State v. Ellington

196 S.E.2d 629, 18 N.C. App. 273, 1973 N.C. App. LEXIS 1834
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
DecidedMay 23, 1973
Docket7318SC392
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 196 S.E.2d 629 (State v. Ellington) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Ellington, 196 S.E.2d 629, 18 N.C. App. 273, 1973 N.C. App. LEXIS 1834 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973).

Opinion

CAMPBELL, Judge.

Since without the informant’s tip the police officers would have had no knowledge of the crime, the reliability of the informer’s tip is essential to the validity of the search warrant.

In Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 3 L.Ed. 2d 327, 79 S.Ct. 329 (1959), corroborating evidence gained by police upon independent investigation was held to be sufficient evidence from which to infer the reliability of the informer’s tip. In Draper an informer advised the police that a certain individual, whose dress, gait and luggage he described, would be arriving on one of two trains, carrying a quantity of heroin. When a man precisely fitting this description did appear, the police arrested him and found heroin. The Supreme Court held that there was probable cause for the arrest without a warrant.

In 1964, without mention of the Draper case, the United States Supreme Court formulated a standard for testing prob *275 able cause to search based upon an informant’s tip. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 12 L.Ed. 2d 723, 84 S.Ct. 1509 (1964), provided that an affidavit based on an informant’s tip must set forth two things: (1) some of the underlying circumstances from which the police officers concluded that the informant is credible or his information reliable; and (2) some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant based his conclusions about the alleged criminal activity of the defendant.

The Court soon made clear, however, that Aguilar did not overrule Draper. In Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L.Ed. 2d 637, 89 S.Ct. 584 (1969), the court expressly reaffirmed Draper and formulated an alternative test to Aguilar:

“The informer’s report must first be measured against Aguilar’s standards so that its probative value can be assessed. If the tip is found inadequate under Aguilar, the other allegations which corroborate the information contained in the hearsay report should then be considered. At this stage as well, however, the standards enunciated in Aguilar must inform the magistrate’s decision. He must ask: Can it fairly be said that the tip, even when certain parts of it have been corroborated by independent sources, is as trustworthy as a tip which would pass Aguilar’s tests without independent corroboration?” 393 U.S. at 415, 21 L.Ed. 2d at 643, 89 S.Ct at 588.

Spinelli thus stands for the proposition that even if the two-pronged test of Aguilar is not met, the information before the magistrate may be sufficient if, as in Draper, it is sufficiently detailed, or sufficiently corroborated, to supply as much trustworthiness as does the Aguilar test.

In Spinelli an informant relayed information that the defendant was using a designated apartment as the headquarters of a gambling operation. The informant supplied information that defendant was using two telephones with different unlisted numbers, giving those numbers. The authorities confirmed the numbers given, and also included information that Spinelli had a reputation in police circles as a gambler. The court held that this information did not have the indicia of reliability that was present in the Draper case, and did not add up to probable cause.

“ ... In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was gathered, it is es *276 pecially important that the tip describe the accused’s criminal activity in sufficient detail that the magistrate may know that he is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual’s general reputation.” 393 U.S. at 416, 21 L.Ed. 2d at 644, 89 S.Ct. at 589.

In United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 29 L.Ed. 2d 723, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (1971), the court used the tip plus corroboration test as an alternative to Aguilar, and the court found probable cause in a plurality opinion. The Harris affidavit alleged that defendant was dealing in non-taxpaid whiskey based upon information of a person who had himself purchased whiskey from the defendant within the last two weeks. The affidavit contained no underlying circumstances from which to infer the informant’s credibility, but nevertheless the court affirmed the validity of the warrant, primarily because the informant claimed to have had firsthand observation, and because his statement was an admission against penal interest.

Two Federal Courts of Appeal, speaking nearly simultaneously on this issue, have concluded that Harris is a diminution of the requirement of the Spinelli case in finding suitable alternative to Aguilar. See United States v. McNally, 473 F. 2d 934 (3rd Cir. 1973) and United States v. Marihart, 472 F. 2d 809 (8th Cir. 1972).

The tip plus corroborating evidence test satisfies the Aguilar requirements where (1) the credibility of the informer is bolstered by a plethora of corroborating facts — names, times, descriptions — shown to be true, which in themselves are not of the type likely to circulate in rumor; and (2) the corroborating facts are of such detail as to support the reasonable inference that the informant gathered his information, not from rumor, but from firsthand observation himself. The inference that the informer observed the facts he relates is permissible. See the concurring opinion of Justice White in Spinelli v. United States, supra, at 423, 21 L.Ed. 2d at 647, 89 S.Ct. at 592.

In applying Spinelli’s alternative test to the facts of the present case, we first apply the Aguilar test — the sufficiency of the showing furnished the judicial officer of (1) the underlying circumstances showing the credibility of the informer, and (2) the underlying circumstances from which the informer *277 reached the conclusions he conveyed in' the tip, which here- was his statement that the defendant was carrying marijuana.

Here Aguilar’s first prong is amply satisfied: The affidavit contains the statement that the “informer is 100% reliable, and that information obtained from this same informant recently led to the confiscation of 120,000 Barbiturates recently in New York City.” Even in the absence of this statement the informant’s reliability may reasonably be inferred from the very nature of his detailed report.

The second prong of the Aguilar test is not satisfied, however, because the officer revealed nothing to the issuing magistrate that would indicate the basis of the informer’s conclusions.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
196 S.E.2d 629, 18 N.C. App. 273, 1973 N.C. App. LEXIS 1834, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-ellington-ncctapp-1973.