State v. Dickson

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

State v. Dickson

DecidedJuly 6, 2010

Docket2010-UP-348

StatusUnpublished

This text of State v. Dickson (State v. Dickson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Dickson, (S.C. Ct. App. 2010).

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Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Daniel Dickson, Appellant.

Appeal From Charleston County
R. Markley Dennis, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-348
Submitted June 1, 2010 Filed July 6, 2010

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Lanelle Cantey Durant, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Senior Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Daniel Dickson appeals his conviction for attempted armed robbery and kidnapping. On appeal, Dickson argues the trial court erred in finding the State's reason for striking the juror because he was a Lutheran minister was not pretextual even though he was of the same age, gender, and race as Dickson. We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Edwards, 384 S.C. 504, 510, 682 S.E.2d 820, 823 (2009) ("Employment is a well-understood and recognized consideration in the exercise of peremptory challenges."); McCrea v. Gheraibeh, 380 S.C. 183, 187 n.2, 669 S.E.2d 333, 335 n.2 (2008) (finding a strike will be deemed racially neutral unless there is an inherent discriminatory intent in the explanation); State v. Evins, 373 S.C. 404, 415, 645 S.E.2d 904, 909 (2007) ("Once the proponent states a reason that is race-neutral, the burden is on the party challenging the strike to show the explanation is mere pretext, either by showing similarly situated members of another race were seated on the jury or that the reason given for the strike is so fundamentally implausible as to constitute mere pretext despite a lack of disparate treatment.").

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

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THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Daniel Dickson, Appellant.

Appeal From Charleston County
R. Markley Dennis, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-348
Submitted June 1, 2010 Filed July 6, 2010

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Lanelle Cantey Durant, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Senior Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Daniel Dickson appeals his conviction for attempted armed robbery and kidnapping. On appeal, Dickson argues the trial court erred in finding the State's reason for striking the juror because he was a Lutheran minister was not pretextual even though he was of the same age, gender, and race as Dickson. We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Edwards, 384 S.C. 504, 510, 682 S.E.2d 820, 823 (2009) ("Employment is a well-understood and recognized consideration in the exercise of peremptory challenges."); McCrea v. Gheraibeh, 380 S.C. 183, 187 n.2, 669 S.E.2d 333, 335 n.2 (2008) (finding a strike will be deemed racially neutral unless there is an inherent discriminatory intent in the explanation); State v. Evins, 373 S.C. 404, 415, 645 S.E.2d 904, 909 (2007) ("Once the proponent states a reason that is race-neutral, the burden is on the party challenging the strike to show the explanation is mere pretext, either by showing similarly situated members of another race were seated on the jury or that the reason given for the strike is so fundamentally implausible as to constitute mere pretext despite a lack of disparate treatment.").

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

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