State v. Dod

2025 Ohio 1723
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 14, 2025
DocketC-240647
StatusPublished

This text of 2025 Ohio 1723 (State v. Dod) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Dod, 2025 Ohio 1723 (Ohio Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Dod, 2025-Ohio-1723.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240647 TRIAL NO. B-2203417 Plaintiff-Appellee, :

vs. :

JOHN DOD, : JUDGMENT ENTRY Defendant-Appellant. :

This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs. The appeal is dismissed for the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs are taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that 1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and 2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.

To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 5/14/2025 per order of the court.

By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as State v. Dod, 2025-Ohio-1723.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240647 TRIAL NO. B-2203417 Plaintiff-Appellee, :

JOHN DOD, : OPINION

Defendant-Appellant. :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Appeal Dismissed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: May 14, 2025

Connie M. Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Norbert Wessels, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Schuh & Goldberg, LLP, and Brian T. Goldberg, for Defendant-Appellant. ZAYAS, Judge.

{¶1} John Dod appeals from the trial court’s judgment continuing him on

community control after a probation violation. Dod contends that the trial court’s

notification that any future violations may result in an aggregate prison term of four

years violated his due-process rights.

Factual Background

{¶2} In March 2023, John Dod pled guilty to one count of violating a

protection order, a fifth-degree felony, and one count of burglary, a third-degree

felony. The trial court sentenced Dod to three years of intensive supervision probation

and notified him that if he violated community control, the court would impose a

sentence of 12 months on the protection-order violation, and 36 months on the

burglary, to be served consecutively for an aggregate term of 48 months.

{¶3} After a second community-control violation, the court continued Dod

on community control and ordered him to complete a program at River City. The court

notified him that if he violated community control, the court would impose a sentence

of 12 months.

{¶4} A few days later, another community-control violation was filed after

Dod was unsuccessfully discharged from River City. Again, the court continued his

community control and ordered him to complete the Talbert House long-term

program. Dod was notified that the court would impose a sentence of 12 months on

the protection-order violation, and 36 months on the burglary, to be served

consecutively, for any future violations.

{¶5} Dod appeared before the court a few weeks later requesting placement

in another program that would allow him to work and visit his children while enrolled

in the program. See State v. Dod, 2024-Ohio-4807, ¶ 5 (1st Dist.). The court suggested OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

that he pursue Veteran’s Court. Id. The court treated his rejection of the Talbert

House placement as a community-control violation, but the court never informed Dod

of the violation or made a finding that Dod violated his community control. Id. at ¶

12.

{¶6} A few weeks later, after determining that Dod was ineligible for

Veteran’s Court, the court sentenced him to prison for an aggregate term of 36

months. Id. at ¶ 6. Dod appealed, and this court reversed the trial court’s judgment

and vacated the sentence, holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to modify the

sentence. See id. at ¶ 11-13.

{¶7} On remand, the trial court continued Dod on community control and

ordered him to complete the River City program. The court informed him that if he

failed to successfully complete the program, violated any law, or left the state without

permission, he would be in violation of his community control. The court warned Dod

that it would impose a prison sentence for any future violation consisting of 12 months

on the protection-order conviction, to be served consecutively to a 36-month term on

the burglary conviction, for an aggregate term of 48 months.

{¶8} Dod appeals arguing that the court violated his due-process rights by

imposing a longer potential sentence for any future violations than the 36-month

prison term it had previously imposed for a community-control violation. Dod

contends that after his sentence was vacated by this court, the trial court vindictively

notified him that a future violation could result in an aggregate 48-month prison term.

{¶9} As a preliminary matter, this court must first determine whether this

issue is ripe for review. This court and several appellate courts have held that a

potential future sentence for a community-control violation is not ripe for review until

a prison term is imposed. See State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-6339, ¶ 4-6 (1st Dist.); State

4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

v. Poppe, 2007-Ohio-688, ¶ 14 (3d Dist.) (“an appeal of a reserved sentence of

imprisonment that is part of a sentence of community control is not ripe until an actual

sentencing order imposes the prison term for community control violation”); State v.

Daniel, 2015-Ohio-3826, ¶ 9 (11th Dist.), citing Poppe at ¶ 14 (“Ohio appellate courts

have consistently held that ‘an appeal of a reserved sentence of imprisonment that is

part of a sentence of community control is not ripe until an actual sentencing order

imposes the prison term for community control violation.’”; State v. Wilson, 2006-

Ohio-3541, ¶ 8 (5th Dist.) (“this Court has held that appeals challenging potential

periods of incarceration for violation of community control sanctions are not ripe until

an actual sentencing order imposes a prison term for such violation”); State v.

Williams, 2014-Ohio-725, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.) (“when a trial court imposes a sentence of

community control with a reserve prison sentence, an appeal of the prison sentence

does not become ripe until after a defendant actually violates community control”);

State v. Ellis, 2003-Ohio-2243, ¶ 12-15 (4th Dist.) (party lacks authority to appeal

sentence that may be imposed for a future community-control violation “because the

issues or claims she raises are not yet justiciable”); State v. Ogle, 2002-Ohio-860, *12

(6th Dist.) (“This court concludes that the issue raised by appellant is not yet ripe for

review, as appellant has not yet been found to have violated his community control

sanctions.”).

{¶10} Accordingly, Dod’s claim is not ripe for review until after Dod violates

his community control and a prison term is imposed, and we must dismiss the appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

KINSLEY, P.J., and MOORE, J., concur.

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Related

State v. Williams
2014 Ohio 725 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2014)
State v. Daniel
2015 Ohio 3826 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2015)
State v. Poppe, Unpublished Decision (2-20-2007)
2007 Ohio 688 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2007)
State v. Wilson, C-061000 (11-30-2007)
2007 Ohio 6339 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2007)
State v. Dod
2024 Ohio 4807 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2024)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2025 Ohio 1723, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-dod-ohioctapp-2025.