State v. Dorsey

2025 Ohio 2977

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Dorsey, 2025-Ohio-2977.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 31149

Appellee

v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE TYMICA DORSEY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO Appellant CASE No. CR 2023-02-0437

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: August 20, 2025

HENSAL, Judge.

{¶1} Tymica Dorsey appeals her convictions by the Summit County Court of Common

Pleas. This Court affirms.

I.

{¶2} When C.S. changed jobs in May 2022, she was required to transfer money from

her 401(K) with her previous employer to her new employer using a physical check. She received

a check in the amount of $13,048.86 with the administrator of the new 401(K) preprinted as the

payee. Following the instructions provided to her, C.S. mailed the unendorsed check to the payee

at a mailbox in Akron. She later received a letter that indicated the payee had not received the

check. When C.S. followed up with the company that issued the check, she learned that the front

of the check had been modified to include Ms. Dorsey’s name and address beneath the payee’s

name and had been endorsed for deposit to a Chase Bank account on June 8, 2022. 2

{¶3} In May 2022, J.G. mailed a number of checks as part of her responsibility to manage

accounts payable for her employer, Akron Auto Auctions. Shortly thereafter, a few of the checks

were flagged as fraudulent transactions by the bank that she used. One such check, in the amount

of $30,223.46, was originally payable to a software vender called Auction Edge. When she

obtained a copy of the cashed check, she noted that the payee had been modified and Ms. Dorsey’s

name was now typed on the face of the check. The check was endorsed for deposit into a Chase

Bank account on May 27, 2022.

{¶4} C.S. contacted law enforcement in October 2022, and in the course of reviewing

Ms. Dorsey’s bank records, a detective also noticed the deposit from Akron Auto Auction. Ms.

Dorsey was charged with grand theft, forgery, and receiving stolen property in connection with

each incident. Following a bench trial, the trial court found Ms. Dorsey guilty of each charge and

sentenced her to concurrent twenty-four-month periods of community control for each count. The

trial court also ordered her to pay restitution to C.S. in the amount of $1,143.73. Ms. Dorsey

appealed, raising three assignments of error for this Court’s review.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH ON THE RECORD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CHARGES LEVIED AGAINST [MS.] DORSEY

{¶5} Ms. Dorsey’s first assignment of error is that her convictions are not supported by

sufficient evidence. This Court does not agree.

{¶6} “Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law that

this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Williams, 2009-Ohio-6955, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.), citing State v.

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). The relevant inquiry is whether the prosecution has 3

met its burden of production by presenting sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. Thompkins

at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). For purposes of a sufficiency analysis, this Court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

We do not evaluate credibility, and we make all reasonable inferences in favor of the State. State

v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273 (1991). The evidence is sufficient if it allows the trier of fact to

reasonably conclude that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable

doubt. Id.

{¶7} Revised Code Section 2913.02(A)(3), which prohibits theft, provides that “[n]o

person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property or services, shall knowingly obtain or exert

control over either the property or services . . . [b]y deception.” When the amount in question is

more than $7,500 but less than $150,000, a violation of Section 2913.02(A) is grand theft, a fourth-

degree felony. R.C. 2913.02(B)(2). Forgery is prohibited by Section 2913.31, which provides

that “[n]o person, with purpose to defraud, or knowing that the person is facilitating a fraud, shall

. . . [u]tter, or possess with purpose to utter, any writing that the person knows to have been forged.”

R.C. 2913.31(A)(3). Section 2913.51(A) prohibits any person from receiving, retaining, or

disposing of the property of another “knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the

property has been obtained through commission of a theft offense.”

{¶8} Ms. Dorsey argues that the evidence supporting her conviction was insufficient

because her own evidence demonstrated that she had an alibi. The presence of a purported alibi,

however, goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its sufficiency. See State v. Wilkerson,

2025-Ohio-1279, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.). See also State v. Brown, 2011-Ohio-1040, ¶ 4 (9th Dist.). Ms.

Dorsey also maintains that the State did not produce sufficient evidence that she committed grand

theft, forgery, or receiving stolen property because the State did not produce direct evidence in the 4

form of video from the banks where the checks were deposited or testimony from a witness

describing how she obtained, altered, and deposited the checks. It is well-established, however,

that as with any element of an offense, identity may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence,

which do not differ with respect to probative value. See State v. Flynn, 2007-Ohio-6210, ¶ 12 (9th

Dist.). See also State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 485 (2001), citing Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259,

at paragraph one of the syllabus.

{¶9} The State demonstrated that the checks mailed by C.S. and J.G. were altered so that

Ms. Dorsey’s name was listed as the payee. The checks were deposited inside two different

branches of Ms. Dorsey’s bank to her existing account, and no attempt was made to immediately

withdraw the funds. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the trial court

could reasonably conclude that Ms. Dorsey was guilty of grand theft, forgery, and receiving stolen

property. Ms. Dorsey’s first assignment of error is overruled.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

DORSEY’S CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (CLAUSE XIV, SECTION 1, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION).

{¶10} Ms. Dorsey’s second assignment of error argues that her convictions are against the

manifest weight of the evidence. This Court does not agree.

{¶11} When considering whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the

evidence, this Court must:

review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. 5

State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist. 1986). A reversal on this basis is reserved for

the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Id., citing State

v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). As explained above, identity may be proved

by direct or circumstantial evidence. See Flynn, at ¶ 12; Treesh at 485.

{¶12} C.S. testified that when she received copies of the missing check, it had been

modified so that it was payable to Ms. Dorsey. Similarly, J.G. testified that both the front and

back of the missing check issued by Akron Auto Auctions had been modified: the front was

payable to Ms. Dorsey, and the back was missing the company’s logo. Neither woman knew Ms.

Dorsey, and they had no familiarity with her name before they learned that the checks had been

modified. Both checks were admitted into evidence. On each, Ms. Dorsey’s name had been

inserted as the payee on the front of the check, and her Chase Bank account number appeared on

the back beneath an illegible signature.

{¶13} Detective Russell Bassett, who investigated the incidents, explained that it is

common for images of stolen checks to be shared or sold. He explained that the images look

legitimate, and people are able to cash them on that basis. In this case, he explained that the check

from Akron Auto Auctions was deposited into Ms. Dorsey’s bank account in person inside a Chase

Bank branch in Mayfield Heights on May 27, 2022. The check mailed by C.S. was deposited into

the same bank account in person inside a Chase Bank branch in Euclid on June 8, 2022. Detective

Russell testified that after the check from Akron Auto Auctions was deposited into Ms. Dorsey’s

account, a series of purchases followed. After the transaction was marked as fraudulent and the

funds were recovered, Ms. Dorsey’s account ran a negative balance until the check mailed by C.S.

was deposited on June 8, 2022. Detective Russell explained that because the checks were

deposited without a withdrawal, it is probable that no identification was required from the 6

depositor. He also testified that he became aware of the incident after the bank’s window for

retaining surveillance video had closed, so there was no video of the transactions available.

{¶14} Ms. Dorsey testified that she had no knowledge of the checks until she called her

bank to inquire about a deposit that she could not access. At that point, she learned that her account

was locked because of fraudulent activity. Ms. Dorsey testified that she did not modify the checks

and did not ask anyone to do it for her. According to her testimony, she was driving for Uber on

June 8, 2022, and she presented a series of screen shots from a cellular phone in an attempt to

demonstrate that she could not have deposited a check in Euclid on that date. Although those

screen shots do appear to document a series of Uber rides, they do not contain any identifying

information that could connect them to Ms. Dorsey. She testified that she was not driving for Uber

on May 27, 2022, and she did not remember what she did that day. Ms. Dorsey acknowledged

that her testimony suggested that an unknown person modified the checks and deposited them in

her account without her knowledge, but she could not offer any further explanation. She also

acknowledged that her account was overdrawn between the dates when the two checks were

deposited.

{¶15} In reaching its verdict, the trial court chose not to credit Ms. Dorsey’s testimony

that she had no knowledge of the deposits into her account. This Court must “‘consider[] the

credibility of witnesses’” as part of our manifest weight review. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387,

quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175. Nonetheless, this Court is mindful of the well-established

principle that a trier of fact enjoys the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses. State v.

Rivera, 2019-Ohio-62, ¶ 39 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Johnson, 2010-Ohio-3296, ¶ 15 (9th

Dist.). Given the evidence in this case, this Court cannot conclude that Ms. Dorsey’s convictions

are against the manifest weight of the evidence, and her second assignment of error is overruled. 7

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY SECTION 10, ARTICLE 1, OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION AND THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

{¶16} In her third assignment of error, Ms. Dorsey has argued that she received ineffective

assistance from her attorney. Specifically, she maintains that she “had limited contact with trial

counsel, [w]as not i[n]formed, and was not kept abreast of the legal issues by counsel.”

{¶17} In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant most show

(1) deficiency in the performance of counsel “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the

‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment” and (2) that the errors made by

counsel were “so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial[.]” Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A defendant must demonstrate prejudice by showing that, but for

counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable possibility that the outcome of the trial would have been

different. Id. at 694. “A defendant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a

court’s need to consider the other.” State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389 (2000), citing

Strickland at 697.

{¶18} Ms. Dorsey has not developed any argument explaining why, in the absence of the

alleged deficiencies of trial counsel, the result of the proceeding would have been different. This

Court declines to construct such an argument on her behalf. See State v. Smith, 2017-Ohio-8680,

¶ 15 (9th Dist.), citing Cardone v. Cardone, 1998 WL 224934, *8-9 (9th Dist. May 6, 1998). Ms.

Dorsey’s third assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.

III.

{¶19} Ms. Dorsey’s three assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the

Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 8

Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellant.

JENNIFER HENSAL FOR THE COURT

STEVENSON, P. J. SUTTON, J. CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

WESLEY A. JOHNSTON, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN R. DIMARTINO, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.