[Cite as State v. D.L.L., 2025-Ohio-4956.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115025 v. :
D.L.L., :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: VACATED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 30, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-96-338340-ZA
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney and Tyler W. Blair, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Michael V. Wilhelm, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:
Defendant-appellant D.L.L., appeals the trial court’s denial of his
application for expungement. The State agrees that the trial court erred in finding
that D.L.L.’s offenses were not eligible for expungement. Upon review, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
I. Facts and Procedural History
In July 1996, D.L.L. entered guilty pleas for two fourth-degree
felonies: (1) failure to comply with an order or signal of a peace officer, with
specifications, in violation of R.C. 2921.331, and (2) receiving stolen property, that
being a motor vehicle, in violation of R.C. 2913.51. In December 2024, D.L.L. filed
an application for expungement. The trial court ordered an expungement
investigation report and set the matter for a hearing. The State filed a responsive
brief, advising that it did not oppose the application, D.L.L.’s offenses were eligible
for expungement, and it waived its right to a hearing.
In April 2025, the trial court held several expungement and record-
sealing hearings. The trial court advised that D.L.L.’s two fourth-degree-felony
convictions were not eligible for expungement since he had two third-degree-felony
convictions along with “numerous other felony and misdemeanor convictions.” The
trial court explained that “people have been trying to essentially get around [the
expungement statute] and apply for expungement on lower felonies so that they can
become eligible for the felonies of the third degree. But the problem is that that’s
kind of like backdooring it and . . . essentially forum shop[ping] and trick[ing] the
[c]ourt.” The trial court stated that it denied expungement applications employing
such tactics because “that’s not what the legislature . . . intended” and it would not
“engage in that type of subversion” of the statute. While defense counsel offered arguments in response to the trial court’s contentions, D.L.L. was not afforded the
opportunity to present any information regarding his expungement eligibility. Nor
was the State involved in the limited proceedings. The trial court subsequently
denied D.L.L.’s expungement application, finding that the “petitioner [wa]s not
eligible.”
D.L.L. appeals, raising a single assignment of error for review.
Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in finding that [D.L.L.] was not eligible for an expungement.
II. Law and Analysis
In his sole assignment of error, D.L.L. challenges the trial court’s
finding that he was not an eligible offender for the purpose of expunging his two
fourth-degree-felony convictions. D.L.L. argues that the decision does not follow
the text of Ohio’s expungement law or the legislature’s campaign to expand
expungement eligibility. D.L.L. asserts that “[t]he trial court’s issue with D.L.[L.] is
not his two [fourth-degree-felony] convictions, but rather two [third-degree-felony]
convictions that were not before the court.” The State agrees, conceding that the
trial court erred when it “made an unsupported interpretation of the plain language
of an unambiguous statute.”
Whether an applicant is considered an eligible offender under
R.C. 2953.32 is an issue of law and therefore, analyzed under a de novo standard of
review. State. v. J.P., 2025-Ohio-2597, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), citing State v. M.E., 2018- Ohio-4715, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.), citing State v. M.R., 2010-Ohio-6025, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.),
citing State v. Futrall, 2009-Ohio-5590, ¶ 6. “Reviewing eligibility under a de novo
standard means we independently analyze the record while giving no deference to
the trial court’s decision.” Id. at ¶ 16. Matters of statutory construction also present
questions of law and are reviewed de novo. State v. J.B., 2025-Ohio-3143, ¶ 14 (8th
Dist.).
In reviewing D.L.L.’s December 2024 application for expungement
under R.C. 2953.32, we reference the version of the statute that was in effect at the
time of the application’s filing — in this case, the version effective from
October 3, 2023, to March 19, 2025 (“Former R.C. 2953.32”). State v. Lasalle,
2002-Ohio-4009, ¶ 19. Former, subsequent, and current R.C. 2953.32(B)(1)
establish that, under certain circumstances, “an eligible offender may apply to the
sentencing court . . . for the sealing or expungement of the record of the case that
pertains to the conviction, except for convictions listed in [R.C. 2953.32(A)(1)].”
Former R.C. 2953.32(A)(1) provides:
(A)(1) Sections 2953.32 to 2953.34 of the Revised Code do not apply to any of the following:
(a) Convictions under Chapter 4506., 4507., 4510., 4511., or 4549., of the Revised Code, or a conviction for a violation of a municipal ordinance that is substantially similar to any section contained in any of those chapters;
(b) Convictions of a felony offense of violence that is not a sexually oriented offense; (c) Convictions of a sexually oriented offense when the offender is subject to the requirements of Chapter 2950 of the Revised Code or Chapter 2950 of the Revised Code as it existed prior to January 1, 2008;
(d) Convictions of an offense in circumstances in which the victim of the offense was less than thirteen years of age, except for convictions under section 2919.21 of the Revised Code;
(e) Convictions of a felony of the first or second degree;
(f) Except as provided in division (A)(2) of this section, convictions for a violation of section 2919.25 or 2919.27 of the Revised Code or a conviction for a violation of a municipal ordinance that is substantially similar to either section;
(g) Convictions of a felony of the third degree if the offender has more than one other conviction of any felony or, if the person has exactly two convictions of a felony of the third degree, has more convictions in total than those two third[-]degree[-]felony convictions and two misdemeanor convictions.[1]
Having identified the relevant statute, we now turn to the rules of
statutory construction. “The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain
and give effect to the legislature’s intent, as expressed in the plain meaning of the
statutory language.” (Cleaned up.) J.B. at ¶ 17. When “‘statutory language is plain
and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, we must rely on what
the General Assembly has said’” and, as a general rule, apply the statute as written
without further interpretation. State v. K.O., 2024-Ohio-2582, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.),
quoting Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., 2003-Ohio-1099, ¶ 12; J.B. at ¶ 17, citing
Sumlin at ¶ 19.
1 We note that both parties reference R.C. 2953.32(A)(1)(h) in their appellate
briefs. R.C.
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[Cite as State v. D.L.L., 2025-Ohio-4956.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115025 v. :
D.L.L., :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: VACATED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 30, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-96-338340-ZA
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney and Tyler W. Blair, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Michael V. Wilhelm, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:
Defendant-appellant D.L.L., appeals the trial court’s denial of his
application for expungement. The State agrees that the trial court erred in finding
that D.L.L.’s offenses were not eligible for expungement. Upon review, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
I. Facts and Procedural History
In July 1996, D.L.L. entered guilty pleas for two fourth-degree
felonies: (1) failure to comply with an order or signal of a peace officer, with
specifications, in violation of R.C. 2921.331, and (2) receiving stolen property, that
being a motor vehicle, in violation of R.C. 2913.51. In December 2024, D.L.L. filed
an application for expungement. The trial court ordered an expungement
investigation report and set the matter for a hearing. The State filed a responsive
brief, advising that it did not oppose the application, D.L.L.’s offenses were eligible
for expungement, and it waived its right to a hearing.
In April 2025, the trial court held several expungement and record-
sealing hearings. The trial court advised that D.L.L.’s two fourth-degree-felony
convictions were not eligible for expungement since he had two third-degree-felony
convictions along with “numerous other felony and misdemeanor convictions.” The
trial court explained that “people have been trying to essentially get around [the
expungement statute] and apply for expungement on lower felonies so that they can
become eligible for the felonies of the third degree. But the problem is that that’s
kind of like backdooring it and . . . essentially forum shop[ping] and trick[ing] the
[c]ourt.” The trial court stated that it denied expungement applications employing
such tactics because “that’s not what the legislature . . . intended” and it would not
“engage in that type of subversion” of the statute. While defense counsel offered arguments in response to the trial court’s contentions, D.L.L. was not afforded the
opportunity to present any information regarding his expungement eligibility. Nor
was the State involved in the limited proceedings. The trial court subsequently
denied D.L.L.’s expungement application, finding that the “petitioner [wa]s not
eligible.”
D.L.L. appeals, raising a single assignment of error for review.
Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in finding that [D.L.L.] was not eligible for an expungement.
II. Law and Analysis
In his sole assignment of error, D.L.L. challenges the trial court’s
finding that he was not an eligible offender for the purpose of expunging his two
fourth-degree-felony convictions. D.L.L. argues that the decision does not follow
the text of Ohio’s expungement law or the legislature’s campaign to expand
expungement eligibility. D.L.L. asserts that “[t]he trial court’s issue with D.L.[L.] is
not his two [fourth-degree-felony] convictions, but rather two [third-degree-felony]
convictions that were not before the court.” The State agrees, conceding that the
trial court erred when it “made an unsupported interpretation of the plain language
of an unambiguous statute.”
Whether an applicant is considered an eligible offender under
R.C. 2953.32 is an issue of law and therefore, analyzed under a de novo standard of
review. State. v. J.P., 2025-Ohio-2597, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), citing State v. M.E., 2018- Ohio-4715, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.), citing State v. M.R., 2010-Ohio-6025, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.),
citing State v. Futrall, 2009-Ohio-5590, ¶ 6. “Reviewing eligibility under a de novo
standard means we independently analyze the record while giving no deference to
the trial court’s decision.” Id. at ¶ 16. Matters of statutory construction also present
questions of law and are reviewed de novo. State v. J.B., 2025-Ohio-3143, ¶ 14 (8th
Dist.).
In reviewing D.L.L.’s December 2024 application for expungement
under R.C. 2953.32, we reference the version of the statute that was in effect at the
time of the application’s filing — in this case, the version effective from
October 3, 2023, to March 19, 2025 (“Former R.C. 2953.32”). State v. Lasalle,
2002-Ohio-4009, ¶ 19. Former, subsequent, and current R.C. 2953.32(B)(1)
establish that, under certain circumstances, “an eligible offender may apply to the
sentencing court . . . for the sealing or expungement of the record of the case that
pertains to the conviction, except for convictions listed in [R.C. 2953.32(A)(1)].”
Former R.C. 2953.32(A)(1) provides:
(A)(1) Sections 2953.32 to 2953.34 of the Revised Code do not apply to any of the following:
(a) Convictions under Chapter 4506., 4507., 4510., 4511., or 4549., of the Revised Code, or a conviction for a violation of a municipal ordinance that is substantially similar to any section contained in any of those chapters;
(b) Convictions of a felony offense of violence that is not a sexually oriented offense; (c) Convictions of a sexually oriented offense when the offender is subject to the requirements of Chapter 2950 of the Revised Code or Chapter 2950 of the Revised Code as it existed prior to January 1, 2008;
(d) Convictions of an offense in circumstances in which the victim of the offense was less than thirteen years of age, except for convictions under section 2919.21 of the Revised Code;
(e) Convictions of a felony of the first or second degree;
(f) Except as provided in division (A)(2) of this section, convictions for a violation of section 2919.25 or 2919.27 of the Revised Code or a conviction for a violation of a municipal ordinance that is substantially similar to either section;
(g) Convictions of a felony of the third degree if the offender has more than one other conviction of any felony or, if the person has exactly two convictions of a felony of the third degree, has more convictions in total than those two third[-]degree[-]felony convictions and two misdemeanor convictions.[1]
Having identified the relevant statute, we now turn to the rules of
statutory construction. “The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain
and give effect to the legislature’s intent, as expressed in the plain meaning of the
statutory language.” (Cleaned up.) J.B. at ¶ 17. When “‘statutory language is plain
and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, we must rely on what
the General Assembly has said’” and, as a general rule, apply the statute as written
without further interpretation. State v. K.O., 2024-Ohio-2582, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.),
quoting Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., 2003-Ohio-1099, ¶ 12; J.B. at ¶ 17, citing
Sumlin at ¶ 19.
1 We note that both parties reference R.C. 2953.32(A)(1)(h) in their appellate
briefs. R.C. 2953.32(A)(1)(h) first appeared in subsequent versions of the statute, remains current, and contains the same language as Former R.C. 2953.32(A)(1)(g) cited herein. Upon review, we find that the statutory language of Former
R.C. 2953.32(A)(1) conveys a clear and definite list of exceptions and plainly and
unambiguously enumerates the convictions that are ineligible for expungement.
Accordingly, the trial court was required to apply the statute as written and any
further interpretation of legislative intent was unwarranted. Indeed, the Ohio
Supreme Court has held “that ‘“it is the role of the legislature to address the statutory
scheme on sealing records[,]”’” and “‘a court may not deviate from the requirements
of a statute simply because it would prefer that the statute had been written
differently.’” J.B. at ¶ 14, quoting State v. G.K., 2022-Ohio-2858, ¶ 27, quoting State
v. Radcliff, 2015-Ohio-235, ¶ 36.
Based on the plain language of Former R.C. 2953.32(A)(1), the two
fourth-degree-felony convictions that D.L.L. sought to expunge are clearly not
excluded; the statute does not prohibit the sealing or expunging of fourth-degree-
felony convictions in relation to third-degree-felony convictions when the fourth-
degree-felony convictions are nonviolent and otherwise eligible for expungement.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in finding that D.L.L.’s two fourth-degree-felony
convictions were not eligible for expungement. Since the trial court incorrectly
determined D.L.L. was an ineligible offender based on its interpretation of excluded
convictions alone and did not determine whether he was otherwise ineligible under
other statutory requirements and considerations, we remand the matter to the trial
court for further proceedings.
Judgment vacated, and case remanded. It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
_________________________ EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR