State v. Dornoff

2018 Ohio 3084, 105 N.E.3d 1278
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedAugust 3, 2018
DocketWD-16-072
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 2018 Ohio 3084 (State v. Dornoff) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Dornoff, 2018 Ohio 3084, 105 N.E.3d 1278 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

SINGER, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Steven H. Dornoff, Jr., appeals the September 14, 2016 judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, where he was sentenced to 15 years of incarceration, following acceptance of his negotiated guilty plea agreement. For the reasons which follow, we vacate and remand.

{¶ 2} Appellant sets forth the following assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred to the prejudice of appellant in accepting a guilty plea, which was not made knowingly, in violation of appellant's due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution.
2. The trial court erred to the prejudice of appellant by denying his motion to withdraw his plea.

Background

{¶ 3} On September 3, 2015, appellant was charged in a six-count indictment with three counts of rape with firearm specifications, one count of felonious assault with a sexual motivation specification, one count of felonious assault with firearm and sexual motivation specifications and one count of kidnapping with a sexual motivation specification. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The charges stem from an incident which occurred on August 29, 2015, when appellant drove a woman to a cemetery, allegedly threatened her and struck her on the head with a rifle, then raped her.

{¶ 4} On September 7, 2016, a jury trial commenced. The trial concluded on September 8, 2016, when the court became aware that appellant agreed to enter a plea. On September 12, 2016, appellant entered a guilty plea to one count of rape with a firearm specification, one count of felonious assault with a sexual motivation specification and one count of kidnapping with a sexual motivation specification. On the document entitled "Plea of Guilty to Amended Indictment and Waiver of Trial by Jury," it provided in relevant part that "[t]he defendant is also aware that he will be required to register as a Tier 2 and Tier 3 Sexual Offender."

{¶ 5} Sentencing proceeded immediately after the plea was accepted. Appellant was sentenced to 11 years in prison on the rape count, 4 years in prison on the felonious assault count and 11 years in prison on the kidnapping count. The rape and the kidnapping counts were ordered to be served concurrently, for an aggregate sentence of 15 years of incarceration. The remaining counts of the indictment were dismissed. The court filed its judgment entry on September 14, 2016.

{¶ 6} On September 30, 2016, appellant filed with the trial court a pro se motion to withdraw his plea. The court denied the motion on October 3, 2016. Appellant filed another motion to withdraw his plea with the trial court, on November 3, 2016. This second motion was also denied by the court.

{¶ 7} On December 28, 2016, appellant filed with this court a motion for leave to file a delayed appeal; we found appellant's motion well-taken. Appellant then filed his appeal.

Assignment of Error No. 1

{¶ 8} Appellant argues his plea was not knowingly or voluntarily offered as the trial court did not discuss registration duties, community notification requirements, duration or penalties associated with being classified as a Tier III sexual offender prior to accepting his guilty plea. In addition, appellant contends his plea document did not provide specific information pertaining to Tier III registration requirements. Appellant submits the court's failure to inform him of Tier III registration requirements should be viewed as a complete failure to comply and his plea must be vacated without a showing of prejudice.

Law

Crim.R. 11

{¶ 9} Crim.R. 11(C) governs guilty and no contest pleas in felony cases.

Before a trial court may accept a guilty plea, it must address the defendant personally and inform him of, and ensure that he understands, "the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved" and the "effect of the plea of guilty." Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b). The underlying purpose of Crim.R. 11(C) is to ensure that the information a defendant needs to make a voluntary and intelligent decision about pleading guilty is conveyed to him. State v. Ballard , 66 Ohio St.2d 473 , 479-480, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981).

{¶ 10} "If a trial court fails to literally comply with Crim.R. 11, reviewing courts must engage in a multitiered analysis to determine whether the trial judge failed to explain the defendant's constitutional or nonconstitutional rights and, if there was a failure, to determine the significance of the failure and the appropriate remedy." State v. Clark , 119 Ohio St.3d 239 , 2008-Ohio-3748 , 893 N.E.2d 462 , ¶ 30.

{¶ 11} If the trial court fails to strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C) when explaining the defendant's constitutional rights, the guilty or no contest plea is invalid "under a presumption that it was entered involuntarily and unknowingly." (Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 31. Although the court need not use the exact language in the rule, it must explain the defendant's constitutional rights "in a manner which is reasonably intelligent to the defendant." State v. Rinehart , 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-11-030, 2013-Ohio-3372 , 2013 WL 3968747 , ¶ 17.

{¶ 12} A less stringent, substantial-compliance rule applies if the trial judge imperfectly explains a defendant's nonconstitutional rights, such as the maximum possible penalty and the effect of the plea. Clark at ¶ 31. "Under this standard, a slight deviation from the text of the rule is permissible; so long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that 'the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving,' the plea may be upheld." Id. , quoting State v. Nero , 56 Ohio St.3d 106 , 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990).

{¶ 13} Where the trial judge does not substantially comply with Crim.R.

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Related

State v. McFadden
2021 Ohio 2204 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2021)
State v. Montgomery
2020 Ohio 5552 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2020)
State v. Dornoff
2020 Ohio 3909 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2020)
State v. Dornoff (Slip Opinion)
2020 Ohio 3022 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2020)
State v. White
2020 Ohio 219 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2020)
State v. Anderson
2019 Ohio 1915 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2019)
State v. Hagan
2019 Ohio 1047 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2019)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2018 Ohio 3084, 105 N.E.3d 1278, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-dornoff-ohioctapp-2018.