State v. Ellis

2025 Ohio 1014

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 24, 2025
• Docket: 2024-L-061
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Ellis, 2025-Ohio-1014.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2024-L-061

Plaintiff-Appellee, Criminal Appeal from the - vs - Court of Common Pleas

WILLIAM ELLIS, Trial Court No. 2023 CR 000988 Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION

Decided: March 24, 2025 Judgment: Affirmed

Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor; Teri R. Daniel, Kristi L. Winner, and Jennifer A. McGee, Assistant Prosecutors, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Vanessa R. Clapp, Lake County Public Defender, 125 East Erie Street, Painesville, OH 44077 and Paul J. Lubonovic, Assistant Public Defender, 100 West Erie Street, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Defendant-Appellant).

JOHN J. EKLUND, J.

{¶1} Appellant, William Ellis, appeals the judgment of conviction from the Lake

County Court of Common Pleas after a jury trial where he was found guilty of Possession

of Drugs, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A).

{¶2} Appellant has raised one assignment of error arguing that the trial court

erred by denying his Motion to Suppress, in which Appellant asserted that the State did

not obtain voluntary, third-party consent to search the vehicle where police officers

recovered a baggie of cocaine that had Appellant’s DNA on it. {¶3} Having reviewed the record and the applicable caselaw, we find Appellant’s

assignment of error to be without merit. The State appropriately obtained voluntary

consent to search the vehicle in which the drugs were recovered. Moreover, the State

had independent probable cause to search the vehicle based on observed illegal conduct.

{¶4} Therefore, the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is

affirmed.

Substantive and Procedural History

{¶5} On January 9, 2024, the Lake County Grand Jury charged Appellant with

one count of Possession of Drugs, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A).

Appellant pled not guilty.

{¶6} On April 11, 2024, Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress, challenging the

validity of the third-party consent obtained to search the vehicle in which the cocaine was

recovered and challenging the search and analysis of Appellant’s DNA. The State filed a

response. The trial court transferred the suppression hearing to another judge because

part of the challenge involved a search warrant that the judge presiding over the case had

issued.

{¶7} The trial court held a hearing on the Motion to Suppress on May 17, 2024.

At the hearing, the State called Detective-Lieutenant John Begovic and Detective David

Burrington, both of the Willoughby Police Department. Detective-Lieutenant Begovic said

that he had been a police officer for 32 years and Detective Burrington had been a police

officer for 26 years.

{¶8} Detective-Lieutenant Begovic testified that he began an investigation on

June 1, 2023, after the department received a call from Penelope Campbell. Campbell

Case No. 2024-L-061 lived at the North Turtle Trail condominiums and called to advise the department that she

believed a drug transaction was taking place in the unit across from hers involving a

female driving a white Mazda. Campbell had also made similar calls on May 17, 2023,

and May 24, 2023. The State introduced the reports based on Campbell’s prior calls, in

which she described what appeared to be hand-to-hand drug transactions involving a tall,

black man known to her as “Will.” She described that numerous vehicles came and went

from the unit.

{¶9} When Campbell called on June 1, Detective-Lieutenant Begovic and

Detective Burrington went to North Turtle Trail to investigate. While parked in the parking

lot, they observed a white female, later identified as Kaylyn Keig, park a silver Scion next

to a black Chevy Impala. She then entered Condo A, where Campbell had reported the

suspected drug activity. Five minutes later Keig and a man Detective-Lieutenant Begovic

recognized as Appellant exited the unit and entered a gray Honda SUV. Appellant got in

the driver’s seat and Keig got in the passenger seat, but the detectives could not see into

the vehicle because the windows were tinted.

{¶10} After five minutes, Appellant exited the Honda SUV, and, as he did,

Detective-Lieutenant Begovic said that “a large plume of smoke bellowed out of the

vehicle.” Appellant then opened the right rear door of the Chevy Impala, removed two

bags from the back seat, and put them in the Honda SUV. Appellant then removed a

cardboard box from the trunk of the Chevy Impala and put it in the Honda SUV. Detective-

Lieutenant Begovic said this activity was similar to what Campbell had reported and

caught his attention as suspicious activity. After this, Appellant re-entered the Honda

Case No. 2024-L-061 SUV. He re-emerged after about five minutes, more smoke billowed out of the vehicle,

and Appellant had a marijuana cigarette in his hand.

{¶11} Detective-Lieutenant Begovic and Detective Burrington approached the

vehicle and called for backup. Detective-Lieutenant Begovic said that he could smell the

odor of marijuana when he approached Appellant. Without prompting, Appellant said that

he had a medical marijuana card and was allowed to smoke. Detective-Lieutenant

Begovic placed Appellant in handcuffs and searched him. He found two cell phones in

Appellant’s pocket and $580.00 in cash. Keig was also handcuffed, and Detective

Burrington Mirandized both Appellant and Keig.

{¶12} According to the Detectives, Keig stated that her boyfriend owned the silver

Scion and that she was the listed owner of both the gray Honda SUV and the black Chevy

Impala. They testified that Keig gave verbal consent to search the vehicles while

handcuffed and outside of a police cruiser. Keig was then placed in a police cruiser.

Detective-Lieutenant Begovic stated that he searched the Honda SUV on the basis of the

marijuana use in the vehicle.

{¶13} Detective-Lieutenant Begovic said that a search of the Honda SUV revealed

a used marijuana cigarette. The two bags and the box that Appellant had moved from the

Impala to the Honda SUV had a quantity of marijuana in them. Officers found a small

clear baggie with suspected cocaine inside the Impala on the floorboard of the driver’s

seat area. After recovering these items, officers release both Appellant and Keig.

{¶14} The Lake County Crime Lab tested the suspected cocaine and confirmed it

was 3.38 grams of cocaine. The crime lab also indicated that the plastic baggie had touch

DNA on it. Detective-Lieutenant Begovic obtained a search warrant to obtain a buccal

Case No. 2024-L-061 swab from Appellant. The crime lab tested the swab and confirmed it was a match for the

touch DNA on the plastic baggie.

{¶15} The State also called Keig to testify. She said that she was friends with

Appellant and went to the North Turtle Trail condo to swap out their cars. Her fiancé’s car

had “bad brakes” and Appellant “has two cars that we share so I needed to borrow one

of the other cars.” She said they talked about exchanging the vehicles and then Appellant

began to swap out some of his stuff for the exchange. She admitted that they were

smoking marijuana in the Honda SUV. Keig said that the Honda SUV was registered in

her name but that Appellant paid for it.

{¶16} Keig could not remember being Mirandized by the officers. She said that

she was “asked if I would consent” to the cars being searched “or the dogs would be

brought in.” She did not remember whether she gave consent to search the Chevy Impala

or the Honda SUV. She said that she did not give consent to search the Scion because it

belonged to her fiancé. She said she did not feel any consent was free or voluntary

because the officers had approached her with guns drawn, had placed her in handcuffs,

and had put her in the back of a police cruiser. However, she said she felt free to deny

consent to search the Scion because it was not her car.

{¶17} On May 24, 2024, the trial court issued its judgment entry denying

Appellant’s Motion to Suppress. The trial court found that the Detectives had

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity including smoking marijuana (which is not legal even with a medical marijuana card) and smoking marijuana while operating a vehicle, . . . the three phone calls from Campbell; Keig arriving at Unit A and almost immediately coming back out with Defendant and sitting in the Honda that had been reported by Campbell; the Honda’s heavily tinted windows; the billow of smoke coming out of the Honda when Defendant exited the first time; Defendant moving items from the Impala (which had also been reported by Campbell) to the 5

Case No. 2024-L-061 Honda; the fact that the Honda was running while Defendant and Keig were inside smoking marijuana; and the second billow of smoke plus the marijuana cigarette in Defendant’s hand when he exited the Honda the second time.

{¶18} The trial court also concluded that Keig, as the owner of the vehicles, had

voluntarily given consent to search the vehicles and that Appellant, as the borrower, could

not override the consent given by the owner at the scene and did not violate his

expectation of privacy. Finally, the trial court determined there was probable cause to

obtain a search warrant for Appellant’s DNA.

{¶19} After the trial court denied Appellant’s Motion to Suppress, the matter

proceeded to jury trial before the originally assigned judge. The jury found Appellant

guilty.

{¶20} On August 5, 2024, the trial court sentenced Appellant to ten months in

prison with 33 days of credit for time served.

{¶21} Appellant timely appealed raising one assignment of error.

Assignment of Error and Analysis

{¶22} Appellant’s sole assignment of error states: “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED

WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.”

{¶23} Appellant acknowledges that Keig could “theoretically” give consent to

search the vehicles because she at least appeared to have common authority over them.

However, he argues that the State failed to demonstrate that Keig voluntarily gave

consent to search the vehicles.

{¶24} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law

and fact.” State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At a hearing on a motion to suppress,

the trial court, as the trier of fact, is in the best position to weigh the evidence by resolving 6

Case No. 2024-L-061 factual questions and evaluating the credibility of witnesses. Id.; State v. Mills, 62 Ohio

St.3d 357, 366 (1992). As a result, an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings

of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Burnside at ¶ 8. An

appellate court reviews the trial court’s application of the law to its factual findings de

novo. State v. Belton, 2016-Ohio-1581, ¶ 100. Accepting the facts as true, the reviewing

court then must independently determine, without deference to the trial court, whether the

trial court properly applied the substantive law to the facts of the case. Burnside at ¶ 8.

{¶25} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he

right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. Const., amend. IV. The language of

Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution is virtually identical and affords the same

protections. State v. Hoffman, 2014-Ohio-4795, ¶ 11. “The touchstone of both is

reasonableness.” State v. Brown, 2020-Ohio-5140, ¶ 8 (11th Dist.).

{¶26} “[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval

by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject

only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” (Footnote omitted.)

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). “When a defendant moves to suppress

evidence recovered during a warrantless search, the state has the burden of showing that

the search fits within one of the defined exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant

requirement.” State v. Banks-Harvey, 2018-Ohio-201, ¶ 18.

{¶27} “Courts must exclude evidence obtained by searches and seizures that

violate the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 181, citing Mapp v.

Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to the states). “‘The primary

Case No. 2024-L-061 purpose of the exclusionary rule is to remove incentive from the police to violate the

Fourth Amendment.’” State v. Eggleston, 2015-Ohio-958, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.), quoting State

v. Casey, 2014-Ohio-2586, ¶ 29 (12th Dist.).

{¶28} “A search based on consent is one exception to the Fourth Amendment’s

general warrant requirement.” State v. Ferrell, 2017-Ohio-9341, ¶ 12 (11th Dist.); State v.

Penn, 61 Ohio St.3d 720, 723 (1991). “Appellate review of the voluntariness of consent

to search is ‘limited to a determination of whether the trial court’s decision was “clearly

erroneous,”’ and an appellate court must ‘accept the trial court’s findings of facts and

determinations regarding credibility if they are supported by competent, credible

evidence.’” Bainbridge v. Kaseda, 2008-Ohio-2136, ¶ 27 (11th Dist.), quoting State v.

Samples, 1994 WL 315710, *2 (11th Dist. June 24, 1994).

{¶29} “In order to waive his Fourth Amendment privilege against unreasonable

searches and seizures, the accused must give a consent which is voluntary under the

totality of all the surrounding circumstances.” State v. Childress, 4 Ohio St.3d 217 (1983),

paragraph one of the syllabus. A third party may validly give consent, but the third-party

must possess “common authority over the area sought to be searched.” State v. Miller,

117 Ohio App.3d 750, 759 (11th Dist. 1997), citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.

164, 172 (1974).

{¶30} “‘[W]hen the subject of a search is not in custody,’” the State must

“‘demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress

or coercion, express or implied.’” State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 242-243 (1997),

quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973). “When an individual is

lawfully detained by police and consents to a search, the state must demonstrate by clear

Case No. 2024-L-061 and convincing evidence that consent was freely and voluntarily given.” State v. Clark,

2024-Ohio-1869, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (“the State

has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely

and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a

claim of lawful authority.”).

Important factors for the trial court to consider in determining whether a consent was voluntary include the following: (1) the suspect’s custodial status and the length of the initial detention; (2) whether the consent was given in public or at a police station; (3) the presence of threats, promises, or coercive police procedures; (4) the words and conduct of the suspect; (5) the extent and level of the suspect’s cooperation with the police; (6) the suspect’s awareness of his right to refuse to consent and his status as a “newcomer to the law”; and (7) the suspect[’]s education and intelligence.

State v. Riggins, 2004-Ohio-4247, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.), citing Schneckloth at 248-249; State

v. Lett, 2009-Ohio-2796, ¶ 33 (11th Dist.) (adopting Riggins).

{¶31} In State v. Rath, 2023-Ohio-2118, ¶ (11th Dist.), we assessed the totality of

the circumstances and determined that the defendant had voluntarily consented to the

search of his person. Id. at ¶ 13. At the time officers asked for consent to search his

person, Rath was reluctant and initially denied consent. Id. at ¶ 14. However, the

“interaction between Rath and the police was cooperative rather than confrontational,

occurred in a public space, and was of brief duration.” Id. Although there were numerous

officers at the scene, only a couple were actively engaged with Rath. Id. Further, “[t]he

fact that Rath was under investigatory detention when he gave his consent does not ipso

facto render the consent involuntary.” Id.; State v. Fouch, 2015-Ohio-1784, ¶ 28 (5th Dist.)

(the fact that defendant was in custody “did not affect the voluntariness of [her] consent

to search”). We said that a detective’s statements to Rath that they suspected him of drug

trafficking and that their suspicions would have to be eased before he would be free to 9

Case No. 2024-L-061 leave “simply reflected the actual circumstances of the situation” and did not constitute

threat or coercion. Rath at ¶ 14.

{¶32} In this case, when Detective-Lieutenant Begovic and Detective Burrington

approached Appellant and Keig, they were both placed in handcuffs. Detective Burrington

said that he read Keig her Miranda rights and Keig gave consent to search her vehicles

before she was placed in a police cruiser. Although Keig had been detained, she had

received her Miranda rights, had not been placed under arrest, had not yet been placed

in a police cruiser, and was in a public place at the time she was asked for consent to

search the vehicles.

{¶33} Keig’s testimony indicated that she did not remember whether she gave

consent to search the Chevy Impala and the Honda SUV. However, she said that she did

not give consent to search the Scion because it was her fiancé’s vehicle.1 Keig’s stated

denial of consent to search one vehicle supports the conclusion that she was aware of

her right to refuse consent. The inability to remember granting consent to search her own

vehicles also tends to undermine the credibility or reliability of her testimony.

{¶34} The trial court’s judgment entry found that Keig testified that if she refused

consent, the Detectives told her that “the dogs would be brought in,” rendering her

consent involuntary. However, the trial court did not find her “testimony to be credible on

that point.” There was no testimony from either of the Detectives to suggest they made

such a statement to Keig. The totality of the circumstances here bears similarity to Rath

and leads us to conclude that the trial court’s determination that Keig voluntarily gave

1. Despite this discrepancy in the testimony, officers searched the Scion and found nothing of note. 10

Case No. 2024-L-061 consent to search the Chevy Impala where the cocaine was located was not clearly

erroneous. See Kaseda, 2008-Ohio-2136, at ¶ 27 (11th Dist.).

{¶35} Finally, regardless of Keig’s consent to search the Chevy Impala, the search

was justified under the automobile exception allowing the warrantless search of a vehicle

when law enforcement has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband.

See State v. Welch, 18 Ohio St.3d 88, 91 (1985). The Detectives watched as Appellant

and Keig smoked marijuana in the Honda SUV and noted an odor of marijuana. The odor

of marijuana alone is sufficient probable cause to search a vehicle. State v. Moore, 90

Ohio St.3d 47, 50 (2000). Therefore, the Detectives had probable cause to search the

Honda SUV.

{¶36} The Detectives then observed Appellant transfer items from the Chevy

Impala into the Honda SUV. Once officers searched the Honda SUV, they found a used

marijuana cigarette and also found a quantity of marijuana in the items Appellant had

transferred from the Chevy Impala to the Honda SUV. Because the Detectives had

established that Appellant had transferred an illegal substance from one vehicle to the

other, they likewise would have had probable cause to believe Appellant was engaged in

the transfer of illegal narcotics related to the Chevy Impala. Therefore, there was an

independent justification to search the Chevy Impala beyond Keig’s consent to do so, and

the cocaine in the Impala would have been inevitably discovered. See Rath, 2023-Ohio-

2118, at ¶ 15 (11th Dist.).

{¶37} Accordingly, Appellant’s sole assignment of error is without merit.

Case No. 2024-L-061 {¶38} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lake County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed.

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,

SCOTT LYNCH, J.,

concur.

Case No. 2024-L-061