GILLETTE, P. J.
Defendant seeks reversal of his conviction for aggravated murder, arguing that the jury was exposed to evidence that was not admitted at trial and that this evidence affected the jury’s verdict. After a thorough examination of the circumstances surrounding the jurors’ receipt of the evidence, we agree with the trial court’s finding that the evidence did not prejudice defendant and therefore affirm.
In November, 1981, defendant was charged with committing a murder in the course of an attempt to commit first degree robbery. Following a two week trial, the jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty. After the verdict had been rendered, but prior to entry of judgment, defendant’s attorney received information that during the course of the trial one of the jurors had received an anonymous letter containing a clipping from a Klamath Falls newspaper. The article purportedly contained information about a prior trial involving defendant or a crime committed by defendant. Defendant’s attorney promptly informed the trial court of this development. The court, defendant’s attorney and the district attorney met imirfediately and agreed to question the jurors,' under oath, about the article. The subsequent hearing revealed nothing to indicate that any juror had received a newsclipping from any source, known or anonymous. However, juror MacAdam testified that, during the trial, a deputy sheriff made a statement about defendant’s past in the presence of MacAdam and another juror. Although MacAdam could not remember the officer’s exact words, the essence of the message was that defendant had “done something like this before.” Defendant moved for a new trial, contending that the deputy sheriffs statement constituted a violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court denied the motion after concluding:
“I
“The State’s interest in having final judgments was not outweighed by any possible juror misconduct in the present case.
“II
“Any possible juror misconduct or irregularity was not such so as to have prejudiced or affected the final verdict sufficient to warrant a new trial.
[461]*461“III
“Defendant’s right to confrontation was not violated in this case.”1
[462]*462This appeal followed.
It is apparent from the conclusions quoted above that the trial court treated this case as though it raised two distinct issues: juror misconduct and a violation of the Confrontation Clause. We think the case raises only the latter question. In State v. Gardner, 230 Or 569, 371 P2d 558 (1962), the Supreme Court stated the principle to be used in deciding “juror misconduct” cases:
“* * * [T]he verdict will stand unless the evidence clearly establishes that the misconduct constitutes a serious violation of the juror’s duty and deprives complainant of a fair trial. ***”230 Or at 575.
In this case, there is no evidence that the jurors who heard the deputy’s statement utilized the information in any way that could be characterized as a violation of their duties. We therefore confine our attention to the constitutional issue.
Defendant asserts that the deputy’s statement violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Pointer v. Texas, 380 US 400, 85 S Ct 1065, 13 L Ed 2d 923 (1965). The constitutional issue requires a two step analysis: Was defendant’s right to confrontation violated? If so, was the error prejudical to defendant? As noted above, the trial court concluded that “defendant’s right to confrontation was not violated in this case.” We disagree.
In Parker v. Gladden, 385 US 363, 87 S Ct 468, 17 L Ed 2d 420 (1966), a bailiff in charge of a sequestered jury remarked to several jurors, “Oh that wicked fellow [defendant], he is guilty,” and “If there is anything wrong [in finding defendant [463]*463guilty] the Supreme Court will correct it.” The United States Supreme Court found those occurrences to be violations of the Confrontation Clause. Although the deputy’s statement in the present case is less overtly prejudical than the Parker bailiffs statement, there is little qualitative difference between the two remarks; if the former violates the Sixth Amendment, then so does the latter. Further, defendant in this case was deprived of a number of defensive tools that the Confrontation Clause is intended to secure, e.g., the opportunities to cross-examine the deputy, to introduce evidence to rebut his statement, to object to the admission of the statement and to argue the significance of the evidence to the jury. United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F2d 877, 884 n 3 (9th Cir 1981); see Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F2d 851, 854 (9th Cir 1980). We conclude that defendant was deprived of his right to be confronted with a witness against him.
We must therefore decide whether this constitutional violation necessitates a reversal of defendant’s conviction. Chapman v. California, 386 US 18, 24, 87 S Ct 824, 828, 17 L Ed 2d 705 (1967), states the “harmless error rule” to be applied in cases involving federal constitutional errors: The error must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See also United States v. Vasquez, 597 F2d 192 (9th Cir 1979); Gibson v. Clanon, supra, 633 F2d at 853.
The initial determination is to be made by the trial judge. Carson v. Brauer, 234 Or 333, 342, 382 P2d 79 (1963); United States v. Bagnariol, supra, 665 F2d at 884. In this case, the trial court conducted a thorough hearing to determine the nature of any evidence brought to the attention of the jurors, the extent to which the jurors discussed such evidence and when such discussion occurred. On the basis of the information revealed at the hearing, the court made findings and conclusions that (1) defendant’s right to confrontation was not violated beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) “the statement made by Deputy Palmer to jurors Cooper and MacAdam did not prejudice or affect their verdict in this case.” Taken together, these findings and conclusions constitute a determination, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury’s verdict was not affected by the deputy’s out-of-court statement. We agree.
In addition to the findings noted above, the trial court determined that only two jurors heard Palmer’s remark, only [464]*464one of those two jurors remembered the remark clearly, and neither juror discussed the remark with any of the other jurors at any time prior to the announcement of the verdict. Each of these findings is amply supported by the record of the hearing, and together they indicate that the deputy’s statement could have affected the votes of only two jurors.3 The court’s finding that the statement did not in fact influence either juror is also amply supported by their testimony. Cooper’s recollection of the incident was extremely vague and equivocal, demonstrating beyond doubt that, if she heard Palmer’s statement at all, its effect on her was negligible. Moreover, her testimony establishes that she, along with the rest of the jurors, took the court’s instructions4
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GILLETTE, P. J.
Defendant seeks reversal of his conviction for aggravated murder, arguing that the jury was exposed to evidence that was not admitted at trial and that this evidence affected the jury’s verdict. After a thorough examination of the circumstances surrounding the jurors’ receipt of the evidence, we agree with the trial court’s finding that the evidence did not prejudice defendant and therefore affirm.
In November, 1981, defendant was charged with committing a murder in the course of an attempt to commit first degree robbery. Following a two week trial, the jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty. After the verdict had been rendered, but prior to entry of judgment, defendant’s attorney received information that during the course of the trial one of the jurors had received an anonymous letter containing a clipping from a Klamath Falls newspaper. The article purportedly contained information about a prior trial involving defendant or a crime committed by defendant. Defendant’s attorney promptly informed the trial court of this development. The court, defendant’s attorney and the district attorney met imirfediately and agreed to question the jurors,' under oath, about the article. The subsequent hearing revealed nothing to indicate that any juror had received a newsclipping from any source, known or anonymous. However, juror MacAdam testified that, during the trial, a deputy sheriff made a statement about defendant’s past in the presence of MacAdam and another juror. Although MacAdam could not remember the officer’s exact words, the essence of the message was that defendant had “done something like this before.” Defendant moved for a new trial, contending that the deputy sheriffs statement constituted a violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court denied the motion after concluding:
“I
“The State’s interest in having final judgments was not outweighed by any possible juror misconduct in the present case.
“II
“Any possible juror misconduct or irregularity was not such so as to have prejudiced or affected the final verdict sufficient to warrant a new trial.
[461]*461“III
“Defendant’s right to confrontation was not violated in this case.”1
[462]*462This appeal followed.
It is apparent from the conclusions quoted above that the trial court treated this case as though it raised two distinct issues: juror misconduct and a violation of the Confrontation Clause. We think the case raises only the latter question. In State v. Gardner, 230 Or 569, 371 P2d 558 (1962), the Supreme Court stated the principle to be used in deciding “juror misconduct” cases:
“* * * [T]he verdict will stand unless the evidence clearly establishes that the misconduct constitutes a serious violation of the juror’s duty and deprives complainant of a fair trial. ***”230 Or at 575.
In this case, there is no evidence that the jurors who heard the deputy’s statement utilized the information in any way that could be characterized as a violation of their duties. We therefore confine our attention to the constitutional issue.
Defendant asserts that the deputy’s statement violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Pointer v. Texas, 380 US 400, 85 S Ct 1065, 13 L Ed 2d 923 (1965). The constitutional issue requires a two step analysis: Was defendant’s right to confrontation violated? If so, was the error prejudical to defendant? As noted above, the trial court concluded that “defendant’s right to confrontation was not violated in this case.” We disagree.
In Parker v. Gladden, 385 US 363, 87 S Ct 468, 17 L Ed 2d 420 (1966), a bailiff in charge of a sequestered jury remarked to several jurors, “Oh that wicked fellow [defendant], he is guilty,” and “If there is anything wrong [in finding defendant [463]*463guilty] the Supreme Court will correct it.” The United States Supreme Court found those occurrences to be violations of the Confrontation Clause. Although the deputy’s statement in the present case is less overtly prejudical than the Parker bailiffs statement, there is little qualitative difference between the two remarks; if the former violates the Sixth Amendment, then so does the latter. Further, defendant in this case was deprived of a number of defensive tools that the Confrontation Clause is intended to secure, e.g., the opportunities to cross-examine the deputy, to introduce evidence to rebut his statement, to object to the admission of the statement and to argue the significance of the evidence to the jury. United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F2d 877, 884 n 3 (9th Cir 1981); see Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F2d 851, 854 (9th Cir 1980). We conclude that defendant was deprived of his right to be confronted with a witness against him.
We must therefore decide whether this constitutional violation necessitates a reversal of defendant’s conviction. Chapman v. California, 386 US 18, 24, 87 S Ct 824, 828, 17 L Ed 2d 705 (1967), states the “harmless error rule” to be applied in cases involving federal constitutional errors: The error must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See also United States v. Vasquez, 597 F2d 192 (9th Cir 1979); Gibson v. Clanon, supra, 633 F2d at 853.
The initial determination is to be made by the trial judge. Carson v. Brauer, 234 Or 333, 342, 382 P2d 79 (1963); United States v. Bagnariol, supra, 665 F2d at 884. In this case, the trial court conducted a thorough hearing to determine the nature of any evidence brought to the attention of the jurors, the extent to which the jurors discussed such evidence and when such discussion occurred. On the basis of the information revealed at the hearing, the court made findings and conclusions that (1) defendant’s right to confrontation was not violated beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) “the statement made by Deputy Palmer to jurors Cooper and MacAdam did not prejudice or affect their verdict in this case.” Taken together, these findings and conclusions constitute a determination, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury’s verdict was not affected by the deputy’s out-of-court statement. We agree.
In addition to the findings noted above, the trial court determined that only two jurors heard Palmer’s remark, only [464]*464one of those two jurors remembered the remark clearly, and neither juror discussed the remark with any of the other jurors at any time prior to the announcement of the verdict. Each of these findings is amply supported by the record of the hearing, and together they indicate that the deputy’s statement could have affected the votes of only two jurors.3 The court’s finding that the statement did not in fact influence either juror is also amply supported by their testimony. Cooper’s recollection of the incident was extremely vague and equivocal, demonstrating beyond doubt that, if she heard Palmer’s statement at all, its effect on her was negligible. Moreover, her testimony establishes that she, along with the rest of the jurors, took the court’s instructions4 seriously and did her best to decide the case only on the evidence presented at trial.5
[465]*465Likewise, MacAdam’s testimony demonstrates that he remained unprejudiced by the comment. Although the the deputy sheriffs statement made a distinct impression on him, he, too, paid careful attention to the jury instructions and abided by them.6 Thus, the jury instructions, together with the evidence that Cooper and MacAdam followed them, weigh strongly in favor of a conclusion that defendant was not prejudiced by the extrinsic evidence. See United States v. Bagnariol, supra, 665 F2d at 889; United States v. Bagley, 641 F2d 1235, 1241 (9th Cir 1981).
Finally, the trial court’s unequivocal finding that defendant was not prejudiced is entitled to great weight. United States v. Bagnariol, supra, 665 F2d at 885; Gibson v. [466]*466Clanon, supra, 633 F2d at 855. We find much in the record to support the trial court’s determination and nothing that militates against it. We are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the violation of defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation had no prejudicial effect on the jury’s verdict.
Our conclusion in this case should not in any way detract from the seriousness of the constitutional violation. Had the trial court been less precise in its instructions or less diligent in its investigation into potential jury prejudice, or had Cooper and MacAdam been less conscientious in following the court’s instructions, the deputy’s statement would likely have required a new trial.
Affirmed.