State v. Dodson

2014 Ohio 4197

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Dodson, 2014-Ohio-4197.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 98521

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE vs.

JEFFREY DODSON

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT: APPLICATION DENIED

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-11-555731 Application for Reopening Motion No. 476756

RELEASE DATE: September 23, 2014 FOR APPELLANT

Jeffrey Dodson, pro se Inmate No. 623-109 Belmont Correctional Institution P.O. Box 540 St. Clairsville, Ohio 43950

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy J. McGinty Cuyahoga County Prosecutor

BY: Jesse W. Canonico Brett Hammond Assistant County Prosecutors The Justice Center, 8th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113

LARRY A. JONES, SR., J.: {¶1} Jeffrey Dodson has filed an application for reopening pursuant to App.R.

26(B). Dodson is attempting to reopen the appellate judgment, rendered in State v.

Dodson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98521, 2013-Ohio-1344, that affirmed the sentence of

incarceration in part, imposed in State v. Dodson, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-11-555731,

vacated the sentence in part, and remanded for resentencing. We decline to reopen

Dodson’s appeal.

{¶2} App.R. 26(B)(2)(b) requires that Dodson establish “a showing of good cause

for untimely filing if the application is filed more than 90 days after journalization of the

appellate judgment,” which is subject to reopening. The Supreme Court of Ohio, with

regard to the 90-day deadline as provided by App.R. 26(B)(2)(b), has established that:

We now reject [the applicant’s] claims that those excuses gave good cause to miss the 90-day deadline in App.R. 26(B).* * * Consistent enforcement of the rule’s deadline by the appellate courts in Ohio protects on the one hand the state’s legitimate interest in the finality of its judgments and ensures on the other hand that any claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are promptly examined and resolved.

Ohio and other states “may erect reasonable procedural requirements for triggering the right to an adjudication,” Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. (1982), 455 U.S. 422, 437, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265, and that is what Ohio has done by creating a 90- day deadline for the filing of applications to reopen. * * * The 90-day requirement in the rule is applicable to all appellants, State v. Winstead (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 277, 278, 658 N.E.2d 722, and [the applicant] offers no sound reason why he — unlike so many other Ohio criminal defendants — could not comply with that fundamental aspect of the rule. (Emphasis added.) State v. Gumm, 103 Ohio St.3d 162, 2004-Ohio-4755, 814 N.E.2d 861, at ¶ 7. See also, State v. Lamar, 102 Ohio St.3d 467, 2004-Ohio-3976, 812 N.E.2d 970; State v. Cooey, 73 Ohio St.3d 411, 1995-Ohio-328, 653 N.E.2d 252; State v. Reddick, 72 Ohio St.3d 88, 1995-Ohio-248, 647 N.E.2d 784.

See also State v. LaMar, 102 Ohio St.3d 467, 2004-Ohio-3976, 812 N.E.2d 970; State v. Cooey, 73 Ohio St.3d 411, 1995-Ohio-328, 653 N.E.2d 252; State v. Reddick, 72 Ohio

St.3d 88, 1995-Ohio-249, 647 N.E.2d 784.

{¶3} Herein, Dodson is attempting to reopen the appellate judgment that was

journalized on April 4, 2013. The application for reopening was not filed until July 16,

2014, more than 90 days after journalization of the appellate judgment in State v. Dodson,

supra.

{¶4} Dodson argues that because “[he] is pro se and is not an attorney and it can be

seen that on that basis the error in not filing the App.R. 26(B) petition in a timely manner

is a genuine misunderstanding of the procedural requirements,” “good cause” exists for

the untimely filing of his application for reopening. This court has long held that lack of

legal counsel, when attempting to file an App.R. 26(B) application for reopening, does

not establish “good cause” for filing beyond the ninety day limitation. State v. Hornack,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81021, 2005-Ohio-5843. See also State v. Lamar, supra.

Difficulty in conducting legal research or limited access to legal materials does not

establish “good cause” for the untimely filing of an application for reopening. State v.

Houston, 73 Ohio St.3d 346, 1995-Ohio-317, 652 N.E.2d 1018; State v. Kinder, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 94722, 2012-Ohio-1339; State v. Lawson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84402,

2006-Ohio-3939. Finally, a lack of legal training, effort or imagination, and ignorance

of the law do not establish “good cause” for failure to seek timely relief pursuant to

App.R. 26(B). State v. Farrow, 115 Ohio St.3d 205, 2007-Ohio-4792, 874 N.E.2d 526,

citing State v. Winstead, 74 Ohio St.3d 277, 1996-Ohio-52, 658 N.E.2d 722. Herein,

Dodson has failed to establish “a showing of good cause” for the untimely filing of his application for reopening, premised upon lack of legal counsel, lack of legal training,

ignorance of the law, and limited access to legal materials.

{¶5} Accordingly, the application for reopening is denied.

LARRY A. JONES, SR., JUDGE

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR