State v. Ellison Ranching Co.

571 P.2d 394, 93 Nev. 575, 58 Oil & Gas Rep. 542, 1977 Nev. LEXIS 637
CourtNevada Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 18, 1977
DocketNo. 9208
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 571 P.2d 394 (State v. Ellison Ranching Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Ellison Ranching Co., 571 P.2d 394, 93 Nev. 575, 58 Oil & Gas Rep. 542, 1977 Nev. LEXIS 637 (Neb. 1977).

Opinion

[576]*576OPINION

Per Curiam:

Ellison Ranching Company, the respondent, brought this action to determine what interest, if any, the State of Nevada had in the gas, coal, oil, and other mineral rights of properties acquired in a state patent by Ellison’s predecessors in interest. NRS 321.332, subsection l.1 The district judge ruled that the State had no such rights in the properties; hence this appeal.2

In 1864, the Congress granted to Nevada sections 16 and 36 of every township in the State. Nevada had the right to sell the land, providing the proceeds therefrom were used to support the public schools. Act of March 21, 1864, ch. 36, § 7, 13 Stat. 30, 32 (1864). Because much of the land proved unmarketable, Congress in 1880 granted, in lieu of the prior grant, two million acres of land that was to be selected from unappropriated, nonmineral public land.

[577]*577Section 3 of the 1880 act provided that Nevada could prescribe laws governing the sale of the in-lieu lands. Act of June 16, 1880, ch. 245, § 3, 21 Stat. 287, 288 (1880). In 1887 Nevada did enact a statute declaring that all sales of land selected under the 1880 federal grant were subject to a reservation of “all mines of gold, silver, copper, lead, cinnabar and other valuable minerals that may exist in such land.” Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 103, § 2, 1887 Nev. Stats, at 103.3 Nevada, in the Act of 1887, disclaimed any interest in those minerals and required persons desiring title to them to seek title from the federal government. This provision of the Act was predicated on Nevada’s misconception that the grant had reserved the mineral right to the federal government.

The patents covering the lands the subject of this action were issued to respondent’s predecessors in interest on August [578]*57816, 1916, and contained the following reservation, pursuant to the Act'of 1887: “Provided that all mines of gold, silver, copper, lead, cinnabar and other valuable minerals which may exist in said tract are hereby expressly reserved.”

In 1921, Nevada enacted a statute purporting to convey to all patentees of selected lands title to all minerals discovered therein, subject to royalties payable to State of five percent of the net proceeds of all gas, coal, and oil “mined or extracted therefrom.”4

State contends that the reservation in the Act of 1887 and the patents issued pursuant to it included not only mines existing at the time the patents were issued, but also all minerals discovered anytime thereafter. State therefore argues that, since it retained those rights, the 1921 statute conscripting them to patentees subject to payment of royalties on the mined or extracted gas, coal, and oil is valid and binding upon respondent’s properties.

The court below held that the reservation in the patents applied only to mines existing at the time the patents were issued. We agree. In Davis’s Adm’r v. Weibbold, 139 U.S. 507, 517 (1891), certain land had been acquired by patent [579]*579pursuant to a statute declaring that “no title shall be acquired . . . to any mine of gold, silver, cinnabar or copper; or to any valid mining claim or possession held under existing laws.” The court concluded that the patentee’s entry of a mining claim after gaining title to the land did not deprive him of his title. While conceding that the statutory provision might be read as a reservation of all mineral rights, it noted that this was not its necessary meaning:

[I]n strictness they import only that the. provisions by which the title to the land in such town sites is transferred shall not be the means of passing a title also to mines of gold, silver, cinnabar or copper in the land, or to valid mining claims or possessions thereon. They are to be read in connection with the clause protecting existing rights to mineral veins; and with the qualification, uniformly accompanying exceptions in acts of Congress of mineral lands from grant or sale. Thus read they must be held, we think, merely to prohibit the passage of title under the provisions of the town site laws to mines of gold, silver, cinnabar or copper, which are known to exist, on the issue of the town-site patent, and to mining claims and mining possessions, in respect to which such proceedings have been taken under the law or the custom of miners, as to render them valid, creating a property right in the holder, and not to prohibit the acquisition for all time of mines which then lay buried unknown in the depths of the earth.

Davis’s Adm’r v. Weibbold, 139 U.S. at 518-519.

State attempts to distinguish this case from Weibbold on the basis of language used in the statutes and patents. The 1887 Act reserved all mines that may exist, while the statute in Weibbold reserved mines known to exist at the time the patent has issued. State’s argument is not well taken. The statute in Weibbold reserved “any mine . . . or . . . any . . . mining claim held under existing laws.” This trivial difference from the language of the 1887 Act is insufficient to support significantly different interpretations.

We believe that if the Legislature had intended to impose the far-reaching limitation on the land patented it would have expressed an intention to do so. As noted in Weibbold:

If land, which a party has actually occupied, possessed and peacefully enjoyed for a long series of years, claiming title under a patent of the United States fifteen years [580]*580old, can be entered upon and prospected for a mine by any trespasser who chooses to do so, and a mine being found, the mine can be located, and taken out of the patent on the vague and uncertain exception in the patent in question, it can be done fifty, or a hundred years hence, and the patent instead of being a muniment of title upon which the patentee, or his grantees can rest in security, would be but a delusion, and a snare.

Cowell v. Lammers, 10 Sawyer 246, 247, 21 F. 200 (D.C. Cir. 1884), as cited in Davis’s Adm’r v. Weibbold, 139 U.S. at 521.

Since the language of the reservation can be reasonably construed only as reserving any mines existing at the time the patent was issued, the State had no rights to convey by the 1921 Act and no power to impose a royalty payment on its patentees. Therefore, the lower court was correct in declaring respondent to have sole rights to any gas, coal, and oil or other minerals which might be discovered in its land and to have no obligation to pay royalties on same to the State.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
571 P.2d 394, 93 Nev. 575, 58 Oil & Gas Rep. 542, 1977 Nev. LEXIS 637, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-ellison-ranching-co-nev-1977.