State v. Edmonson

2025 Ohio 4314

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Edmonson, 2025-Ohio-4314.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

CLERMONT COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, :

Appellee, : CASE NOS. CA2025-01-006 CA2025-01-007 : - vs - OPINION AND : JUDGMENT ENTRY 9/15/2025 CHARLES ROBERT EDMONSON, :

Appellant. :

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case Nos. 2024-CR- 00457; 2024-CR-00552

Mark J. Tekulve, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nicholas A. Horton, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

W. Stephen Haynes, Clermont County Public Defender, and Robert F. Benintendi, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

____________ OPINION

M. POWELL, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant, Charles Edmonson, appeals from his convictions for

endangering children, felonious assault, and kidnapping. We affirm his convictions but Clermont CA2025-01-006 CA2025-01-007

remand so that the trial court can issue nunc pro tunc judgment entries of conviction that

accurately reflect the court's determinations during the plea proceeding.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶ 2} On December 27, 2024, the trial court held a consolidated plea and

sentencing hearing in which Edmonson entered guilty pleas to felony charges across

multiple cases under a plea agreement.

{¶ 3} The charges against Edmonson originated from three separate indictments.

On June 25, 2024, the grand jury first indicted Edmonson on five counts of endangering

children in Case No. 2024 CR 434. Two weeks later, on July 9, 2024, the grand jury

returned a second indictment in Case No. 2024 CR 457, charging Edmonson with 26

counts: 19 counts of endangering children as second-degree felonies under various

subsections of R.C. 2919.22, and seven counts of felonious assault as second-degree

felonies under R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). More charges emerged from a third indictment on

August 27, 2024, in Case No. 2024 CR 552. This 22-count indictment included 12 counts

of kidnapping as first-degree felonies, six counts of abduction as third-degree felonies,

one count of attempted felonious assault as a third-degree felony, one count of assault

as a fourth-degree felony, and two additional counts of endangering children as third-

degree felonies. Each kidnapping count contained an identical specification stating:

"FURTHERMORE, the victim of the offense was less than thirteen years of age and the

defendant committed the offense of kidnapping with a sexual motivation." This

specification created the potential for life imprisonment under R.C. 2905.01(C)(3), the

kidnapping statute, which authorizes such sentences when two conditions are met: the

victim is under 13 years of age, and the defendant is convicted of a sexual-motivation

specification.

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{¶ 4} The parties reached a comprehensive plea agreement that resolved the

charges across the cases while eliminating the possibility of a life sentence. Under the

agreement's terms, Edmonson would plead guilty to five felony counts in two cases. In

Case No. 2024 CR 457, he agreed to plead guilty to Counts III, IV, and V, each alleging

endangering children as second-degree felonies, and to Count XXI, alleging felonious

assault as a second-degree felony. In Case No. 2024 CR 552, he agreed to plead guilty

to Count I, an amended charge of kidnapping. The parties agreed that the specification

attached to Count I would be dismissed entirely, thereby removing both the age element

and the sexual-motivation component that together created life-sentence exposure. In

exchange for these pleas, the State agreed to dismiss with prejudice all remaining

charges across the three cases, including the entirety of Case No. 2024 CR 434.

{¶ 5} The parties also negotiated jointly recommended sentences totaling 15 to

22.5 years of imprisonment. The kidnapping charge would carry an 11- to 16.5-year term,

while the four counts in Case No. 2024 CR 457 would each carry four- to six-year terms,

with the latter to run concurrent to each other but consecutive to the kidnapping sentence.

{¶ 6} At the plea and sentencing hearing, the trial court began by correctly

outlining the plea terms, accurately identifying the specific counts to which Edmonson

would plead guilty and explaining that the kidnapping charge would be amended to

remove what the court termed "the specification." The court informed Edmonson that he

would be pleading guilty to "Counts III, IV, V, and XXI in Case Number 2024 CR 457,"

describing these as "three endangering children counts and one felonious assault count,

all second-degree felonies," and to "Count I in Case Number 2024 CR 552, kidnapping

as a first-degree felony, with the specification removed."

{¶ 7} But when the court attempted to explain the specific nature of each charge,

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confusion emerged. Rather than addressing the counts to which Edmonson was actually

pleading guilty, the court mistakenly began explaining Counts I and II of the indictment in

Case No. 2024 CR 457, charges that were to be dismissed under the plea agreement.

The court provided detailed explanations of these dismissed counts, describing them as

involving torture or cruel abuse of children W.E.1 and S.E., occurring between July 13,

2018, and December 13, 2023. After explaining these irrelevant charges and receiving

Edmonson's acknowledgment of understanding, the court recognized its error.

{¶ 8} The court attempted to correct course, stating: "Excuse me, Count IV. I

started out with Counts I and II. They all read the same, but III, it's III and IV." The court

then provided an explanation of Count IV, again detailing torture or cruel abuse

allegations during the same time period but involving victim W.E.2. The court

subsequently addressed Count XXI, the felonious-assault charge involving victim S.E.

But despite having correctly identified Count V as one of the charges to which Edmonson

would plead guilty, and despite the court's stated intention to review each count

individually, the court entirely omitted any explanation of Count V. When the sequence of

explanations should have reached Count V, the court instead moved directly to explaining

Count XXI.

{¶ 9} The proceedings were further complicated by inconsistent terminology

regarding the kidnapping specification. Throughout the hearing, the trial court used

varying language to describe what was being dismissed, referring alternately to an "age

specification," "sexual motivation specification," and simply "the specification." The court's

explanation to Edmonson created particular ambiguity: "they're eliminating the

specification that W.E. was under the age of 13. That way, and that the kidnapping was

with a sexual motivation, which eliminates any possibility of any type of a life prison

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sentence."

{¶ 10} This phrasing suggested the court understood that both components

necessary for life imprisonment were being eliminated, yet the awkward construction left

unclear whether the court was describing two separate elements or a single specification

containing both. The written plea form referenced dismissal of "the specification" without

further elaboration, treating the specification as a single unit to be removed entirely.

{¶ 11} Following the plea colloquy, the State provided a factual basis that correctly

identified the charges as Counts III, IV, V, and XXI in Case No. 2024 CR 457 and Count

I as amended in Case No. 2024 CR 552. The prosecutor's recitation included specific

factual allegations corresponding to each count and properly identified the victims

associated with each charge. For Count V specifically, the State alleged torture or cruel

abuse of W.E.3, a child under 18 years of age, occurring between February 8, 2019, and

December 13, 2023, resulting in serious physical harm.

{¶ 12} When asked whether he had any disagreement with the factual recitation,

Edmonson responded negatively. The court then had Edmonson acknowledge and sign

written plea forms, which correctly delineated the charges to which he was pleading and

accurately reflected the terms negotiated by the parties.

{¶ 13} Based on the totality of the proceedings, the trial court found that

Edmonson's pleas were entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The court

accepted the guilty pleas and immediately proceeded to sentencing, imposing the jointly

recommended prison terms: 11 to 16.5 years on the kidnapping count and 4 to 6 years

on each of the four counts in Case No. 2024 CR 457, with the latter terms to run

concurrently with each other but consecutively to the kidnapping sentence. The court

dismissed the remaining charges with prejudice as agreed.

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{¶ 14} The trial court entered the judgments of convictions on December 30, 2024,

but the entries contained two apparent clerical errors. The entry in Case No. 2024 CR

552 stated that Edmonson had pleaded guilty to kidnapping "amended to remove the age

of the child element as to Count 1," without mentioning the sexual-motivation

specification. In Case No. 2024 CR 457, page one of the entry characterized the

felonious-assault conviction as "a felony of the first degree," despite the fact that R.C.

2903.11(A)(1) unambiguously classifies felonious assault as a second-degree felony.

{¶ 15} Edmonson appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

{¶ 16} Edmonson raises four assignments of error challenging various aspects of

the plea proceedings. The assignments of error focus primarily on the trial court's failure

to properly explain Count V during the plea colloquy, confusion regarding the dismissal

of the kidnapping specification, and error in the judgment entry that mischaracterized the

degree of the felonious-assault conviction.

A. The Trial Court's Failure to Memorialize Dismissal of the Sexual Motivation Specification

{¶ 17} The first assignment of error alleges:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, IN CASE NO. 2024 CR 0552, IN NOT MEMORIALIZING IN THE SENTENCING ENTRY THAT THE "SEXUAL MOTIVATION" SPECIFICATION HAD BEEN DISMISSED.

{¶ 18} Edmonson contends that the trial court committed reversible error by failing

to reflect in its judgment entry the complete terms of the plea agreement regarding the

kidnapping charge in Case No. 2024 CR 552. The State agrees that correction is

warranted.

{¶ 19} Understanding this assignment of error requires examining how Ohio's

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kidnapping statute creates the possibility of life imprisonment. Under R.C. 2905.01(B)(2),

the elements required to prove kidnapping depend on the victim's age. For adult victims,

the prosecution must establish that the defendant used force, threat, or deception to

create a substantial risk of serious physical harm. For victims under 13 years of age,

however, the statute permits conviction based on the defendant's use of "any means" to

either create a substantial risk of serious physical harm or cause physical harm to the

victim.

{¶ 20} R.C. 2905.01(C)(3) establishes that a maximum prison term of life

imprisonment becomes possible when two distinct conditions are satisfied: first, the victim

must be less than 13 years of age, and second, the defendant must be convicted of or

plead guilty to a "sexual motivation specification," which means that the offender's

purpose in kidnapping the victim was "to gratify" his "sexual needs or desires," R.C.

2971.01(J).1 Both conditions are essential; if either is absent, life imprisonment is not the

required maximum under the statute.

{¶ 21} The age element and the sexual-motivation specification, while related,

serve different legal functions. The victim's age affects the elements the prosecution must

prove to establish the underlying kidnapping offense itself. The sexual-motivation

specification, by contrast, constitutes a separate enhancement that triggers the possibility

of life imprisonment when combined with the age element. The indictment's specification

combined these distinct legal concepts in a single "Furthermore" clause, stating:

"FURTHERMORE, the victim of the offense was less than thirteen years of age and the

1. R.C. 2971.01(J) defines "sexual motivation." R.C. 2971.01(K) defines "sexual motivation specification" as "a specification, as described in section 2941.147 of the Revised Code, that charges that a person charged with a designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense committed the offense with a sexual motivation." The kidnapping statute points to this meaning of "sexual motivation specification." R.C. 2905.01(D). -7- Clermont CA2025-01-006 CA2025-01-007

defendant committed the offense of kidnapping with a sexual motivation." This drafting

created confusion throughout the proceedings, as evidenced by the trial court's varying

references to an "age specification," "sexual motivation specification," and simply "the

specification."

{¶ 22} The record indicates that the plea negotiations addressed both components

necessary for life imprisonment. During the plea colloquy, the trial court explained that

"they're eliminating the specification that W.E. was under the age of 13. That way, and

that the kidnapping was with a sexual motivation, which eliminates any possibility of any

type of a life prison sentence." This explanation, while awkwardly phrased, demonstrates

the court's recognition that both elements contributing to life-sentence exposure were

being modified. The court's reference to eliminating "any possibility of any type of a life

prison sentence" suggests that both the age element of the underlying offense and the

sexual-motivation specification were being addressed.

{¶ 23} The record demonstrates that the trial court agreed to modify the kidnapping

charge in the manner necessary to eliminate life-sentence exposure entirely. Several

factors support this conclusion. First, the court's explicit statement that removing the

discussed elements would "eliminate any possibility of any type of a life prison sentence"

reflects an understanding that both conditions for life imprisonment were being

addressed. Had only the age element been modified, the sexual-motivation specification

could still have triggered enhanced penalties. Second, the prosecutor's factual recitation

made no reference to sexual motivation, confirming that this component was not part of

Edmonson's plea. The State's factual basis described the offense as involving a child

victim but omitted any allegation of sexual motivation, demonstrating that this element

was not included in the charge to which Edmonson was pleading guilty. Third, the written

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plea form consistently referred to dismissing "the specification" as a single unit, treating

the improperly combined elements as one entity to be removed entirely.

{¶ 24} Despite the clarity of the court's decision during the plea proceedings, the

judgment entry incompletely captured what had been decided. The written order stated

only that Edmonson had pleaded guilty to kidnapping "amended to remove the age of the

child element as to Count 1," without mentioning the sexual-motivation specification. This

omission created a significant ambiguity. By referencing only the "age of the child

element," the sentencing entry suggested that the sexual-motivation specification

remained intact, which would have preserved the possibility of life imprisonment. Such an

interpretation directly contradicts the court's explicit statements during the plea hearing.

{¶ 25} The incomplete description in the sentencing entry constitutes precisely the

type of clerical error that nunc pro tunc authority is designed to remedy. Courts may

correct judgment entries to ensure that "the record speaks the truth," but such corrections

are limited in proper use to "reflect[ing] what the court actually decided." State v. Lester,

2011-Ohio-5204, ¶ 18. Crim.R. 36 provides the procedural mechanism for such

corrections, authorizing courts to remedy "[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or

other parts of the record, and errors arising from oversight or omission." A clerical mistake

is "a mistake[] or omission that is mechanical in nature and apparent on the record and

does not involve a legal decision or judgment." Lester at ¶ 18.

{¶ 26} Here, the trial court actually decided to eliminate both components

necessary for a maximum prison term of life imprisonment. The judgment entry's

reference to one component only represents a mechanical error in describing that

decision rather than a different substantive ruling. This error is apparent on the record,

given the court's statements during the plea hearing. The error involves no legal decision

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or judgment that was not already made during the plea proceedings. The judgment entry's

partial description of that modification falls within Crim.R. 36's authorization to correct

clerical mistakes and oversights.

{¶ 27} The trial court erred by failing to memorialize completely in the judgment

entry the modifications made to the kidnapping charge as part of the plea agreement.

While the court correctly noted the removal of the age element, it failed to reflect that the

sexual-motivation specification was also eliminated. This constitutes a clerical error

amenable to correction through nunc pro tunc proceedings.

{¶ 28} We remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to issue a nunc pro

tunc entry correcting the judgment entry in Case No. 2024 CR 552 to reflect accurately

that Edmonson pleaded guilty to kidnapping with both the age element of the underlying

offense and the sexual-motivation specification eliminated, thereby removing any

possibility of life imprisonment under R.C. 2905.01(C)(3).

{¶ 29} The first assignment of error is sustained.

B. Edmonson's Guilty Plea in Case No. 2024 CR 552

{¶ 30} The second assignment of error alleges:

APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA, IN CASE NO. 2024 CR 0552, WAS NOT MADE KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY OR VOLUNTARILY THEREBY VIOLATING HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE UNITED STATES AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONS.

{¶ 31} Edmonson presents this assignment of error contingent upon our resolution

of the first assignment, arguing that if we were to determine the sexual-motivation

specification remained part of his plea, his constitutional rights would have been violated.

We conclude that the issues raised in this assignment of error are moot based on our

resolution of the first assignment of error.

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{¶ 32} Edmonson explicitly frames this assignment as contingent, stating it is

presented "in an abundance of caution" should we determine that the sexual-motivation

specification was not eliminated as part of the plea agreement. "A case is moot when the

issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the

outcome." (Cleaned up.) State ex rel. Citizens for Community Values, Inc. v. DeWine,

2020-Ohio-4547, ¶ 7.

{¶ 33} Our analysis of the first assignment of error establishes definitively that the

sexual-motivation specification was eliminated as part of the plea agreement. The record

demonstrates through multiple indicators that both the age element of the underlying

kidnapping offense and the sexual-motivation specification were removed to eliminate

entirely the possibility of life imprisonment under R.C. 2905.01(C)(3). Given this

determination, the premise underlying Edmonson's second assignment of error simply

did not occur. Edmonson was not misled about the nature of his plea. He received

accurate information that the sexual-motivation specification would be dismissed, and his

plea was accepted on that basis. The factual predicate for his constitutional challenge is

absent from the record.

{¶ 34} Because we have determined that the record establishes beyond question

that the sexual-motivation specification was eliminated as part of the plea agreement,

Edmonson's constitutional challenge to his plea lacks any factual foundation. His plea

was entered with complete and accurate knowledge that the specification would be

dismissed, exactly as the parties understood and as the trial court implemented through

its sentencing decision. The issues raised in this assignment of error are therefore moot.

{¶ 35} The second assignment of error need not be addressed.

C. Edmonson's Guilty Plea in Case No. 2024 CR 457

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{¶ 36} The third assignment of error alleges:

APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA, IN CASE NO. 2024 CR 0457, AS TO COUNT V WAS NOT MADE KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY OR VOLUNTARILY THEREBY VIOLATING HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE UNITED STATES AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONS.

{¶ 37} Edmonson challenges the validity of his guilty plea to Count V in Case No.

2024 CR 0457, contending that the trial court's failure to properly explain this charge

during the plea colloquy violated his constitutional rights. This assignment of error

requires us to determine whether the trial court's admittedly imperfect colloquy

nonetheless satisfied the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C), and if not, whether any

deficiency necessitates vacating Edmonson's plea.

1. The Governing Legal Framework

{¶ 38} "When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders

enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and

the Ohio Constitution." (Citations omitted.) State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 1996-

Ohio-179. Crim.R. 11(C) "prescribes the process that a trial court must use before

accepting a plea of guilty to a felony." State v. Bishop, 2018-Ohio-5132, ¶ 11. The rule

"'ensures an adequate record on review by requiring the trial court to personally inform

the defendant of his rights and the consequences of his plea and determine if the plea is

understandingly and voluntarily made.'" State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 11, quoting

State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168 (1975).

{¶ 39} The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Dangler provides the framework for

evaluating Crim.R. 11 compliance. Under Dangler, "a defendant is not entitled to have his

plea vacated unless he demonstrates he was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to

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comply with the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C)." Id. at ¶ 16. The Court recognized two narrow

exceptions to this prejudice requirement: first, when a trial court fails to explain the

constitutional rights set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), id. at ¶ 14, and second, when a trial

court "complete[ly] fail[s] to comply with a portion of Crim.R. 11(C)," (Emphasis in

original.) Id. at ¶ 15.

{¶ 40} Importantly, Dangler clarified that the inquiry is not whether the trial court

provided a perfect colloquy, but rather whether "the dialogue between the court and the

defendant demonstrates that the defendant understood the consequences of his plea."

Id. at ¶ 12. The Court established a straightforward three-part test: "(1) has the trial court

complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with

the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of

demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant

met that burden?" Dangler at ¶ 17.

2. The Trial Court's Compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)

{¶ 41} Our review of the plea proceedings reveals that while the trial court's

colloquy was far from perfect, it did not completely fail to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)

regarding Count V. The record establishes several distinct avenues through which

Edmonson received information about this charge.

{¶ 42} The trial court admittedly began the colloquy by erroneously discussing

dismissed Counts I and II rather than the charges to which Edmonson was actually

pleading guilty. This created initial confusion, as the court provided detailed explanations

of offenses involving victims W.E.1 and S.E., neither of whom were connected to Count

V. But the court recognized its error partway through the proceedings and attempted to

correct course. More significantly, the court specifically addressed Count V when

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explaining maximum penalties, stating: "The maximum minimum sentence I could impose

on Count V would be eight years in prison." This direct reference to Count V by name,

coupled with the penalty explanation, provided Edmonson with concrete information

about this particular charge.

{¶ 43} When formally accepting Edmonson's guilty pleas, the trial court specifically

enumerated each count, asking: "as to Count III, endangering children; Count IV,

endangering children; Count V, endangering children, and Count XXI, felonious assault,

how do you plead to each of those four charges?" This judicial inquiry explicitly identified

Count V as endangering children and required Edmonson's individual response, ensuring

his awareness that he was pleading to this specific charge.

{¶ 44} The prosecutor's factual recitation provided crucial clarifying information,

correctly identifying all charges including Count V and specifying that this count involved

victim W.E.3. For Count V specifically, the State alleged "torture or cruel abuse of W.E.3,

a child under eighteen years of age, occurring between February 8, 2019, and December

13, 2023, resulting in serious physical harm." When asked whether he disagreed with or

misunderstood this factual basis, Edmonson responded negatively. The written plea

forms, which constitute an integral component of the Crim.R. 11 process, clearly

delineated Counts III, IV, V, and XXI as the charges to which Edmonson was pleading

guilty. Edmonson acknowledged reviewing these forms with his counsel, understanding

their contents, and signing them voluntarily.

{¶ 45} Edmonson's argument that the trial court "completely failed" to comply with

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) regarding Count V misconstrues the Dangler standard. A complete

failure occurs when a court makes "'no mention'" of the relevant requirement. State v.

Obhof, 2023-Ohio-408, ¶ 26 (11th Dist.), quoting Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, at ¶ 15. See

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also State v. Fabian, 2020-Ohio-3926, ¶ 19-20 (12th Dist.). Here, the trial court did not

remain entirely silent about Count V. Rather, the court specifically mentioned Count V

when explaining penalties, explicitly included it when accepting pleas, and ensured that

the factual basis addressed this charge.

{¶ 46} This case is materially different from State v. Sarkozy, 2008-Ohio-509, on

which Edmonson relies. In Sarkozy, the trial court made absolutely no mention of

postrelease control despite its mandatory imposition, creating a complete void in the

defendant's understanding of his sentence. Sarkozy at ¶ 22. Here, by contrast, the court

provided multiple touchpoints of information about Count V, even if the initial explanation

was confusing.

{¶ 47} Rather, our analysis aligns with the approach taken in State v. Mills, 2024-

Ohio-3359 (12th Dist.), where we found adequate Crim.R. 11 compliance despite a less-

than-ideal colloquy. In Mills, as here, the defendant received essential information about

his charge and penalty through various components of the plea process, even though the

trial court's explanation lacked perfect clarity. The Mills court emphasized that Crim.R. 11

does not require mechanical perfection but rather focuses on whether the defendant

actually understood the charges and penalties. See Mills at ¶ 16. We have said (several

times) that "'"it is sufficient if the totality of the circumstances warrant the trial court in

making a determination [that] the defendant understands the charge[]."'" Id., quoting State

v. Huston, 2018-Ohio-2818, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Goens, 2006-Ohio-4324, ¶

10 (12th Dist.).

{¶ 48} The present case presents even stronger evidence of compliance than

Mills. Here, unlike in Mills, the court specifically mentioned the challenged count by name

when discussing penalties and explicitly included it when accepting the defendant's pleas.

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The prosecutor's detailed factual basis and the defendant's review of comprehensive plea

forms provided additional layers of information.

{¶ 49} We do not think that the temporary confusion created by the court's initial

discussion of dismissed counts and its failure to properly explain the basis of Count V

during the plea colloquy constituted a complete failure to comply with a portion of Crim.R.

11(C). As the Court emphasized in Dangler, the focus must be on "whether the dialogue

between the court and the defendant demonstrates that the defendant understood the

consequences of his plea," not whether the colloquy followed a perfect sequence.

Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, at ¶ 12.

3. Edmonson has not demonstrated prejudice

{¶ 50} Because this case does not involve a failure to explain constitutional rights

and does not involve complete noncompliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), Edmonson must

demonstrate prejudice to succeed on his challenge. The test for prejudice is "'whether the

plea would have otherwise been made.'" Id. at ¶ 16, quoting State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d

106, 108 (1990).

{¶ 51} Multiple aspects of the record undermine any claim of prejudice. First,

Edmonson was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings and acknowledged

reviewing the charges and plea forms with his attorney. Second, when the prosecutor

provided the factual basis specifically identifying Count V and victim W.E.3, Edmonson

indicated no confusion or disagreement. Third, Edmonson's responses throughout the

colloquy reflected his understanding of the proceedings. Most significantly, there is no

indication in the record that Edmonson would have refused to plead guilty to Count V had

the court provided a more detailed initial explanation. The charge carried the same

penalty as the other endangering-children counts, involved the same basic conduct

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(torture or cruel abuse of a child), and was part of a comprehensive plea agreement that

eliminated the possibility of a life sentence on the kidnapping charge.

{¶ 52} Edmonson's representation by competent counsel provides an additional

safeguard against uninformed pleas. The record establishes that his attorney reviewed

the charges and plea forms with him before the hearing. In the absence of any indication

that counsel was ineffective or that Edmonson was confused about the charges despite

his attorney's guidance, we cannot presume prejudice from the court's imperfect colloquy.

{¶ 53} While we do not condone the trial court's initial confusion regarding which

counts were being discussed, the totality of the plea proceedings demonstrates that

Edmonson received adequate information about Count V to make his plea knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily. The court's specific mention of Count V during penalty

discussions, explicit inclusion of this count when accepting pleas, and the prosecutor's

detailed factual basis provided sufficient information to satisfy Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).

{¶ 54} Because the trial court did not completely fail to comply with Crim.R.

11(C)(2)(a), Edmonson was required to demonstrate prejudice, which he has failed to do.

The record supports the conclusion that Edmonson understood he was pleading guilty to

Count V involving victim W.E.3, and nothing suggests he would have acted differently

with a more detailed initial explanation.

{¶ 55} The third assignment of error is overruled.

D. The Felonious-Assault Conviction

{¶ 56} The fourth assignment of error alleges:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, IN CASE NO. 2024 CR 0457, IN NOTING THAT FELONIOUS ASSAULT IS A FELONY OF THE FIRST DEGREE.

{¶ 57} Lastly, Edmonson challenges the trial court's characterization of his

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felonious assault conviction in the judgment of conviction for Case No. 2024 CR 0457,

arguing that the court incorrectly described the offense as a first-degree felony when it is

statutorily classified as a second-degree felony. The State acknowledges that this

constitutes a clerical error requiring correction through a nunc pro tunc entry. Our analysis

confirms that the error meets the established criteria for such relief and warrants remand

for correction.

{¶ 58} The record establishes without dispute that Edmonson pleaded guilty to

felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). This statute unambiguously classifies

his felonious-assault charge as a second-degree felony. See R.C. 2903.11(D)(1)(a).

Nevertheless, the trial court's judgment of conviction for the case contains a reference

characterizing the offense as "a felony of the first degree" on page one. Tellingly, on page

two of the judgment entry the court correctly described the same offense as a second-

degree felony, demonstrating that the erroneous reference represents an isolated mistake

rather than a substantive legal misunderstanding.

{¶ 59} Ohio law provides clear guidance for addressing such errors through

Crim.R. 36, which authorizes courts to correct "clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or

other parts of the record, and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission." A

clerical error constitutes "a mistake[] or omission that is mechanical in nature and

apparent on the record and does not involve a legal decision or judgment." Lester, 2011-

Ohio-5204, at ¶ 18.

{¶ 60} The mischaracterization of felonious assault clearly satisfies the established

criteria for clerical correction. The error is mechanical in nature, involving nothing more

than an incorrect degree designation that contradicts both statutory law and the court's

demonstrated understanding throughout the proceedings. The mistake is readily

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apparent from the record, and the error involves no legal decision or judgment. The

isolated reference to a first-degree felony represents nothing more than a transcription

error that fails to reflect the court's actual decision.

{¶ 61} We remand this matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of issuing a

nunc pro tunc sentencing entry that correctly characterizes Count XXI, felonious assault,

as a second-degree felony in accordance with R.C. 2903.11(D)(1)(a).

{¶ 62} The fourth assignment of error is sustained.

III. CONCLUSION

{¶ 63} We have overruled the second and third assignments of error and sustained

the first and fourth assignments of error. The trial court's judgments of conviction are

affirmed in part and reversed in part. We affirm Edmonson's convictions on all counts,

finding that his guilty pleas were entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily in

compliance with constitutional and procedural requirements. But we reverse those

portions of the judgments that contain the clerical errors identified in our analysis.

{¶ 64} These cases are remanded for the limited purpose of issuing nunc pro tunc

judgment entries of conviction that accurately reflect the court's determinations during the

plea proceedings. The corrected entry in Case No. 2024 CR 552 should reflect that

Edmonson pleaded guilty to kidnapping with both the age element of the underlying

offense and the sexual-motivation specification eliminated. And the corrected entry in

Case No. 2024 CR 457 should properly characterize Count XXI, felonious assault, as a

felony of the second degree.

BYRNE, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.

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JUDGMENT ENTRY

The assignments of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgments or final orders appealed from be, and the same hereby are, reversed and vacated as to the specification attached to Count 1 in Case No. 2024 CR 552 and as to felony degree of Count XXI in Case No. 2024 CR 457 and remanded to correct the clerical errors in the judgment entries of conviction by the issuance of nunc pro tunc entries consistent with the above Opinion. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Clermont County Court of Common Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.

Costs to be taxed 75% to appellant and 25% to appellee.

/s/ Matthew R. Byrne, Presiding Judge

/s/ Robin N. Piper, Judge

/s/ Mike Powell, Judge

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