Seawell, J.
We
first consider the exception of the defendant to the exclusion of the evidence offered by the defendant through the testimony of M. D. Hoyle relating to a conversation which he had with Foster Spivey after the shooting and while the latter was in the hospital. The defendant offered this for the purpose of impeaching the dying declaration of Spivey made to his father, introduced by the State. It must be conceded that, if admitted, it would have had that effect, since the dying declaration made by Spivey shortly after the shooting may properly engender the inference that the shooting was not accidental, but, on the contrary, had some motive, however unknown to the declarant. That is also the appraisal which the State seemed to put upon this item of evidence as justifying its introduction.
The theory on which dying declarations are excepted from the hearsay ' rule and admitted in evidence is that the declaration is made under the realization of approaching death, when there is no longer any motive for
making a false statement, thus creating a sanction for truth equal to that of an oath.
S. v. Williams,
67 N. C., 12, 14;
S. v. Beal,
199 N. C., 278, 297, 154 S. E., 604;
S. v. Laughter,
159 N. C., 488, 74 S. E., 913. Perhaps a more potent reason, one strong enough to supersede the right of confrontation, so strongly entrenched in our law, is the necessity of preserving important evidence, which often could come from no other source, of the identity of the killer and such circumstances of the killing as come within the range of the exception. It can readily be understood that such significant declarations, often attended with such dramatic force as to powerfully affect the jury, should in justice be subject to the rules of impeachment which attend other testimony, when impeachment is possible or impeaching evidence available. See
S. v. Williams, supra,
in the cautionary statements on pages 14, 15.
Had the deceased been a sworn witness, testifying in court, the proffered testimony that he had made an inconsistent statement, and more favorable to the defendant, explanatory of the occurrence, would readily have been admitted. We do not conceive the rule to be different when the defendant has the more difficult task of refuting a dying declaration without, of course, the advantage of confrontation and cross-examination of the witness, whose testimony is to be admitted, if at all, as an exception to the rule.
Upon this point, authorities seem to be strongly in favor of the suggested rule, which we believe to be founded upon reason and justice. In
Carver v. U. S.,
164 U. S., 694, 41 L. Ed., 602, the Court passing upon this point, said:
“There was also error in refusing to permit the defendant to prove by certain witnesses that the deceased, Anna Maledon, made statements to them in apparent contradiction to her dying declaration, and tending to show that defendant did not shoot her intentionally. Whether these statements were admissible as dying declarations or not is immaterial, since we think they were admissible as tending to impeach the declaration of the deceased, which had already been admitted. A dying declaration by no means imports absolute verity. ... In nearly all the cases in which the question has arisen, evidence of other statements by the deceased inconsistent with his dying declarations has been received.
People v. Lawrence,
21 Cal., 368 (an opinion by
Chief Justice Field,
now of this Court) ;
State v. Blackburn,
80 N. C., 474;
McPherson v. State,
9 Yerg., 279;
Hurd v. People,
25 Mich., 405;
Battle v. State,
74 Ga., 101;
Felder v. State,
23 Tex. App., 447, 5 S. W., 145;
Moore v. State,
12 Ala., 764.”
In
Ashton’s Case,
2 Lewin (Eng.), 147, it is said: “When a party comes to the conviction that he is about to die, he is in the same practical state as if called on in a court of justice under the sanction of an oath,
and his declarations as to the canse of his death are considered equal to an oath, but they are, nevertheless, open to observation, for though the sanction is the same, the opportunity of investigating the truth is very different and, therefore, the accused is entitled to every allowance and benefit that he may have lost by the absence of the opportunity of more full investigation by the means of cross-examination.”
In
People v. Lawrence,
21 Cal., 368—the case referred to in the above opinion in the Supreme Court of the United
States
— Mr.
Justice Field,
then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California, said: “Though the condition of the person making the declaration in the last hours of life, under a sense of impending dissolution, might compensate for the want of an oath, it can never make up for the want of a cross-examination, and, therefore, there would be no justice in any rule which would deprive the accused in such circumstances of the right to impeach the credit of the deceased by proof that he had made contradictory statements as to the homicide and its cause.” See Annotations, 16 A. L. R., pp. 417-423.
In the North Carolina Law Review, Volume 14, page 382, upon a review of the authorities, the conclusion is reached that: “A dying-declaration is not conclusive, its weight and credibility being for the jury to determine. It may be impeached in the same manner as any other sworn statement.”
It has been held in this State that dying declarations may be corroborated by evidence that the declarant had made the same or similar statement as to the homicide, although such testimony was not qualified as a dying declaration.
S. v. Blackburn,
80 N. C., 474;
S. v. Craine,
120 N. C., 601, 602, 27 S. E., 72. It is our belief that the converse of the rule is a necessary corollary, consonant with the theory on which dying declarations are admitted in evidence and founded on principles of justice. There was error in excluding the proffered evidence.
The objection of the defendant to the instruction to the jury above quoted is that it omits the word “intentional,” and not only permits, but requires, conviction upon proof of the mere killing by the deadly weapon, whether intentional or otherwise. The objection is well taken.
The intentional use of a deadly weapon in a homicide imports malice and raises the rebuttable presumption that the defendant is guilty of murder in the second degree, placing the burden upon him to show such circumstances as may reduce the crime to manslaughter, or entitle him to an acquittal. The presumption is not raised by the mere use of such a weapon.
The use of an inexact formula, while not to be approved in any case, may not result in reversible error, where the intentional use of the weapon is admitted; but where the defense is based on the theory of accidental
shooting and tbe intentional use is not admitted, but, on tbe contrary, denied, and becomes tbe crux of tbe controversy, tbe court must be meticulous in instructing tbe jury tbat tbe
intentional
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Seawell, J.
We
first consider the exception of the defendant to the exclusion of the evidence offered by the defendant through the testimony of M. D. Hoyle relating to a conversation which he had with Foster Spivey after the shooting and while the latter was in the hospital. The defendant offered this for the purpose of impeaching the dying declaration of Spivey made to his father, introduced by the State. It must be conceded that, if admitted, it would have had that effect, since the dying declaration made by Spivey shortly after the shooting may properly engender the inference that the shooting was not accidental, but, on the contrary, had some motive, however unknown to the declarant. That is also the appraisal which the State seemed to put upon this item of evidence as justifying its introduction.
The theory on which dying declarations are excepted from the hearsay ' rule and admitted in evidence is that the declaration is made under the realization of approaching death, when there is no longer any motive for
making a false statement, thus creating a sanction for truth equal to that of an oath.
S. v. Williams,
67 N. C., 12, 14;
S. v. Beal,
199 N. C., 278, 297, 154 S. E., 604;
S. v. Laughter,
159 N. C., 488, 74 S. E., 913. Perhaps a more potent reason, one strong enough to supersede the right of confrontation, so strongly entrenched in our law, is the necessity of preserving important evidence, which often could come from no other source, of the identity of the killer and such circumstances of the killing as come within the range of the exception. It can readily be understood that such significant declarations, often attended with such dramatic force as to powerfully affect the jury, should in justice be subject to the rules of impeachment which attend other testimony, when impeachment is possible or impeaching evidence available. See
S. v. Williams, supra,
in the cautionary statements on pages 14, 15.
Had the deceased been a sworn witness, testifying in court, the proffered testimony that he had made an inconsistent statement, and more favorable to the defendant, explanatory of the occurrence, would readily have been admitted. We do not conceive the rule to be different when the defendant has the more difficult task of refuting a dying declaration without, of course, the advantage of confrontation and cross-examination of the witness, whose testimony is to be admitted, if at all, as an exception to the rule.
Upon this point, authorities seem to be strongly in favor of the suggested rule, which we believe to be founded upon reason and justice. In
Carver v. U. S.,
164 U. S., 694, 41 L. Ed., 602, the Court passing upon this point, said:
“There was also error in refusing to permit the defendant to prove by certain witnesses that the deceased, Anna Maledon, made statements to them in apparent contradiction to her dying declaration, and tending to show that defendant did not shoot her intentionally. Whether these statements were admissible as dying declarations or not is immaterial, since we think they were admissible as tending to impeach the declaration of the deceased, which had already been admitted. A dying declaration by no means imports absolute verity. ... In nearly all the cases in which the question has arisen, evidence of other statements by the deceased inconsistent with his dying declarations has been received.
People v. Lawrence,
21 Cal., 368 (an opinion by
Chief Justice Field,
now of this Court) ;
State v. Blackburn,
80 N. C., 474;
McPherson v. State,
9 Yerg., 279;
Hurd v. People,
25 Mich., 405;
Battle v. State,
74 Ga., 101;
Felder v. State,
23 Tex. App., 447, 5 S. W., 145;
Moore v. State,
12 Ala., 764.”
In
Ashton’s Case,
2 Lewin (Eng.), 147, it is said: “When a party comes to the conviction that he is about to die, he is in the same practical state as if called on in a court of justice under the sanction of an oath,
and his declarations as to the canse of his death are considered equal to an oath, but they are, nevertheless, open to observation, for though the sanction is the same, the opportunity of investigating the truth is very different and, therefore, the accused is entitled to every allowance and benefit that he may have lost by the absence of the opportunity of more full investigation by the means of cross-examination.”
In
People v. Lawrence,
21 Cal., 368—the case referred to in the above opinion in the Supreme Court of the United
States
— Mr.
Justice Field,
then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California, said: “Though the condition of the person making the declaration in the last hours of life, under a sense of impending dissolution, might compensate for the want of an oath, it can never make up for the want of a cross-examination, and, therefore, there would be no justice in any rule which would deprive the accused in such circumstances of the right to impeach the credit of the deceased by proof that he had made contradictory statements as to the homicide and its cause.” See Annotations, 16 A. L. R., pp. 417-423.
In the North Carolina Law Review, Volume 14, page 382, upon a review of the authorities, the conclusion is reached that: “A dying-declaration is not conclusive, its weight and credibility being for the jury to determine. It may be impeached in the same manner as any other sworn statement.”
It has been held in this State that dying declarations may be corroborated by evidence that the declarant had made the same or similar statement as to the homicide, although such testimony was not qualified as a dying declaration.
S. v. Blackburn,
80 N. C., 474;
S. v. Craine,
120 N. C., 601, 602, 27 S. E., 72. It is our belief that the converse of the rule is a necessary corollary, consonant with the theory on which dying declarations are admitted in evidence and founded on principles of justice. There was error in excluding the proffered evidence.
The objection of the defendant to the instruction to the jury above quoted is that it omits the word “intentional,” and not only permits, but requires, conviction upon proof of the mere killing by the deadly weapon, whether intentional or otherwise. The objection is well taken.
The intentional use of a deadly weapon in a homicide imports malice and raises the rebuttable presumption that the defendant is guilty of murder in the second degree, placing the burden upon him to show such circumstances as may reduce the crime to manslaughter, or entitle him to an acquittal. The presumption is not raised by the mere use of such a weapon.
The use of an inexact formula, while not to be approved in any case, may not result in reversible error, where the intentional use of the weapon is admitted; but where the defense is based on the theory of accidental
shooting and tbe intentional use is not admitted, but, on tbe contrary, denied, and becomes tbe crux of tbe controversy, tbe court must be meticulous in instructing tbe jury tbat tbe
intentional
use of tbe deadly weapon is necessary
to
rais'e tbe presumption.
Tbe State calls attention to tbe fact tbat in numerous other parts of tbe charge tbe court did correctly state tbe law in this respect; and to this tbe defendant replies tbat tbe lapse in tbat respect was at a critical point in tbe charge, where tbe court “boiled down” all its preceding-instructions to tbe one controlling principle, which it gave as guidance to tbe jury — making conviction to depend on whether “tbe defendant shot tbe deceased with a deadly weapon, which resulted in tbe death of tbe deceased.” If so, tbe jury was admonished tbat it would be their duty to return a verdict of guilty of manslaughter. Under these circumstances, we are unable to apply in aid of
the
State
the
principle of contextual construction in order to relieve tbe instruction of prejudicial error. Tbe instructions were contradictory, and sufficiently so, we think, to have, in all probability, caused confusion in tbe minds of tbe jury.
S. v. DeGraffenreid, ante,
113;
S. v. Roddey,
219 N. C., 532, 14 S. E. (2d), 526.
It is to be noted tbat tbe instruction here was upon tbe question of manslaughter, of which defendant was found guilty; and this discloses a further inexactness in the instruction, which must have been prejudicial to tbe defendant, notwithstanding any previous explanation which tbe court might have given with regard to tbe privilege of tbe defendant to mitigate
the charge, or
exculpate himself entirely upon a proper showing.
For tbe reasons here given, tbe defendant is entitled to a new trial. It is so ordered.
New trial.