State v. Eckelbarger

2025 Ohio 2024

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 6, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-16
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Eckelbarger, 2025-Ohio-2024.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CHAMPAIGN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 2024-CA-16 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 2024 CR 022 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas SKYLER DEAN ECKELBARGER : Court) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION

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Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on June 6, 2025, the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

CHRISTOPHER B. EPLEY, PRESIDING JUDGE

MARY K. HUFFMAN, JUDGE

ROBERT G. HANSEMAN, JUDGE -2-

OPINION CHAMPAIGN C.A. No. 2024-CA-16

MARY ADELINE R. LEWIS, Attorney for Appellant SAMANTHA B. WHETHERHOLT, Attorney for Appellee

HANSEMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant Skyler Dean Eckelbarger appeals from his conviction in the

Champaign County Court of Common Pleas after he pled guilty to one count of failure to

comply with an order or signal of a police officer and one count of violating a protection order.

In support of his appeal, Eckelbarger contends that his guilty plea to violating a protection

order was invalid because the trial court accepted his guilty plea before he executed a waiver

of indictment on that charge. For the reasons outlined below, we disagree with Eckelbarger’s

claim and will affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Facts and Course of Proceedings

{¶ 2} On March 4, 2024, a Champaign County grand jury returned an indictment

charging Eckelbarger with one third-degree-felony count of failure to comply with an order

or signal of a police officer. The charge arose after Eckelbarger fled from a Saint Paris police

officer who was attempting to conduct a traffic stop due to Eckelbarger’s operation of his

motorcycle without a license plate. The officer reported that Eckelbarger fled at a high rate

of speed and lost control of his motorcycle while attempting to make a left-hand turn. The

officer also reported that Eckelbarger and his female passenger were ejected from the

motorcycle during the incident and fled on foot until they were apprehended and taken into

custody. -3- {¶ 3} Eckelbarger pled not guilty to the indicted charge and the matter was scheduled

for a jury trial. The State thereafter filed a bill of information in the same case that charged

Eckelbarger with one fifth-degree-felony count of violating a protection order. This additional

charge stemmed from allegations that Eckelbarger violated a civil protection order that had

been obtained by the father of the female passenger who was involved in the motorcycle

incident. Specifically, it was alleged that Eckelbarger had called the female passenger 39

times from jail despite the civil protection order, which prohibited him from contacting her or

any member of her immediate family.

{¶ 4} On May 20, 2024, Eckelbarger appeared in court and waived his right to an

indictment by a grand jury on the charge of violating a protection order. As part of a plea

agreement, Eckelbarger pled guilty to that charge and to the indicted charge of failure to

comply with an order or signal of a police officer. In exchange for Eckelbarger’s guilty pleas,

the State agreed to recommend that a presentence investigation report be prepared for

sentencing and that Eckelbarger receive no more than 36 months in prison. In addition, the

parties agreed that the motorcycle driven by Eckelbarger would be returned to the registered

owner and that Eckelbarger would pay court costs and any applicable court-appointed legal

fees.

{¶ 5} On June 13, 2024, the trial court sentenced Eckelbarger to 24 months in prison

for failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer and a consecutive 12 months

in prison for violating a protection order. Accordingly, Eckelbarger received a total sentence

of 36 months in prison. The trial court also suspended Eckelbarger’s driver’s license for 15

years and ordered him to pay court costs and a $4,500 fine.

{¶ 6} Eckelbarger now appeals from his conviction, raising a single assignment of

error for review. -4-

Assignment of Error

{¶ 7} Eckelbarger claims that his guilty plea to violating a protection order as charged

in the bill of information was invalid because he did not waive his right to an indictment by a

grand jury in strict compliance with R.C. 2941.021. Eckelbarger asserts that his waiver of

indictment did not comply with R.C. 2941.021 because the trial court accepted his guilty plea

before he executed his waiver of indictment. We disagree.

{¶ 8} As a preliminary matter, we note that when reviewing the validity of a

defendant’s plea, “[a]n appellate court must determine whether the record affirmatively

demonstrates that [the] plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary[.]” State v. Russell,

2012-Ohio-6051, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.), citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). “If a

defendant’s plea is not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, it ‘has been obtained in violation

of due process and is void.’ ” State v. Carter, 2022-Ohio-206, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.), quoting Russell

at ¶ 7. “In order for a plea to be given knowingly, [intelligently,] and voluntarily, the trial court

must follow the mandates of Crim.R. 11(C).” State v. Brown, 2012-Ohio-199, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.).

Pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C), the trial court should not accept a defendant’s guilty plea to a

felony offense without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the

following:

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with

understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum

penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible

for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at

the sentencing hearing.

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant -5- understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the

court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and

sentence.

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant

understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to

jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have

compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor,

and to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be

compelled to testify against himself or herself.

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)-(c).

{¶ 9} A defendant is generally “not entitled to have his plea vacated unless he

demonstrates he was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply with the provisions

of Crim.R. 11(C).” State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 16, citing State v. Nero, 56 Ohio

St.3d 106, 108 (1990). There are, however, two circumstances in which it is unnecessary

for a defendant to demonstrate prejudice to vacate his plea. The first is when the trial court

fails to explain the notifications under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), i.e., the constitutional rights that

a defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest. Id. at ¶ 14. The second is when the trial

court completely fails to comply with a portion of the nonconstitutional notifications under

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) or (b). Id. at ¶ 15. “Aside from these two exceptions, the traditional rule

continues to apply: a defendant is not entitled to have his plea vacated unless he

demonstrates he was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply with the provisions

of Crim.R. 11(C).” Id. at ¶ 16, citing Nero at 108.

{¶ 10} In this case, Eckelbarger does not dispute that the trial court engaged him in -6- a plea colloquy and does not allege that the trial court failed to give any of the notifications

required by Crim.R. 11(C). As previously discussed, Eckelbarger instead claims that his

guilty plea to violating a protection order was invalid because the trial court allegedly

accepted his guilty plea before he executed a waiver of indictment on that charge. According

to Eckelbarger, the “odd order” of the proceedings did not comply with the requirements of

Crim.R. 11(C) or R.C. 2941.021—the statute that governs prosecution by information.

{¶ 11} R.C. 2941.021 provides the following:

Any criminal offense which is not punishable by death or life

imprisonment may be prosecuted by information filed in the common pleas

court by the prosecuting attorney if the defendant, after he has been advised

by the court of the nature of the charge against him and of his rights under

the constitution, is represented by counsel or has affirmatively waived

counsel by waiver in writing and in open court, waives in writing and in open

court prosecution by indictment.

{¶ 12} The requirements under R.C. 2941.021 are mandatory. Wells v. Sacks, 115

Ohio App. 219, 223 (10th Dist. 1962); State v. Krajnik, 2021-Ohio-1442, ¶ 10 (6th Dist.). “ ‘[I]f

there is a failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of the statute, the waiver is

ineffective[.]’ ” Krajnik at ¶ 10, quoting Wells at 223. “Under Article I, Section 10 of the

Constitution, a felony [bill of] information is void if the accused has not effectively waived his

right to indictment.” Wells at 223.

{¶ 13} In this case, Eckelbarger concedes that the trial court provided the required

advisements under R.C. 2941.021 when it obtained his waiver of indictment. Eckelbarger,

however, argues that his waiver was “moot” because it was made after the trial court had

already accepted his guilty plea to violating a protection order. To support his claim that his -7- guilty plea was accepted before his waiver of indictment, Eckelbarger points to the following

discussion that occurred immediately after the parties informed the trial court of their plea

agreement:

THE COURT: . . . Mr. Eckelbarger, could you hear what the lawyers

had to say?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Did they say anything that you did not understand?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is it your desire to enter a plea of guilt to the two

Counts?

THE COURT: Is Attorney Anderson retained by you for Count Two

[violating a protection order]?

THE COURT: Attorney Anderson, have you seen the Bill of

Information?

MR. ANDERSON: I have, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you accept service and waive the reading?

MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Does your client waive the one-day rule before being

arraigned and called upon to answer the Bill?

MR. ANDERSON: He does, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And does your client wish to enter a plea to that Bill?

MR. ANDERSON: Yes, he does. He pleads guilty to that. -8- THE COURT: Guilty plea will be accepted. Is that something we can

do right now?

(Emphasis added.) Plea and Bill of Information Hearing Tr. (May 20, 2024), p. 5-6.

{¶ 14} After reviewing the record, we disagree with Eckelbarger’s claim that the

foregoing discussion establishes that the trial court accepted his guilty plea to violating a

protection order before he executed a waiver of indictment on that charge. The foregoing

discussion constitutes Eckelbarger’s arraignment, not an acceptance of his guilty plea. See

Crim.R. 10 (“Arraignment shall be conducted in open court, and shall consist of reading the

indictment, information or complaint to the defendant, or stating to the defendant the

substance of the charge, and calling on the defendant to plead thereto. The defendant may

in open court waive the reading of the indictment, information, or complaint.”). The trial

court’s use of the future tense language “will be accepted” and asking if acceptance of the

guilty plea was “something we can do right now?” supports the notion that the trial court had

not formally accepted Eckelbarger’s guilty plea.

{¶ 15} Furthermore, after the discussion in question, the trial court went on to explain

Eckelbarger’s constitutional right to an indictment by a grand jury and how one must waive

that right when pleading guilty to a bill of information. Tr. at 10-12. Once the trial court

completed its waiver explanation, Eckelbarger confirmed he understood that by pleading

guilty to the bill, he would be waiving his right to a grand jury and accepting the charge

brought by the prosecutor. Id. at 12. Thereafter, Eckelbarger orally waived his right to an

indictment on the record and reviewed and signed a written waiver of indictment form. Id. at

14-15; Waiver of Indictment (May 20, 2024). It was not until after the trial court accepted

Eckelbarger’s waiver of indictment that the court proceeded to complete a Crim.R. 11 plea -9- colloquy and accept Eckelbarger’s guilty pleas. Tr. at 15-26.

{¶ 16} Upon review, we find that, in fashioning his argument, Eckelbarger has taken

a small portion of the record out of context and manipulated it in a way to reach a conclusion

that is not supported by the record as a whole. When considering the entire record, it

becomes clear that, during the discussion in question, Eckelbarger and his counsel were

simply notifying the trial court of Eckelbarger’s intent to plead guilty to violating a protection

order, and that the trial court responded by notifying the parties of its intent to accept that

plea. Such an exchange is not the equivalent of the trial court formally accepting

Eckelbarger’s guilty plea. Therefore, we reject Eckelbarger’s claim that the trial court

accepted his guilty plea to violating a protection order before he waived his right to an

indictment on that charge.

{¶ 17} Because Eckelbarger is only challenging the timing of his waiver of indictment

and otherwise concedes that his waiver and plea complied with R.C. 2941.021 and Crim.R.

11, his assignment of error lacks merit, as we agree that the trial court fully complied with

those provisions. Also, by pleading guilty in compliance with Crim.R. 11, Eckelbarger

effectively waived his right to contest non-jurisdictional defects that occurred before he

entered his plea, which included any alleged defects in his waiver of indictment. State v.

Doll, 2017-Ohio-760, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Kelley, 57 Ohio St.3d 127 (1991), State

ex rel. Beauchamp v. Lazaroff, 77 Ohio St.3d 237, 238 (1997) and State v. Hill, 1993 WL

27640 (8th Dist. Feb. 4, 1993); accord State v. Padgett, 2019-Ohio-174, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.),

citing Stacy v. Van Coren, 18 Ohio St.2d 188 (1969), State v. Mays, 2013-Ohio-4031 (8th

Dist.) and Hill.

{¶ 18} For all the foregoing reasons, Eckelbarger’s sole assignment of error is

overruled. -10-

Conclusion

{¶ 19} Having overruled Eckelbarger’s sole assignment of error, the judgment of the

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EPLEY, P.J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.