As Corporal Dangle approached the vehicle, he noticed Ferguson bend down

towards the floorboard. Then, after Ferguson rolled down his passenger window,

Dangle spotted a cellophane wrapper coated in a crystalline material laying on the

floor of the vehicle. Believing this to be narcotics, Dangle placed Ferguson under

arrest. Ferguson insisted that it was a pastry wrapper, and upon further inspection,

4 Dangle realized it was not narcotics and released Ferguson from custody, telling him

that he was not under arrest.

Corporal Dangle proceeded with the traffic stop. Dangle testified that while

checking the window tint on the vehicle, he “could see in plain view in the driver door

a small blue ziploc style jewelry bag or dime bag” in the handle of the door. Given his

training and experience, he believed “that it was an empty bag used to package

narcotics or previously held narcotics.” He said that he “wasn’t sure at the time,” but

it “heightened [his] suspicion that there could potentially be more narcotics . . . in the

vehicle.” Dangle asked Ferguson if he was subject to a Fourth Amendment waiver to

which Ferguson replied that he was on probation out of Florida, but he was unsure

about the Fourth Amendment waiver. Dangle could not confirm the waiver, and he

testified that he called for the drug dog at 2:37 a.m. When asked about the length of

time he kept Ferguson for the traffic stop, Dangle expressed that the stop evolved into

a drug investigation after he observed the empty dime bag inside the vehicle.

Dangle’s body cam footage was admitted into evidence at the hearing. Although

the trial court viewed only portions of the video during the hearing, the court did not

5 make its ruling at the hearing. Instead the court stated that it was going to read the

cases cited by the parties, and “[t]ake another look at the bodycam.”

The trial court granted Ferguson’s motion. As relevant here, the court

determined that the 37 minutes that elapsed from the time officers initiated a traffic

stop to the time the K-9 unit arrived exceeded that which would be required for the

officers to issue warnings or write a citation for the window tint violation. The court

found that the “discovery of a single empty plastic bag did not provide reasonable

articulable suspicion to prolong the detention.” This appeal followed.

On appeal, in addition to asserting that the trial court reached the wrong result

on the merits of the motion to suppress, the State argues that the trial court failed to

consider all of the available evidence in its ruling, and asks this Court to remand for

additional findings.

“A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that

violation.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U. S. 348, 354 (II) (135 SCt 1609, 191 LE2d

492) (2015). However, “a seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth

Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by

the Constitution.” Terry, 358 Ga. App. at 200 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted).

6 “[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined

by the seizure’s mission — to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, and

attend to related safety concerns.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). “Because

addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is

necessary to effectuate that purpose. Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks

tied to the traffic infraction are — or reasonably should have been — completed.”

Rodriguez, 575 U. S. at 354 (II) (citations and punctuation omitted). “Our law is clear

that it is permissible to conduct an open air search around a vehicle while a traffic stop

is still in progress so long as the stop has not been unreasonably prolonged for the

purpose of conducting the search.” Rush v. State, 368 Ga. App. 827, 832 (2) (890

SE2d 883) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). However if “the officers

prolonged the traffic stop in order to conduct [a] K-9 open-air sniff . . . the seizure at

issue [is] unlawful.” State v. Fish, 365 Ga. App. 605, 609 (1) (879 SE2d 694) (2022).

That said, a lawful traffic stop can morph into a criminal investigation and

justify prolongation “so long as the officer can articulate reasonable suspicion that

criminal activity is occurring.” Taylor v. State, 342 Ga. App. 814, 816 (805 SE2d 131)

(2017) (physical precedent only). To satisfy the articulable reasonable suspicion

7 standard, “the officer’s investigation must be justified by specific articulable facts

sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.” Id. (citation and

punctuation omitted). This requires a “particularized and objective basis” for

suspecting that the particular person stopped is involved in criminal activity. Id.

(citation and punctuation omitted) “Although this suspicion need not meet the higher

standard of probable cause, it must be more than a mere caprice or a hunch.” Id.

(citation and punctuation omitted). To determine whether reasonable articulable

suspicion existed, courts must look to the totality of the circumstances. Id.

“Ultimately, the State bears the burden of proving that the search of the car was

lawful, and to carry this burden, the State must show that it was lawful to detain the

defendant until the time the drug dog indicated the presence of drugs.” Id. at 816-817

(citation and punctuation omitted).

Given the manner in which the trial court expressed its holdings, we are unable

to meaningfully consider whether the Appellant’s arguments have merit. See Williams

v. State, 301 Ga. 60, 62 (799 SE2d 779) (2017). Ordinarily, we generally presume the

regularity of the proceedings and generally do not expect trial courts to specifically set

forth each individual fact relied upon. See O’Shields v. State, 351 Ga. App. 800, 804

8 (1) (833 SE2d 290) (2019) (construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

trial court’s judgment where the trial court has made no express findings of fact in a

motion to suppress order). However, in this case, in its order, the court sets out a

number of findings of fact. But in the section analyzing whether there was reasonable

articulable suspicion to justify continued detention., the court simply states: “The

Court finds that the discovery of a single empty plastic bag did not provide reasonable

articulable suspicion to prolong the detention.” It then “reject[s] the suggestion that

the subsequent discovery of contraband should be considered as a factor supporting

the propriety of a search.” There are many additional facts in the record,1 and it is not

clear whether the court overlooked these facts, discounted them for some reason, or

whether the court in fact considered all of these facts and found them not to reach the

reasonable articulable suspicion standard. Given that the test for reasonable articulable

1 For example, Dangle also testified about Ferguson’s presence in what Dangle described as a high-crime area, the woman loitering around the parking lot and Ferguson’s vehicle, and Ferguson’s usual behavior in remaining in his parking spot for an extended time and then moving to the passenger seat when another driver arrived. Other information can be seen in the body cam footage, which the trial court did not describe in its order, such as Dangle’s questioning of Ferguson possessing a torch lighter and two cell phones, Ferguson’s statement that he was previously a drug user, Ferguson bearing an appearance that Dangle believed was consistent with a drug user, and inconsistent statements made Dangle. The parties disagree about whether some of these facts would be properly considered at this stage of the proceeding. 9 suspicion is a “totality of the circumstances” test, we cannot determine whether the

ruling of the trial court was in error without a more robust explanation regarding the

basis of the trial court’s order. See Williams, 301 Ga. at 62 (“If the trial court has

made express findings of fact, but not with sufficient detail to permit meaningful

appellate review, an appellate court may remand for further findings.”) (citation and

punctuation omitted). See also Hughes, 296 Ga. 744, at 746 (we “generally must limit

[our] consideration of the disputed facts to those expressly found by the trial court”).

Our decision should not be construed as altering existing requirements for trial

courts to substantiate their holdings. However when, as here, there is nothing in the

analysis stating that the court considered the totality of the record and there is only

one “single” fact specifically highlighted as the basis for its holding, we are unable to

discern whether — or assume that — the court’s holding indeed did consider the

totality of the evidence.

Accordingly, we vacate the order of the trial court and remand for the court to

make additional findings so that this Court can meaningfully review its judgment.

10 We do not authorize the reporting of this opinion because it does not announce

a new rule or policy, or involve an interpretation of law that is not already precedent.

See Court of Appeals Rules 33.2 (b), 34.

Judgment vacated and case remanded. Rickman, P. J., and Davis, J., concur.