[Cite as State v. Downton, 2025-Ohio-4903.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT ALLEN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 1-25-32 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
AMBER N. DOWNTON, OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Lima Municipal Court Trial Court No. 25CRB00054
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: October 27, 2025
APPEARANCES:
William T. Cramer for Appellant
Joseph C. Snyder for Appellee Case No. 1-25-32
ZIMMERMAN, J.,
{¶1} Although originally placed on our accelerated calendar, we have elected
pursuant to Loc.R. 11(E) to issue a full opinion in lieu of a summary journal entry.
Defendant-appellant, Amber N. Downton (“Downton”), appeals the June 20, 2025
judgment entry of sentence of the Lima Municipal Court. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
{¶2} This case stems from an incident with the victim at a Walmart in
December 2024. The two previously worked together. In 2022, the victim obtained
a five-year protection order against Downton, which was served on her on
September 29, 2022. Prior to the December 2024 incident, Downton was convicted
of violating this same protection order in 2023.
{¶3} On January 10, 2025, Downton was charged with violating a protection
order in violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(2), a first-degree misdemeanor, and menacing
in violation of R.C. 2903.22(A)(1), a fourth-degree misdemeanor. Downton
appeared for arraignment on January 17, 2025 and pleaded not guilty to the
complaint.
{¶4} The case proceeded to a jury trial on June 20, 2025, and the jury found
Downton guilty of violating a protection order but not guilty of menacing. That
-2- Case No. 1-25-32
same day, the trial court sentenced Downton to 180 days in jail and assessed a $150
fine as well as court costs.
{¶5} Downton filed her notice of appeal on June 26, 2025. She raises one
assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
Appellant’s conviction for violating a protection order is against the weight of the evidence.
{¶6} In her sole assignment of error, Downton argues that her violating a
protection order conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In
particular, Downton asserts that the greater weight of the credible evidence
demonstrates that her conduct was not reckless because evidence presented at trial
reflects that the encounter was incidental, and she was merely passing by the victim
as she tried to leave the store.
Standard of Review
{¶7} Manifest “weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are
clearly different legal concepts.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389
(1997). In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, “‘weigh[] the evidence
and all reasonable inferences, consider[] the credibility of witnesses and determine[]
whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way
and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
-3- Case No. 1-25-32
reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Id. at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio
App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier
of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and
the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967).
When applying the manifest-weight standard, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where
the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court
overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Haller, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.),
quoting State v. Hunter, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.
Analysis
{¶8} Downton was convicted of violating a protection order in violation of
R.C. 2919.27(A)(2), which provides, in its relevant part, that “[n]o person shall
recklessly violate the terms of . . . [a] protection order issued pursuant to [R.C.]
2151.34, 2903.213, or 2903.214 . . . .” “A person acts recklessly when, with
heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the person’s conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is
likely to be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22(C).
{¶9} In this case, Downton argues that her conviction for violating a
protection order is against the manifest weight of the evidence. She claims the
encounter was incidental, as she did not know the victim would be at the Walmart,
-4- Case No. 1-25-32
and contends that she did not direct any comments toward the victim and was simply
trying to find her daughter to leave the store.
{¶10} Downton’s argument is unpersuasive. The protection order, served on
Downton on September 29, 2022 by Deputy Justin Hollar (“Deputy Hollar”) of the
Allen County Sheriff’s Office, requires her to stay away from the victim and her
husband and not be present within 500 feet of them. Further, the order explicitly
states that if Downton “accidentally comes in contact with protected persons in any
public or private place,” she “must depart immediately.” (Emphasis in original).
(State’s Exhibit B).
{¶11} At trial, both the victim and her husband testified that they
encountered Downton at Walmart. The victim testified that Downton, instead of
immediately departing, walked past her twice within a few feet, uttering insults. The
victim’s husband confirmed the encounters. A surveillance video depicting the
encounter was also played for the jury. Critically, the video, along with the victim’s
testimony showed that Downton’s daughter was with her during both of these
encounters, belying Downton’s argument that she was merely trying to find her
daughter to leave the store.
{¶12} Crucially, Downton herself testified that she failed to immediately
leave the store after seeing the victim. She admitted to seeing the victim for the first
time while looking at jewelry before the other two encounters. On cross-
-5- Case No. 1-25-32
examination, Downton confirmed that she did not immediately leave because she
was shopping with her daughter and did not think it was fair to her daughter to leave
empty-handed. Downton also testified that she knew the protection order was in
place. Likewise, Deputy Hollar testified that he ensures that he reads the terms of
protection orders to respondents, which supports the conclusion that Downton was
aware of the requirement to immediately depart.
{¶13} Consequently, we conclude that the weight of the evidence reflects
that Downton acted with heedless indifference to the consequences of her actions.
See State v. Diebert, 2025-Ohio-2620, ¶ 28 (6th Dist.). Indeed, by failing to
immediately depart from Walmart as required by the protection order when she
accidentally encountered the victim and her husband, Downton disregarded a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of violating the protection order and therefore acted
recklessly. See State v. Collier, 2007-Ohio-6349, ¶ 85 (2d Dist.).
{¶14} For these reasons, we conclude that the jury did not lose its way and
create such a manifest miscarriage of justice that Downton’s violating a protection
order conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Therefore, Downton’s
violating a protection order conviction is not against the manifest weight of the
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[Cite as State v. Downton, 2025-Ohio-4903.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT ALLEN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 1-25-32 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
AMBER N. DOWNTON, OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Lima Municipal Court Trial Court No. 25CRB00054
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: October 27, 2025
APPEARANCES:
William T. Cramer for Appellant
Joseph C. Snyder for Appellee Case No. 1-25-32
ZIMMERMAN, J.,
{¶1} Although originally placed on our accelerated calendar, we have elected
pursuant to Loc.R. 11(E) to issue a full opinion in lieu of a summary journal entry.
Defendant-appellant, Amber N. Downton (“Downton”), appeals the June 20, 2025
judgment entry of sentence of the Lima Municipal Court. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
{¶2} This case stems from an incident with the victim at a Walmart in
December 2024. The two previously worked together. In 2022, the victim obtained
a five-year protection order against Downton, which was served on her on
September 29, 2022. Prior to the December 2024 incident, Downton was convicted
of violating this same protection order in 2023.
{¶3} On January 10, 2025, Downton was charged with violating a protection
order in violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(2), a first-degree misdemeanor, and menacing
in violation of R.C. 2903.22(A)(1), a fourth-degree misdemeanor. Downton
appeared for arraignment on January 17, 2025 and pleaded not guilty to the
complaint.
{¶4} The case proceeded to a jury trial on June 20, 2025, and the jury found
Downton guilty of violating a protection order but not guilty of menacing. That
-2- Case No. 1-25-32
same day, the trial court sentenced Downton to 180 days in jail and assessed a $150
fine as well as court costs.
{¶5} Downton filed her notice of appeal on June 26, 2025. She raises one
assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
Appellant’s conviction for violating a protection order is against the weight of the evidence.
{¶6} In her sole assignment of error, Downton argues that her violating a
protection order conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In
particular, Downton asserts that the greater weight of the credible evidence
demonstrates that her conduct was not reckless because evidence presented at trial
reflects that the encounter was incidental, and she was merely passing by the victim
as she tried to leave the store.
Standard of Review
{¶7} Manifest “weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are
clearly different legal concepts.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389
(1997). In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, “‘weigh[] the evidence
and all reasonable inferences, consider[] the credibility of witnesses and determine[]
whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way
and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
-3- Case No. 1-25-32
reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Id. at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio
App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier
of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and
the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967).
When applying the manifest-weight standard, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where
the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court
overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Haller, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.),
quoting State v. Hunter, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.
Analysis
{¶8} Downton was convicted of violating a protection order in violation of
R.C. 2919.27(A)(2), which provides, in its relevant part, that “[n]o person shall
recklessly violate the terms of . . . [a] protection order issued pursuant to [R.C.]
2151.34, 2903.213, or 2903.214 . . . .” “A person acts recklessly when, with
heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the person’s conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is
likely to be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22(C).
{¶9} In this case, Downton argues that her conviction for violating a
protection order is against the manifest weight of the evidence. She claims the
encounter was incidental, as she did not know the victim would be at the Walmart,
-4- Case No. 1-25-32
and contends that she did not direct any comments toward the victim and was simply
trying to find her daughter to leave the store.
{¶10} Downton’s argument is unpersuasive. The protection order, served on
Downton on September 29, 2022 by Deputy Justin Hollar (“Deputy Hollar”) of the
Allen County Sheriff’s Office, requires her to stay away from the victim and her
husband and not be present within 500 feet of them. Further, the order explicitly
states that if Downton “accidentally comes in contact with protected persons in any
public or private place,” she “must depart immediately.” (Emphasis in original).
(State’s Exhibit B).
{¶11} At trial, both the victim and her husband testified that they
encountered Downton at Walmart. The victim testified that Downton, instead of
immediately departing, walked past her twice within a few feet, uttering insults. The
victim’s husband confirmed the encounters. A surveillance video depicting the
encounter was also played for the jury. Critically, the video, along with the victim’s
testimony showed that Downton’s daughter was with her during both of these
encounters, belying Downton’s argument that she was merely trying to find her
daughter to leave the store.
{¶12} Crucially, Downton herself testified that she failed to immediately
leave the store after seeing the victim. She admitted to seeing the victim for the first
time while looking at jewelry before the other two encounters. On cross-
-5- Case No. 1-25-32
examination, Downton confirmed that she did not immediately leave because she
was shopping with her daughter and did not think it was fair to her daughter to leave
empty-handed. Downton also testified that she knew the protection order was in
place. Likewise, Deputy Hollar testified that he ensures that he reads the terms of
protection orders to respondents, which supports the conclusion that Downton was
aware of the requirement to immediately depart.
{¶13} Consequently, we conclude that the weight of the evidence reflects
that Downton acted with heedless indifference to the consequences of her actions.
See State v. Diebert, 2025-Ohio-2620, ¶ 28 (6th Dist.). Indeed, by failing to
immediately depart from Walmart as required by the protection order when she
accidentally encountered the victim and her husband, Downton disregarded a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of violating the protection order and therefore acted
recklessly. See State v. Collier, 2007-Ohio-6349, ¶ 85 (2d Dist.).
{¶14} For these reasons, we conclude that the jury did not lose its way and
create such a manifest miscarriage of justice that Downton’s violating a protection
order conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Therefore, Downton’s
violating a protection order conviction is not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
{¶15} Downton’s assignment of error is overruled.
-6- Case No. 1-25-32
{¶16} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
WALDICK, P.J. and MILLER, J., concur.
-7- Case No. 1-25-32
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is
overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby
rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the
judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
Juergen A. Waldick, Judge
Mark C. Miller, Judge
DATED: /hls
-8-