State v. . Elkins

122 S.E. 289, 187 N.C. 533, 1924 N.C. LEXIS 333

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: April 9, 1924
• Status: Published

Opinion

Hoke, J.

The tax in question is under Schedule B of the Revenue Act of 1923, ch. 4, imposing license taxes on certain trades and professions; section 77 being on the business of maintaining or operating a garage, and in which a garage is defined as “any place where automobiles are repaired or stored, for which a charge is made.”

On the facts established by the special verdict, the defendant’s case clearly comes within the statutory provision, and we know of no reason that would justify us in holding the law to be invalid. The power of the Legislature to impose taxes of this general character is undoubted, and the right of classification is referred largely to the Legislature’s discretion, with the limit that it must not be palpably arbitrary. Tullis v. R. R., 175 U. S., 348; Ins. Co. v. Dagg, 172 U. S., 562; McGowan v. Savings Bank, 170 U. S., 286, cited in Efland v. R. R., 146 N. C., 139.

In S. v. Worth, 116 N. C., 1007, it is beld among other things that the word “trade, when used in defining the power to tax, includes any employment or business for gain or profit.” And in the fully considered case of Smith v. Wilkins, 164 N. C., 135-148, Associate Justice Allen states as the proper deduction from the authorities on the subject:

“(1) That the plaintiff is engaged in a trade within the meaning of the Constitution.

“(2) That the General Assembly has the power to tax trades.

“(3) That in the exercise of this power the General Assembly is not required to tax all trades, but may tax some and refuse to tax others.

“(4) That the General Assembly has the power to make classifications subject to the limitation that the tax must be equal on those in the same class, and that there must-be some reason for the difference between the classes.

“(5) That it has the power to provide regulations determining the 'different classes, and that these will not be interfered with unless utterly unreasonable.

“(6) That if the General Assembly has exceeded its power, it is the duty of the courts to so declare, but that every presumption is in favor of the proper exercise of the power of the General Assembly, and the courts will not declare otherwise except in extreme cases and from necessity.”

The repairing of automobiles is- not infrequently of such an extent and character that unless the definition, as in this instance, is made to include both repairing and storing of vehicles, it would be at times well' nigh impossible to bring any such business within the effect of a license tax, and on reason and authority, we are of opinion that on the facts presented the defendant has been properly convicted.

No error.