[Cite as State v. Doyle, 2012-Ohio-5464.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WASHINGTON COUNTY
THE STATE OF OHIO, : : Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No: 11CA35 : v. : : DECISION AND TROY A. DOYLE, : JUDGMENT ENTRY : Defendant-Appellant. : Filed: October 29, 2012
APPEARANCES:
Eric Allen, The Law Office of Eric J. Allen, LTD, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant.
James Schneider, Washington County Prosecuting Attorney, and Alison L. Cauthorn, Washington County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Marietta, Ohio, for Appellee.
Kline, J.:
{¶1} Troy A. Doyle (hereinafter “Doyle”) appeals the judgment of the
Washington County Court of Common Pleas, which convicted him of breaking and
entering. On appeal, Doyle contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to
eleven months in prison. We disagree. Doyle’s sentence is not clearly and convincingly
contrary to law, and we find nothing arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable about
an eleven-month prison term. Accordingly, we overrule Doyle’s assignment of error and
affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, because of a clerical mistake in the trial
court’s sentencing entry, we remand this cause to the trial court under App.R. 9(E).
I. Washington App. No. 11CA35 2
{¶2} Doyle has a lengthy criminal history. And on March 31, 2011, a
Washington County Grand Jury indicted Doyle for (1) breaking and entering, a fifth-
degree felony, and (2) theft, also a fifth-degree felony. After being arraigned, Doyle was
released on his own recognizance.
{¶3} A jury trial was scheduled for June 13, 2011, but Doyle did not appear in
court that day. As a result, Doyle was charged with failure to appear, a fourth-degree
felony.
{¶4} Eventually, Doyle and the state entered into a plea agreement. Under the
agreement, Doyle pled guilty to breaking and entering, and the state dropped the
charges for theft and failure to appear. The trial court then sentenced Doyle to eleven
months in prison. In relevant part, the trial court found “the following prison factor[] to be
present: * * * Defendant violated conditions of bond in this case, in that he failed to
appear for the scheduled jury trial.” Sentencing Entry at 2.
{¶5} Doyle appeals and asserts the following assignment of error: “THE TRIAL
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY USING DISMISSED CONDUCT AGAINST
THE APPELLANT.”
II.
{¶6} In his sole assignment of error, Doyle contends that the trial court abused
its discretion by imposing an eleven-month prison term for breaking and entering.
{¶7} We use a two-step approach to review a felony sentence. “First, [we]
must examine the sentencing court’s compliance with all applicable rules and statutes in
imposing the sentence to determine whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly
contrary to law. If this first prong is satisfied, the trial court’s decision shall be reviewed Washington App. No. 11CA35 3
under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-
4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, ¶ 4.
{¶8} Initially, we find that the trial court complied with all applicable rules and
statutes. Doyle was convicted of breaking and entering, which is a non-violent felony of
the fifth degree. See R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a). However, because Doyle did not appear
for his scheduled trial date, the trial court was authorized to impose a prison term under
R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(iii). And an eleven-month prison term falls within the permissible
statutory range. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(5); State v. Stonerock, 4th Dist. No. 11CA15,
2012-Ohio-2290, ¶ 21-22. Finally, the trial court considered the general guidance
factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. See State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1,
2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 42; Kalish at ¶ 13. Specifically, the trial court noted
that it had “considered * * * the principles and purposes of sentencing pursuant to
O.R.C. sections 2929.11 through 2929.19, as to the sentence to be imposed for felony
crimes.” Sentencing Entry at 2. Accordingly, Doyle’s eleven-month sentence is not
clearly and convincingly contrary to law.
{¶9} Next, we address whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing
Doyle’s sentence. An abuse of discretion connotes more than a mere error of
judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). “In
the sentencing context, we review the trial court’s selection of the sentence within the
permissible statutory range.” State v. Smith, 4th Dist. No. 08CA6, 2009-Ohio-716, ¶ 17,
citing Kalish at ¶ 17. Sentencing courts “have full discretion to impose a prison
sentence within the statutory range and are [not] required to make findings or give their Washington App. No. 11CA35 4
reasons for imposing maximum * * * or more than the minimum sentences.” Foster at
paragraph seven of the syllabus; accord Kalish at ¶ 11. “Nevertheless, * * * courts must
still consider the general guidance factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.”
State v. Voycik, 4th Dist. Nos. 08CA33 & 08CA34, 2009-Ohio-3669, ¶ 14.
{¶10} We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Doyle’s
prison sentence. In sentencing Doyle, the trial court determined that he had “violated
conditions of bond in this case, in that he failed to appear for the scheduled jury trial.”
Sentencing Entry at 2. Doyle takes issue with this particular determination. He claims
that mentioning the failure to appear “does not seem to have any bearing on sentencing
the defendant for the admitted conduct.” Merit Brief of the Appellant at 5. We disagree.
Breaking and entering is not an offense of violence. State v. Summers, 5th Dist. No.
94-CA-0243, 1995 WL 768590, *3 (Oct. 23, 1995). And “[e]xcept as provided in [R.C.
2929.13(B)(1)(b)], if an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony of the fourth
or fifth degree that is not an offense of violence, the court shall sentence the offender to
a community control sanction of at least one year’s duration if all of the following apply: *
* *.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a). Therefore, in many circumstances, a
trial court may not impose a prison term for a fourth-or-fifth-degree felony that is not an
offense of violence. But a trial “court has discretion to impose a prison term upon an
offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony of the fourth or fifth degree that
is not an offense of violence if * * * [t]he offender violated a term of the conditions of
bond as set by the court.” R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(iii). Therefore, in sentencing Doyle,
the trial court was justified in considering his failure to appear for the scheduled jury
trial. And regarding the length of Doyle’s sentence, there is nothing arbitrary, Washington App. No. 11CA35 5
unreasonable, or unconscionable about an eleven-month prison term, especially
considering Doyle’s lengthy criminal record. See R.C. 2929.12(D)(2).
{¶11} Accordingly, we overrule Doyle’s assignment of error and affirm the
judgment of the trial court. Nevertheless, we remand this matter to the trial court under
App.R. 9(E).
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[Cite as State v. Doyle, 2012-Ohio-5464.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WASHINGTON COUNTY
THE STATE OF OHIO, : : Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No: 11CA35 : v. : : DECISION AND TROY A. DOYLE, : JUDGMENT ENTRY : Defendant-Appellant. : Filed: October 29, 2012
APPEARANCES:
Eric Allen, The Law Office of Eric J. Allen, LTD, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant.
James Schneider, Washington County Prosecuting Attorney, and Alison L. Cauthorn, Washington County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Marietta, Ohio, for Appellee.
Kline, J.:
{¶1} Troy A. Doyle (hereinafter “Doyle”) appeals the judgment of the
Washington County Court of Common Pleas, which convicted him of breaking and
entering. On appeal, Doyle contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to
eleven months in prison. We disagree. Doyle’s sentence is not clearly and convincingly
contrary to law, and we find nothing arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable about
an eleven-month prison term. Accordingly, we overrule Doyle’s assignment of error and
affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, because of a clerical mistake in the trial
court’s sentencing entry, we remand this cause to the trial court under App.R. 9(E).
I. Washington App. No. 11CA35 2
{¶2} Doyle has a lengthy criminal history. And on March 31, 2011, a
Washington County Grand Jury indicted Doyle for (1) breaking and entering, a fifth-
degree felony, and (2) theft, also a fifth-degree felony. After being arraigned, Doyle was
released on his own recognizance.
{¶3} A jury trial was scheduled for June 13, 2011, but Doyle did not appear in
court that day. As a result, Doyle was charged with failure to appear, a fourth-degree
felony.
{¶4} Eventually, Doyle and the state entered into a plea agreement. Under the
agreement, Doyle pled guilty to breaking and entering, and the state dropped the
charges for theft and failure to appear. The trial court then sentenced Doyle to eleven
months in prison. In relevant part, the trial court found “the following prison factor[] to be
present: * * * Defendant violated conditions of bond in this case, in that he failed to
appear for the scheduled jury trial.” Sentencing Entry at 2.
{¶5} Doyle appeals and asserts the following assignment of error: “THE TRIAL
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY USING DISMISSED CONDUCT AGAINST
THE APPELLANT.”
II.
{¶6} In his sole assignment of error, Doyle contends that the trial court abused
its discretion by imposing an eleven-month prison term for breaking and entering.
{¶7} We use a two-step approach to review a felony sentence. “First, [we]
must examine the sentencing court’s compliance with all applicable rules and statutes in
imposing the sentence to determine whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly
contrary to law. If this first prong is satisfied, the trial court’s decision shall be reviewed Washington App. No. 11CA35 3
under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-
4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, ¶ 4.
{¶8} Initially, we find that the trial court complied with all applicable rules and
statutes. Doyle was convicted of breaking and entering, which is a non-violent felony of
the fifth degree. See R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a). However, because Doyle did not appear
for his scheduled trial date, the trial court was authorized to impose a prison term under
R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(iii). And an eleven-month prison term falls within the permissible
statutory range. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(5); State v. Stonerock, 4th Dist. No. 11CA15,
2012-Ohio-2290, ¶ 21-22. Finally, the trial court considered the general guidance
factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. See State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1,
2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 42; Kalish at ¶ 13. Specifically, the trial court noted
that it had “considered * * * the principles and purposes of sentencing pursuant to
O.R.C. sections 2929.11 through 2929.19, as to the sentence to be imposed for felony
crimes.” Sentencing Entry at 2. Accordingly, Doyle’s eleven-month sentence is not
clearly and convincingly contrary to law.
{¶9} Next, we address whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing
Doyle’s sentence. An abuse of discretion connotes more than a mere error of
judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). “In
the sentencing context, we review the trial court’s selection of the sentence within the
permissible statutory range.” State v. Smith, 4th Dist. No. 08CA6, 2009-Ohio-716, ¶ 17,
citing Kalish at ¶ 17. Sentencing courts “have full discretion to impose a prison
sentence within the statutory range and are [not] required to make findings or give their Washington App. No. 11CA35 4
reasons for imposing maximum * * * or more than the minimum sentences.” Foster at
paragraph seven of the syllabus; accord Kalish at ¶ 11. “Nevertheless, * * * courts must
still consider the general guidance factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.”
State v. Voycik, 4th Dist. Nos. 08CA33 & 08CA34, 2009-Ohio-3669, ¶ 14.
{¶10} We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Doyle’s
prison sentence. In sentencing Doyle, the trial court determined that he had “violated
conditions of bond in this case, in that he failed to appear for the scheduled jury trial.”
Sentencing Entry at 2. Doyle takes issue with this particular determination. He claims
that mentioning the failure to appear “does not seem to have any bearing on sentencing
the defendant for the admitted conduct.” Merit Brief of the Appellant at 5. We disagree.
Breaking and entering is not an offense of violence. State v. Summers, 5th Dist. No.
94-CA-0243, 1995 WL 768590, *3 (Oct. 23, 1995). And “[e]xcept as provided in [R.C.
2929.13(B)(1)(b)], if an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony of the fourth
or fifth degree that is not an offense of violence, the court shall sentence the offender to
a community control sanction of at least one year’s duration if all of the following apply: *
* *.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a). Therefore, in many circumstances, a
trial court may not impose a prison term for a fourth-or-fifth-degree felony that is not an
offense of violence. But a trial “court has discretion to impose a prison term upon an
offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony of the fourth or fifth degree that
is not an offense of violence if * * * [t]he offender violated a term of the conditions of
bond as set by the court.” R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(iii). Therefore, in sentencing Doyle,
the trial court was justified in considering his failure to appear for the scheduled jury
trial. And regarding the length of Doyle’s sentence, there is nothing arbitrary, Washington App. No. 11CA35 5
unreasonable, or unconscionable about an eleven-month prison term, especially
considering Doyle’s lengthy criminal record. See R.C. 2929.12(D)(2).
{¶11} Accordingly, we overrule Doyle’s assignment of error and affirm the
judgment of the trial court. Nevertheless, we remand this matter to the trial court under
App.R. 9(E). The trial court’s sentencing entry contains a clerical mistake. That is,
page 4 of the sentencing entry states that Doyle pled guilty “to the crime of THEFT, a
fifth degree felony violation of O.R.C. sections 2911.13, as charged in the Indictment[.]”
But in reality, Doyle pled guilty to “[b]reaking and entering” in violation of R.C. 2911.13.
Therefore, we remand this cause to the trial court under App.R. 9(E), and we instruct
the trial court to correct the sentencing entry in accordance with Crim.R. 36.
CAUSE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS; JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Washington App. No. 11CA35 6
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that THIS CAUSE BE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS and that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED. Appellant shall pay the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Washington County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Abele, P.J. and McFarland, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion.
For the Court
BY:_____________________________ Roger L. Kline, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.