State v. Duncan

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: February 11, 1981
• Docket: 80-191
• Status: Published

Opinion

No. 80-191 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Respondent, VS . NORMAN B. DUNCAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Gallatin. Honorable Jack D. Shanstrom, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Larry W. Moran, Bozeman, Montana Marchiondo & Berry, Albuquerque, New Mexico Charles Berry argued, Albuquerque, New Mexico For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Mark Murphy argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Donald White, County Attorney, argued, Bozeman, Montana

Submitted: January 16, 1981 Decided: FEB 11 1981 Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of the Court. Defendant Norman Duncan appeals a denial of post- c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f by a G a l l a t i n County D i s t r i c t C o u r t . Norman Duncan was c o n v i c t e d o f d e c e p t i v e p r a c t i c e s and

the sale of unregistered securities in Gallatin County District Court, for which he received sentences of five

years and three years respectively. His c o n v i c t i o n was a f f i r m e d by t h i s C o u r t on A p r i l 1 9 , 1 9 7 9 , i n S t a t e v . Duncan

(1979)I Mont . , 593 P.2d 1 0 2 6 , 36 S t . R e p . 748. On May 23, 1 9 7 9 , Duncan moved f o r c o n t i n u a n c e o f b a i l and t h e matter was set for hearing on May 29, 1979, before the Honorable Jack D. Shanstrom. At that hearing, defendant

submitted his written petition for post-conviction relief p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 46-21-101, MCA.

On J u n e 1 8 , 1 9 7 9 , Duncan p e t i t i o n e d f o r a new j u d g e on t h e s t a t e d ground t h a t t h e " i n t e r e s t of j u s t i c e w i t h r e s p e c t t o p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n m a t t e r s , and p r o c e d u r a l d u e p r o c e s s would i n d i c a t e appointment of a judge t o hear such m a t t e r s o t h e r

than the trial judge whose decision is involved." No a f f i d a v i t was o f f e r e d by d e f e n d a n t r e p r e s e n t i n g t h a t J u d g e

S h a n s t r o m , o r t h e H o n o r a b l e W. W. Lessley, also challenged, had any p e r s o n a l b i a s o r p r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t . In

August, t h e H o n o r a b l e N a t A l l e n assumed j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e

case but withdrew his acceptance one week later on the g r o u n d t h a t t h e " c a u s e was f i l e d i n 1976 and t h a t S e c t i o n 6 o f t h e new D i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n R u l e s d o e s n o t a p p l y i n c a u s e s filed prior t o March 1, 1 9 7 7 . " Judge Shanstrom reassumed jurisdiction. On A u g u s t 31, 1979, defendant filed an affidavit concluding that he d i d not feel he could receive a fair hearing on h i s p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n relief p e t i t i o n from J u d g e

Shanstrom. On S e p t e m b e r 2 8 , 1979, Judge L e s s l e y r e q u e s t e d

t h a t t h e H o n o r a b l e Gordon B e n n e t t a s s u m e l i m i t e d j u r i s d i c -

t i o n t o hear the d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n issue. Judge Bennett held a h e a r i n g on t h e q u e s t i o n and d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e r e e x i s t e d no a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e on t h e p a r t o f J u d g e S h a n s t r o m . In his memorandum, J u d g e B e n n e t t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t , c o n t r a r y t o J u d g e Allen's position, a p e t i t i o n for post-conviction r e l i e f was

a new c i v i l action, independent of the original criminal

cause. On F e b r u a r y 1 3 , 1980, Judge Shanstrom, who had reas-

serted jurisdiction, ordered that defendant's petition be s e t for hearing i n h i s court. On F e b r u a r y 2 6 , Duncan f i l e d

a m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e J u d g e S h a n s t r o m ' s o r d e r and s u b m i t t e d a motion f o r s u b s t i t u t i o n of a new j u d g e p u r s u a n t t o t h i s Court's newly a d o p t e d r u l e on d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n o f judges. 34 S t . R e p . 26. Judge Shanstrom r u l e d a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t on both motions and heard the petition. After hearing, Judge Shanstrom denied Duncan's p e t i t i o n f o r post-conviction r e l i e f , and t h i s a p p e a l f o l l o w e d . Duncan r a i s e s n i n e i s s u e s f o r o u r r e v i e w , o n l y o n e o f which w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s o p i n i o n . Defendant argues that i t was error for Judge Shanstrom t o hear h i s post-

conviction relief petition under our rules of disqua.lifi- c a t i o n and s u b s t i t u t i o n o f j u d g e s . W agree. e

S e c t i o n 3-1-801, MCA, a d o p t e d by t h i s C o u r t under o u r rule-making authority, recites in applicable part: "Any j u d g e , o r j u s t i c e o f t h e p e a c e m u s t n o t s i t o r a c t i n any a c t i o n o r p r o c e e d i n g :

"6. When he h a s b e e n d i s q u a l i f i e d f o r c a u s e a s hereinafter described:

"Whenever a p a r t y t o a n y p r o c e e d i n g i n any c o u r t makes and f i l e s a t i m e l y and s u f f i c i e n t a f f i d a v i t t h a t a j u d g e o r j u s t i c e of t h e p e a c e , b e f o r e whom t h e m a t t e r is pending h a s a p e r s o n a l b i a s o r p r e j u d i c e e i t h e r a g a i n s t him o r i n f a v o r o f a n y adverse p a r t y , such judge o r j u s t i c e of t h e peace s h a l l p r- e d n o - r t h e r t h e r e i n , b ------- h e r oce f-u ut anot j u d g e -- r 3 u - t- c - o f t h e p e a c e s h a l l b e a s s i g n e d p-

o -s- i- e - t o h e a r s u c h d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n----- e e d i-y -t h e --- ~roc nb~ - c h i e f j u s t i c e o f t h e Supreme C o u r t , o r by a d i s - t r i c t judge, i f t h e a f f i d a v i t is a g a i n s t a jus- t i c e of t h e peace, police or municipal court judge. The a f f i d a v i t s h a l l s t a t e t h e f a c t s and the reasons for the belief t h a t bias or prejudice e x i s t s , and s h a l l be f i l e d n o t l e s s t h a n 2 0 d a y s b e f o r e t h e o r i g i n a l d a t e o f t r i a . 1 , o r good c a u s e s h a l l be shown f o r f a i l u r e t o f i l e i t w i t h i n s u c h time. I t s h a l l be a c c o m p a n i e d by a c e r t i f i c a t e o f c o u n s e l o f r e c o r d s t a t i n g t h a t i t i s made i n good f a i t h . "

W s t r i c t l y i n t e r p r e t t h i s r u l e and f i n d i t s p r o v i s i o n s e

t o be p l a i n and unambiguous. J u d g e L e s s l e y was c o m p l e t e l y w i t h o u t a u t h o r i t y t o p l a c e t h i s c a u s e under Judge B e n n e t t ' s jurisdiction. The power t o a s s i g n a d i s t r i c t j u d g e t o h e a r a motion f o r d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n is one s o l e l y g r a n t e d t o t h e

Chief J u s t i c e of t h i s Court. It is our opinion t h a t no

judge involved in this case had proper jurisdiction to proceed in this a c t i o n once t h e a f f i d a v i t a l l e g i n g a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e on t h e p a r t o f J u d g e S h a n s t r o m was f i l e d . A t that

point, the case came under the singular authority and j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h i s Court. W e remand t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r p r o c e e d i n g s c o n s i s -

t e n t with t h i s opinion. W concur: e

34-4 $,a&~ Chief J u s t i c e