IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
AUGUST SESSION, 1997 FILED November 18, 1997 STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9610-CC-00365 ) Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk Appellee, ) ) LAUDERDALE COUNTY ) V. ) ) HON. JOSEPH H. WALKER, DAVID SCOTT MOSS, ) JUDGE ) Appellant. ) (DUI)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
WILLIAM DAN DOUGLAS, JR. JOHN KNOX WALKUP 109 North Main Attorney General & Reporter Ripley, TN 38063 CLINTON J. MORGAN Assistant Attorney General 2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243
ELIZABETH T. RICE District Attorney General
MARK DAVIDSON Assistant District Attorney General 302 Market Street P.O. Box 562 Somerville, TN 38068
OPINION FILED ________________________
CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE MODIFIED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE OPINION
The Defe ndan t, David Scott M oss, a ppea ls as of rig ht from his conviction
of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) following a non-jury trial in the
Circu it Court of Lauderda le County. In his sole issue on appeal, the Defendant
argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. We affirm the
judgm ent of the tria l court.
When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence,
the standard is whether, after reviewing the eviden ce in th e light m ost favo rable
to the pros ection, an y rational trier of fact could have found the essential
eleme nts of the crim e beyon d a reas onable doubt. Jack son v. V irginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979 ). This standard is applicable to findings of guilt predicated upon
direct eviden ce, circ ums tantial e vidence or a combination of direct and
circumstantial evidenc e. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1990). O n appe al, the State is entitled to th e strong est legitimate view of
the eviden ce an d all inference s therefro m. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832,
835 (Tenn. 1978). Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of
innocence and replaces it with a presumption of guilt, the accused has the
burden in this court of illustrating why the evid ence is insufficient to support the
verdict returned by the trier of fa ct. State v. Williams, 914 S.W.2d 940, 945
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (citing State v. Tug gle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn.
1982)).
-2- Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value
to be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence , are
resolved by the tr ier of fac t, not this court. State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623
(Tenn. Crim. A pp.), perm. to appeal denied, id. (Tenn. 1987). Nor may this court
reweigh or reevalu ate the ev idence . Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 835.
On May 28, 1995, at approxim ately 1:30 a.m., Mike Kirkpatrick, a d eputy-
sheriff with the La uderda le Coun ty Sheriff’s Department, observed a car weaving
back and forth across the center line of Highway 51 at a speed of 60 miles per
hour. Kirkpatrick p ulled the c ar over an d aske d the De fendan t to step ou t.
Officer Kirkpatrick testified that at this point he could smell alcohol on the
Defendant and that his speech was slurred. He also observed six empty beer
bottles in the passenger side floor board with “no alcohol left in any of them, you
know, except for the suds in the bottom of them.” He then asked the Defendant
to perform field sobriety tests.
First, Officer Kirkpatrick asked Defendant to recite the alphabet and
Defendant was able to do this. Second, Defendant attempted the one-leg stand
test, but was unable to keep his balance. He failed this test twice. Defendant
told Officer Kirkpatrick that he did not have any phys ical injuries to his legs that
would prevent h im from perform ing the test. Third, Defendant performed the
heel-to-toe test, during which he could not wa lk hee l-to-toe and h e lost h is
balance several tim es. Finally, Officer Kirkpatrick conducted the horizontal gaze
nystagmus test on Defen dant. He ob served that De fendant’s eyes were
bloodshot and th at “they were ju mpin g” whic h indic ated to the deputy that
Defendant had been drinking. The Defendant did not object to the testimony
-3- regarding the results of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, and we note that
even if he had, and the evidence were ruled to be inadmissible, that our
conclusion as to the sufficiency of the evidence in this case would not change.
See State v. Turner, C.C.A. No. 03C01-9604-CC-00151, slip op. at 7, Cocke
Coun ty (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, July 9, 1997) (N o Rule 11 a pplication filed);
State v. Murphy, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9412-CC-00401, Davidson County (Tenn.
Crim. App., Nashville, filed Oct. 6, 1995), perm. to appeal granted (Tenn. 1996).
On the basis of De fendant’s driving, his slurred speech, the empty beer
bottles, and his performance on the field sobriety tests, Deputy Kirkpatrick
concluded that Defendant was under the influence of alcohol and arrested him.
Defen dant refu sed to tak e an intox imeter te st.
For the defense, Stephanie Spain testified that on May 28, 1995, she met
the Defenda nt in Dyersburg , Tennes see so they co uld ride together to Union
City, Tennes see for a political fund raising dinner. She met Defendant about 6:00
p.m. at the Holiday Inn in Dyersburg. The dinner started at 7:00 p.m. and she
said that no alcoholic beverages were served at the function. After dinner, she
and Defendant drove back to Dyersburg and went to a bar called Checkers at
approximately 10:30 p.m. She testified that the Defendant drank one beer and
poss ibly started a second one while at the bar. They then left and went to the
Holiday Inn where Defendant had left his car earlier that evening. A few minutes
later they decided to go for a drive towards the river, and she testified that neither
of them were drinking. They then went back to the Holiday Inn about 1:00 a.m.
where Defendan t got into his c ar to drive to M emph is, and sh e drove h ome to
-4- Jackson. Ms. Sp ain testified that in her opinion, Defendant did not appear to be
intoxicated .
The Defendant testified at trial to the same events as Ms. Spain.
Furthermore, he explained that the reason his car was weaving when the officer
stopped him was because his steering was out of line. He admitted to the officer
that he had drank one or two beers earlier that evening. The Defendant testified
that he passed the field sobriety tests, and that the reason he was a little shaky
was because he was nervous and it was late at night. Defendant also testified
that the reason he refused the intoximeter test was because he was taking allergy
medic ine and he was conce rned tha t it would affec t the results of the test.
Driving under the influence is defined in part as driving or being in physical
control of an automobile on any of the public roads and highways of the State of
Tennessee, or on any streets or alleys while under th e influenc e of any into xicant.
Tenn. Code Ann.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
AUGUST SESSION, 1997 FILED November 18, 1997 STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9610-CC-00365 ) Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk Appellee, ) ) LAUDERDALE COUNTY ) V. ) ) HON. JOSEPH H. WALKER, DAVID SCOTT MOSS, ) JUDGE ) Appellant. ) (DUI)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
WILLIAM DAN DOUGLAS, JR. JOHN KNOX WALKUP 109 North Main Attorney General & Reporter Ripley, TN 38063 CLINTON J. MORGAN Assistant Attorney General 2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243
ELIZABETH T. RICE District Attorney General
MARK DAVIDSON Assistant District Attorney General 302 Market Street P.O. Box 562 Somerville, TN 38068
OPINION FILED ________________________
CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE MODIFIED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE OPINION
The Defe ndan t, David Scott M oss, a ppea ls as of rig ht from his conviction
of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) following a non-jury trial in the
Circu it Court of Lauderda le County. In his sole issue on appeal, the Defendant
argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. We affirm the
judgm ent of the tria l court.
When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence,
the standard is whether, after reviewing the eviden ce in th e light m ost favo rable
to the pros ection, an y rational trier of fact could have found the essential
eleme nts of the crim e beyon d a reas onable doubt. Jack son v. V irginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979 ). This standard is applicable to findings of guilt predicated upon
direct eviden ce, circ ums tantial e vidence or a combination of direct and
circumstantial evidenc e. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1990). O n appe al, the State is entitled to th e strong est legitimate view of
the eviden ce an d all inference s therefro m. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832,
835 (Tenn. 1978). Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of
innocence and replaces it with a presumption of guilt, the accused has the
burden in this court of illustrating why the evid ence is insufficient to support the
verdict returned by the trier of fa ct. State v. Williams, 914 S.W.2d 940, 945
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (citing State v. Tug gle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn.
1982)).
-2- Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value
to be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence , are
resolved by the tr ier of fac t, not this court. State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623
(Tenn. Crim. A pp.), perm. to appeal denied, id. (Tenn. 1987). Nor may this court
reweigh or reevalu ate the ev idence . Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 835.
On May 28, 1995, at approxim ately 1:30 a.m., Mike Kirkpatrick, a d eputy-
sheriff with the La uderda le Coun ty Sheriff’s Department, observed a car weaving
back and forth across the center line of Highway 51 at a speed of 60 miles per
hour. Kirkpatrick p ulled the c ar over an d aske d the De fendan t to step ou t.
Officer Kirkpatrick testified that at this point he could smell alcohol on the
Defendant and that his speech was slurred. He also observed six empty beer
bottles in the passenger side floor board with “no alcohol left in any of them, you
know, except for the suds in the bottom of them.” He then asked the Defendant
to perform field sobriety tests.
First, Officer Kirkpatrick asked Defendant to recite the alphabet and
Defendant was able to do this. Second, Defendant attempted the one-leg stand
test, but was unable to keep his balance. He failed this test twice. Defendant
told Officer Kirkpatrick that he did not have any phys ical injuries to his legs that
would prevent h im from perform ing the test. Third, Defendant performed the
heel-to-toe test, during which he could not wa lk hee l-to-toe and h e lost h is
balance several tim es. Finally, Officer Kirkpatrick conducted the horizontal gaze
nystagmus test on Defen dant. He ob served that De fendant’s eyes were
bloodshot and th at “they were ju mpin g” whic h indic ated to the deputy that
Defendant had been drinking. The Defendant did not object to the testimony
-3- regarding the results of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, and we note that
even if he had, and the evidence were ruled to be inadmissible, that our
conclusion as to the sufficiency of the evidence in this case would not change.
See State v. Turner, C.C.A. No. 03C01-9604-CC-00151, slip op. at 7, Cocke
Coun ty (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, July 9, 1997) (N o Rule 11 a pplication filed);
State v. Murphy, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9412-CC-00401, Davidson County (Tenn.
Crim. App., Nashville, filed Oct. 6, 1995), perm. to appeal granted (Tenn. 1996).
On the basis of De fendant’s driving, his slurred speech, the empty beer
bottles, and his performance on the field sobriety tests, Deputy Kirkpatrick
concluded that Defendant was under the influence of alcohol and arrested him.
Defen dant refu sed to tak e an intox imeter te st.
For the defense, Stephanie Spain testified that on May 28, 1995, she met
the Defenda nt in Dyersburg , Tennes see so they co uld ride together to Union
City, Tennes see for a political fund raising dinner. She met Defendant about 6:00
p.m. at the Holiday Inn in Dyersburg. The dinner started at 7:00 p.m. and she
said that no alcoholic beverages were served at the function. After dinner, she
and Defendant drove back to Dyersburg and went to a bar called Checkers at
approximately 10:30 p.m. She testified that the Defendant drank one beer and
poss ibly started a second one while at the bar. They then left and went to the
Holiday Inn where Defendant had left his car earlier that evening. A few minutes
later they decided to go for a drive towards the river, and she testified that neither
of them were drinking. They then went back to the Holiday Inn about 1:00 a.m.
where Defendan t got into his c ar to drive to M emph is, and sh e drove h ome to
-4- Jackson. Ms. Sp ain testified that in her opinion, Defendant did not appear to be
intoxicated .
The Defendant testified at trial to the same events as Ms. Spain.
Furthermore, he explained that the reason his car was weaving when the officer
stopped him was because his steering was out of line. He admitted to the officer
that he had drank one or two beers earlier that evening. The Defendant testified
that he passed the field sobriety tests, and that the reason he was a little shaky
was because he was nervous and it was late at night. Defendant also testified
that the reason he refused the intoximeter test was because he was taking allergy
medic ine and he was conce rned tha t it would affec t the results of the test.
Driving under the influence is defined in part as driving or being in physical
control of an automobile on any of the public roads and highways of the State of
Tennessee, or on any streets or alleys while under th e influenc e of any into xicant.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401 (a)(1) (Supp. 19 96). Therefore, the evidence must
show that the offender: “(1) was in physical control of an automobile, (2) on a
public road within the State of Tennessee, and (3) was under the influence of an
intoxicant.” State v. Waddey, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9508-CC-00245, slip op. at 3,
W illiamson County, (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, July 5, 1996) (Rule 11
application not filed).
-5- First, from the testimony at trial, Defendant was clearly in physical control
of his car. Officer Kirkpatrick observed the car weaving back and forth, pulled the
car over, and Defen dant step ped ou t of the driver’s side. Second, Defendant
drove his car on Highway 51, a public road within the State of Tennessee. Third,
based on Office r Kirkp atrick’s observations of Defendant and his experience, he
determined Defe ndan t to be c learly un der the influen ce of a lcoho l. The trial court
could have co nclude d from Defendant’s erratic driving, his slurred speech, the
empty beer b ottles in his car , and h is failure to ade quate ly perfo rm two of the fie ld
sobrie ty tests, th at the D efend ant wa s und er the in fluenc e of alc ohol.
In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the
evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for DUI. This issue is without
merit.
Neither party raise d the leng th of sente nce for D efendant’ s conviction of
DUI first offense as an issue in this appeal. The trial court sentenced Defendant
to serve six (6) months in the county jail with all but forty-eight (48) h ours
suspended, and assessed a $350.00 fine. The DUI statutes mandate that the
maximum sente nce fo r a DU I convic tion is eleven (11) months and twenty-nine
(29) days, with the trial court to determine what portion of the sentence above the
manda tory minimum punishme nt must be served prior to a defendant being
placed on prob ation. State v. Combs, 945 S.W.2d 770, 774 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1996); Tenn. C ode Ann . § 55-10-403 (c). Furthermo re, Section 55-1 0-403(c)
requires that D.U.I. offenders be placed on probation for the difference between
the tim e actu ally served a nd the m aximum possible senten ce. Accordingly, we
affirm the Defendant’s conviction for DUI first offense, but mod ify the D efend ant’s
-6- sentence by increasing it to eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days, with
all but forty-eight (48) hours suspended. All other portions of the sentence
imposed by the trial court shall remain the same. The judgment of the trial cour t,
as modified, is accordingly affirmed.
____________________________________ THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
CONCUR:
___________________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
___________________________________ JERRY L. SMITH, Judge
-7-