State v. Ellis

2026 Ohio 413

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 6, 2026
• Docket: CT2025-0082
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Ellis, 2026-Ohio-413.]

COURT OF APPEALS MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO, Case No. CT2025-0082

Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR2025-0253 BRENT E. ELLIS, Judgment: Affirmed Defendant – Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: February 6, 2026

BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin; Kevin W. Popham; David M. Gormley, Judges

APPEARANCES: RON WELCH, Prosecuting Attorney, JOE A. PALMER, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee; CHRIS BRIGDON, for Defendant-Appellant.

Baldwin, P.J.

{¶1} The appellant, Brent E. Ellis, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to

suppress. The appellee is the State of Ohio.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE

{¶2} On April 3, 2025, the appellant was indicted on the following:

• Count 1: Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)

with accompanying firearm and forfeiture of property specifications in

violation of R.C. 2941.141(A) and R.C. 2941.1417(A); • Count 2: Aggravated Possession of Drugs, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)

with accompanying firearm and forfeiture of property specifications in

violation of R.C. 2941.141(A) and R.C. 2941.1417(A);

• Count 3: Trafficking in a Fentanyl-Related Compound, in violation of R.C.

2925.03(A)(2) with accompanying firearm and forfeiture of property

specifications in violation of R.C. 2941.141(A) and R.C. 2941.1417(A);

• Count 4: Possession of a Fentanyl-Related Compound, in violation of R.C.

2925.11(A) with accompanying firearm and forfeiture of property

specifications in violation of R.C. 2941.141(A) and R.C. 2941.1417(A);

• Count 5: Carrying a Concealed Weapon, in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2)

with an accompanying forfeiture of property specification in violation of R.C.

2941.1417(A);

• Count 6: Improperly Handling Firearms in a Motor Vehicle, in violation of

R.C. 2923.16(B) with an accompanying forfeiture of property specification

in violation of R.C. 2941.1417(A);

• Count 7: Improperly Handling Firearms in a Motor Vehicle, in violation of

R.C. 2923.16(B) with an accompanying forfeiture of property specification

• Count 8: Improperly Handling Firearms in a Motor Vehicle, in violation of

R.C. 2923.16(B) with an accompanying forfeiture of property specification

in violation of R.C. 2941.1417(A); • Count 9: Having Weapons While Under Disability, in violation of R.C.

2923.13(A)(4) with an accompanying forfeiture of property specification in

violation of R.C. 2941.1417(A);

• Count 10: Having Weapons While Under Disability, in violation of R.C.

2923.13(A)(4) with an accompanying forfeiture of property specification in

• Count 11: Having Weapons While Under Disability, in violation of R.C.

2923.13(A)(4) with an accompanying forfeiture of property specification in

• Count 12: Having Weapons While Under Disability, in violation of R.C.

2923.13(A)(4) with an accompanying forfeiture of property specification in

violation of R.C. 2941.1417(A).

{¶3} On May 28, 2025, the appellant filed a motion to suppress.

{¶4} On July 7, 2025, the trial court held a suppression hearing.

{¶5} At the hearing, Patrolman Blanton testified that he was observing the

residence of an individual who had recently been released from prison for drug trafficking.

Law enforcement had received complaints of drug activity at the address. Blanton

observed the appellant’s vehicle at the residence and watched it leave. The appellant was

pulled over for traveling thirty-five miles per hour in a twenty-five mile-per-hour zone.

Blanton initiated contact with the appellant and inquired about his speeding. During this

conversation, Blanton noticed a butane torch on the center console and cellophane plastic

bags on the floor. Blanton testified that, on drug stops, officers often encounter these

items together. {¶6} Blanton then asked where the appellant was coming from. The appellant

responded with a location in Zanesville that did not exist. The appellant also told Blanton

that he did not have any weapons or drugs in the vehicle.

{¶7} Blanton returned to his vehicle to write the appellant a warning. During this

time, Patrolman Hardesty and his K-9 partner, who is trained to alert to marijuana, arrived

on scene and completed a sniff of the vehicle’s exterior. The K-9 alerted at the front door.

{¶8} On cross-examination, when asked whether he had any basis to do

anything other than issue a ticket, Blanton testified that the appellant could be arrested

for providing false statements based upon his answer about where he was coming from,

but the appellant was not placed under arrest at that time.

{¶9} The appellant was told to step out of the vehicle. Another patrolman asked

whether he had any weapons on him; the appellant indicated he did not. When the

patrolman began patting the appellant down, Blanton observed a pistol inside his left

pocket. The appellant then admitted there were more weapons in the vehicle, including

one in a black bag. Blanton returned to the vehicle, opened the bag, and discovered

another firearm, marijuana, and a large shard of methamphetamine.

{¶10} Next, Patrolman Hardesty testified that his K-9 partner is Danforth. Danforth

is trained to detect marijuana, crack cocaine, methamphetamines, and heroin.

{¶11} Before beginning Danforth’s K-9 sniff, Patrolman Hardesty asked the

appellant whether he had any marijuana in the vehicle. The appellant said he did not.

Danforth alerted on the vehicle.

{¶12} Patrolman Hardesty also testified that, the pistol he removed from the

appellant’s jacket had a round in the chamber. {¶13} The trial court denied the appellant’s motion to suppress, finding that “there

was probable cause, even without the use of the dog at all[.]”

{¶14} Pursuant to a plea agreement, the appellant entered a plea of no contest to

Counts 1 and 3.

{¶15} The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and herein raises the following

two assignments of error:

{¶16} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO

SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE CANINE SNIFF WAS UNRELIABLE AND COULD NOT

ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE WHERE THE K-9 WAS TRAINED TO DETECT

MARIJUANA, WHICH IS NOW LEGAL IN OHIO.”

{¶17} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CANINE ALERT

PROVIDED PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE WHEN THE STATE

FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE RELIABILITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE K-9

SNIFF.”

I.

{¶18} In his first assignment of error, the appellant argues the trial court erred in

denying his motion to suppress. We disagree.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶19} An appellate review of a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to suppress

involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Long, 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332 (4th

Dist.1998). During a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact

and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness

credibility. State v. Brooks, 1996-Ohio-134. A reviewing court is bound to accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v.

Medcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d 142 (4th Dist.1996). Accepting these facts as true, the

appellate court must independently determine, as a matter of law, without deference to

the trial court’s conclusion, whether the trial court’s decision meets the applicable legal

standard. State v. Williams, 86 Ohio App.3d 37 (4th Dist.1993), overruled on other

grounds.

{¶20} There are three methods of challenging a trial court’s ruling on a motion to

suppress on appeal. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court’s finding of fact. In

reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether the trial

court’s findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See State v.

Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982); State v. Klein, 73 Ohio App.3d 486 (4th Dist.1991).

Second, an appellant may argue the trial court failed to apply the appropriate test or

correct law to the findings of fact. In that case, an appellate court can reverse the trial

court for committing an error of law. See Williams, supra. Finally, an appellant may argue

the trial court has incorrectly decided the ultimate issue or final issues raised in a motion

to suppress. When reviewing this type of claim, an appellate court must independently

determine, without deference to the trial court’s conclusion, whether the facts meet the

appropriate legal standard in any given case. State v. Curry, 95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96 (8th

Dist.1994).

{¶21} The appellant is not challenging the trial court’s findings of fact but whether

the trial court decided the ultimate issue correctly. We, therefore, must determine whether

the facts satisfy the applicable standard. ANALYSIS

{¶22} The issue in this case is whether probable cause existed to support the

search. In determining whether probable cause exists, the proper test is the “totality of

the circumstances.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527

(1983). Probable cause exists when there is a fair probability, given the totality of the

circumstances, that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.

Id.; State v. Kadri, 2017-Ohio-604, ¶24 (5th Dist.).

{¶23} The appellant argues specifically that the officers lacked probable cause

because the K-9 sniff was unreliable since the dog was trained to alert to marijuana. We

disagree.

{¶24} Although the appellant argues that a K-9 trained to alert to marijuana cannot

be the sole basis to establish probable cause to search the vehicle, those simply are not

the facts of this case. As we must consider the totality of the circumstances, we decline

to address this one fact in isolation.

{¶25} As noted above, we look at the totality of the circumstances leading to the

search to determine whether or not an officer had probable cause. Gates at 233, 103

S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Here, law enforcement observed the appellant leave

an address known to police for drug activity. The appellant was stopped for exceeding

the speed limit. Blanton observed a butane torch on the center console and cellophane

baggies on the floor of the vehicle. When asked where he was coming from, the appellant

lied to law enforcement. At that moment, he was subject to arrest for falsification. The

appellant was asked whether he had any drugs or firearms in the vehicle; he said no. He was also asked whether he had marijuana in the vehicle, he again answered no. A K-9

trained to alert to marijuana signaled an alert. The officers then ordered the appellant out

of the vehicle, at which point they observed a firearm in his pocket; it contained a round

in the chamber. The appellant then stated there was another firearm in a black bag in the

front seat. In that same bag, officers recovered a firearm, marijuana, and a large shard of

methamphetamine.

{¶26} Based on the testimony presented at the suppression hearing, we find that

the totality of the circumstances established probable cause to believe that additional

evidence of the appellant’s drugs, firearm, or falsification offenses would be found in his

vehicle.

{¶27} Accordingly, the appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.

II.

{¶28} In his second assignment of error, the appellant summarily argues that the

trial court erred in finding that the K-9 alert provided probable cause to search the vehicle.

We disagree.

{¶29} We note that the appellant misconstrues the record by treating the K-9 alert

as the sole basis for the trial court’s determination. It was not, as discussed above.

Moreover, the trial court specifically found that, “there was probable cause, even without

the use of the dog at all[.]”

{¶30} Further, the appellant cites no statutory, case law, rules of evidence,

learned treatise, or other relevant legal authority from this or any other jurisdiction to

support his argument. Accordingly, the appellant’s brief does not comply with App.R.

16(A)(7), which provides: The appellant shall include in its brief, under the headings and in the

order indicated, all of the following * * * An argument containing the

contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error

presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with

citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which

appellant relies. The argument may be preceded by a summary.

{¶31} “If an argument exists that can support [an] assignment of error, it is not this

court’s duty to root it out.” Thomas v. Harmon, 2009-Ohio-3299, ¶14 (4th Dist.). “It is not

the function of this court to construct a foundation for [an appellant’s] claims; failure to

comply with the rules governing practice in the appellate courts is a tactic which is

ordinarily fatal.” Catanzarite v. Boswell, 2009-Ohio-1211, ¶16 (9th Dist.). Therefore, “[w]e

may disregard any assignment of error that fails to present any citations to case law or

statutes in support of its assertions.” Fry v. Holzer Clinic, Inc., 2008-Ohio-2194, ¶12 (4th

Dist.). See, also, App.R. 16(A)(7); App.R. 12(A)(2).

{¶32} An appellate court may rely upon App.R. 12(A) in overruling or disregarding

an assignment of error because of “the lack of briefing” on the assignment of error. Hawley

v. Ritley, 35 Ohio St.3d 157, 159 (1988). “Errors not treated in the brief will be regarded

as having been abandoned by the party who gave them birth.” Uncapher v. Baltimore &

O.R. Co., 127 Ohio St. 351, 356 (1933).

{¶33} The appellant has failed to fully brief this assignment of error by omitting

citations to any applicable legal authority from this jurisdiction or any other. Therefore, we

may disregard this assignment of error for failure to brief.

{¶34} Accordingly, the appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled. CONCLUSION

{¶35} Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of

Muskingum County, Ohio is hereby affirmed.

{¶36} Costs to the appellant.

By: Baldwin, P.J.

Popham, J. and

Gormley, J. concur.