[Cite as State v. Dilts, 2026-Ohio-1667.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT KNOX COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. 25CA000011
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Mount Vernon Municipal Court, Case No. 2024 CRB 0218 PHILLIP DILTS, Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: May 6, 2026
BEFORE: Andrew J. King; Craig R. Baldwin; Robert G. Montgomery, Judges
APPEARANCES: BRITTANY A. WHITNEY, for Plaintiff-Appellee; MICHAEL L. BROWN, for Defendant-Appellant.
Montgomery, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Phillip Dilts (“Appellant”), appeals from the Mount
Vernon Municipal Court’s decision denying his post-sentence motion to withdraw his no
contest pleas to domestic violence. For the reasons below, we AFFIRM.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
{¶2} In 2024, Appellant was charged with two counts of Domestic Violence, both
violations of R.C. 2919.25(A), and one count of Sexual Conduct with an Animal, a violation of R.C. 959.21(B). On August 12, 2024, after discovery was fully exchanged between the
State and defense counsel, Appellant entered a plea of “no contest” to two counts of
domestic violence; the State agreed to dismiss the sexual conduct with an animal charge.
The court held a sentencing hearing immediately after the plea. Appellant received
supervision and jail was stayed until a review hearing.
{¶3} On July 17, 2025, nearly one year after Appellant’s guilty plea was entered,
he filed a motion to withdraw his plea (“Motion”) pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1. Said Motion
alleged that testimony at a January 6, 2025 Civil Protection Order (CPO) hearing, which
awarded Appellant's wife a five-year CPO against him, constituted newly discovered facts
that would have changed the outcome of his domestic violence case. The Motion focused
on admissions that Appellant's daughter slapped him and that Appellant's car keys were
taken to prevent him from leaving.
{¶4} On August 18, 2025, the Mount Vernon Municipal Court held a hearing on
Appellant’s Motion. Appellant did not call any witnesses but argued that statements made
on cross examination during the CPO hearing undermined the credibility of the domestic
violence charges against him. The crux of the testimony Appellant set forth in the Motion
was that, (1) Appellant’s daughter slapped/shoved him, thereby instigating the resulting
contact; and (2) Appellant’s daughter took his car keys, preventing him from leaving the
situation. Appellant referenced partial excerpts from the CPO hearing transcript;
however, the entirety of the transcript was not offered as an Exhibit.
{¶5} The State responded that this evidence was previously disclosed during the
discovery phase of the domestic violence case, before Appellant pled no contest. The trial
court denied Appellant’s Motion. Appellant filed the instant appeal. SOLE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶6} “I. THE JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN NOT ALLOWING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA.” 1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶7} A motion to withdraw a plea is governed by Crim. R. 32.1, which provides:
“A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence is
imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the
judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.” State v.
Kohler, 2023-Ohio-1772, ¶ 10 (5th Dist.). This Court recognizes a Crim.R. 32.1 post-
sentence motion to withdraw a plea as a distinct avenue for relief. State v. Cramer, 2010-
Ohio-2591 (5th Dist.). As opposed to a presentence motion to withdraw, which is to be
considered liberally by the court, a post-sentence withdrawal motion is allowable only in
extraordinary cases. State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 264 (1977); State v. Casey, 2024-
Ohio-5284, ¶ 22 (5th Dist.).
{¶8} A post-sentence motion to withdraw a plea is governed by the “manifest
injustice” standard. See Crim.R. 32.1. A manifest injustice has been defined as a “clear or
openly unjust act.” State ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner, 83 Ohio St.3d 203, 208 (1998);
State v. Childress, 2025-Ohio-2429, ¶ 11 (5th Dist.). The defendant seeking to withdraw
the post-sentence has the burden of establishing manifest injustice based on specific facts
contained in the record or supplied through affidavits attached to the motion. State v.
1 On April 16, 2026, Appellant filed a motion to supplement the record with an affidavit from trial
counsel. The Motion is GRANTED. Notwithstanding granting this Motion, and for the reasons set forth herein, the affidavit does not aid Appellant in demonstrating manifest injustice that is necessary to find that the trial court abused its discretion. Waterhouse, 2022-Ohio- 655, ¶ 9 (5th Dist.), citing State v. Walsh, 2015-Ohio-4135, ¶ 16
(5th Dist.).
{¶9} Because the decision of whether an injustice exists requires an examination
of the underlying facts asserted in the motion, we review a trial court's refusal to allow a
post-sentence motion to withdraw under an abuse of discretion standard. Childress, at
¶ 9. A trial court does not abuse its discretion unless “the trial court's decision was
unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgement.”
Id., citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 21 (1983). Importantly, this Court has
stated, “[a]ny undue delay between the occurrence of the alleged cause for withdrawal of
a guilty plea and the filing of a motion under Crim. R. 32.1 is a factor adversely affecting
the credibility of the movant and militating against the granting of the motion.” Childress,
at ¶ 15, citing Smith, supra.
ANALYSIS
{¶10} Here, Appellant did not file his Motion for nearly one year after his no
contest pleas, and over five (5) months after the CPO hearing. Aside from the extended
delay, Appellant completely fails to satisfy his burden of establishing the requisite
manifest injustice. The record reveals that the information Appellant claims helps him
was available prior to his no contest pleas, and was provided to Appellant’s defense
counsel during the discovery phase of the underlying criminal case. See State’s Response
to Defense Counsel’s Requests for Discovery, dated April 10, 2024; April 17, 2024; and
April 26, 2024.
{¶11} For example, regarding the statement that Appellant’s daughter struck him,
the prosecutor states as follows at the hearing on Appellant’s Motion: Miss Dilts having physical contact with her father was apparent at
numerous points through the discovery provided, including the very
original 911 call. It was always a part of the factual analysis that Mr. Dilts
had been physical with her mother and that she had interjected herself into
that situation in defense of her mother.
But the statements that are made such that he - - that she had punched him
even, that things got really bad between me and dad over there. I mean, we
were on each other. We wrestled out. So, * * * actually what was available
to defense counsel or excuse me, what was available to Mr. Dilts at the time
that he made decision to enter a counseled plea was even more significant
than Miss Dilts saying that she had slapped her father.
Mtn. Hrg. Tr. at p. 5.
The record confirms the above. Aside from the original 911 call, the original police reports
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[Cite as State v. Dilts, 2026-Ohio-1667.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT KNOX COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. 25CA000011
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Mount Vernon Municipal Court, Case No. 2024 CRB 0218 PHILLIP DILTS, Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: May 6, 2026
BEFORE: Andrew J. King; Craig R. Baldwin; Robert G. Montgomery, Judges
APPEARANCES: BRITTANY A. WHITNEY, for Plaintiff-Appellee; MICHAEL L. BROWN, for Defendant-Appellant.
Montgomery, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Phillip Dilts (“Appellant”), appeals from the Mount
Vernon Municipal Court’s decision denying his post-sentence motion to withdraw his no
contest pleas to domestic violence. For the reasons below, we AFFIRM.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
{¶2} In 2024, Appellant was charged with two counts of Domestic Violence, both
violations of R.C. 2919.25(A), and one count of Sexual Conduct with an Animal, a violation of R.C. 959.21(B). On August 12, 2024, after discovery was fully exchanged between the
State and defense counsel, Appellant entered a plea of “no contest” to two counts of
domestic violence; the State agreed to dismiss the sexual conduct with an animal charge.
The court held a sentencing hearing immediately after the plea. Appellant received
supervision and jail was stayed until a review hearing.
{¶3} On July 17, 2025, nearly one year after Appellant’s guilty plea was entered,
he filed a motion to withdraw his plea (“Motion”) pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1. Said Motion
alleged that testimony at a January 6, 2025 Civil Protection Order (CPO) hearing, which
awarded Appellant's wife a five-year CPO against him, constituted newly discovered facts
that would have changed the outcome of his domestic violence case. The Motion focused
on admissions that Appellant's daughter slapped him and that Appellant's car keys were
taken to prevent him from leaving.
{¶4} On August 18, 2025, the Mount Vernon Municipal Court held a hearing on
Appellant’s Motion. Appellant did not call any witnesses but argued that statements made
on cross examination during the CPO hearing undermined the credibility of the domestic
violence charges against him. The crux of the testimony Appellant set forth in the Motion
was that, (1) Appellant’s daughter slapped/shoved him, thereby instigating the resulting
contact; and (2) Appellant’s daughter took his car keys, preventing him from leaving the
situation. Appellant referenced partial excerpts from the CPO hearing transcript;
however, the entirety of the transcript was not offered as an Exhibit.
{¶5} The State responded that this evidence was previously disclosed during the
discovery phase of the domestic violence case, before Appellant pled no contest. The trial
court denied Appellant’s Motion. Appellant filed the instant appeal. SOLE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶6} “I. THE JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN NOT ALLOWING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA.” 1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶7} A motion to withdraw a plea is governed by Crim. R. 32.1, which provides:
“A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence is
imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the
judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.” State v.
Kohler, 2023-Ohio-1772, ¶ 10 (5th Dist.). This Court recognizes a Crim.R. 32.1 post-
sentence motion to withdraw a plea as a distinct avenue for relief. State v. Cramer, 2010-
Ohio-2591 (5th Dist.). As opposed to a presentence motion to withdraw, which is to be
considered liberally by the court, a post-sentence withdrawal motion is allowable only in
extraordinary cases. State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 264 (1977); State v. Casey, 2024-
Ohio-5284, ¶ 22 (5th Dist.).
{¶8} A post-sentence motion to withdraw a plea is governed by the “manifest
injustice” standard. See Crim.R. 32.1. A manifest injustice has been defined as a “clear or
openly unjust act.” State ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner, 83 Ohio St.3d 203, 208 (1998);
State v. Childress, 2025-Ohio-2429, ¶ 11 (5th Dist.). The defendant seeking to withdraw
the post-sentence has the burden of establishing manifest injustice based on specific facts
contained in the record or supplied through affidavits attached to the motion. State v.
1 On April 16, 2026, Appellant filed a motion to supplement the record with an affidavit from trial
counsel. The Motion is GRANTED. Notwithstanding granting this Motion, and for the reasons set forth herein, the affidavit does not aid Appellant in demonstrating manifest injustice that is necessary to find that the trial court abused its discretion. Waterhouse, 2022-Ohio- 655, ¶ 9 (5th Dist.), citing State v. Walsh, 2015-Ohio-4135, ¶ 16
(5th Dist.).
{¶9} Because the decision of whether an injustice exists requires an examination
of the underlying facts asserted in the motion, we review a trial court's refusal to allow a
post-sentence motion to withdraw under an abuse of discretion standard. Childress, at
¶ 9. A trial court does not abuse its discretion unless “the trial court's decision was
unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgement.”
Id., citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 21 (1983). Importantly, this Court has
stated, “[a]ny undue delay between the occurrence of the alleged cause for withdrawal of
a guilty plea and the filing of a motion under Crim. R. 32.1 is a factor adversely affecting
the credibility of the movant and militating against the granting of the motion.” Childress,
at ¶ 15, citing Smith, supra.
ANALYSIS
{¶10} Here, Appellant did not file his Motion for nearly one year after his no
contest pleas, and over five (5) months after the CPO hearing. Aside from the extended
delay, Appellant completely fails to satisfy his burden of establishing the requisite
manifest injustice. The record reveals that the information Appellant claims helps him
was available prior to his no contest pleas, and was provided to Appellant’s defense
counsel during the discovery phase of the underlying criminal case. See State’s Response
to Defense Counsel’s Requests for Discovery, dated April 10, 2024; April 17, 2024; and
April 26, 2024.
{¶11} For example, regarding the statement that Appellant’s daughter struck him,
the prosecutor states as follows at the hearing on Appellant’s Motion: Miss Dilts having physical contact with her father was apparent at
numerous points through the discovery provided, including the very
original 911 call. It was always a part of the factual analysis that Mr. Dilts
had been physical with her mother and that she had interjected herself into
that situation in defense of her mother.
But the statements that are made such that he - - that she had punched him
even, that things got really bad between me and dad over there. I mean, we
were on each other. We wrestled out. So, * * * actually what was available
to defense counsel or excuse me, what was available to Mr. Dilts at the time
that he made decision to enter a counseled plea was even more significant
than Miss Dilts saying that she had slapped her father.
Mtn. Hrg. Tr. at p. 5.
The record confirms the above. Aside from the original 911 call, the original police reports
and witness statements contain information that Appellant's daughter did in fact have
physical contact with Appellant during the domestic violence situation. Thus, even if
Appellant did not have the 911 call before his pleas (see defense counsel’s affidavit), the
facts of the case had always included that Appellant’s daughter intervened to try and
protect her mother.
{¶12} Further, Appellant's wife and daughter conveyed to law enforcement at the
scene that they removed the keys to both vehicles at the residence to prevent Appellant
from leaving because he had been drinking and threatened to shoot himself in the head.
The State represents that this information is confirmed by the officer’s body cam video,
State’s Exhibit 1, provided to Appellant’s defense counsel in the State’s discovery response on April 10, 2024. No doubt, the domestic violence situation was extremely chaotic and
had many moving parts.
{¶13} Appellant completely fails to demonstrate that any testimony during the
CPO hearing was inconsistent with the evidence either provided to Appellant, or available
for inspection by Appellant, during the discovery phase of the criminal domestic violence
case. Hence, Appellant cannot demonstrate circumstances so extraordinary or an “openly
unjust act” that his plea must be withdrawn post-sentence. Kreiner, supra; Childress, at
¶ 11. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable in denying Appellant’s Motion. Appellant’s sole assignment of
error is overruled.
CONCLUSION
{¶14} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s post-
sentence motion to withdraw his no contest pleas to domestic violence. Accordingly,
Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the Mount Vernon
Municipal Court is AFFIRMED.
{¶15} Costs to Appellant.
By: Montgomery, J. King, P.J. and Baldwin, J. concur.