[Cite as State v. Edwards, 2026-Ohio-141.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 30448 Appellee : : Trial Court Case Nos. CRB 2402097 A v. : &B : CHRISTOPHER A. EDWARDS : (Criminal Appeal from Municipal Court) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION
...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on January 16, 2026, the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
ROBERT G. HANSEMAN, JUDGE
LEWIS, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30448
GARY C. SCHAENGOLD, Attorney for Appellant ERIK R. BLAINE, Attorney for Appellee
HANSEMAN, J.
{¶ 1} Christopher A. Edwards appeals from his conviction for violating a protection
order, which followed a bench trial in the Vandalia Municipal Court. He claims that his
conviction was based on insufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of the
evidence. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Edwards and the complainant, A.L., were in a relationship and lived together for
approximately two years. The relationship ended in July 2024. After the two separated,
Edwards came to her work. He also broke into her home, breaking her windows. A.L. sought
and obtained an ex parte protection order against him in Miami County. Edwards participated
in the final protection order hearing on August 26, 2024, and he was served with the final
protection order the same day. The order prohibited Edwards from contacting A.L. or being
within 500 feet of her, among other things.
{¶ 3} Edwards did not stay away from A.L. On October 11, 2024, A.L. saw Edwards
stopped along the side of the highway as she was leaving the nearby restaurant where she
worked. Edwards left as soon as he saw her.
{¶ 4} At approximately 9:40 a.m. on October 31, 2024, A.L. again saw Edwards as
she was heading to work. While driving along State Route 49 near her home, A.L. observed
Edwards on a motorcycle at a gas station, waiting to pull out onto the road. After A.L. passed
by, Edwards turned onto State Route 49 a few cars behind her and followed her onto
2 eastbound Interstate 70. He then maneuvered so that he was traveling behind A.L. After the
highway split into three lanes, A.L. took the middle lane. Edwards pulled up beside her in
the right lane, blew her a kiss, sped off, and then took the next exit. A.L. took a video of
Edwards behind her and ahead of her on Interstate 70. That day, she reported Edwards’s
conduct to the Ohio State Highway Patrol.
{¶ 5} A.L. spoke with Troopers Jason Whitner and Russell Davis on November 15,
2024. During her interview, she told them that Edwards had contacted one of her co-workers
by text on November 11, 2024.
{¶ 6} On November 20, 2024, Edwards was charged with violating a protection order
and menacing by stalking, both first-degree misdemeanors. He pled not guilty to the
charges.
{¶ 7} The matter proceeded to a bench trial on March 19, 2025. Before trial began,
the State indicated, and the defense agreed, that the protection order case would be based
on the October 31 incident only and that the State would not go forward on the menacing by
stalking charge. The State then presented the testimony of two witnesses (A.L. and Trooper
Whitner) and two exhibits (the final protection order and A.L.’s video). Edwards offered no
evidence in his defense. After considering the evidence, the trial court found Edwards guilty
of violating a protection order and ordered a presentence investigation.
{¶ 8} Sentencing was held on April 9, 2025. After hearing from Edwards and A.L., the
trial court imposed 180 days in jail with 170 days suspended on the condition that Edwards
have no contact with A.L. Edwards was given credit for one day already served, and the
court permitted him to serve the remaining nine days over three consecutive weekends. The
court placed Edwards on two years of community control and ordered him to pay a $150 fine
and court costs.
3 {¶ 9} Edwards appeals from his conviction, raising two assignments of error. We
address them together.
II. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶ 10} In his assignments of error, Edwards claims that his conviction for violating a
protection order was based on insufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of the
evidence. He argues that the State failed to prove that he was served with the protection
order and that he was the individual on the motorcycle on October 31, 2024.
A. Standards of Review
{¶ 11} “When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, [he] is arguing
that the State presented inadequate evidence on an element of the offense to sustain the
verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Matthews, 2018-Ohio-2424, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.). “‘An appellate
court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal
conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence,
if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id., quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259
(1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. “The verdict will not be disturbed unless the appellate
court finds that reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-
fact.” State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430 (1997), citing Jenks at 273.
{¶ 12} In contrast, “[a] weight of the evidence argument challenges the believability
of the evidence and asks which of the competing inferences suggested by the evidence is
more believable or persuasive.” State v. Wilson, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.). When
evaluating whether a conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence, the
4 appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, consider witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the
evidence, the trier of fact “‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of
justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.
1983). A judgment of conviction should be reversed as being against the manifest weight of
the evidence only in exceptional circumstances. Martin at 175.
B. Service of the Protection Order
{¶ 13} Edwards was convicted of violating R.C. 2919.27(A), which requires the State
to prove that he recklessly violated the terms of a protection order. He asserts, citing State
v.
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[Cite as State v. Edwards, 2026-Ohio-141.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 30448 Appellee : : Trial Court Case Nos. CRB 2402097 A v. : &B : CHRISTOPHER A. EDWARDS : (Criminal Appeal from Municipal Court) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION
...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on January 16, 2026, the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
ROBERT G. HANSEMAN, JUDGE
LEWIS, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30448
GARY C. SCHAENGOLD, Attorney for Appellant ERIK R. BLAINE, Attorney for Appellee
HANSEMAN, J.
{¶ 1} Christopher A. Edwards appeals from his conviction for violating a protection
order, which followed a bench trial in the Vandalia Municipal Court. He claims that his
conviction was based on insufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of the
evidence. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Edwards and the complainant, A.L., were in a relationship and lived together for
approximately two years. The relationship ended in July 2024. After the two separated,
Edwards came to her work. He also broke into her home, breaking her windows. A.L. sought
and obtained an ex parte protection order against him in Miami County. Edwards participated
in the final protection order hearing on August 26, 2024, and he was served with the final
protection order the same day. The order prohibited Edwards from contacting A.L. or being
within 500 feet of her, among other things.
{¶ 3} Edwards did not stay away from A.L. On October 11, 2024, A.L. saw Edwards
stopped along the side of the highway as she was leaving the nearby restaurant where she
worked. Edwards left as soon as he saw her.
{¶ 4} At approximately 9:40 a.m. on October 31, 2024, A.L. again saw Edwards as
she was heading to work. While driving along State Route 49 near her home, A.L. observed
Edwards on a motorcycle at a gas station, waiting to pull out onto the road. After A.L. passed
by, Edwards turned onto State Route 49 a few cars behind her and followed her onto
2 eastbound Interstate 70. He then maneuvered so that he was traveling behind A.L. After the
highway split into three lanes, A.L. took the middle lane. Edwards pulled up beside her in
the right lane, blew her a kiss, sped off, and then took the next exit. A.L. took a video of
Edwards behind her and ahead of her on Interstate 70. That day, she reported Edwards’s
conduct to the Ohio State Highway Patrol.
{¶ 5} A.L. spoke with Troopers Jason Whitner and Russell Davis on November 15,
2024. During her interview, she told them that Edwards had contacted one of her co-workers
by text on November 11, 2024.
{¶ 6} On November 20, 2024, Edwards was charged with violating a protection order
and menacing by stalking, both first-degree misdemeanors. He pled not guilty to the
charges.
{¶ 7} The matter proceeded to a bench trial on March 19, 2025. Before trial began,
the State indicated, and the defense agreed, that the protection order case would be based
on the October 31 incident only and that the State would not go forward on the menacing by
stalking charge. The State then presented the testimony of two witnesses (A.L. and Trooper
Whitner) and two exhibits (the final protection order and A.L.’s video). Edwards offered no
evidence in his defense. After considering the evidence, the trial court found Edwards guilty
of violating a protection order and ordered a presentence investigation.
{¶ 8} Sentencing was held on April 9, 2025. After hearing from Edwards and A.L., the
trial court imposed 180 days in jail with 170 days suspended on the condition that Edwards
have no contact with A.L. Edwards was given credit for one day already served, and the
court permitted him to serve the remaining nine days over three consecutive weekends. The
court placed Edwards on two years of community control and ordered him to pay a $150 fine
and court costs.
3 {¶ 9} Edwards appeals from his conviction, raising two assignments of error. We
address them together.
II. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶ 10} In his assignments of error, Edwards claims that his conviction for violating a
protection order was based on insufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of the
evidence. He argues that the State failed to prove that he was served with the protection
order and that he was the individual on the motorcycle on October 31, 2024.
A. Standards of Review
{¶ 11} “When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, [he] is arguing
that the State presented inadequate evidence on an element of the offense to sustain the
verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Matthews, 2018-Ohio-2424, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.). “‘An appellate
court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal
conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence,
if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id., quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259
(1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. “The verdict will not be disturbed unless the appellate
court finds that reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-
fact.” State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430 (1997), citing Jenks at 273.
{¶ 12} In contrast, “[a] weight of the evidence argument challenges the believability
of the evidence and asks which of the competing inferences suggested by the evidence is
more believable or persuasive.” State v. Wilson, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.). When
evaluating whether a conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence, the
4 appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, consider witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the
evidence, the trier of fact “‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of
justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.
1983). A judgment of conviction should be reversed as being against the manifest weight of
the evidence only in exceptional circumstances. Martin at 175.
B. Service of the Protection Order
{¶ 13} Edwards was convicted of violating R.C. 2919.27(A), which requires the State
to prove that he recklessly violated the terms of a protection order. He asserts, citing State
v. Terrell, 2014-Ohio-4344 (2d Dist.), that the State was also required to prove that he was
properly served with the protection order prior to the conduct for which he was charged.
{¶ 14} In Terrell, we reversed the defendant’s conviction for violating a protection
order where the State failed to demonstrate that he had been served with the final protection
order prior to engaging in conduct that violated the order. In doing so, we followed State v.
Smith, 2013-Ohio-1698, which held that “[t]o sustain a conviction for a violation of a
protection order pursuant to R.C. 2919.27(A)(2), the state must establish, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that it served the defendant with the order before the alleged violation.”
Id. at syllabus.
{¶ 15} R.C. 2919.27 was amended to supersede the holding of Smith. See 2017
Sub.S.B. 7; State v. P.J.M., 2020-Ohio-3805, ¶ 24, fn. 1 (8th Dist.). Since September 27,
2017, R.C. 2919.27(D) has provided that “[i]n a prosecution for a violation of this section, it
is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the protection order or consent agreement
was served on the defendant if the prosecution proves that the defendant was shown the
5 protection order or consent agreement or a copy of either or a judge, magistrate, or law
enforcement officer informed the defendant that a protection order or consent agreement
had been issued, and proves that the defendant recklessly violated the terms of the order or
agreement.”
{¶ 16} Here, the evidence supported the conclusions that Edwards was informed of
the protection order and that he was served with it before October 31, 2024. Initially, it
appears that defense counsel stipulated that Edwards had been served. Defense counsel
told the court during his opening statement that Edwards “acknowledge[d] being served with
the protection order” but that he was challenging the allegation that he had violated it. When
the prosector questioned A.L. about the conduct that precipitated the protection order,
defense counsel interrupted, stating that “[w]e will stipulate to the protection report.” The trial
court could have reasonably interpreted the stipulation to be related to both the existence
and the service of the final protection order.
{¶ 17} Regardless, A.L. testified that Edwards was initially served with an ex parte
protection order, that he participated in the final hearing on August 26, 2024, and that he
was aware that a final protection order was going to be issued. The final protection order
was filed at 9:15 a.m. on August 26, 2024. A.L. stated, and the order itself reflects, that
Edwards was served with the order on the same day. On this record, the trial court could
have reasonably concluded that Edwards was both informed of and served with the final
protection order before October 31, 2024.
C. The October 31, 2024 Incident
{¶ 18} Edwards further claims that A.L.’s “vague testimony” did not establish that he
was the individual on the motorcycle on October 31, 2024. He emphasizes that the
6 motorcycle rider wore a helmet that obscured his face and that A.L. acknowledged that
neither the motorcycle nor the helmet belonged to Edwards.
{¶ 19} At trial, A.L. identified Edwards as the individual who followed her and gestured
to her from a motorcycle on October 31, 2024. Although she admittedly did not see
Edwards’s face during the encounter and she did not recognize the helmet that he was
wearing, she said that “everything else was the same.” She indicated that Edwards always
wore the same gloves and shoes and that she had recognized them. She further testified, “I
know his shoes. I know his pants. I know . . . the way he looks on a bike.” On cross-
examination, she added that she knew “his body” and “his style of riding.” A.L. explained on
redirect examination that she had ridden behind Edwards “quite a few times” and knew his
stance. She stated that “with the way he rides, it’s very distinguishable.” A.L. thought that
Edwards was riding his girlfriend’s motorcycle; she had seen photographs of it.
{¶ 20} A.L.’s description of the encounter buttressed her identification of Edwards.
A.L. testified that she always left her house for work at 9:30 a.m., and that she saw Edwards
at a gas station near her home, waiting to turn onto State Route 49, which was part of her
route. She said that once they were on Interstate 70, the motorcycle first got behind her. The
motorcycle then pulled beside her, and the rider blew her a kiss, sped away, and took the
next exit. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that the motorcyclist’s actions
were consistent with the behavior of someone who knew A.L.—that is, of Edwards
specifically—rather than of a stranger. A.L.’s testimony was sufficient to prove that Edwards
was the person who followed her from the gas station and gestured to her on October 31,
2024.
{¶ 21} Although Trooper Whitner did not witness the October 31 encounter, he
testified that he had viewed the video that A.L. had taken. When asked on cross-examination
7 whether there were many people who “look like that and drive on a motorcycle,” the trooper
responded affirmatively. Whitner further testified, however, that he had never met Edwards
and would not know whether the motorcyclist was him.
{¶ 22} It was the province of the trial court, as the trier of fact, to assess the witnesses’
credibility and determine whether the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
Edwards had violated the protection order. In reaching its verdict, the court was free to
believe all, part, or none of the witnesses’ testimony. State v. Peterson, 2021-Ohio-3947,
¶ 27 (2d Dist.). The trial court found A.L. to be a “very credible witness” and stated that it
believed her. With the record before us, we cannot conclude that the trial court lost its way
when it found Edwards guilty of violating a protection order.
{¶ 23} Edwards’s conviction for violating a protection order was based on sufficient
evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, his
assignments of error are overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 24} The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
.............
LEWIS, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.