[Cite as State v. Eades, 2020-Ohio-5537.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case No. 28511 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2018-CR-3727 : RAY L. EADES : (Criminal Appeal from : Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellant : :
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OPINION
Rendered on the 4th day of December, 2020.
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR. by ANDREW T. FRENCH, Atty. Reg. No. 0069384, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
BEN M. SWIFT, Atty. Reg. No. 0065745, P.O. Box 49637, Dayton, Ohio 45449 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee
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HALL, J. -2-
{¶ 1} Ray L. Eades appeals from his conviction following a no-contest plea to two
counts of attempted aggravated murder of victims under age 13 and child endangering.1
{¶ 2} Eades advances four assignments of error. First, he alleges ineffective
assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s failure to pursue a plea of not guilty by
reason of insanity and failure to purse the withdrawal of his no-contest plea. Second, he
contends the trial court erred in accepting the no-contest plea, which he claims was not
entered knowingly or voluntarily. Third, he argues that the statutory “seriousness” and
“recidivism” factors did not support his sentence. Fourth, he asserts that the record did
not support the trial court’s imposition of partially consecutive sentences.
{¶ 3} The charges against Eades stemmed from his attempt to kill his two children,
who were ages six and eight at the time, by burning down his family’s home while the
children were asleep inside. According to a presentence investigation report, Eades was
under the influence of alcohol at the time and recently had been informed by his wife that
she wanted a divorce. In the course of entering a no-contest plea, Eades admitted the
facts contained in a bill of particulars. Those facts included, among other things, Eades
giving sleep medication to his children, barricading the home’s doors and windows,
locking interior doors, disabling the home’s smoke detectors, pouring alcohol around the
house, blocking a fire hydrant with his parked car, and lighting a grill inside the house
while his children were sleeping. Fortunately, police quickly responded to the scene,
discovered the fire, and saved the two children, who were treated for inhalation of smoke
1Eades also pled no contest to other charges that merged into the attempted aggravated murder charges at sentencing as allied offenses of similar import. -3-
and fumes. Although the children suffered no lasting physical harm, they continue to deal
with anxiety and ongoing emotional issues.
{¶ 4} The record reflects that Eades has a history of mental-health problems that
began in childhood. Following his indictment, he initially entered a plea of not guilty by
reason of insanity. The trial court ordered a mental evaluation regarding Eades’
competence to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the offenses. Following the
evaluation, an expert opined that Eades was competent to stand trial, that he was not
suffering from an acute and severe mental disease or defect at the time of the offenses,
and that he knew the wrongfulness of the acts charged.
{¶ 5} Eades later withdrew his insanity plea and entered a no-contest plea to all
charges against him. The trial court accepted the no-contest plea at the conclusion of a
June 6, 2019 hearing. Thereafter, the trial court allowed Eades to undergo another
psychological evaluation and to submit a report for mitigation purposes. The matter
proceeded to a July 17, 2019 sentencing hearing. Based on the information presented,
defense counsel sought to have sentencing delayed so Eades could pursue civil
commitment through probate court. The trial court expressed some skepticism that civil
commitment was a viable option in that context but agreed to continue sentencing to allow
the parties to address the issue. Two days later, Eades briefed the issue in a written
motion to hold sentencing in abeyance. The trial court overruled the motion, finding
nothing in Ohio law authorizing civil commitment for a defendant who has withdrawn an
insanity plea, been found competent to stand trial, and entered a no-contest plea. The
trial court then completed the sentencing hearing on August 21, 2019. At that time,
defense counsel advised the trial court that counsel had discussed a plea-withdrawal -4-
motion with Eades. The trial court took two recesses to allow Eades to think about it and
to consult with his attorney. After both recesses, Eades assured the trial court that he did
not want to withdraw his no-contest plea, and the trial court proceeded to impose
sentence. After merging several counts as allied offenses, the trial court imposed
consecutive eight-year prison sentences for the two counts of attempted aggravated
murder. The trial court imposed a concurrent 180-day term of incarceration for each of
the two counts of child endangering. The result was an aggregate 16-year prison
sentence. The trial court journalized the sentence in an August 29, 2019 judgment entry.
This appeal followed.
{¶ 6} In his first assignment of error, Eades alleges ineffective assistance of
counsel based on his attorney’s failure to pursue a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
He argues that the facts and circumstances of the case establish that an insanity plea
would have had a reasonable probability of success. In support, Eades cites evidence
establishing his diagnosis of mental illnesses beginning at age four and continuing
through his childhood. Eades acknowledges that his mental condition stabilized as an
adult and that he successfully served several years in the Marine Corps. He asserts,
however, that his wife’s leaving him and asking for a divorce triggered his dormant mental
illness, resulting in him committing the acts at issue. Under these circumstances, Eades
contends his attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to pursue an insanity
defense.
{¶ 7} Eades also alleges ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s
failing to “pursue [his] wishes to withdraw his no contest plea.” Although no plea-
withdrawal motion was filed, Eades appears to suggest that the trial court improperly -5-
dissuaded him from filing such a motion. Based on the evidence of his mental-health
history and his hesitation during the second sentencing hearing regarding whether to
stand on his no-contest plea, Eades maintains that his attorney should have moved to
withdraw the plea so he could pursue an insanity defense.
{¶ 8} To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate
both that trial counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
that the errors were serious enough to create a reasonable probability that, but for the
errors, the result of the trial or proceeding would have been different. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42
Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989).
{¶ 9} We are unpersuaded that Eades’ counsel provided deficient representation
by failing to further pursue a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. As set forth above,
counsel did assist Eades in entering such a plea. Only after Eades was evaluated by a
psychological expert and found not to have been legally insane at the time of his offenses
did Eades change his plea to no contest. Although Eades has a history of mental issues,
it does not follow that he met the definition of legal insanity when he committed the acts
at issue. In light of the expert’s opinion that Eades was not insane when he committed his
offenses, failing to continue to pursue a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity did not fall
below an objective standard of reasonableness. State v. Coleman, 2d Dist. Montgomery
No. 24955, 2014-Ohio-856, ¶ 35, citing State v. Purcell, 107 Ohio App.3d 501, 506, 669
N.E.2d 60, 64 (1st Dist.1995).
{¶ 10} We note too that Eades was evaluated and found competent to stand trial.
The plea and sentencing transcripts contains nothing to undermine the correctness of -6-
that expert opinion. During the plea hearing, Eades rationally explained to the trial court
why he wanted to withdraw his insanity plea and enter a no-contest plea. “This court has
recognized that the withdrawal of an insanity plea does not constitute ineffective
assistance where a defendant makes his own informed choice to do so.” Id., citing State
v. Sinks, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 11428, 1990 WL 80582, *5 (June 13, 1990).
Accordingly, we see no ineffective assistance of counsel due to the failure to continue to
pursue a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
{¶ 11} We reach the same conclusion with respect to defense counsel’s failure to
pursue Eades’ purported “wishes to withdraw his no contest plea.” As an initial matter,
Eades never indicated on the record that he wanted to withdraw his no-contest plea.
Recognizing the seriousness of his situation, he did express uncertainty and hesitation
about what he should do. In response, the trial court did not attempt to dissuade him from
withdrawing his plea. The trial court simply explained the implications of such a decision
and twice recessed the proceedings so Eades could consult with counsel and think about
what he wanted to do. After both recesses, Eades affirmed that he wanted to stand by his
no-contest plea. We see no basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim predicated
on counsel abiding by Eades’ wishes and failing to seek withdrawal of the plea. The first
assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 12} In his second assignment of error, Eades contends the trial court erred in
accepting a no-contest plea that was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. He claims the
plea-hearing transcript reflects his reluctance to enter a plea, his uncertainty as to what
he was doing, his “possible” distrust of his attorney, and his requests for assistance from
the trial court. Under these circumstances, Eades asserts that the record reflects a plea -7-
that was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and, therefore, that should not have been
accepted.
{¶ 13} “Due process mandates that a * * * plea be knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary,” and “[c]ompliance with Crim.R. 11(C) ensures that a plea meets this
constitutional mandate.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Thompson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
28308, 2020-Ohio-211, ¶ 5. Here Eades makes no argument that the trial court failed to
demonstrate strict compliance with the constitutional advisements in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).
Nor does he argue that the trial court failed to demonstrate substantial compliance with
the non-constitutional advisements in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b).
{¶ 14} But even when a trial court engages in a thorough Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy,
a reviewing court is permitted to consider the record to satisfy itself that, under the totality
of the circumstances, a defendant entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea.
State v. Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-Ohio-5487, 71 N.E.3d 180, ¶ 43-44. Here
Eades argues that notwithstanding a full Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy, he exhibited reluctance
and an inability to understand what was happening. Eades contends he was uncertain
what he was doing, questioned whether he could rely on his attorney, and requested
assistance from the trial court. He argues that these circumstances demonstrate the lack
of a knowing and voluntary plea.
{¶ 15} We find Eades’ argument to be unpersuasive. The record reflects that the
trial court patiently explained everything to Eades, who had completed some college and
who was employed at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base at the time of his offenses. The
plea-hearing transcript makes clear that Eades’ hesitation, questioning, and requests for
assistance were motivated by the gravity of the situation and his own recognition that he -8-
faced a “huge decision,” not by a lack of understanding of what was happening or what
he was doing. (See, e.g., Plea Hearing Tr. at 15.) He rationally explained to the trial court
that he had decided to plead no contest because he believed it was “the best way
possible” to proceed. (Id. at 45.) When Eades wanted to pause to discuss something with
counsel, the trial court stopped the proceeding and gave him ample time to do so. (Id. at
32.) Eades admitted that he had received all the time he needed to consult his attorney.
(Id. at 43.) When Eades inquired about his counsel’s performance and advice, the trial
court generally spoke in favorable terms about counsel’s reputation. But at one point the
trial court made clear that it could not “give an endorsement” of Eades’ attorney or give a
“second opinion” about defense counsel. (Id. at 14.) Ultimately, Eades informed the trial
court that he was satisfied with the representation provided by his attorney. (Id. at 41.)
Based on our review of the plea-hearing transcript, we see no support for Eades’ assertion
that he did not know what was happening or what he was doing when he entered his no-
contest plea. To the contrary, the record persuades us that Eades fully understood what
was occurring and that he entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. The second
{¶ 16} In his third assignment of error, Eades contends the “seriousness” and
“recidivism” factors in R.C. 2929.12 did not support the sentence the trial court imposed.
After listing the statutory factors, Eades argues:
Here, the trial court may not have fully considered all relevant factors
under these circumstances. All the factors indicating that Eades is not likely
to commit future crimes are present in this case. And although the offenses
were serious and could have caused harm to his children, there was no -9-
intent or malice demonstrated as Eades does not remember causing the
incident. It was very likely that Eades suffered a mental break triggered by
the event of divorce which raises many concerns as to whether a prison
sentence should have been ordered in this case verses inpatient treatment.
The overriding concern of recidivism, if any, stems from Eades’ mental
illness that had not been properly diagnosed or treated.
Therefore, the trial court failed to properly consider the seriousness
and recidivism factors in this case when it sentenced Eades to sixteen (16)
years in prison.
(Appellant’s Brief at 19-20.)
{¶ 17} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), we may vacate or modify a sentence only if we
determine by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the
sentence or that it is otherwise contrary to law. Here Eades does not dispute the
lawfulness of the individual sentences he received. They were within the authorized
statutory range, and the trial court indicated that it had considered the statutory principles
and purposes of sentencing and the statutory seriousness and recidivism factors.
(August 21, 2019 Sentencing Tr. at 21-22.) The trial court was not required to explain its
reasoning or make specific findings regarding the applicability of those factors. State v.
Tabor, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28298, 2020-Ohio-2855, ¶ 8. Therefore, Eades’
individual sentences were authorized by law. State v. Folk, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
27375, 2017-Ohio-8105, ¶ 6-7. That being so, we may vacate or modify the individual
sentences only if we find by clear and convincing evidence that the record did not support -10-
them.2 We make no such finding here.
{¶ 18} With regard to the statutory seriousness and recidivism factors, Eades
contends all of the R.C. 2929.12(E) factors indicate that he is unlikely to commit future
crimes. Those factors include the lack of juvenile delinquency adjudications, the lack of
prior criminal offenses, leading a law-abiding life for a number of years, committing the
current offense under circumstances not likely to recur, and showing genuine remorse.
Eades asserts that any concern about recidivism stems from “mental illness that had not
been properly diagnosed or treated.” (Appellant’s Brief at 19.) He also claims the record
lacks evidence that he acted with malice or the intent to harm his children.
{¶ 19} Upon review, we agree that most of the R.C. 2929.12(E) factors appear to
be favorable to Eades. He has no prior juvenile or adult record and seems to have led a
law-abiding life prior to the current offenses. Based on our review of the record, he also
seemed to express genuine remorse. As for the offenses being unlikely to recur, however,
the record does not compel a conclusion that Eades would not attempt to harm his
children again. Although he had a history of mental-health issues, the record also reflects
that he was under the influence of alcohol when he engaged in the conduct that nearly
led to the death of his children. Notably, in his own statement to the trial court, Eades
suggested that he was “not capable of saying that this will never happen again.” (July 17,
2019 Sentencing Tr. at 80.) In addition, Eades’ claim that he did not intend to harm his
children is belied by his actions leading up to the fire. Although the trial court was
cognizant of and sympathetic to Eades’ mental-health issues, it nevertheless expressed
22We will address the trial court’s imposition of partially consecutive sentences under Eades’ fourth assignment of error. -11-
a need to protect his children from future crime. (Id. at 94.) The record does not clearly
and convincingly fail to support this conclusion. We note too that under R.C. 2929.12(B)
at least one factor applied indicating that Eades’ actions were more serious than conduct
normally constituting the offense, namely the fact that his relationship with his children
facilitated the offense. In short, we are unpersuaded that the record clearly and
convincingly fails to support the imposition of eight-year prison sentences for Eades’ act
of attempting to kill his two children. In reaching this conclusion, we note that the statutory
maximum penalty for attempted aggravated murder was 11 years in prison on each count.
The third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 20} In his fourth assignment of error, Eades challenges the trial court’s
imposition of partially consecutive sentences. In particular, he contends the record fails
to support consecutive sentences on the two counts of attempted aggravated murder.
Eades recognizes that the trial court made the consecutive-sentence findings required by
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). He argues, however, that the record clearly and convincingly fails to
support some of those findings.
{¶ 21} When addressing the eight-year prison sentences for attempted aggravated
murder, the trial court made the following findings:
I had indicated that these sentences were going to be consecutive
and there are findings that I must place on the record pursuant to [R.C.]
2929.14(C)(4).
Number 1, I find that consecutive sentence [sic] is necessary to
protect the public from future crime or to punish Mr. Eades; number 2, the
consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of your -12-
conduct and to the danger the defendant poses to the public; and at least
two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses
of conduct and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so
committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the
offenses committed as part of any other courses of conduct adequately
reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
Specifically addressing that, there were two attempted murder
cases. There were two separate victims.
So I do, in fact, find that the offenses were great and unusual and no
single prison term for any of the offenses adequately reflects the
seriousness of your conduct.
(August 21, 2019 Sentencing Tr. at 25-26.)
{¶ 22} With regard to the foregoing findings, Eades’ only arguments are (1) that he
committed a “single act” and did not engage in a course of conduct and (2) that “there is
no evidence in the record that demonstrates that Eades is a danger to the public and
likely to reoffend.” For these two reasons, he argues that the record clearly and
convincingly fails to support the imposition of consecutive sentences on the counts of
attempted aggravated murder.
{¶ 23} Contrary to Eades’ first argument, the record does support the trial court’s
finding that the two attempted aggravated murder offenses “were committed as part of
one or more courses of conduct.” The course of conduct involved a multi-step plan to kill
his children. It included acquiring fire-starter logs, pouring alcohol around the house,
placing home-made “wicks” around the house, purchasing medication and giving it to his -13-
children to induce sleep, moving a barbeque grill into the bedroom, barricading doors and
windows, locking interior doors, dismantling smoke alarms, blocking the fire hydrant near
his home, and, finally, lighting an indoor fire intended to kill his children. Finally, we reject
Eades’ second argument that there is no evidence of him being a danger to the public
and likely to reoffend. As set forth above, Eades himself indicated that he was incapable
of saying he would not reoffend. Based on the information before us, the record does not
contain evidence that clearly and convincingly fails to support the trial court’s finding about
a need to protect the public from future crime. The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 24} The judgment of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
DONOVAN, J. and FROELICH, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Mathias H. Heck, Jr. Andrew T. French Ben M. Swift Hon. Richard Skelton