IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED FEBRUARY 1999 SESSION June 18, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) Appellee, ) C.C.A. No. 01C01-9712-CR-00561 ) vs. ) Davidson County ) DENNY JAMES McABEE, ) Hon. J. Randall Wyatt, Judge ) Appellant. ) (Aggravated Robbery) )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
S. RAY WHITE (on appeal) JOHN KNOX WALKUP Attorney at Law Attorney General & Reporter 9856 S. Windrow Rd. Rockvale, TN 37153 TIMOTHY F. BEHAN Assistant Attorney General RAY CULP (at motion for new trial) 425 Fifth Ave. N., 2d Floor Attorney at Law Nashville, TN 37243-0493 439 Battle Ave. Franklin, TN 37064 VICTOR S. JOHNSON, III District Attorney General PAUL BRUNO (at trial) Attorney at Law LILA STATOM 222 Second Ave. North, Ste. 350 Asst. District Attorney General Nashville, TN 37201 222 Second Ave North, Ste. 500 Nashville, TN 37201 RAYBURN McGOWAN, JR. (at trial) Attorney at Law 222 Second Ave. North, Ste. 416 Nashville, TN 37201
OPINION FILED:________________
AFFIRMED
JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE OPINION
The defendant, Denny James McAbee, stands convicted of
aggravated robbery for the carjacking of Earl Glen "Bubba" Lackey, Jr. on April 19,
1996. McAbee received his conviction at the conclusion of a jury trial in the
Davidson County Criminal Court. He was subsequently sentenced to serve fourteen
years in the Department of Correction consecutively to a previously imposed
sentence of six years and one day for an aggravated burglary conviction. In this
direct appeal, McAbee raises two issues of alleged error. First, he claims the
photographic lineup conducted was improper. Second, he claims prosecutorial
misconduct in witness intimidation and in failing to disclose exculpatory information
during discovery. Following a review of the record, the briefs and oral arguments
of the parties, and the law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I
In his first issue, McAbee alleges the trial court erred in failing to
suppress evidence regarding a photographic lineup from which the victim selected
him as the perpetrator of the crime. The essence of his complaint is that the lineup
was "a result of the efforts of an officer with a personal score to settle" who
manipulated the photographs to the defendant's prejudice.
A patrol officer assigned to the area in which the crime took place
conducted an investigation which led him to suspect the defendant as the
perpetrator. With the assistance of a detective, the patrol officer assembled a
photographic lineup consisting of pictures of the defendant and five other individuals
who shared similar characteristics with the defendant. This was approximately the
seventh photographic lineup the patrol officer had assembled. The officer took the
lineup to the victim's home and asked the victim whether anyone in it looked familiar
from the robbery. The victim immediately selected the defendant's photograph.
2 At the suppression hearing, the defendant claimed that his photograph
was much more recent than those of the other individuals represented. He argued
that the officer put the lineup together himself, rather than leaving that to the
detective assigned to the case, to ensure that the victim made an identification of
the defendant.
"To be admissible as evidence, an identification must not have been
conducted in such an impermissibly suggestive manner as to create a substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification." State v. Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d 773, 794
(Tenn.) (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S. Ct. 967 (1968)), cert
denied, --- U.S. ---, 119 S. Ct. 343 (1998). In Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.
Ct. 375 (1972), the Supreme Court identified five factors for assessing reliability of
an identification. They are: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the
perpetrator at the time of the offense, (2) the witness' degree of attention, (3) the
accuracy of the witness' prior description of the perpetrator, (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and (5) the time between the
crime and the identification.
The victim's identification of the defendant via photographic lineup
easily passes the Neil v. Biggers assessment. The victim had an opportunity to
observe the defendant for a period of time at close range. The crime took place
during daylight hours. The victim's testimony indicates he paid attention to the
perpetrator, who was making him nervous and ultimately threatened him with a gun.
The initial description the victim gave of the perpetrator supports the identification
he made of the defendant from the lineup.1 By all accounts, the victim chose the
1 The victim testified at the suppression hearing and at trial that he initially described the perpetrator's hair as dark brown or black, which is consistent with the defendant's photograph from the lineup. Other physical characteristics described by the victim match the defendant's photograph. However, as
3 defendant from the lineup quickly and was confident in his identification. The lineup
was conducted on May 7, 1996, a brief time after the April 19, 1996 crime.
In this appeal, the defendant argues that the officer who prepared and
conducted the photo lineup had a vendetta against the defendant that should be
considered in assessing the fairness of the procedure. The problem with this
argument is that the defendant offered no proof whatsoever at the suppression
hearing of any vendetta. It was not until trial that the defendant presented this
evidence through an admitted drug-abusing witness who claimed she had been
intimate with the officer. She testified that the officer frequently denigrated the
defendant and the witness' friendship with him. She claimed the officer asked her
questions about the defendant and made statements that he was going to see the
defendant put in jail.
This evidence came too late to benefit the defendant in his quest for
suppression.2 If the defendant desired to have the trial court consider the officer's
alleged vendetta against the defendant in conjunction with the motion to suppress,
he should have presented this evidence at the suppression hearing.3 In fact, the
discussed in section II.B. below, the police report completed by the first officer to respond to the crime scene recounted that the perpetrator had "BL" hair, which the reporting officer testified stood for "blond." The information from the police report was not introduced until trial, and according to the defense, never revealed during pre-trial discovery. See section II.B., infra. Even if the evidence from the police report had been available to the defense at the time of the suppression hearing, the victim was positive in his lineup identification. Further, use of the abbreviation "BL" could be ambiguous, as it represents the first two letters of both "blond" and "black." 2 Furthermore, the verdict may be viewed as signifying that its veracity was discounted by the jury. 3 We acknowledge our supreme court's recent ruling that the appellate courts may consider evidence presented at trial, as well as at the suppression hearing, in evaluating the propriety of a trial court's ruling that a search warrant was validly executed. See State v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290 (Tenn. 1998). We decline, however, to apply that case to the situation at bar. First, the defendant does not seek the benefit of the Henning ruling; he has wholly ignored the fact
4 evidence was not presented until the defendant's case-in-chief, after the evidence
of the victim's identification of the defendant from the photo lineup had already been
admitted. Cf. State v. Sims, 952 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Mo. App. 1997) (in determining
propriety of trial court's ruling on suppression motion, appellate court may consider
evidence presented at hearing on motion to suppress and introduced at trial prior
to introduction of evidence of pretrial identification sought to be suppressed).4
Notwithstanding the defendant's failure to present the evidence of the
alleged vendetta in time for it to be considered in conjunction with the motion to
suppress, the evidence adds nothing to the defendant's argument for suppression.
Even assuming the officer may have been unusually zealous in preparing a photo
lineup and presenting it to the victim, there is no indication the officer suggested that
the victim should pick the defendant from the lineup. Moreover, we disagree with
the defendant's characterization that the officer otherwise manipulated the process
through the selection of photographs. Contrary to the defendant's arguments, his
picture is not distinctive as compared with the others in the lineup due to age of the
photographs, presence of acne, and hair color.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's
motion to suppress the pretrial lineup.
II
The defendant raises two claims of prosecutorial misconduct. The first
that the evidence of the alleged vendetta was not presented until trial. Second, Henning dealt with a search warrant, not pretrial identification. Third, the trial evidence considered in Henning was used by the appellate court to support the correctness of the trial court's ruling, not to give the non-prevailing party a second chance to make his case for suppression. 4 Sims is cited in the Tennessee Supreme Court's Henning decision discussed supra at note 3. See Henning, 975 S.W.2d at 298.
5 is an appropriate issue to be viewed through the framework for prosecutorial
misconduct claims. The second is more properly considered as a potential violation
of Brady v. Maryland.
A
The defendant contends that prosecutorial misconduct occurred when
a potential defense witness was intimidated and ultimately changed her prospective
trial testimony after she was visited in jail by the investigating police officer.5
When an issue of prosecutorial misconduct is presented, the proper
inquiry is "whether the improper conduct could have affected the verdict to the
prejudice of the defendant." Harrington v. State, 215 Tenn. 338, 340, 385 S.W.2d
758, 759 (1965).
At the motion for new trial, the defendant's lead trial attorney testified
that he had met with the incarcerated witness prior to trial, and she had
corroborated another defense witness' report of having had an affair with the police
officer in question. Further, counsel testified that the incarcerated witness told him
the officer had pulled her over on many occasions to inquire about the defendant's
whereabouts. Defendant's lead counsel visited the incarcerated witness a few days
later, at which time she said the officer had been to see her since counsel's last
visit. Counsel testified that the witness said she would not give testimony
unfavorable to the officer because she had pending charges and thought he had
influence over the disposition of these charges. Because he was uncertain after
this meeting how this witness would testify, lead counsel elected not to call this
5 The state's argument, consisting of lengthy quotation from the trial court's order, a cursory statement that "the trial court is correct," and lacking citation to authority other than that contained in the quoted material from the trial court's order, is of little assistance to this court in probing the merits of this issue.
6 witness at trial. Counsel also testified that the witness told him the officer had taped
their conversation. Despite counsel's requests to the state for a copy of the tape,
he had never received one.
The defendant's trial co-counsel testified that he was present during
lead counsel's latter conversation with the incarcerated witness. He testified that
although the incarcerated witness did not per se recant what he understood her
prospective testimony would be, she minimized her knowledge of relevant
information.
The incarcerated witness testified at the motion for new trial. She
acknowledged having told the defendant's trial counsel that the defense witness had
confided that she and the investigating officer had a sexual relationship. However,
the incarcerated witness testified that she never believed anything the defense
witness told her. The incarcerated witness testified that she had seen a police car
at the defense witness' house only two times, and one of those times she was
certain that the officer present was not the investigating officer. She denied that the
investigating officer had ever stopped her to inquire about the defendant's
whereabouts. She admitted that the investigating officer visited her in jail; however,
she denied that she felt threatened by him. To the contrary, she claimed she did
not want to testify because she knew the defendant was guilty and did not want to
assist his defense.
The officer in question testified that he met with the incarcerated
witness in keeping with his normal practice of interviewing all witnesses. He talked
with the witness about her prospective testimony; however, he denied threatening
her. He testified he told the witness to tell the truth. The officer testified that a tape
recording was made of his conversation with this witness. He gave the tape to the
7 assistant district attorney assigned to the case but had no knowledge of its
whereabouts at the time the motion for new trial was heard.6
From this evidence, the trial court found "no credible evidence of
coercion or intimidation by the investigating officer . . . and no evidence of
misconduct by the district attorney." Specifically, the court found no evidence that
the officer threatened the incarcerated witness or coerced her into changing her
testimony. Furthermore, the court found that the defendant had failed to
demonstrate any prejudice from any of the foregoing allegations.
On appellate review, the defendant has not convinced us of the error
of the trial court's ruling. The evidence presented at the hearing on the motion for
new trial, while unusual, fails to demonstrate any wrongdoing by the state.
B
The defendant also claims the prosecution withheld exculpatory
evidence in the form of a police report indicating the perpetrator's hair was blond,
rather than the dark brown color of the defendant's hair.
In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), the United
States Supreme Court held that the prosecution has the duty to furnish exculpatory
evidence to the accused upon request. Any "suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith
or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S. Ct. at 1196-97. The
duty to disclose extends to all "favorable information" regardless of whether the
6 The tape was not received as evidence at that hearing nor is it a part of the record on appeal.
8 evidence is admissible at trial. State v. Marshall, 845 S.W.2d 228, 232-33 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1992); Branch v. State, 4 Tenn. Crim. App. 164, 168, 469 S.W.2d 533,
536 (1969). In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3380
(1985), the Supreme Court held that both exculpatory and impeachment evidence
fall under the Brady rule. Cf. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S. Ct. 763
(1972) (nondisclosure of state's deal with witness violated defendant's due process
rights).
Before an accused is entitled to relief under Brady, he must establish
several prerequisites: (a) the prosecution must have suppressed the evidence; (b)
the evidence suppressed must have been favorable to the accused; and (c) the
evidence must have been material. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 674-75, 105 S. Ct. at
3379-80; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S. Ct. at 1196-97; Workman v. State, 868
S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993); State v. Marshall, 845 S.W.2d 228, 232;
Strouth v. State, 755 S.W.2d 819, 828 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986). In State v.
Spurlock, this court recognized a fourth prerequisite to relief, that "the accused must
make a proper request for the production of the evidence, unless the evidence,
when viewed by the prosecution, is obviously exculpatory in nature and will be
helpful to the accused." State v. Spurlock, 874 S.W.2d 602, 609 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1993) (citations omitted). The defendant bears the burden of proving a Brady
violation by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Edgin, 902 S.W.2d 387, 389
(Tenn. 1995).
In the case at bar, the initial police report indicated the suspect's hair
was "BL." The officer who prepared the report testified "BL" stood for blond and
that the victim had described the perpetrator's hair as "blondish." On the other
hand, the victim testified that he had initially described the perpetrator's hair as dark
brown or black. The defendant's hair is dark brown.
9 During the investigation, the victim identified two individuals whom he
suspected may have been involved. Both of these individuals have blond hair.
Further, an officer testified that he had arrested these individuals for stealing a
vehicle and burning it prior to the victim's car being stolen and burned. The victim
testified, however, that he grew up with one of these individuals and was sure that
this person had not been the carjacker, although he thought this person might have
had someone else commit the crime. An officer interviewed the individuals
identified by the victim as potential suspects, and he received information
implicating the defendant from one of these individuals. Based upon this
information, the officer prepared the photo lineup, choosing a photograph of the
defendant and five individuals who shared similar characteristics with the defendant.
Each of the individuals depicted in the lineup had brown hair.
At the motion for new trial, McAbee's trial counsel testified that he did
not learn about the police report describing the suspect's hair with the abbreviation
"BL" until the trial was underway. As a result of the belated disclosure, he claimed
he was unable to investigate.
The trial court found that the defense failed to carry its burden of
proving a Brady violation.
We begin our analysis with the fourth prerequisite for relief. It appears
that discovery was conducted in this case; however, if "a proper request for the
production of the evidence" was made by the defense, it has not been included in
the record on appeal. See Spurlock, 874 S.W.2d at 609. Thus, we direct our
inquiry to whether "the evidence, when viewed by the prosecution, is obviously
exculpatory in nature and will be helpful to the accused." Id. The evidence in the
case at bar does not fulfill this criteria. The victim's hair color was only one of
10 several physical characteristics described by the victim on the day of the crime. The
description he recounted at trial that he had given on the day of the crime is
remarkably similar to the defendant's photograph in the lineup. The victim's
testimony that he described the perpetrator as having dark brown or black hair was
at odds with the officer's testimony that the victim had said the perpetrator had
blond hair; however, the victim’s testimony that he described the perpetrator as
having possibly black hair was not contradicted per se by the report, which depicted
the perpetrator’s hair as “BL”. The inconsistent evidence of the perpetrator's hair
color was fully probed by the defense at trial. The defendant claims on appeal that
he was "denied . . . the possibility of developing other credible suspects" at trial by
the non-disclosure of this evidence. Although he had the opportunity at the hearing
on the motion for new trial to prove that such evidence could have been developed,
he failed to carry that burden.
Furthermore, although the evidence was suppressed, the information
in the report is not material. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 674-75, 105 S. Ct. at 3379-80.
In that regard, "the question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not
have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he
received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence."
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1566 (1995). In this case, the
jury had before it evidence of the inconsistency between the police report and the
victim's account of a suspect with dark brown or black hair, as well as evidence that
the possible suspects named by the victim had blond hair. Notwithstanding, the jury
convicted the defendant. At the motion for new trial, the defendant had the
opportunity to prove any matter which the state's failure to disclose the police report
deprived him of proving at trial, yet he offered no evidence supporting a finding of
materiality and undermining confidence in the verdict.
11 It bears repeating that the evidence of hair color was but a portion of
the victim's physical description of the perpetrator. In addition, the victim chose the
defendant from a photographic lineup. Viewed in context of all of the evidence
presented, the report indicating the perpetrator had "BL" hair was not material under
the standard of Kyles. Cf. State v. Beal, 614 S.W.2d 77, 80-81 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1981) (due process rule of Brady not violated where minor inconsistencies in initial
description of perpetrator not disclosed during discovery but revealed during pretrial
suppression hearing and exposed by defense counsel at trial).
The trial court correctly determined that no Brady violation had been
demonstrated.
Finding no error requiring reversal, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
________________________________ JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE
CONCUR:
_______________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
_______________________________ JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE