State v. Daniels

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: November 22, 2024
• Docket: 0107003610
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, ) ) ) v. ) ID No. 0107003610 ) JAMEL DANIELS, ) ) Defendant. )

Submitted: November 15, 2024 Decided: November 22, 2024

Upon Defendant Jamel Daniels’ Motion for Postconviction Relief, DENIED.

Upon Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Patrick J. Collins, Esquire, GRANTED.

ORDER

Andrew R. Fletcher, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 820 North French Street, Wilmington DE 19801, Attorney for the State of Delaware.

Patrick J. Collins, Esquire, COLLINS PRICE & WARNER, 8 East 13th Street, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for the Defendant Jamel Daniels.

Jamel Daniels, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, 1181 Paddock Road, Smyrna, DE 19971, Defendant.

WHARTON, J. This 22nd day of November, 2024, upon consideration of Defendant Jamel

Daniels’ (“Daniels”) Motion for Postconviction Relief (“PCR Motion”),1 the

Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Patrick J. Collins,2 Daniels’ Response to the

Motion to Withdraw,3 the State’s Response,4 and the record in this case, it appears

to the Court that:

1. Daniels was convicted of first degree murder and possession of a

firearm during the commission of a felony by a jury on June 8, 2003 and sentenced

to life in prison plus 20 years on both charges. His direct appeal was

unsuccessful.5 Daniels’ first PCR motion was filed through counsel on March 19,

20186 and supplemented on April 30, 2010.7 That motion was denied by the

Superior Court.8 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that decision.9 Daniels’

second PCR motion, filed pro se on September 1, 2013,10 was denied on August 1,

2014.11 That decision was affirmed as well.12

2. Daniels filed this PCR motion, his third, also pro se, alleging actual

1 PCR Mot., D.I. 143. 2 Mot. to Withdraw, D.I. 170. 3 Def.’s Resp., D.I. 173 4 State’s Resp., D.I. 175. 5 Daniels v. State, 859 A.2d 1008 (Del. 2004). 6 D.I. 94. 7 D.I. 108. 8 D.I. 115. 9 Daniels v. State, 2011 WL 1900438 (Del. 2011). 10 D.I. 123. 11 D.I. 131. 12 Daniels v. State, 2014 WL 7010919 (Del. 2014). 2 innocence on March 24, 2023,13 along with two motions for appointment of

counsel.14 The Court granted those motions on June 23, 2023. On February 26,

2024, the Court was advised that Patrick J. Collins, Esquire would be representing

Daniels.15 That day, the Court entered a scheduling order.16 On September 20,

2024, Mr. Collins filed this Motion to Withdraw as Counsel and simultaneously

advised Daniels of his opportunity to submit a response within 30 days.17 Daniels

responded on October 11, 2024.18 The State responded on November 15th.19

3. In its Order on direct appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court set out the

following facts:

Daniels was part of a drug distribution ring led by Leon Price which operated between New York City and West Chester, Pennsylvania. In April 2001, New Castle County police and paramedics found the body of Kensworth Griffith on the side of a road in Christiana Hundred. Griffith had been shot four times, twice from behind with a .45 caliber weapon, once in the stomach with a .25 caliber weapon, and once in the foot. Following an investigation, Daniels and Price were arrested for Griffith's murder. Price was separately tried and convicted in April 2003. Daniels was tried and convicted in June 2003.

At Daniels’ trial, witnesses testified that Griffith owed

13 D.I. 143. 14 D.I. 144, 152, . 15 D.I. 160. 16 D.I. 162. 17 Mot. to Withdraw as Counsel, D.I. 18 Def.’s Resp., D.I. 173. 19 State’s Resp., D.I. 175. 3 Price money for drugs he sold on Price's behalf and that Price was very angry about being unpaid. Another state witness familiar with Price and Daniels through their drug activities testified that Daniels was Price's “right-hand man.” He testified that Daniels stayed with Price in his apartment for several months in early 2001. Price owned two guns, a .45 caliber Glock and a .25 caliber Derringer. Both he and Daniels had been seen in possession of these weapons.

The State presented testimony from two of Price's and Daniels’ associates who witnessed the killing, Jose Martinez and Jamil Mosley. Martinez and Mosley were also from New York and assisted Price in selling drugs. On the day Griffith was killed, the two traveled with Daniels and Price to a gas station in West Chester, Pennsylvania, to pick up Griffith. According to Mosley, Price offered Griffith an opportunity to discharge his debt through additional drug sales. Griffith entered the vehicle, and the five drove to Delaware, eventually pulling off to the side of Adams Dam Road. Martinez and Mosley testified that Daniels and Price exited the vehicle and told Griffith to get out also. After he did, Price and Daniels shot Griffith several times outside the car and left his body on the side of the road.

The State introduced physical evidence consisting of a bullet from Griffith's body and shell casings found at the scene which had been fired from a .45 caliber Glock. The State also introduced a fresh, partially-smoked cigarette butt that was found near Griffith's body. Forensic analyst Teri Lawton testified to the results of DNA testing she performed on the cigarette butt. She testified:

The DNA profiles of the evidentiary samples ... are consistent with being mixtures of the known DNA profiles of the reference samples. Therefore, Jamel Daniels 4 and Lou Price are not excluded as DNA contributors…

When asked to explain this finding, Lawton responded that “[e]ssentially, it means that both of Jamel Daniels and Lou Price's DNA profiles were present in the mixture.” Lawton further stated that no other DNA profiles were found in the sample taken from the scene.20

4. Daniels’ pro se PCR motion alleges he is actually innocent based on

purportedly newly discovered evidence so as to overcome the procedural bars of

Rule 61.21 That newly discovered evidence takes the form of: (1) proposed

testimony of Leon Price (“Price”) stemming from a “newly found belief in justice

and a desire to do the correct thing” exculpating Daniels and incriminating Jose

Martinez (“Martinez”);22 and (2) Daniels’ medical records demonstrating that, due

to injuries he sustained in a prior shooting, he was physically unable to perform the

movements he was described as performing at trial.23 In support of the former

claim, Daniels attached to his PCR Motion an affidavit from Price stating that he

was coerced by “cartel-backed killers who lived in his neighborhood, who knew

where [his] then wife and three children lived, to put the killing on Jamel

Daniels.”24 In fact, according to the affidavit, the second shooter was Martinez.25

20 Daniels v. State, 859 A.2d at 1009-1010. 21 Pro Se Brief in Support of PCR Mot., D.I. 145. 22 Id. at 11-13. 23 Id. at 29. 24 Id. at Ex. B. 5 In support of the latter, Daniels wrote that his medical records were attached to his

PCR Motion, but, in fact, they were not.26

5. In his Motion to Withdraw, Mr. Collins presents a thorough

recapitulation of the evidence presented at trial as well as the procedural history of

the case.27 He also carefully assesses Daniels’ two claims of actual innocence based

on newly discovered evidence. With respect to Price’s new version of events

recanting his previous version, Mr. Collins finds Price’s admission that he was a

shooter credible and his claim that he was reluctant to implicate Martinez because of

Martinez’ cartel-backed family plausible.28 But, he finds Price’s description of

Daniels as not part of his crew and only in town for a few days to party

demonstrably false.29 Witnesses identified Daniels as being Price’s right-hand man

and in the Delaware area much longer than a few days.30 Additionally, Daniels was

a longtime associate of Price and a member of Price’s drug-dealing crew. In his

statement to Mr. Collins’ postconviction investigator, Price included Daniels as part

of his crew that were always together.31 Daniels also made contradictory statements

25 Id. 26 Id. at Ex. C. 27 Mot. to Withdraw, D.I. *** 28 Id. at 33. 29 Id. 30 Id. 31 Id. 6 about where Daniels was at the time of the shooting.32 In his first of three

interviews with Mr. Collins’ postconviction investigator, Price said Daniels was at a

hotel.33 In his second statement he said that Daniels was in the front passenger seat

at the time of the murder, but did not get out of the car.34 In his third statement,

Price reverted to a version where Daniels was at the hotel.35 As to Daniels’ medical

records, Mr. Collins found them in the file, having been sent to the Public

Defender’s Office by Bellevue Hospital in 2002 prior to trial, thereby negating any

argument that they constitute newly discovered evidence.36

6. In his response, Daniels alleges: (1) Mr. Collins is not representing him

effectively because he failed to communicate with him and investigate his case; (2)

Mr. Collins did not discuss his decision to move to withdraw indicating “a conflict

of interest or abandonment;” and (3) he has been deprived of his right to competent

counsel.37 He asks the Court to deny the Motion to Withdraw pending further

investigation, appoint new counsel, and hold a hearing to address the “issues

surrounding my attorney withdrawal.”38 Daniels has little to say regarding Mr.

Collins’ substantive conclusions on the two issues he raised in his pro se PCR

32 Id. at 34. 33 Id. 34 Id. 35 Id. 36 Id. at 35. 37 Def.’s Resp. at 3, D.I. 173. 38 Id. 7 motion. With regard to Price’s inconsistent statements, he only notes that Price’s

first statement to the investigator was consistent with his affidavit, he was “a little

confused on a few things” in his second statement, but was “back on track” in his

third.39 He accuses Mr. Collins of failing to take into account Price’s “mental state

and whatever else he was going through.”40 He expressed surprise the Mr. Collins

was able to locate his medical records “out of the blue.”41

7. The State concurs with Mr. Collins assessment of Daniels two actual

innocence claims.42 In addition to the general suspicion that is warranted in

considering recantations offered by inmate witnesses, the State also highlights the

obvious inconsistencies and apparent falsities in Price’s various statements. 43

Regarding Daniels’ medical records, the State notes they were available at trial, and

thus not newly discovered, but given Daniels testimony that he was in a car riding

around on the day of the murder and not immobilized, the records would have little

probative effect.44

8. The State also addresses Daniels’ response to Mr. Collins’ motion. It

observes that “other than asserting that Price was confused during the interview with

the investigator, Daniels does not appear to dispute any specific factual or legal

39 Id. at 3. 40 Id. 41 Id. 42 State’s Resp., D.I. 175. 43 Id. at 9-11. 44 Id. at 11. 8 basis for Postconviction Counsel’s opinion that Daniels’ postconviction claim of

actual innocence is wholly without merit.”45 The State finds Daniels’ claims about

Mr. Collins’ representation either unsupported by any facts or based on a

misapprehension of postconviction counsel’s role.46

9. Under Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion

for postconviction relief can be barred for time limitations, successive motions,

procedural default, or former adjudication.47 A motion exceeds time limitations if it

is filed more than one year after the conviction becomes final, or, if it asserts a

retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of

conviction is final, more than one year after the right was first recognized by the

Supreme Court of Delaware or the United States Supreme Court.48 A second or

subsequent motion is considered successive and therefore barred and subject to

summary dismissal unless the movant was convicted after a trial and “pleads with

particularity that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the movant

is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he was

convicted” or “pleads with particularity a claim that a new rule of constitutional law,

made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court

or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the movant's case and renders the

45 Id. at 13. 46 Id. at 13-16. 47 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i). 48 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 9 conviction ... invalid.”49 Grounds for relief “not asserted in the proceedings leading

to the judgment of conviction” are barred as procedurally defaulted unless the

movant can show “cause for relief” and “prejudice from [the] violation.”50 Grounds

for relief formerly adjudicated in the case, including “proceedings leading to the

judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a post-conviction proceeding, or in a federal

habeas corpus hearing” are barred.51 The bars to relief do not apply either to a claim

that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a claim that pleads with particularity that new

evidence exists that creates a strong inference of actual innocence,52

10. To prove a claim that newly discovered evidence exists that creates a

strong inference of actual innocence, a petitioner must show “the evidence (a) will

probably change the result if a new trial is granted; (b) was discovered since the trial

and could not have been discovered before by the exercise of due diligence; and (c)

is not merely cumulative or impeaching.”53 Satisfying the actual innocence test is a

heavy burden and such claims are rare.54 Furthermore, to prove “[i]nnocence of the

‘acts underlying the charges’ requires ‘more than innocence of intent; it requires

49 Super. Ct. Crim R. 61(i)(2); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2). 50 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 51 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 52 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). 53 Taylor v. State, 180 A.3d 41 (Del. 2018) (citing Downes v. State, 771 A.2d 289, 291 (Del. 2001). 54 Purnell v. State, 254 A.3d 1053, 1100 (Del. 2021). 10 new evidence that a person other than the petitioner committed the crime.’” 55 The

Delaware Supreme Court also held in Purnell v. State that “a body of new evidence

that goes only to the weight or credibility of that which was presented to the jury is

almost never adequate to meet the demanding bar for being granted a new trial.”56

Attacking a witness’s credibility in general will not be sufficient to satisfy the

actual innocence standard.57

11. Before addressing the merits of a defendant’s motion for postconviction

relief, the Court must first apply the procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal

Rule 61(i).58 If a procedural bar exists, then the Court will not consider the merits of

the postconviction claim.59

12. Since this motion is Daniels’ third motion for postconviction relief filed

many years after his conviction became final, it is barred as repetitive and untimely

unless he can overcome those bars to relief. Daniels attempts to do just that by

pleading that newly discovered evidence exists that creates a strong inference that

he is innocent in fact of the charges. Of the two grounds for relief advanced in

Daniels pro se PCR Motion only one claim need be considered on the merits. That

claim relates to Price’s new version of events. The second claim that his medical

55 Id. at 1095 (citing State v. Taylor, 2018 WL 3199537, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. June 28, 2018), aff'd, 206 A.3d 825 (Del. 2019)). 56 Id. at 1098. 57 Id. 58 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 59 Id. 11 records constitute newly discovered evidence fails because the records are not

newly discovered, having been in his attorneys file before trial. Further, the

records themselves would have been insufficient, if introduced at trial, to have

probably altered the outcome of the trial. The Court finds this claim is barred.

13. The Court turns then to the only remaining claim. It finds that Daniels

has failed to meet his heavy burden to satisfy the actual innocence test. The

testimony of Leon Price most assuredly would not change the result of a new trial

if one were granted. Not only are Price’s recent statements inconsistent with his

original version of events in 2001, but they are inconsistent with each other with

respect to his relationship with Daniels and Daniels’ location at the time of the

murder. They also are contradicted by other witnesses who place Daniels at the

scene of the murder using a Glock handgun to shoot the victim. Those witnesses

are corroborated by the physical evidence of a freshly smoked cigarette with both

Price’s and Daniels’ DNA on it.

14. Finally, Daniels’ response to the Motion to Withdraw fails to contest

Mr. Collins conclusions regarding his claims in any meaningful way. Nor does he

support his allegations that Mr. Collins was ineffective and/or conflicted with any

specific arguments that Mr. Collins should have made on his behalf or facts

supporting his allegations of a conflict of interest.

15. Accordingly, having carefully reviewed the record itself, the Court

12 concurs with Mr. Collins that Daniels postconviction claims are wholly without

merit such that he could not ethically advocate them. It also declines Daniels’

invitation to appoint new postconviction counsel as that request is similarly

without merit.

THEREFORE, the reasons stated above Jamel Daniels’ Motion for

Postconviction Relief is DENIED. Patrick J. Collins’ Motion to Withdraw as

Counsel is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Ferris W. Wharton Ferris W. Wharton, J.