State v. Darren Smith

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON

JANUARY SESSION, 1996 FILED March 25, 1999

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9506-CR-00157 ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

Appe llant, )

)

) SHELBY COUNTY

VS. )

) HON . BERN IE WEIN MAN DARREN SMITH, ) JUDGE )

Appellee. ) (Direct Appeal - Reckless ) Endangerment and Attempted ) Second D egree Mu rder)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

JOHN KNOX WALKUP DANIEL A. SEWARD Attorney General and Reporter Attorney for Appellee P. O. Box 11207

EUGENE J. HONEA Memphis, TN 38111-0207 Assistant Attorney General 450 James Robertson Parkway Nashville, TN 37243-0493

WILLIAM L. GIBBONS District Attorney General

REGINALD R. HENDERSON KAREN COOK Assistant District Attorney 201 Poplar Avenue Memphis, TN 38104

OPINION FILED ________________________ AFFIRMED JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE

OPINION

In this case the defendant, Darren Smith, was convicted by a Shelby Coun ty jury of two (2) counts of attempte d second degree murder and four (4) counts of reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of ten (10) years for each count of attempted murder and one (1) year for each re ckless e ndang ermen t conviction. Following sentencing, the defendant filed a motion for judgm ent of acq uittal or in the a lternative a n ew trial. The motion alleged inter alia that the state failed to prove that t he defendant was legally sane at the time of the commission of the offenses. The trial court agreed and entered a judg ment of no t guilty by reaso n of ins anity on all char ges. It is from this judgment that the state appeals. After a careful review of the re cord in this case , we affirm th e judgm ent of the tria l court.

I.

The defendan t and Laura M oss were b oth police officers with the City of Memphis. The couple became involved in a romantic relationship which ended sometime in April, 1993. Apparently the defendant was angry over the break-up, and the relationship between him and Moss became acrim oniou s. The coup le filed formal co mplain ts agains t each oth er, and the defendant made several threatening phone calls to Moss’ residence. On at least one occasion the defendant came to Moss’ residence uninvited, d espite rep eated ins tructions to stay away from her. This led to a physical altercation between the defendant and Michael Hill, himself a police officer and Moss’ romantic interest at the time.

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On June 4, 199 3, the d efend ant ca me to Moss ’ hom e to dis cuss a cred it card statement with her. Moss did not have time to discuss the matter, but the defendant persisted in telepho ning he r all day. Sometime between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m., the defendant called Moss and told her that he was coming over to her house. Despite being told not to come, the defendant nevertheless had a friend take him to Moss’ house. W hen Moss called the police, the defendant left on foot.

Later that night, Moss a nd Hill were in her b edroom wa tching television.

Her three (3) daughters and a niece were playing in another bedroom. Sudden ly, a shotgun blast came through the window of the room where Mo ss and H ill were located. The ch ildren beg an to scre am an d ran into the hallway. A second blast came through the kitchen window, a third shot was fired through the dining room window and a final blast splintered the front d oor. After the last shot, Moss and Hill were able to se e the defend ant run from the house and drive away. Police later recovered the shotgun from the defendant’s parent’s residence. The defendant confessed to the shooting when confronted by the police.

At trial, Dr. Robert Freeman, a psychiatrist who treated the defendant for depression, testified that a serious head injury ca used the de fendant to have problems with social interaction. Dr. Freeman opined that defendant was suffering from “tem porary ins anity” at the tim e of the offe nse. The doctor testified that there wa s a “poss ibility” that the defen dant lack ed “sub stantial cap acity to apprec iate the wro ngfulne ss of his ac tions.”

On cross-examination, the prosecution questioned Dr. Freeman regarding an incident prior to defendant’s head injury where he punc hed o ut a win dow in Moss’ residenc e and let h imself in. A lthough the docto r testified that the head injury was a “large fac tor” in defendant’s “temporary insanity,” he stated that

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knowledge of the prior incident actually “strengthen[ed]” his diagnosis that defendan t was suffering from post-trauma tic stress disorder.

In rebuttal, the state introduced the defendant’s statement to law enforcement authorities concerning the prior incident where he punched through the window at Moss’ residence. Defendant was suspended for two (2) days from his police d uties as a result of this in cident.

At the conc lusion of th e proof, the jury found defend ant guilty of two (2)

counts of attempted second degree murder and four (4) counts of reckless endan germe nt.

Subseq uently, the defendant filed a motion for judgm ent of a cquitta l or in the alternative a new trial, alleging that the state failed to carry its burden on the issue of defend ant’s san ity at the time of the commission of the offenses. The trial court found that the defendant presented sufficient proof to rebut the presumption of sanity, and the state presented no reliable proof in support of defenda nt’s sanity. Therefore, the trial court set aside the jury’s verdicts and entered a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity. From the trial court’s judgment, the state brings this appeal as of right pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c).

II.

In pertinent part, Tenn. R. Crim. P. 29(a) provides, “[t]he court on motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment or information . . . if the evidenc e is insufficien t to sustain a convictio n of such offense o r offense s.”

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A motion for judgment of acquittal raises a qu estion of law for the trial court to determ ine. State v. Adams, 916 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 95). In mak ing this determ ination , the trial c ourt is conce rned with the legal sufficiency of the evidence, not the weight of the evide nce. State v. Adams, 916 S.W.2d at 473; State v. Hall, 656 S.W.2d 60, 61 (Tenn . Crim. App. 19 83). The trial court must “look only at all of the eviden ce introduced by the State . . . take the strongest legitimate view of it in favor of the State, and . . . allow a ll reaso nable inferences from it in the State’s favor.” State v. Hall, 656 S .W .2d at 6 1. This Court must apply the same standard when resolving issues concerning the grant or denia l of a judgm ent of acq uittal. State v. Adams, 916 S.W.2d at 473.

III.

Insanity at the time that an offe nse is co mm itted is an ab solute de fense to a crime. The standard for proving a plea of insanity was established in Graham v. State, 547 S .W .2d 53 1 (Te nn. 19 77), an d was subs eque ntly codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-501(a) (1991), which provides:

Insanity is a defense to prosecution if, at the time of such co nduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, the person lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of the perso n’s conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of the law.

A defendant is presumed sane; therefore, at the time of the instant offenses, it was the defendant who initially had to present evidence of his or her insanity. Spurloc k v. State, 368 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Tenn . 1963). Once evidence had been p resente d which raised a re asona ble dou bt as to the defendant’ s sanity, the burden of proof shifted to the state to establish the defen dant’s sa nity beyond a reas onab le doubt. State v. Sparks, 891 S.W.2d 607, 615 (Tenn. 199 5).

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“Sanity thus becom es an elem ent of the crime.” State v. Clayton, 656 S.W .2d 344, 346 (Tenn. 1983). To meet its burden, the state had establish:

(1) the defendant was not “suffering from a mental illness at the time of the commission of the crime,” or

(2) the illne ss pro ved did not “pre vent his knowing the wrongfulness of his act” and did no t “render him substantially incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law he is charged with violating .”

State v. Jackson, 890 S.W.2d 436, 440 (Tenn. 1994) (quoting State v. Clayton, 656 S.W .2d at 351). 1 The s tate could meet its b urden o f proving sa nity

through the introduction of expert testimony on the issue, or through lay testim ony wh ere a p roper found ation fo r the ex press ing of an opinio n is laid, or throu gh the sh owing o f acts or statements of the petitioner, at or very near the time of the commission of the crime, which are co nsistent with sanity and inconsistent with insa nity.

State v. Sparks, 891 S.W.2d at 461 (quoting Edwa rds v. State , 540 S.W.2d 641, 646 (T enn. 19 76)); State v. Jackson, 890 S.W.2d at 440.

IV.

Entry of a judgm ent of acq uittal by reas on of insa nity is the ap propriate remedy where the burden of proof on the element of sanity has shifted to the state, and the state fails to carry it. Many jurisdictions, both federal and state, adhere to the view that it is the trial court’s duty to determine, as a matter of law, whether a defendant has p resen ted su fficient e videnc e to pu t his san ity in question. See United States v. D avis, 772 F.2d 13 39, 1343 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.

1 Effective July 1, 1995, the legislature amended the insanity statute, making insanity an affirmative defense whereby the defendant has the burden of establishing his or her insanity by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Co de Ann. § 39-11-501(a) (Su pp. 1995).

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Green, 468 F.2d 116, 118 n. 3 (4 th Cir. 197 2); Davis v. United States, 364 F.2d 572, 574 (10th Cir. 1 966); Otney v. United States, 340 F.2 d 696, 6 98 (10th Cir. 1965); Fitts v. United States, 284 F.2d 108, 112 (10 th Cir. 1960); United States v. Horne, 304 F.Supp. 727, 730 (E.D. T enn. 19 69); Peop le v. Hill, 934 P.2d 821, 826 (Colo. 1997); Commonwealth v. Sirbaugh, 500 A.2 d 453, 4 60 (Pa . Super. C t. 1985); State v. Day, 560 P.2 d 945, 9 47 (N.M . Ct. App. 1977 ); People v. Johnson, 503 P.2d 1019 , 1020 (Colo. 1 972); McCra cken v. S tate, 237 A.2d 87, 88-89 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968 ). Althou gh T enne ssee case law is sile nt on th is poin t, this Court agrees that the trial court should determine whether the defendant has presented sufficient evidence to shift the burden of proof to the state on the element of sanity. Furtherm ore, this Court will not overtu rn a trial cou rt’s determination in this regard absent a finding of an abuse of discretion.

Notwithstanding the jury’s verd icts of guilt an d implicit reje ction of the insanity defense, the trial court found that the defendant in the present case had produc ed sufficien t evidence to rebut the presum ption of sa nity. The trial court did not abu se its discre tion in ma king this de termina tion. As a re sult, the state had the burden to prove the defendant’s sanity beyon d a reas onable doubt. State v. Sparks, 891 S.W .2d at 615 ; State v. Clayton, 656 S.W.2d at 346.

Even though the defendant notified the state of his in tention to present an insanity defen se ap proxim ately five (5) mo nths prior to trial, the state fa iled to present any ex pert tes timon y on the issue o f defen dant’s sanity a t trial. Instead, the state relied upon lay testimon y conce rning acts or statem ents of the defendant prior to and after the commission of the offenses. The victim testified that defendant threatened her and Officer Hill on several prior occasions. The state prese nted th e defe ndan t’s state men t conc erning the prio r incident where he punched through a win dow at Mo ss’ residence. Furthermore, although the

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defendant testified that he could not remember committing the offenses, Officer Harvey Edingbough stated that the defendant admitted shooting into Moss’ home shortly after the incident. However, while this testimony might be construed as being consistent w ith sanity, suc h testimo ny was n ot nece ssarily inco nsistent with insanity. See State v. Sparks, 891 S.W .2d at 461 ; State v. Jackson, 890 S.W.2d at 440. There fore, the sta te’s eviden ce was insufficient to estab lish de fenda nt’s sanity bey ond a re asona ble dou bt.

In this case we offer no opinion as to the defendant’s actual menta l state at the time o f the offens e. W e are sim ply saying that under the applicable law at the time of the offense the defendant offered sufficient evidence in insanity for the trial judge to properly conclude that the burden of proof on this issue had shifted to the stated . Howe ver, the state made little effort to prove defend ant’s san ity beyond a reaso nable d oubt. Be cause the state fa iled to carry its burde n on th is issue, the trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

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JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE

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CONCUR:

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DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE

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LYNN W. BROWN, SPECIAL JUDGE