[Cite as State v. Dowell, 2025-Ohio-2425.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240712 TRIAL NOS. C/24/CRB/7008/A/B Plaintiff-Appellant, :
vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY KIERSTEN DOWELL, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs. The judgments of the trial court are reversed and the cause is remanded for the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs are taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that 1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and 2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 7/9/2025 per order of the court.
By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as State v. Dowell, 2025-Ohio-2425.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240712 TRIAL NOS. C/24/CRB/7008/A/B Plaintiff-Appellant, :
vs. : OPINION KIERSTEN DOWELL, :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgments Appealed From Are: Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: July 9, 2025
Connie M. Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and John D. Hill, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and David H. Hoffmann, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellee. NESTOR, Judge.
{¶1} After police were informed that defendant-appellee Kiersten Dowell was
experiencing a mental health crisis, they intended to bring her into custody for the
purpose of transferring her to treatment, as permitted by Ohio’s civil commitment law.
However, Dowell refused to go with the officers, and eventually, they arrested her and
charged her with obstructing official business and resisting arrest. Dowell filed
motions to dismiss the complaints, highlighting the lack of any criminal penalty in
Ohio’s civil commitment law. The trial court dismissed the complaints, and the State
appeals those judgments. After reviewing relevant caselaw, we agree with the State
that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaints and remand the cause to the
trial court for further proceedings.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} In April 2024, Dowell was at her physician’s office when she expressed
suicidal ideations. Out of concern for Dowell’s safety, her physician signed an
emergency hospital admission form for Dowell to receive treatment. Before Dowell
was admitted, she left her physician’s office. Her physician then notified the police of
the circumstances. Ohio’s civil commitment law, R.C. 5122.10, permits police officers
to take an individual who “represents a substantial risk of physical harm to
[themselves] . . . into custody and . . . immediately transport the person to a hospital.”
R.C. Ch. 5122 does not include a criminal penalty for individuals subject to involuntary
civil commitment.
{¶3} Shortly after her physician notified police of the situation, an officer
spotted Dowell in her vehicle and pulled her over. The officer informed Dowell that
he would take her into custody so that she could be evaluated for her ongoing mental
health crisis. During their interaction, the officer informed her that she was not being OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
“criminally arrested.” Likely as a result of her mental state, Dowell refused to engage
with the officer and refused to exit from her vehicle. A second officer arrived on the
scene. Dowell eventually exited from her vehicle, but she still refused to go with the
officers.
{¶4} After failing to reason with Dowell, the officers attempted to put her into
handcuffs. A struggle ensued. Throughout this chaos, officers told Dowell that if she
did not comply with their attempt to take her into custody, she would be criminally
arrested for obstruction of official business. Officers successfully put one of Dowell’s
hands into the cuffs, but the trio continued to struggle, as Dowell twisted and fought
so the officers could not get her second hand into cuffs. Eventually, the officers got
Dowell into handcuffs and put her in the back of a police cruiser. The State then
charged Dowell with obstructing official business under R.C. 2921.31 and resisting
arrest under R.C. 2921.33.
{¶5} Dowell filed motions to dismiss her charges, arguing that she did not
obstruct official business and did not resist arrest because R.C. 5122.10 does not
provide a criminal penalty for refusing to submit to police custody. The trial court
granted Dowell’s motions. The State now appeals, asserting a single assignment of
error. It argues that the trial court erred in granting Dowell’s motions to dismiss.
II. Analysis
{¶6} Typically, we “review[] a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss
an indictment for abuse of discretion.” State v. Troisi, 2022-Ohio-3582, ¶ 17, citing
State v. Keenan, 2015-Ohio-2484, ¶ 7. However, “[w]e review a trial court’s legal
conclusions in ruling on a pretrial motion to dismiss criminal charges de novo.” State
v. Williams, 2023-Ohio-3526, ¶ 14 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Frasure, 2008-Ohio-
1504, ¶ 35 (11th Dist.). Thus, we review the trial court’s decision here de novo, as it
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
determined that there was no crime.
{¶7} “A motion to dismiss an indictment tests the legal sufficiency of the
indictment, regardless of the quality or quantity of the evidence that may be
introduced by either the state or the defendant.” State ex rel. Steffen v. Judges of the
Court of Appeals for the First Appellate Dist., 2010-Ohio-2430, ¶ 34, citing State v.
Certain, 2009-Ohio-148, ¶ 4. “The real inquiry concerns whether the indictment is
valid on its face, and courts have upheld a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss
when the indictment clearly alleged acts that fulfilled each element of the crime
charged.” State v. Flantoill, 2024-Ohio-5224, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.), quoting State v.
Cunningham, 2024-Ohio-2032, ¶ 53 (10th Dist.).
{¶8} A charge for obstructing official business under R.C. 2929.31 requires
the State to prove that the defendant “‘(1) performed an act; (2) without privilege; (3)
with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance of a public official of any
authorized act within the public official’s official capacity; and (4) that hampered or
impeded the performance of the public official’s duties.’” State v. Terry, 2025-Ohio-
1195, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.), quoting In re S.J., 2023-Ohio-3441, ¶ 21 (1st Dist.), quoting State
v. Brantley, 2022-Ohio-597, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.).
{¶9} Ohio appellate courts diverge as to what the legal elements of the statute
require. The Eighth District held that “obstructing official business is established
where there is both an illegal act that quickens the duty of the police officer to enforce
the law, and interference with intent to impede that enforcement.” State v. Vargas,
2012-Ohio-2768, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), citing Garfield Hts. v. Simpson, 82 Ohio App.3d 286,
291 (8th Dist. 1992), citing Warrensville Hts. v. Wason, 50 Ohio App.2d 21 (8th Dist.
1976).
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[Cite as State v. Dowell, 2025-Ohio-2425.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240712 TRIAL NOS. C/24/CRB/7008/A/B Plaintiff-Appellant, :
vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY KIERSTEN DOWELL, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs. The judgments of the trial court are reversed and the cause is remanded for the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs are taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that 1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and 2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 7/9/2025 per order of the court.
By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as State v. Dowell, 2025-Ohio-2425.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240712 TRIAL NOS. C/24/CRB/7008/A/B Plaintiff-Appellant, :
vs. : OPINION KIERSTEN DOWELL, :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgments Appealed From Are: Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: July 9, 2025
Connie M. Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and John D. Hill, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and David H. Hoffmann, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellee. NESTOR, Judge.
{¶1} After police were informed that defendant-appellee Kiersten Dowell was
experiencing a mental health crisis, they intended to bring her into custody for the
purpose of transferring her to treatment, as permitted by Ohio’s civil commitment law.
However, Dowell refused to go with the officers, and eventually, they arrested her and
charged her with obstructing official business and resisting arrest. Dowell filed
motions to dismiss the complaints, highlighting the lack of any criminal penalty in
Ohio’s civil commitment law. The trial court dismissed the complaints, and the State
appeals those judgments. After reviewing relevant caselaw, we agree with the State
that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaints and remand the cause to the
trial court for further proceedings.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} In April 2024, Dowell was at her physician’s office when she expressed
suicidal ideations. Out of concern for Dowell’s safety, her physician signed an
emergency hospital admission form for Dowell to receive treatment. Before Dowell
was admitted, she left her physician’s office. Her physician then notified the police of
the circumstances. Ohio’s civil commitment law, R.C. 5122.10, permits police officers
to take an individual who “represents a substantial risk of physical harm to
[themselves] . . . into custody and . . . immediately transport the person to a hospital.”
R.C. Ch. 5122 does not include a criminal penalty for individuals subject to involuntary
civil commitment.
{¶3} Shortly after her physician notified police of the situation, an officer
spotted Dowell in her vehicle and pulled her over. The officer informed Dowell that
he would take her into custody so that she could be evaluated for her ongoing mental
health crisis. During their interaction, the officer informed her that she was not being OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
“criminally arrested.” Likely as a result of her mental state, Dowell refused to engage
with the officer and refused to exit from her vehicle. A second officer arrived on the
scene. Dowell eventually exited from her vehicle, but she still refused to go with the
officers.
{¶4} After failing to reason with Dowell, the officers attempted to put her into
handcuffs. A struggle ensued. Throughout this chaos, officers told Dowell that if she
did not comply with their attempt to take her into custody, she would be criminally
arrested for obstruction of official business. Officers successfully put one of Dowell’s
hands into the cuffs, but the trio continued to struggle, as Dowell twisted and fought
so the officers could not get her second hand into cuffs. Eventually, the officers got
Dowell into handcuffs and put her in the back of a police cruiser. The State then
charged Dowell with obstructing official business under R.C. 2921.31 and resisting
arrest under R.C. 2921.33.
{¶5} Dowell filed motions to dismiss her charges, arguing that she did not
obstruct official business and did not resist arrest because R.C. 5122.10 does not
provide a criminal penalty for refusing to submit to police custody. The trial court
granted Dowell’s motions. The State now appeals, asserting a single assignment of
error. It argues that the trial court erred in granting Dowell’s motions to dismiss.
II. Analysis
{¶6} Typically, we “review[] a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss
an indictment for abuse of discretion.” State v. Troisi, 2022-Ohio-3582, ¶ 17, citing
State v. Keenan, 2015-Ohio-2484, ¶ 7. However, “[w]e review a trial court’s legal
conclusions in ruling on a pretrial motion to dismiss criminal charges de novo.” State
v. Williams, 2023-Ohio-3526, ¶ 14 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Frasure, 2008-Ohio-
1504, ¶ 35 (11th Dist.). Thus, we review the trial court’s decision here de novo, as it
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
determined that there was no crime.
{¶7} “A motion to dismiss an indictment tests the legal sufficiency of the
indictment, regardless of the quality or quantity of the evidence that may be
introduced by either the state or the defendant.” State ex rel. Steffen v. Judges of the
Court of Appeals for the First Appellate Dist., 2010-Ohio-2430, ¶ 34, citing State v.
Certain, 2009-Ohio-148, ¶ 4. “The real inquiry concerns whether the indictment is
valid on its face, and courts have upheld a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss
when the indictment clearly alleged acts that fulfilled each element of the crime
charged.” State v. Flantoill, 2024-Ohio-5224, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.), quoting State v.
Cunningham, 2024-Ohio-2032, ¶ 53 (10th Dist.).
{¶8} A charge for obstructing official business under R.C. 2929.31 requires
the State to prove that the defendant “‘(1) performed an act; (2) without privilege; (3)
with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance of a public official of any
authorized act within the public official’s official capacity; and (4) that hampered or
impeded the performance of the public official’s duties.’” State v. Terry, 2025-Ohio-
1195, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.), quoting In re S.J., 2023-Ohio-3441, ¶ 21 (1st Dist.), quoting State
v. Brantley, 2022-Ohio-597, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.).
{¶9} Ohio appellate courts diverge as to what the legal elements of the statute
require. The Eighth District held that “obstructing official business is established
where there is both an illegal act that quickens the duty of the police officer to enforce
the law, and interference with intent to impede that enforcement.” State v. Vargas,
2012-Ohio-2768, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), citing Garfield Hts. v. Simpson, 82 Ohio App.3d 286,
291 (8th Dist. 1992), citing Warrensville Hts. v. Wason, 50 Ohio App.2d 21 (8th Dist.
1976). However, this court rejected that approach and held that “[t]he state merely
ha[s] to prove that [the defendant’s] conduct obstructed the police from performing
5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
their official duties . . . [and] ‘the statute does not require the police to be confronted
with an illegal act at the time of interference.’” State v. Jeter, 2005-Ohio-1872, ¶ 16-
17 (1st Dist.), quoting Dayton v. Van Hoose, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5764 (2d Dist.
Dec. 8, 2000), quoting Warren v. Lucas, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2146 (11th Dist. May
19, 2000).
{¶10} Under our precedent, the act complained of just needs to be an
affirmative one, and physically resisting an arrest to avoid the placement of handcuffs
suffices as an affirmative act. Terry at ¶ 14-15, citing State v. Grice, 2009-Ohio-372,
¶ 9 (1st Dist.), and State v. Carrion, 2023-Ohio-4386, ¶ 19-20 (1st Dist.) (“An
affirmative act is an essential element of the offense of obstructing official business . .
. [and] [t]aking physical action to avoid an officer’s attempt to effectuate an arrest,
such as tucking one’s wrists to avoid the placement of handcuffs, [suffices].”).
{¶11} Here, the complaint stated that Dowell, without privilege, and with the
purpose to prevent officers from performing official acts, hampered the officers’
performance of those official acts. These allegations fulfill each element of the alleged
crime. Under the Eighth District’s approach, the complaint here may not have
survived. However, even though the statute that the officers acted pursuant to here
(R.C. 5122.10) does not provide for a criminal penalty for an individual’s refusal to
submit to officers’ requests, our precedent does not require an illegal act as a condition
to the obstruction charge. Thus, the trial court erred in dismissing the obstruction of
official business charge.
{¶12} Based on that determination, we reach the same conclusion as to
Dowell’s resisting arrest charge under R.C. 2921.33. Under R.C. 2921.33, “[n]o person,
recklessly or by force, shall resist or interfere with a lawful arrest of the person or
another.” The complaint alleged that Dowell resisted arrest by force. “‘To be a lawful
6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
arrest, the arresting officer must have probable cause or a reasonable basis to believe
that the offense for which the defendant has been arrested did, in fact, occur.’” State
v. Pitts, 2022-Ohio-4172, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.), quoting In re M.H., 2021-Ohio-1041, ¶ 25
(1st Dist.), quoting State v. Glenn, 2004-Ohio-1489, ¶ 23 (1st Dist.). Based upon our
holding regarding the obstruction charge, the arrest here was lawful. Furthermore,
the State alleged facts that fulfilled each element of the crime, and thus, the complaint
is valid on its face and did not warrant dismissal.
{¶13} While we are bound by our precedent, we can appreciate the effect of
that precedent and that this case “demonstrates how easily mentally ill people can
enter the prison system.” See State v. Galinari, 2022-Ohio-4337, ¶ 2 (Donnelly, J.,
concurring). Police officers responding to individuals in a mental health crisis are
faced with circumstances sometimes beyond their training and expertise. The result
in this case underlines both the drastic nature of Ohio’s civil commitment law and the
need to mitigate collateral consequences for people experiencing a mental health
crisis.
{¶14} Nevertheless, we sustain the State’s sole assignment of error, as it was
improper for the trial court to dispose of the complaints by granting Dowell’s motions
to dismiss.
III. Conclusion
{¶15} Based on the foregoing analysis, we sustain the State’s assignment of
error, reverse the trial court’s judgments, and remand the cause for further
proceedings.
Judgments reversed and cause remanded.
CROUSE, P.J., and MOORE, J., concur.