State v. Deyarmin

2025 Ohio 5758

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 24, 2025
• Docket: 114913
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Deyarmin, 2025-Ohio-5758.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 114913 v. :

RANDY DEYARMIN, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 24, 2025

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-21-662385-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jillian Piteo, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Joseph V. Pagano, for appellant.

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:

Defendant-appellant Randy Deyarmin (“Deyarmin”) appeals the

decision of the trial court revoking his community-control sanctions and imposing

a prison term. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. Factual and Procedural History

In August 2021, a grand jury was convened and indicted Deyarmin

for two counts of rape, two counts of gross sexual imposition, and one count of child

endangering. Each of the rape charges included a furthermore clause that Deyarmin

purposely compelled the victim, who was under ten years of age, to submit by force

or threat of force. Additionally, all the rape and gross-sexual-imposition charges

included sexually violent predator specifications.

In May 2023, the parties entered into a plea agreement. The State

agreed to amend a rape charge to abduction pursuant to R.C. 2905.02(A)(2), a

felony of the third degree, and amend the child-endangering charge from a felony of

the second degree to a misdemeanor of the first degree. In exchange for a guilty plea

to the charges as amended the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. The

trial court proceeded with the plea agreement submitted by the parties and accepted

Deyarmin’s guilty pleas. In the course of the colloquy, the trial court expressed its

intention to impose community-control sanctions.

By agreement of the parties, the case proceeded immediately to

sentencing. The State represented that Deyarmin had not had any felony

convictions in the past 30 years. The court made note of two prior charges for

indecent exposure. The State further indicated that the victim’s mother reported the

offense after she walked in on Deyarmin performing a sex act on her child and that

forensic evidence established that Deyarmin’s DNA was located on the outside of the

victim’s underpants. Based on that history, the State requested sex-offender counseling as a part of the sentence. The defense did not object to this request. The

defense then represented that Deyarmin had been cooperative throughout the

process and requested community control, noting that they believed Deyarmin

would be successful in that setting.

After listening to the recitation of facts from the State and the defense,

the court expressed concern about Deyarmin’s access to children and was informed

that he had nine grandchildren, the oldest grandchild being 14 years old. The trial

court imposed two years of community-control sanctions under the adult probation

department’s sex offender unit. The conditions required, in part, that Deyarmin

complete sex-offender assessments and successfully complete sex-offender

treatment, if recommended. The trial court informed Deyarmin that the court could

impose a sentence of up to 36 months in prison if he violated community control.

Finally, the court warned Deyarmin that it would impose a prison sentence if he

violated the terms of his community control.

Deyarmin did not object after the imposition of his sentence nor did

he file a direct appeal to his convictions.

Two years later in February 2025, the trial court received notification

that Deyarmin had violated the terms of his community-control sanctions.1 At the

subsequent hearing, Deyarmin’s probation officer informed the court that the basis

of the violation was that Deyarmin had been unsuccessfully discharged from sex-

1 At that time, the original trial court judge had been elected to higher office and

the case was assigned to a new trial court judge. offender treatment. The probation officer further notified the court that Deyarmin

had signed a waiver of probable cause for the violation. Deyarmin then admitted to

the violation in open court. Based on the foregoing, the trial court found that

Deyarmin was in violation of the terms of his community-control sanctions.

The trial court then explained the potential consequences of its

finding, including the imposition of a prison term, and offered the defense an

opportunity to present any mitigating evidence. The defense claimed that Deyarmin

fully attended classes but did not complete certain paperwork that would have

required him to “falsely” acknowledge that he had a sexual problem. The defense

noted that Deyarmin’s convictions did not include any sex offenses.

In response, the probation officer informed the court that the

paperwork in question consisted of homework assignments. These assignments

were designed to address triggers, relapse prevention, and other factors relevant to

the rehabilitation of the offender.

After reviewing the record and discussing the issues with Deyarmin

directly, the court imposed a nine-month prison term. Deyarmin appeals and raises

the following error for our review.

Assignment of Error

The trial court abused its discretion by imposing a condition that [Deyarmin] complete a sex-offender treatment program where he only agreed to [plead] guilty to, and the court convicted him for, non- sexually-oriented offenses and the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a prison sentence by finding [Deyarmin] violated that condition of his community-control sanction. Law and Analysis

In this appeal, Deyarmin asks this court to do two things. First, he

asks us to determine that the trial court improperly imposed sexual-offender

treatment as part of his community-control sanctions. Second, he argues that this

court should reverse the prison sentence imposed because the sole basis of the

community-control violation was his failure to successfully complete an improperly

imposed sentencing requirement. Neither of Deyarmin’s arguments are well taken.

Challenge to the Original Sentence

As noted previously, Deyarmin did not object to the sentencing

condition nor did he file a direct appeal to his convictions. This failure is fatal to

Deyarmin’ s claim. A sentence that is merely voidable cannot be corrected via a

postconviction petition or other collateral attack. State v. Jeffries, 2025-Ohio-1734,

¶ 5 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Stewart, 2020-Ohio-6743, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.) citing State

v. Henderson, 2020-Ohio-4784, ¶ 43. Even if the trial court imposed a sentence

“‘based on an error, including [a sentence] in which a trial court fails to impose a

statutorily mandated term,’” the sentence is “‘voidable if the court imposing the

sentence has jurisdiction over the case[, i.e., subject-matter jurisdiction] and the

defendant[, i.e., personal-jurisdiction].’” Id. ¶ 5, quoting Henderson at ¶ 1. In

contrast, a void judgment exists where the court lacked either subject-matter

jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction or both, and may be challenged in collateral

proceedings. Henderson at ¶ 17. Deyarmin does not allege that the trial court lacked personal or

subject-matter jurisdiction in his case. Rather, he claims that the trial court

improperly exercised its jurisdiction and Deyarmin asserts that the trial court’s

action in imposing sex-offender treatment rendered his plea invalid and warranted

reversal of the plea and remand for further proceedings. These alleged errors

rendered Deyarmin’s sentence voidable not void. Thus, his sole remedy was to file

a direct appeal, which he failed to do. Therefore, his claims are barred by res

judicata. “The doctrine of res judicata bars the assertion of claims against a valid,

final judgment of conviction that has been raised or could have been raised on

appeal.” State v. Majid, 2025-Ohio-172, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Ketterer,

2010-Ohio-3831, ¶ 59, citing State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175 (1967), paragraph

nine of the syllabus. Accordingly, Deyarmin’s challenge to the imposition of sexual-

offender treatment is overruled.

Imposition of a Prison Term after a Community-Control Violation

In the instant case, Deyarmin waived the probable-cause hearing and

admitted that his conduct amounted to a community-control violation, resulting in

the trial court’s finding that he violated his community control. On appeal, he argues

that because he otherwise complied with his community-control requirements and

had a valid reason for not fully engaging in the sexual-offender treatment program,

the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed a prison term.

Contrary to Deyarmin’s assertion, we do not review the felony

sentence for an abuse of discretion, even though the trial court is given great latitude when ruling on a community-control violation. State v. Brooks, 2004-Ohio-4746,

¶ 20. An appellate court reviews the imposition of a felony sentence under the

standard of review delineated in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Seith, 2016-Ohio-

8302, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.); see State v. Stricklett, 2025-Ohio-1247, ¶ 8 (4th Dist.), State

v. Motz, 2020-Ohio-4356, ¶ 37, (12th Dist.). The appellate court may increase,

reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence or vacate the sentence and remand for

resentencing, if the court clearly and convincingly finds

(a) [t]hat the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under relevant sentencing statutes.[2]

(b) [t]hat the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

Seith at ¶ 9, citing R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).

In the instant case, Deyarmin argues his sentence is contrary to law.

A sentence is contrary to law if the imposed sentence falls outside the statutory range

for the particular offense or the trial court failed to consider the purposes and

principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism

factors under R.C. 2929.12. State v. Castro, 2024-Ohio-2453, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.), citing

State v. Woodard, 2018-Ohio-2402, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.).

Deyarmin was convicted of abduction under R.C. 2905.02(A)(2), a

felony of the third degree, which allowed a definite prison term of 9, 12, 18, 24, 30,

or 36 months. R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b). The trial court’s imposition of a nine-month

sentence was within the statutory range, and thus the sentence was not contrary to

2 R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) specifically references R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D), R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), and R.C. 2929.20(I). law in that regard. Additionally, we must determine whether the trial court

appropriately considered the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

Neither R.C. 2929.11 nor 2929.12 require a trial court to place

findings on the record to establish that it considered all of the appropriate factors.

State v. Williams, 2024-Ohio-5708, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Jones, 2020-

Ohio-6729, ¶ 20, citing State v. Wilson, 2011-Ohio-2669, ¶ 31; State v. Arnett, 88

Ohio St.3d 208, 215 (2000). “‘Indeed, consideration of the factors is presumed

unless the defendant affirmatively shows otherwise.’” Id., quoting State v. Phillips,

2021-Ohio-2772, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Wright, 2018-Ohio-965, ¶ 16 (8th

Dist.). Furthermore, a court’s journal entry, which states that “the trial court

considered the required statutory factors, without more, is sufficient to fulfill a trial

court’s obligations under [R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12].” State v. Riemer, 2021-Ohio-

4122, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Whitehead, 2021-Ohio-847, ¶ 34 (8th Dist.),

citing Seith, 2016-Ohio-8302, at ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).

In the instant case, the trial court’s journal entry stated that the court

“considered all required factors of the law,” and “prison is consistent with the

purpose of R.C. 2929.11.” This language, by itself, is sufficient to establish that the

trial court considered the required factors when determining the sentence. Reimer

at ¶ 18. Although not required, the trial court also discussed some of its concerns on

the record, noting that two assessments showed Deyarmin had a moderately high to

high risk of reoffending and that prison was necessary to protect public safety from an offender who is likely to reoffend. Accordingly, the trial court properly

considered the R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 factors.

We decline to address Deyarmin’s argument that the sexual-offender

treatment was improperly imposed because that issue is barred by res judicata.

With respect to the argument that he had a legitimate reason for failing to fully

participate in the treatment program, Deyarmin’s argument lacks merit. The trial

court informed Deyarmin at sentencing that he must submit to a sex-offender

assessment, that he was required to complete any treatment recommended, and that

failure to do so would result in a prison sentence. The trial court discussed its

concerns with the facts of the case at length, that it was imposing community control

based on the advocacy of Deyarmin’s counsel, and that the court would have

imposed a prison sentence if counsel had not convinced the court to act otherwise.

Given the trial court’s admonitions, Deyarmin cannot now complain that he was

unaware of the consequences of failing to complete this condition of his community-

control sanctions.

Based on the foregoing, the trial court’s sentence was not contrary to

law. Accordingly, the assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_________________________ EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and WILLIAM A. KLATT, J.,* CONCUR

(*Sitting by assignment: William A. Klatt, J., retired, of the Tenth District Court of Appeals.)